PERSSON v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 23735/94 • ECHR ID: 001-3489
Document date: February 26, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 23735/94
by Harry PERSSON
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 26 February 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 6 May 1993 by
Harry PERSSON against Sweden and registered on 22 March 1994 under file
No. 23735/94;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government on 28 June 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by
the applicant on 29 August 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1935, resides in Luleå.
He is, since 1994, the sole owner of the real property Gautsträsk 1:16
situated within the municipality of Sorsele in the north of Sweden.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
In September 1985, the applicant reported H.F., a tenant of a
nearby summer cottage, to the police, claiming that he had illegally
constructed and cleared a road on Gautsträsk 1:16, at the time owned
by the applicant's father, and that he had, for this purpose, cut down
trees on the property. In August 1989, after the police had
investigated the matter, the applicant was informed that the case had
been closed by the chief prosecutor as there was no evidence of any
criminal offence having been committed.
In October 1989, H.F. bought part of the property Gautsträsk
1:20, on which the summer cottage was situated. On 6 December he
applied to the Real Estate Formation Authority (Fastighetsbildnings-
myndigheten - "the Authority") for a partition (avstyckning). Later,
he further requested that an easement (servitut) be established, giving
him a right to use the above road located on Gautsträsk 1:16 and five
other neighbouring properties (fastighetsreglering). After the death
of the applicant's father, Gautsträsk 1:16 was, at this time, owned by
the applicant, his mother and his two sisters.
On 31 August 1990 the Authority summoned the property owners
concerned, including the applicant, to a meeting concerning the issues
raised by H.F.'s application. The meeting was to take place at the
property bought by H.F. The date of the meeting was erroneously given
as 12 August 1990 instead of 12 September 1990. A new summons with the
correct date was allegedly sent less than a week before the meeting.
In a letter to the Authority of 5 September 1990, the owners of
Gautsträsk 1:16 opposed that H.F. should be allowed to use the road on
their property as it was unsuitable in several respects. If it was
necessary for H.F. to cross their property, they proposed that another
road be constructed at a different location north of the road used by
H.F. and that it be jointly owned and maintained by the property owners
in the area (vägsamfällighet). The applicant further submitted his own
survey of the roads in the area dated 26 February 1990. In this
survey, he claimed that the road on their property was actually a track
which had been used since the 1930's for walking and cycling and since
the 1960's by a few stray cars. On aerial photographs from the 1960's
and the 1970's the track was allegedly hardly perceptible. No major
change had occurred until the beginning of the 1980's when H.F. started
to use the road also in wintertime and cleared it from snow.
The applicant was not present at the meeting on
12 September 1990. He was, however, represented by his mother who
opposed the establishment of an easement. The other property owners
concerned approved. The Authority inspected the locus in quo (syn),
including the alternative road location proposed by the owners of
Gautsträsk 1:16.
By decision of 12 September 1990, the Authority decided to allow
the partition. It further decided that Gautsträsk 1:16 and the other
five properties in question be encumbered with an easement in
accordance with H.F.'s application. As regards the easement, the
Authority stated the following:(translation)
"An easement is established for an access road encumbering
Gautsträsk 1:16 and other properties. The easement is
established in regard to an already existing road. The
road has a suitable location on moderately broken ground.
The road is used by the owners of the agricultural
properties Gautsträsk 1:20, 1:21, 1:22, 1:13 and 1:26 as
well as the owner of a summer cottage built on the property
Gautsträsk 1:20. It is therefore not unreasonable that
also the owner of the partitioned plot, H.F., may use the
road. The alternative proposal concerning a road to the
north is inferior. The lie is more hilly and the standard
of the road is lower.
...
The easement regarding the right to use the road is
established without agreement [between the property
owners].
...
The established easements are of considerable importance as
required by Chapter 7, Section 1 of the Real Estate
Formation Act [Fastighetsbildningslagen, 1970:988].
...
No compensation has been claimed. Thus, no compensation is
to be paid."
The applicant appealed against the decision in so far as it
concerned the easement. He called into question the impartiality of
the land surveyor (förrättningslantmätare) who had conducted the
proceedings and claimed that the summons had been served too late. He
requested that a new meeting be held by a different surveyor and that
summons be served to this meeting at least two weeks in advance.
The Authority agreed with the applicant's complaint that he had
been called too late to the first meeting. On 7 November 1990 it
therefore summoned the property owners to a new meeting and declared
invalid the decisions taken on 12 September. The summons was sent to
the applicant's permanent address in Luleå. In the summons the land
surveyor declared that if there were no new circumstances he intended
to affirm the previous decisions. The second meeting was to be held
at the Land Surveyors' Office in Lycksele on 26 November 1990.
The applicant received the summons by forwarded mail on
15 November 1990 in Stockholm where he was at the time attending a
course on town and country planning. He contacted the Authority by
phone the same day and requested that the meeting be cancelled as he
was unable to attend due to his studies. In letters to the Authority
dated 19 and 25 November, he reiterated the request. He complained
that the time between serving of the summons and the meeting was
insufficient, maintaining that at least four weeks' notice should have
been given. He also criticised, inter alia, the land surveyor's
declared intention to affirm the previous decisions and the designated
location of the second meeting, 130 km away from the properties
concerned, which allegedly made it very difficult for the parties to
attend. He further maintained his position as to the unsuitability of
the road in question. The applicant's request for a cancellation
of the second meeting was rejected and the meeting was held as
scheduled by the same land surveyor. Again, the applicant was absent
but represented by his mother. The Authority decided on the same day
to allow the partition and establish the road easement. In the
decision, reference was made to the reasons stated in the decision of
12 September. The applicant and the other owners of Gautsträsk 1:16,
who had now claimed 13,000 SEK as compensation, were awarded
compensation of 50 SEK, as the encumbrance on their property was
considered to be minimal.
The applicant and the other owners of Gautsträsk 1:16 appealed
to the Real Estate Court (Fastighetsdomstolen). On 14 March 1991 the
court summoned the parties to a hearing to be held in Sorsele on
28 May 1991.
The hearing was held as scheduled. The applicant was present but
not the other owners of Gautsträsk 1:16. The owners were represented
at the hearing by a lawyer. They requested, in the first place, that
the road easement be declared null and void in so far as it concerned
their property and, in the second place, that they be awarded
compensation of 10,000 SEK. The court inspected the area but did not
view the alternative road location proposed by the appellants, although
they had requested the court to do so.
On 2 July 1991 the Real Estate Court, agreeing with the
Authority's assessments concerning the easement, upheld the appealed
decision in all respects. It noted, inter alia, that about 60 metres
of the road for which the easement had been established was located on
Gautsträsk 1:16 and that it was connected to the country road at a more
right angle than indicated on the map drawn up by the land surveyor.
The court, which was unanimous, consisted of two professional judges,
one technical expert (fastighetsråd) and two lay judges.
The applicant and the other owners of Gautsträsk 1:16 appealed
to the Court of Appeal of Upper Norrland (Hovrätten för Övre Norrland).
They requested, firstly, that the decisions of the Authority and the
Real Estate Court be quashed and the case be referred back to the
Authority for new proceedings and, secondly, that the easement
encumbering their property be declared null and void. They maintained
their position as to the merits of the case. As to the location of the
road for which the easement had been established, they recalled that
the Real Estate Court had noted that it was connected to the country
road at a right angle and not obliquely as indicated on the map drawn
up by the land surveyor and as erroneously outlined on an economic map
(ekonomisk karta).
The appellants further complained of the proceedings in the case.
They reiterated their complaints relating to the proceedings before the
Authority and further complained that the Authority had corresponded
with them by handwritten notes. With respect to the proceedings of the
Real Estate Court, they complained that it had failed to inspect the
location of the alternative road. They further called into question
the impartiality of the two lay judges of the Real Estate Court. In
1987, one of them, the head of the Forestry Board (Skogsvårdsstyrelsen)
at Sorsele, had allegedly informed the applicant's mother that he found
the road for which the easement was later established to be unnecessary
for forestry purposes. Moreover, in a letter to the appellants in
January 1990, he had expressed that he had examined the economic map
and found that the road was marked on it. The appellants therefore
claimed that, before the proceedings in the Real Estate Court, this lay
judge had expressed his opinion that the road was authorised by the
economic map. The complaints against the other lay judge concerned the
fact that she had the same family name as H.F., their opponent in the
case, and therefore might be related to him.
On 28 February 1992 the Court of Appeal, which did not hold a
hearing in the case, upheld the Real Estate Court's decision on the
merits. With respect to the procedural complaints lodged by the
appellants, the Court of Appeal first found that the summons to the
Authority's second meeting had not been served too late. The Court of
Appeal rejected also the other procedural complaints concerning the
proceedings before the Authority. As regards the proceedings before
the Real Estate Court, the Court of Appeal noted that it had been
appropriate for that court to inspect also the alternative road
location but that its failure to do so did not constitute such a
procedural error which would give reason to quash its decision and
refer the case back to it for a new examination. The complaints
concerning the participation of the lay judges in the Real Estate Court
were also rejected, as it had not been shown that there were reasons
to doubt their impartiality in the case. This latter decision was
final.
The applicant and the other owners of Gautsträsk 1:16 thereafter
appealed to the Supreme Court which, however, refused them leave to
appeal on 10 November 1992.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that he did not have a fair hearing in
accordance with Article 6 of the Convention.
As regards the proceedings of the Real Estate Formation
Authority, he submits that the summons to the Authority's meetings were
served too late and that the second meeting on 26 November 1990 was
held at a location which made it impossible for him to attend.
He also contends that the proceedings before the Real Estate
Court were unfair and that the court was not impartial. He refers to
the court's failure to inspect the alternative road location proposed
by the owners of Gautsträsk 1:16 and the participation of the two lay
judges in the court's examination of the case. Furthermore, the
minutes of the court's hearing were allegedly incomplete and the
chairman of the court behaved brusquely towards the lawyer representing
the owners of Gautsträsk 1:16.
2. The applicant further claims that the decisions taken by the
Authority and the courts in his case were not in accordance with the
provisions of the Real Estate Formation Act and thus unlawful. He
contends that the road for which the easement was established was
unsuitable and inferior to the proposed alternative road. Moreover,
the easement was not of considerable importance to H.F.'s property.
It also created environmental damage on Gautsträsk 1:16. In this
connection, the applicant asserts that land surveyors have been given
almost unlimited powers to take arbitrary decisions affecting the
individual's rights. He invokes Article 6 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
3. Further under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant claims
that the police and the public prosecutor failed to properly consider
his complaints concerning the measures undertaken by H.F. on
Gautsträsk 1:16.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 6 May 1993 and registered on
22 March 1994.
On 12 April 1996 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to
communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to
Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure. The Government were
asked to deal with the questions whether the applicant had a fair
hearing given the fact that the Real Estate Court did not inspect the
alternative road location and whether the participation of the head of
the Forestry Board at Sorsele as lay judge in that court gave rise to
doubts as to the court's impartiality.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
28 June 1996 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that
purpose. The applicant replied on 29 August 1996.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that he did not have a fair hearing in
accordance with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
As regards the proceedings of the Real Estate Formation
Authority, he submits that the summons to the Authority's meetings were
served too late and that the second meeting on 26 November 1990 was
held at a location which made it impossible for him to attend.
He also contends that the proceedings before the Real Estate
Court were unfair and that the court was not impartial. He refers to
the court's failure to inspect the alternative road location proposed
by the owners of Gautsträsk 1:16 and the participation of the two lay
judges in the court's examination of the case. Furthermore, the
minutes of the court's hearing were allegedly incomplete and the
chairman of the court behaved brusquely towards the lawyer representing
the owners of Gautsträsk 1:16.
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention reads, in relevant parts,
as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone
is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an ... impartial
tribunal ..."
The respondent Government maintain that the complaint is
manifestly ill-founded. As regards the Real Estate Court's failure to
inspect the alternative road location, they submit that the decision
whether to hold an inspection must be left to the discretion of the
national courts, which are better equipped to assess the necessity
thereof. Only in exceptional circumstances could a national court's
decision in this respect be considered as a violation of Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention. The Government refer in this connection
to the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights with
regard to the admittance of evidence. With respect to the present
case, the Government state that the minutes of the proceedings of the
Real Estate Formation Authority, which contained notes regarding the
alternative road location, was available to the Real Estate Court and
formed part of the basis for its judgment in the case. Thus, as the
relevant information was available, that court did not find it
necessary to inspect the alternative road location. According to the
Government, there are no exceptional circumstances in the case that
could warrant the conclusion that this decision fell outside the
court's discretion.
As regards the Real Estate Court's alleged impartiality, the
Government maintain that the statements made by the lay judge employed
by the Forestry Board concerned mere facts and had no bearing on
whether or not the easement should be established on the road in
question. The statements were not such as to undermine confidence in
the impartiality of that lay judge. The applicant's fears in this
respect were not objectively justified.
The applicant submits that the failure of the Real Estate Court
to inspect the alternative road location was a serious mistake which
affected the outcome of the case, as it had been very difficult for the
applicant and other land owners to communicate with the Real Estate
Formation Authority and discuss the alternative, as the proceedings of
the court were held in a very hostile attitude and as the court might
have misunderstood which alternative was proposed by the applicant.
On the issue of impartiality, the applicant states that the lay
judge employed by the Forestry Board had given the applicant's mother
legal advice regarding the road in question. As an employee of the
Board, he should not function as a lay judge as such commitments make
the Board useless as adviser in legal matters and involve a risk of
partiality.
The Commission first notes that the dispute in the present case
concerned measures which affected the applicant's right to use his
property. The proceedings in the case thus determined the applicant's
civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention.
The Commission recalls that the Real Estate Formation Authority,
at its meeting on 12 September 1990, inspected the locus in quo,
including the alternative road location proposed by the applicant and
the other owners of Gautsträsk 1:16. The applicant was not present at
this meeting, but he was represented by his mother, at the time a co-
owner of the property. The information gathered and the conclusions
drawn by the land surveyor were available to the Real Estate Court when
it decided not to hold a further inspection of the alternative
location. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the applicant was
present at the court's hearing and that there is no indication that he
was unable to submit to the court any documentary evidence he saw fit.
In these circumstances and accepting the Government's view that
the assessment whether certain evidence is necessary for the
determination of a case is primarily a matter for the national courts,
the Commission considers that the failure of the Real Estate Court to
inspect the alternative road location did not render the proceedings
unfair.
With respect to the alleged partiality of the Real Estate Court,
the Commission notes that the lay judge employed by the Forestry Board,
before the court proceedings, had allegedly stated that he considered
the road for which the easement was later established to be unnecessary
for forestry purposes and that he had found that the road in question
was marked on an economic map.
However, the easement was not established for forestry purposes.
Furthermore, it appears undisputed that the road was marked on the
economic map as the applicant, in his appeal to the Court of Appeal,
claimed that it was erroneously outlined on that map. The Commission
therefore considers that there were no objectively justified reasons
to doubt the impartiality of this lay judge. With respect to the
applicant's other complaints in regard to the proceedings in the case,
the Commission finds that they do not reveal any appearance of a
violation of the applicant's rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant further claims that the decisions taken by the
Authority and the courts in his case were not in accordance with the
provisions of the Real Estate Formation Act and thus unlawful. He
contends that the road for which the easement was established was
unsuitable and inferior to the proposed alternative road. Moreover,
the easement was not of considerable importance to H.F.'s property.
It also created environmental damage on Gautsträsk 1:16. In this
connection, the applicant asserts that land surveyors have been given
almost unlimited powers to take arbitrary decisions affecting the
individual's rights. He invokes Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.
As to the applicant's complaint that the decisions taken by the
Authority and the courts in his case were not in accordance with the
applicable legal provisions and thus unlawful, the Commission recalls
that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its
only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by
the Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not competent to
deal with a complaint concerning errors of law or fact allegedly
committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such
errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. The Commission
refers, on this point, to its established case-law (cf., e.g., No.
10153/82, Z. and E. v. Austria, Dec. 13.10.86, D.R. 49 p. 67, and No.
12013/86, Alberti v. Italy, Dec. 10.3.89, D.R. 59 p. 100).
The applicant also complains, however, that the establishment of
the easement violated his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
(P1-1) which provides the following:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
In this respect, the Commission first notes that the applicant
was not deprived of his possessions as a result of the decisions taken
in his case. However, the decisions constituted a measure of
controlling the use of his property falling under the second paragraph
of the above provision. Such a measure is permissible in the general
interest if there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim pursued. In striking a fair
balance between the general interest of the community and the
requirement of protection of the individual's fundamental rights, the
authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (cf. Eur. Court HR,
Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A
no. 163, p. 17, para. 55). In the present case, the Commission recalls
the Real Estate Formation Authority's decision of 26 November 1990,
upheld on appeal, according to which the established easement was of
considerable importance and the road in question was used by several
properties in the area. The Authority further considered that the
alternative road location was inferior. The Commission, therefore
finds that the establishment of the easement was in the general
interest within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). Moreover, as the road was used by several
properties in the area, the encroachment on the applicant's property
resulting from the easement established for the benefit of the plot
bought by H.F. must be considered minimal. In these circumstances and
having regard to the above-mentioned margin of appreciation, the
Commission does not consider the relevant decisions, including the
award of compensation, to be disproportionate to the requirements of
the general interest.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. Further under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the applicant
claims that the police and the public prosecutor failed to properly
consider his complaints concerning the measures undertaken by H.F. on
Gautsträsk 1:16.
Noting that the applicant was informed in August 1989 of the
chief prosecutor's decision to close the investigation of the matter
and that, thus, this complaint has in any event been lodged after the
expiration of the time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, the Commission recalls that there is no right under the
Convention to have criminal investigations or proceedings instituted
against other persons.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber