AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                       Application No. 30059/96

                       by Jan Pieter DE KOK

                       against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 26 February 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, President

           MM.   J.-C. GEUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 15 November 1995

by Jan Pieter DE KOK against the Netherlands and registered on

5 February 1996 under file No. 30059/96;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Dutch national, born in 1952, and resides in

Rotterdam. He states to be a classical homeopathic and iatrosophical

doctor. In the proceedings before the Commission, he is represented by

Mr P.J. de Bruin, a lawyer practising in Rotterdam.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

     On 9 October 1987, Daisy was born. Shortly after her birth, she

started to suffer from respiration and feeding problems. At that time,

Daisy and her mother were medically followed by the homeopathic doctor

Ms M.D., whom the applicant supervised and who worked according to the

applicant's principles and methodology. For personal health reasons Ms

M.D. transferred these two patients to Mr O.J., another doctor

supervised by the applicant. Between 1 and 25 January 1988 there were

a number of contacts by telephone between Daisy's mother and/or her

mother, who sought guidance, and the applicant. The applicant billed

them for these telephone consultations.

     On 9 February 1988, Daisy was admitted to hospital. It appeared

that she was suffering from a growing tumour in the trachea.

     On the basis of several complaints submitted to the Inspector of

Public Health (Inspecteur van de Volksgezondheid) for the province of

North-Holland about unauthorised practising of medicine by the

applicant, the Dutch investigating authorities requested the police to

open an investigation.

     The applicant was present when, on 24 June 1988, the police

arrested Ms M.D. in connection with her treatment of Daisy. At that

point in time, the applicant was briefly questioned by police officer

L. in the presence of Ms M.D. On 12 August 1988, after having been

cautioned, the applicant was interrogated at the Hague police office

about Daisy's treatment.

     On 18 August 1988, the police transmitted the results of its

investigation of the case concerning Daisy to the prosecution

authorities. No criminal or disciplinary proceedings were brought

against Ms M.D.

     As from March 1990, the applicant treated Ms R. prescribing her

homeopathic medication. On 15 March 1990, upon the request of her

husband, Mr R.,  Ms R. was examined by Mr P., a medical specialist in

the R. hospital. He diagnosed a double-sided pneumonia and an

inflammation of the middle ear and advised admission to hospital and

treatment with antibiotics, which she refused.

     On 19 April 1990, both the applicant and Mr O.J., examined Ms R.

As her situation did not improve, they sought the assistance of Mr P.

who was only prepared to assist in having Ms R. admitted to hospital.

Shortly after, Ms R. was taken to hospital, where she was diagnosed as

suffering from pneumonia in an advanced stage and a virulent infection

in both ears. When she was released from hospital on 8 June 1990, 30%

of her lung capacity and 40% of the hearing capacity of her left ear

had been irreparably lost.

     By letter of 1 May 1990, Mr R. requested the public prosecution

department of The Hague to start criminal proceedings against the

applicant. On the basis of this request, the prosecution department

ordered the police to investigate the matter.

     On 26 June 1990, the applicant was arrested and detained on

remand. He was released on 29 June 1990. On the same day a preliminary

judicial investigation (gerechtelijk vooronderzoek) was opened against

the applicant in connection with the events concerning Ms R. and Daisy.

     On 5 June 1991, the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris)

appointed the general practitioner Mr B. as a medical expert. The

applicant filed an objection against this appointment on 13 June 1991.

Following a hearing on 8 July 1991, the Regional Court

(Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague, meeting in chambers

(raadkamer), rejected this objection on 18 July 1991. Mr B. submitted

his report to the investigating judge on 22 June 1991.

     On 10 September 1991, the preliminary investigation against the

applicant in respect of the events concerning Ms R. and Daisy was

closed. A notification of prosecution (kennisgeving van verdere

vervolging) as regards these facts was served on the applicant on 24

September 1991.

     By summons of 5 November 1991, the applicant was ordered to

appear on 21 February 1992 before the Regional Court

(Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague on two separate sets of charges

of having inflicted serious bodily harm, one set of charges relating

to Ms R. and one set of charges to Daisy.

     On 21 February 1992, a hearing was held before the Regional

Court. The applicant's lawyer was absent. The applicant was present,

but, after having submitted a written statement to the court, left

before the prosecution had presented the case.

     The Regional Court rejected the written request of the defence

to adjourn the proceedings in order to examine the minutes (processen-

verbaal) of the police. The Regional Court found it established that

the defence had been aware of the contents of these minutes already on

14 June 1991 and that, given the lapse of time between the notification

of prosecution and the first hearing, the defence had had sufficient

time to prepare the case.

     The prosecution requested the Regional Court to be allowed to

amend the charges against the applicant. The Regional Court granted the

request and decided to adjourn its further examination until 1 May 1992

in order to serve the amended charges on the applicant.

     On 1 May 1992, the Regional Court resumed the proceedings against

the applicant. Both the applicant and his lawyer were present. After

the parties' pleadings, the Regional Court closed its investigation.

     By judgment of 15 May 1992, the Regional Court of The Hague

acquitted the applicant of the charges involving Daisy, convicted him

of participation in the causing of serious bodily harm (medeplegen van

zware mishandeling) as regards Ms R. and sentenced him to two years'

imprisonment under deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention.

The Regional Court further granted the prosecution's request to take

the applicant in immediate detention (onmiddellijke gevangenneming),

holding that, given the applicant's statement that he would continue

to practise medicine according to his own principles, there was a

serious possibility that the applicant would repeat the commission of

offences of which he had been convicted. The applicant filed an appeal

with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.

     On 25 May 1992, the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to

order his release from pre-trial detention. The Court of Appeal meeting

in chambers ordered the applicant's release on 2 June 1992.

     On 21 June 1993, a first hearing on the applicant's appeal

against the judgment of 15 May 1992 took place before the Court of

Appeal. The defence requested the Court of Appeal to hear eight

witnesses in public proceedings. After having deliberated the Court of

Appeal decided to adjourn the proceedings until 23 September 1993 in

order to hear four witnesses to be selected by the defence. The defence

opted for the first four witnesses on their list, namely Mr R., Ms R.,

Mr P. and Mr B. Insofar as the defence requested the Court of Appeal

to record the statements of these witnesses word for word, the court

held that minutes of the court hearings would be drafted by the

President and the Registrar in accordance with the law.

     On 13 September 1993, the Court of Appeal heard the applicant and

the four witnesses selected by the defence.

     At that hearing the applicant stated to the Court of Appeal,

inter alia, that he had founded and was the director of the Collegium

Iatrosophicum. He further stated that he practised medicine on the

basis of iatrosophical principles and that he prescribed self-prepared

medications. He also stated that he had not followed any medical or

pharmaceutical training, but was self-taught. He further stated that,

in the context of his practice, he co-operated with conventional

doctors, that such doctors who wish to work on the basis of

iatrosophical principles first receive a training with him and that

afterwards they work under his supervision. He confirmed that he had

supervised both Ms M.D. and Mr O.J.

     After the applicant, the Court of Appeal heard Mr P. as a

witness. The applicant wished to question Mr P. in person on the basis

of a list of questions. He submitted this list to the court following

the court's request. After having examined the list of questions in

chambers, the Court of Appeal informed the applicant that, on the basis

of Article 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van

Strafvordering), it would prevent ex officio that insinuating,

suggestive, irrelevant and/or unnecessarily harmful questions be put

to the witness. Of the initial total of 119 questions of the defence,

30 were accepted by the Court of Appeal and, with the consent of the

defence, put to this witness by a member of the court on behalf of the

defence.

     The applicant objected that the Court of Appeal had prevented him

from putting a part of his written questions to the witness and

informed the court that he had prepared written questions for each

witness to be heard in the proceedings and thus also for the next

witness. The Court of Appeal also examined the list of questions for

the next witness Ms R. The court stated again that it would prevent ex

officio that insinuating, suggestive, irrelevant and/or unnecessarily

harmful questions be put to this witness. Of the initial total of 149

questions of the defence, 42 were accepted by the Court of Appeal and,

with the consent of the defence, put to this witness by a member of the

court on behalf of the defence.

     The same procedure was followed when the witness Mr B., a medical

specialist who had examined Ms R. after her admission to hospital, was

heard before the Court of Appeal. Of the initial total of 144 questions

of the defence, 63 were accepted by the Court of Appeal and, with the

consent of the defence, put to this witness by a member of the court

on behalf of the defence.

     The next witness, Mr R., was heard before the Court of Appeal

according to the same procedure. Of the initial total of 200 questions

of the defence, 59 questions were accepted by the Court of Appeal and,

with the consent of the defence, put to this witness by a member of the

court of behalf of the defence.

     After the hearing of these witnesses, the defence requested the

Court of Appeal to hear five other witnesses, i.e. Mr O.J., Mr B., Mr

L., Mr E.V. and Mr D. After having deliberated, the court accepted to

hear three of the proposed witnesses. It rejected the request to hear

police officer L. The Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had

stated before the court that he maintained the statement he had made

to Mr L. as recorded in the minutes (proces-verbaal) No. 35285/1988 of

the police. As the defence had stated in support of its request to hear

Mr L., that it sought to question him on the reasons why the applicant

had refused to sign these minutes, the Court of Appeal found a hearing

of Mr L. on this point not necessary or relevant for its examination

of the substance of the applicant's case.

     The Court of Appeal rejected the request to hear Mr D. as it had

already agreed to hear Mr B. The court noted that, in the context of

the preliminary judicial investigation, Mr B. had already submitted a

reasoned written report. As the defence had not indicated why two

expert-witnesses should be heard before the court, on which points the

defence disagreed with Mr B. or why Mr D. would be more of an expert

than the expert Mr B., the Court of Appeal did not find that the

refusal to hear Mr D. would harm the applicant in his defence.

     On 13 December 1993, the Court of Appeal heard Mr O.J. as a

witness. The President of the court informed Mr O.J. that Mr and Ms R.

had informed the Court of Appeal that they did not give permission to

render their medical data public. The applicant himself wished to

question Mr O.J. before the court. The applicant stated he would

question Mr O.J. on the basis of a previously prepared list with

written questions and requested the court to be allowed to submit his

written description of Ms R.'s clinical picture which was to be used

in his questioning. After having examined this document and the list

of questions in chambers, the Court of Appeal informed the applicant

that, on the basis of Article 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Wetboek van Strafvordering), it would prevent ex officio that

insinuating, suggestive, irrelevant and/or unnecessarily harmful

questions be put to the witness. On that basis the Court of Appeal

excluded the applicant's description of Ms R.'s clinical picture as

subject of the questions to be asked. Of the initial total of 91

questions, 83 relating to both Ms R. and Daisy were accepted by the

Court of Appeal and, with the consent of the defence, put to this

witness by a member of the court on behalf of the defence.

     The Court of Appeal further heard Mr E.V., the paediatrician who

had treated Daisey after her admission to hospital. On the basis of a

list with written questions, 77 questions were put to this witness,

with the consent of the defence, by a member of the court on behalf of

the defence.

     The court further heard Mr B., the expert who had submitted a

report to the investigating judge on 22 June 1991. The applicant again

requested the Court of Appeal to be allowed to submit his description

in writing of Ms R.'s clinical picture which was to be used in his

questioning of Mr B.

     The court rejected the request finding, inter alia, that this

description contained intimate and medical information about Ms R.,

whilst she had not given permission to render this information public.

     The applicant informed the Court of Appeal that he would question

Mr B. on the basis of a previously drafted list of questions. The Court

requested the applicant to submit this list and, after having examined

the list in chambers, again informed the applicant that on the basis

of Article 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would prevent ex

officio that insinuating, suggestive, irrelevant and/or unnecessarily

harmful questions be put. Of an initial total of 116 questions, 104

were allowed by the Court of Appeal and, with the consent of the

defence, put to this witness by a member of the court on behalf of the

defence.

     After having rejected a request by the defence to show the Court

of Appeal a video tape of 78 minutes on which several wrongs in

conventional medicine have been documented for lack of relevance, the

court adjourned its further proceedings until 18 April 1994.

     On 7 March 1994, the public prosecutor addressed the following

letter to the applicant's lawyer:

(translation)

           "On 18 April 1994 the case of (the applicant) will be heard

     again.

           In the course of the previous hearing(s) of the case I had

     to observe that your client wished to put a large number of

     questions, I presume with your consent, to the witnesses heard

     so far concerning the private life of Mr R., whereas in my

     opinion these questions were irrelevant to the facts (with which

     your client has been charged).

           I find it hard to avoid the impression that the main

     intention of this was to harm the complainant (aangever) R. These

     questions have therefore justly not been allowed by the Court of

     Appeal.

           I warn you that I shall seriously object when similar

     remarks which have no bearing on the facts (with which your

     client has been charged) will be made by you in the course of

     your pleadings, whereby I do not exclude that Mr R. will file a

     complaint for criminal libel or slander against you.

           A copy of this letter will be transmitted to the President

     of the Court of Appeal and Mr R."

     On 18 April 1994, the final pleadings took place before the Court

of Appeal. The applicant's lawyer submitted the comments of the defence

on the hearings before the Court of Appeal and referred to comments on

the minutes of the hearings in the applicant's case previously

submitted by the defence to the Court of Appeal. The defence

complained, inter alia, that the prosecutor's letter of 7 March 1994

constituted an unacceptable interference with the exercise of the

rights of the defence, that the Court of Appeal, in particular its

President, had unjustly restricted the exercise of the applicant's

rights of defence and that the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable

time.

     After the applicant's lawyer had completed his final pleadings,

the President of the Court of Appeal asked him whether the remarks made

by him in respect of the Court of Appeal were to be considered as a

formal challenge (wraking) of the court in the person of its President.

After consultation with his lawyer, the applicant informed the court

that he did not wish to challenge the court in the person of its

President. After the applicant's final statement, the Court of Appeal

closed its investigation.

     In its judgment of 2 May 1994, the Court of Appeal of The Hague

quashed the judgment of 15 May 1992 of the Regional Court, convicted

the applicant of having caused serious bodily harm (zware mishandeling)

as regards Ms R. and of participation in the causing of serious bodily

harm (medepleging van zware mishandeling) as regards Daisy and

sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment with deduction of the time

spent in pre-trial detention and eight months of which were suspended

during a probation period of two years.

     As regards the objections of the defence against the amendment

of the charges in the proceedings in first instance, the Court of

Appeal found that this amendment had been lawfully made. Insofar as the

applicant argued that the prosecution should be declared inadmissible

on the basis of the prosecutor's letter of 7 March 1994 to the

applicant's lawyer, the Court of Appeal considered that, although it

found the contents of the letter not very suitable, the letter only

contained a warning to the lawyer to refrain from harmful remarks

towards Mr R. The court did not find that this warning constituted a

restriction of the applicant's defence or a personal threat against the

lawyer in the exercise of his profession. The court further noted that

the applicant's lawyer, at the hearing of 18 April 1994, had amply and

without any restriction availed himself of the possibility to submit

whatever was useful for the applicant's defence.

     Insofar as the applicant argued that, as regards the facts

concerning Daisy, the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time, the

Court of Appeal held that, although the delay between the applicant's

first questioning on 12 August 1988 and the opening of the preliminary

judicial investigation on 29 May 1990 was undesirably long, it was not

of such a nature that the prosecution should be declared inadmissible

on the basis that the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time.

Insofar as the applicant alleged that he had already been questioned

in connection with the facts at issue in April 1988, the Court of

Appeal found no factual basis for this allegation.

     As regards the defence's various objections as regards the

fairness of the proceedings on appeal, the Court of Appeal held, inter

alia, that pursuant to Article 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

it was competent to prevent the putting of questions previously

submitted and thus known to the court, that the fact that a member of

the court had put the questions allowed by the court to the respective

witnesses on behalf of the defence had taken place with the consent of

the applicant and his lawyer, that the witnesses had been heard in

accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal

Procedure and that it had not been made plausible that the veracity of

their statements had been influenced by previous knowledge about the

course of affairs at the hearings.

     As regards the argument of the defence that the way the court had

conducted the proceedings on appeal was contrary to Article 6 of the

Convention, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had not

availed himself of the possibility to challenge the Court of Appeal and

that no facts or circumstances had appeared which should lead to the

conclusion that a full new hearing on appeal should take place as the

principles of a fair trial had been violated.

     As regards the sentence to be imposed, the Court of Appeal

considered that an unconditional prison sentence of two years would in

principle be appropriate. However, in view of the fact that the

personal attitude of Ms R., as a follower of the applicant, had played

a part in the creation of the situation and in view of the lapse of

time in the case concerning Daisy, the Court of Appeal decided that

part of the sentence should be conditional.

     The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court

(Hoge Raad), submitting 16 complaints in cassation. The Supreme Court

examined the appeal on 11 October 1994.

     On 24 January 1995, the Advocate-General to the Supreme Court

submitted his conclusions, to which the applicant replied on 5 March

1995.     On 16 May 1995, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal

in cassation. Insofar as the applicant complained that the Court of

Appeal could not be regarded as impartial, the Supreme Court found that

the applicant could have challenged the Court of Appeal judges, but

noted that the applicant had explicitly refused to do so. The Supreme

Court found no grounds on the basis of which the applicant's fear that

the Court of Appeal was biased could be regarded as objectively

justified.

     Insofar as the applicant complained that the proceedings had

exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention and that therefore the prosecution should be declared

inadmissible, the Supreme Court upheld the reasoning of the Court of

Appeal. It further did not find that the delay between the introduction

of the appeal in cassation and the first hearing in the cassation

proceedings should lead to the inadmissibility of the prosecution.

     The Supreme Court further rejected two complaints relating to

factual findings of the Court of Appeal. Referring to Article 101a of

the Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie), the

Supreme Court rejected the remainder of the applicant's appeal in

cassation as not prompting a determination of legal issues in the

interest of legal unity and legal development.

     Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act reads:

(translation)

     "If the Supreme Court considers that a complaint submitted cannot

     lead to cassation and does not prompt a determination of legal

     issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development, it

     can limit itself to this finding when giving the reasons of its

     decision on that point."

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant submits a number of complaints that the criminal

proceedings against him were not in conformity with the requirements

of Article 6 of the Convention.

1.   The applicant complains that he was deprived of a fair trial in

that the Court of Appeal limited the exercise of his defence rights by

not allowing the defence to put certain questions to some of the

witnesses, by not allowing him to seek further clarifications on

specific points, by changing questions to witnesses, by taking certain

witnesses into protection and by not allowing the defence to

demonstrate the mendacity of statements made before the police by

witnesses also heard before the court.

2.   The applicant complains of the way in which the President of the

Court of Appeal conducted the hearings held on 13 September and

13 December 1993 in that he interfered in the way in which the defence

questioned witnesses and could, therefore, not be regarded as being

impartial. The applicant submits that the President clearly appeared

to be biased.

3.   The applicant complains that he was tried by a judicial body

lacking the required knowledge of classical homeopathy and conventional

medicine.

4.   The applicant complains that the medical specialists B. and V.,

who had been appointed by the Court of Appeal, lacked the required

independence, as both had interests in the proceedings. It was

important for Mr B. to conceal the mistakes which had been made in the

hospital and it was important for Mr V. to conceal the real course of

events in the treatment of Daisy.

5.   The applicant complains that the Court of Appeal rejected his

request to appoint Mr D. as a classical homeopathic expert and his

request to hear police officer L. as a witness.

6.   The applicant complains that the prosecution influenced the way

the defence in his case was conducted by threatening his lawyer with

criminal proceedings in case the defence would not comply with the

indications given by the prosecution.

7.   The applicant complains that the contents of the minutes of the

questioning by the police and minutes of the respective court hearings

in his case are not reliable in that these minutes do not contain a

verbatim reproduction of what has been said on those occasions, whereas

these minutes have been used in evidence.

8.   The applicant complains that the proceedings in respect of both

Daisy and Ms R. exceeded a reasonable time.

9.   The applicant complains that it was only at the first court

hearing of his case that the prosecution modified the charges against

him by referring to the fact that he was a medical practitioner whereas

this was known as from the outset of the criminal proceedings against

him.

10.  The applicant complains under Article 14 of the Convention in

conjunction with Article 6 para. 3(d) of the Convention that the Dutch

courts rejected his argument that there had been an emergency

situation. He submits that he has not been sufficiently allowed to

question witnesses and experts on this point and considers that he has

been discriminated against for being a iatrosophic in that he was

convicted and in that such a high sentence was imposed.

11.  The applicant finally complains that the Supreme Court rejected

a number of his complaints in cassation under Article 101a of the

Judicial Organisation Act without giving any substantial reasoning for

its rejection.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant submits a number of complaints that the criminal

proceedings against him were not in conformity with the requirements

of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as

follows:

     "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

     him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a

     reasonable time by an ... impartial tribunal established by

     law....

     2.    ....

     3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

     minimum rights:

     ....

           b.    to have adequate time and facilities for the

     preparation of his defence;

           c.    to defend himself in person or through legal

     assistance of his own choosing ...;

           d.    to examine or have examined witnesses against him and

     to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his

     behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

     ...."

2.   The applicant complains that it was only at the first court

hearing of his case that the prosecution modified the charges against

him by referring to the fact that he was a medical practitioner whereas

this was known as from the outset of the criminal proceedings against

him.

     The Commission notes that the charges against the applicant were

amended at the outset of the proceedings in first instance and that the

Regional Court, on the basis of this amendment, decided to adjourn the

proceedings for a period of more than two months.

     In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the

applicant was harmed in the exercise of his defence rights as

guaranteed by Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   Insofar as the applicant's complaints relate to the taking and

assessment of evidence by the trial courts, the Commission recalls

that, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the

evidence before them as well as the relevance of the evidence which the

defence seeks to adduce. More specifically, Article 6 para. 3(d)

(Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention leaves it to them, again as a general

rule, to assess whether it is appropriate to call witnesses, in the

autonomous sense given to that word in the Convention system; it does

not require the attendance and examination of every witness on the

accused's behalf (cf. Eur. Court HR, Engel v. the Netherlands judgment

of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 38, para. 91; Bricmont v. Belgium

judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 158, p. 31, para. 89; and Vidal

v. Belgium judgment of 22 April 1992, Series A no. 235-B, p. 32, para.

33).

     The Commission notes that in the proceedings at issue a number

of witnesses proposed by the defence have in fact been heard before the

Court of Appeal and that the defence has been enabled to question these

witnesses, albeit that the Court of Appeal did not allow the defence

to ask certain questions which it considered to be insinuating,

suggestive, irrelevant and/or unnecessarily harmful.

     It follows from the national courts' margin of appreciation in

assessing the relevance of the evidence the defence seeks to adduce,

that they have also a margin of appreciation in controlling the

accused's questioning of such defence witnesses as are called.

     The Commission cannot find that the Court of Appeal's decisions

and the reasons given therefor not to hear certain witnesses or the way

in which it controlled the applicant's questioning of the witnesses

heard in his case deprived the applicant of a fair trial within the

meaning of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) of the Convention

or constitute an indication that this court was biased. As regards the

latter aspect the Commission finds it further relevant that the

applicant explicitly refused to challenge the Court of Appeal after his

attention had been drawn to this possibility.

     Considering that the applicant was convicted following

adversarial proceedings in which the defence has been provided with

ample opportunity to hear, question and object to witnesses and to

submit whatever it found relevant to the applicant's case, the

Commission finds no indication that the proceedings at issue, as

regards the taking of evidence, were contrary to the requirements of

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

4.   The applicant complains that he was tried by a judicial body

lacking the required knowledge of classical homeopathy and conventional

medicine.

     The Commission finds that, in criminal proceedings, the right of

access to court does not necessarily include the right to be tried by

a criminal court possessing a detailed knowledge of the particular

professional activity of the accused where the acts for which he or she

stands trial have been committed in the context of an exercise of

professional activities. It is open to criminal courts to seek the

views of professional experts, which the domestic investigative and

judicial authorities in the proceedings at issue have in fact done.

     It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.   The applicant complains that the prosecution influenced the way

the defence in his case was conducted by threatening his lawyer with

criminal proceedings in case the defence would not comply with the

indications given by the prosecution.

     The Commission has noted the contents of the letter of 7 March

1994 which the prosecutor addressed to the applicant lawyer. The

Commission further notes that the prosecutor addressed a copy of this

letter to the Court of Appeal, which considered it following a

complaint by the defence.

     The Commission finds no indication in support of the assumption

that the contents of the letter unduly restricted the applicant in the

exercise of his defence rights in the proceedings at issue. In this

respect the Commission notes that the letter at issue had been sent

after the person referred to in this letter had already been heard as

a witness before the Court of Appeal, that the warning in this letter

solely concerned this particular witness and finally that the Court of

Appeal did in fact express its criticism on the contents of the letter.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.   The applicant complains that the contents of the minutes of the

questioning by the police and minutes of the respective court hearings

in his case are not reliable in that these minutes do not contain a

verbatim reproduction of what has been said on those occasions, whereas

these minutes have been used in evidence.

     The Commission recalls that it is not competent to examine

alleged errors of fact or law committed by national courts, except

where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (cf.

No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83 p. 77).

     The Commission further recalls that, as a general rule, it is for

the national courts to assess the evidence before them (cf.

No. 22909/93, Dec. 6.9.95, D.R. 82 p. 25).

     The Commission notes that in the present case the trial court

hearings were recorded in minutes according to the provisions of the

Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. It further notes that the defence

submitted its comments on these and other minutes in the course of the

proceedings before the Court of Appeal and before this Court reached

its verdict. In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the

absence of verbatim records of the various hearings in the applicant's

case deprived the applicant of a fair hearing within the meaning of

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application must also be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

7.   Insofar as the applicant complains that the Supreme Court

rejected a number of his complaints in cassation under Article 101a of

the Judicial Organisation Act without giving any substantial reasoning

for its rejection, the Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention obliges the courts to give reasons for

their judgments, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed

answer to every argument (cf. Eur. Court HR, Ruiz Torija v. Spain

judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A, p. 12, para. 29).

     The Commission further recalls that when a State provides for an

appeal to a Supreme Court, it may prescribe the conditions and

procedure (cf. No. 12972/87, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54 p. 207) and that

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not require that a decision

whereby an appeal tribunal, basing itself on a specific legal

provision, rejects an appeal as having no chance of success be

accompanied by detailed reasons (cf. No. 8769/79, Dec. 16.7.81, D.R.

25 p. 240).

     The Commission notes that the Supreme Court, referring to Article

101a of the Judicial Organisation Act authorising this procedure,

rejected part of the applicant's complaints in cassation as not

prompting a determination of legal issues in the interest of legal

unity and legal development. The Commission cannot find this procedure

to be contrary to the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application must also be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

8.   The applicant complains under Article 14 of the Convention in

conjunction with Article 6 (Art. 14+6) of the Convention that he has

been discriminated against for being a iatrosophic in that he was

convicted and that such a high sentence was imposed.

     Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

     opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

     minority, property, birth or other status."

     The Commission finds that the facts of the case do not disclose

any discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention in respect of any right protected by the Convention.

     It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

9.   The applicant complains that the proceedings in respect of both

Daisy and Ms R. exceeded a reasonable time.

     According to the constant case-law of the Court and the

Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be

assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having

regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the

case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the competent

authorities (cf. Eur. Court HR, Kemmache v. France judgment of

27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27, para. 60). Persons held in

detention are further entitled to special diligence (cf. Eur. Court HR,

Tomasi v. France judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, p. 35,

para. 84).

     The Commission considers that the proceedings started on

12 August 1988, when the applicant was interrogated by the police in

connection with their investigation of the treatment of Daisey, and

ended on 16 May 1995, when the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's

appeal in cassation. The entire proceedings lasted thus slightly more

than six years and nine months. The Commission notes that the

applicant, apart from the period between 26 and 29 June 1990, has not

been detained in the course of the proceedings at issue.

     Insofar as the applicant complains of the delay between his

questioning on 12 August 1988 and the first hearing before the Regional

Court on 21 February 1992, the Commission notes that in the proceedings

at issue the applicant was not solely charged with facts relating to

the case of Daisy, but also with other offences relating to the facts

concerning Ms R. which occurred in March and April 1990.

     In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

relevant authorities during the period of time which elapsed between

12 August 1988 and 21 February 1992, cannot be considered as having

been totally inactive. Furthermore, having regard to the specific

circumstances of the present case and the fact that the Court of

Appeal, in view of the lapse of time in the case of Daisy, mitigated

its sentence, the Commission cannot find that this period of time

exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Boddaert v. Belgium

judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A no. 235-D).

     As regards the total length of proceedings before the courts

between 21 February 1992 and 16 May 1995, i.e. slightly less than three

years and three months in the course of which the case has been dealt

with at three levels of jurisdiction, the Commission cannot find either

that this period was unreasonably long for the purposes of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part op the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              G.H. THUNE

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber