AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 21842/93

                      by George KEMPERS

                      against Austria

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 27 February 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 16 April 1993 by

George KEMPERS against Austria and registered on 13 May 1993 under file

No. 21842/93;

      Having regard to:

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

      the Commission;

-     the Commission's decision of 6 September 1995 to declare the

      application partly inadmissible and to communicate the remainder

      of the application to the respondent Government for observations

      on its admissibility and merits;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

      28 November 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the

      applicant on 22 January 1996;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Dutch national born in 1949, who is currently

detained in Austria at Karlau prison.  Before the Commission he is

represented by Mr. F. Insam, a lawyer practising in Graz.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

      On 30 April 1991 the applicant was arrested in Graz on suspicion

of having committed offences against the Drug Offences Act

(Suchtgiftgesetz).  C.S., H.A. and I.H. were arrested at the same time

as co-suspects.

      On 3 May 1991 the Investigating Judge at the Graz Regional Court

(Landesgericht) heard the applicant and ordered the institution of pre-

trial investigations (Voruntersuchung) against him.  The applicant

admitted that he had tried to sell 5 kg Cocaine in Graz on

30 April 1991 together with his co-suspects.  He also admitted a

previous drug transaction which had taken place in Aachen (Germany) in

the beginning of April 1991.

      On the same day the Investigating Judge ordered that the

applicant be taken into detention on remand.  The Investigating Judge

found that there was a danger of collusion, a danger that he might

commit offences and a danger of the applicant's absconding.  Pursuant

to Section 45 para. 3 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Strafprozeßordnung) the applicant's contact with his defence counsel

took place under the surveillance of the Investigating Judge for a

period of 14 days after the order of detention on remand as the order

had been based on the ground inter alia of the danger of collusion.

      On 14 May 1991 the Investigating Judge extended the surveillance

of the applicant's contact with his defence counsel, pursuant to

Section 45 para. 3 (2) Code of Criminal Procedure, until service of the

bill of indictment on the applicant.  The Investigating Judge found

this measure necessary because the applicant was suspected of being a

member of a gang of drug traffickers, further members of the gang had

not yet been discovered and the applicant had made contradictory

statements.  Thus, contacts between the applicant and his defence

counsel could prejudice the further investigations, a considerable part

of which had to be undertaken outside Austria.  The applicant appealed

against this decision.

      On 29 May 1991 the Judges' Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Graz

Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal.  It found that the

order of the Investigating Judge did not involve any criticism of the

defence counsel or any reproach against him of conduct contrary to law

or the disciplinary rules of members of the bar, but merely had the

purpose of preventing any contact whatsoever with third persons in

order not to endanger the success of the criminal investigations.  The

applicant was suspected of drug trafficking on a large scale as a

member of a gang which was active in several European States and some

members were still at large.  In such circumstances the police

investigations had to be conducted with utmost care and even the

slightest possibility of collusion had to be prevented.

      On 3 June 1991 R.M., V.B. and T.M. were arrested by the police

when they attempted to sell drugs in Bregenz. These persons were

suspected of being members of the same gang as the applicant.

      On 29 June 1991 the period of two months under Section 193 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure for which detention on remand based solely

on the risk of collusion might last elapsed.

      On 6 August 1991 the Graz Public Prosecutor's Office preferred

a bill of indictment charging the applicant and C.S., J.S., H.A., I.H.,

R.M., V.B and T.M. with drug trafficking.  On 8 August 1991 the bill

of indictment was served on the applicant.

      On 16 September 1991 the Graz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)

dismissed the applicant's objections against the bill of indictment.

      On 8 November 1991 the Graz Court of Appeal, following a request

by the Regional Court, authorised the applicant's detention on remand

for a maximum duration of 9 months, on the ground that there was a risk

of absconding and that the applicant might commit offences of the kind

he was suspected of (Tatbegehrungsgefahr).

      On 15 January 1992 the trial against the applicant and the

co-accused took place before the Graz Regional Court.  At the trial the

applicant admitted the facts as regards the drug transaction in

April 1991 in Graz, but pleaded not guilty and submitted that he had

been incited to the drug deal by undercover agents acting on behalf of

the Austrian State.  As regards the drug transaction in Aachen in

April 1991 the applicant stated that his submissions before the police

and the Investigating judges were wrong.  He had made them merely

because he had felt cheated by the co-accused who, after his arrest,

were still at large.

      On 16 January 1992 the Graz Regional Court convicted the

applicant under the Drug Offences Act of having, together with his

accomplices R.M., C.S. and V.B. attempted in April 1991 to sell a large

quantity of drugs in Graz and Aachen respectively.  The Court also

convicted R.M. and V.B. of a drug transaction which had taken place in

Bregenz in June 1991.  The Court sentenced the applicant to six years'

imprisonment and to a fine of 1,4 million AS or 6 months' imprisonment

in default.

      The Regional Court found that the applicant, who knew drug

suppliers in the Netherlands, had contacted R.M. in Switzerland in

December 1990.  They agreed that the applicant would procure drugs in

the Netherlands while R.M. would look for potential buyers.  In the

beginning of April 1991 the applicant sold drugs he had procured from

C.S. to R.M.  This drug transaction took place in Aachen.  R.M. brought

the drugs to Switzerland and sold them to other persons, amongst them

V.B., who also informed him about potential buyers in Graz.

Subsequently, between 22 and 27 April 1991, negotiations took place

between V.B., acting for these potential buyers, R.M., who financed the

transaction, and the applicant and C.S., who procured the drugs in the

Netherlands.  It was agreed to bring the drugs to Germany close to the

Austrian border and to meet the potential buyers in Graz on

28 April 1991.  As the potential buyers insisted that the drugs be

brought to Graz the transaction did not take place and the drugs were

sent back to the Netherlands.  After further negotiations a new meeting

in Graz was arranged for 30 April 1991.  On that day H.A. brought the

drugs by car to Graz, where also the applicant and C.S. were present.

At the meeting with the potential buyers they were arrested by the

police.  In June 1991 R.M. organised a further drug transaction with

potential buyers who V.B. had found in Bregenz.  R.M. procured the

drugs in Switzerland and hired T.M. for the transport.  On 3 June 1991,

when attempting to hand over the drugs to the presumed buyers, R.M.,

V.B. and T.M. were arrested.

      On 13 May 1992 the Graz Public Prosecutor's Office lodged an

appeal against the sentence regarding the applicant, V.B and C.S.

      On 20 May 1992 the applicant lodged a plea of nullity and an

appeal against the sentence.  He complained, inter alia, about the

surveillance of the contact with his defence counsel at the pre-trial

stage and invoked Article 6 of the Convention.

      On 16 September 1992 the Procurator General' Office commented on

the applicant's plea of nullity in the following way:

      "In the view of the Procurator General's Office, the pleas of

      nullity brought by the accused George Kempers, R.M. and V.B. meet

      the criteria for a decision pursuant to Section 285d of the Code

      of Criminal Procedure.  The transmission of a copy of the

      decision is herewith requested."

      The above submissions of the Procurator General's Office were not

served on the applicant.

      On 16 September 1992 the Supreme Court rejected the plea of

nullity.  As regards the applicant's complaint about the surveillance

of the contact with his defence counsel at the pre-trial stage, the

Supreme Court noted that the applicant in this respect relied on

provisions of the Convention, which, however, did not constitute

reasons for nullity as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

      On 21 December 1992 the Graz Court of Appeal decided on the

applicant's appeal.  It upheld the sentence as regards the term of

imprisonment and reduced the fine to 1 million AS and the imprisonment

in default to 4 months.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      The following account of the relevant provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure is based on the law as in force until 1 January 1994

when the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act

(Strafprozeßänderungs-gesetz 1993) entered into force.

      According to S. 12 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the

Judges' Chamber at the First Instance Court supervises all measures

taken by the Investigating Judge at the First Instance Court in the

course of preliminary investigations.

      According to S. 45 para. 3 a person taken into detention on

remand may meet his defence counsel in the absence of the Investigating

Judge.  However, if detention on remand has been ordered on the ground

of the danger of collusion the Investigating Judge may, during the

first 14 days of the detention, be present when the remand prisoner

meets his defence counsel.  If, based on specific circumstances, the

danger exists that the contact with the defence counsel may interfere

with evidence the Investigating Judge may order that the surveillance

of the contact with the defence counsel be extended until the bill of

indictment is served.  Surveillance of the contact with the defence

counsel may only be exercised as long as the detention on remand is

based on the danger of collusion (S. 180).

      S. 113 provides in particular that anybody affected by a decision

of the Investigating Judge or by a delay in the course of preliminary

investigations or in the proceedings after indictment, may apply for

review by the Judges' Chamber, which decides in private after having

heard the Investigating Judge and the Public Prosecutor. According to

S. 114 there is a further appeal against decisions of the Judges'

Chamber to the Court of Second Instance, if these decisions concern the

separation of proceedings, the institution or discontinuation of the

preliminary investigation, bail, or detention on remand without a

hearing concerning release having taken place.

      Under S. 180 paras. 1 and 2 a person may be held in detention on

remand if he is seriously suspected of having committed a criminal

offence and if there is a risk of his absconding, of collusion or that

the person might commit offences. According to S. 193, detention may

not last more than two months where its sole justification is the risk

of collusion; it may not last more than six months where one of the

other grounds is relied on. The Court of Appeal may, however, if so

requested by the Investigating Judge or the Public Prosecutor and if

the difficulty or the scope of the investigations makes it necessary,

extend the detention. In such cases the maximum duration of detention

is three months where the measure is based on a risk of collusion

alone, and one year, or even two years, if the term of imprisonment

which the suspect risks is ten years or more, in the other

circumstances provided for.

      By virtue of SS. 194 and 195, it is open to the suspect to apply

for release at any time. Such an application and any appeal against a

decision ordering detention on remand must be examined by the Judges'

Chamber at a private hearing in the presence of the accused or his

defence counsel.

      Under S. 285 (d) para. 1 a plea of nullity may be rejected by the

Supreme Court after deliberation in private if the Supreme Court

unanimously finds that the complaint should be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded without any need for further deliberation.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) of

the Convention that his right to defence had been prejudiced because

at the pre-trial stage the contact with his defence counsel was under

the surveillance of the Investigating Judge.

2.    He further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

about a violation of the principle of equality of arms in the

proceedings on his plea of nullity before the Supreme Court.  He

submits that the Procurator General made submissions to the Supreme

Court of which the applicant was not informed and to which he had no

possibility to react.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 16 April 1993 and registered

on 13 May 1993.

      On 6 September 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

applicant's complaint concerning the surveillance of the contact with

his defence counsel by the Investigating Judge at the pretrial stage

and his complaint that he was not given the possibility to react to

submissions made by the Procurator General in the proceedings before

the Supreme Court and declared inadmissible the remainder of the

application.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

28 November 1995.  The applicant replied on 22 January 1996.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c)

(Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention that his right to defence was

prejudiced because at the pre-trial stage his contacts with his counsel

were placed under the surveillance of the Investigating Judge.

      Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (b) and (d) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-d) of the

Convention, insofar as relevant, read as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of... any criminal charge against him,

      everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent

      and impartial tribunal established by law. ...

      3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

      minimum rights:

      ...

      b.   to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of

      his defence;

           c.    to defend himself in person or through legal

      assistance of his own choosing ..."

      The Government submit that the surveillance of the applicant's

contacts with his defence counsel lasted until 29 June 1991, the date

on which the statutory time-limit of two months for detention on remand

based solely on the risk of collusion expired.  After that date the

applicant's meetings with his defence counsel were no longer under

surveillance.  The measure imposed in the course of the criminal

investigations had been necessary in order to secure the success of the

investigations.  In view of the fact that at the time of the

applicant's arrest further members of the gang to which he belonged had

not been discovered and arrested, it had been imperative that the

applicant had no possibility whatsoever to collude with third persons.

For this reason even the fact that he and his co-suspects had been

arrested had to be kept confidential in the beginning.  These measures

eventually lead to the arrest of further three members of the gang.

      The Government submit further that the temporary surveillance of

the applicant's contacts with his defence counsel at the beginning of

the criminal investigations did not hinder him in the exercise of his

defence rights.  Contacts with his defence lawyer had not been

prohibited and after surveillance ceased he had at his disposal more

than five weeks before the bill of indictment was served on him and

more than half a year before the trial commenced during which time he

could communicate freely with his lawyer in order to prepare his

defence.  Therefore the applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 3 (b)

and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention have not been violated.

      This is contested by the applicant who submits that the

surveillance of the contacts with his lawyer ceased on 8 August 1991,

as the decision of the Judges' Chamber of 29 May 1991 explicitly

provided that the supervision may take place until the bill of

indictment was to be served on the applicant.  He therefore had no

opportunity of confidential conversations with his defence lawyer until

that date.  Such confidential conversations, however, would have been

necessary in order to formulate precise requests for the taking of

evidence which required a comprehensive and detailed information on the

course of the events.  Therefore the surveillance exercised by the

Investigating Judge violated his defence rights under Article 6

para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that an accused's right to communicate

with his defence counsel out of hearing of a third person is part of

the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic society and

follows from Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) of the Convention.  If a

lawyer were unable to confer with his client and receive confidential

instructions from him without surveillance, his assistance would loose

much of its usefulness, whereas the Convention is intended to guarantee

rights that are practical and effective (see Eur. Court HR, S. v.

Switzerland judgment of 28 November 1991, Series A no. 220, p. 16,

para. 48).  In the above mentioned case the Court also noted that the

risk of collusion merits consideration, however the possibility of

several defence counsel collaborating with a view to co-ordinating

their defence strategy was not sufficient to restrict the accused's

right of defence (S.v. Switzerland judgment, op. cit., p. 16, para.

49).

      The Commission observes that after the applicant's taking into

detention on remand on 3 May 1991 the contact with his defence counsel

took place under surveillance of the Investigating Judge in accordance

with Section 45 para. 3 (1) of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, as the

detention on remand was ordered on the grounds, inter alia, of the

danger of collusion.  On 14 May 1991 the Investigating Judge, under

Section 45 para. 3 (2) of the Criminal Code, extended the surveillance

until the bill of indictment was served on the applicant.

      It is in dispute between the parties whether the surveillance

ordered by the Investigating Judge lasted until 29 June 1991, the date

on which the statutory time-limit of two months for detention on remand

based solely on the risk of collusion expired, as is the submission of

the Government, or, as the applicant submits, until 8 August 1991, when

the bill of indictment was served on him.  However, according to

domestic law, surveillance had to stop on 29 June 1991 since from that

time onwards the applicant's detention on remand could no longer be

based on the ground of danger of collusion.  The applicant does not

state explicitly that between 29 June and 8 August 1991 he had met his

defence counsel or that on such an occasion the Investigating Judge had

been present.  If this had been the case the applicant could have

complained to the Judges' Chamber.

      The Commission observes further that in the present case, unlike

in the above mentioned case of S. v. Switzerland, several co-suspects

were still at large at the time detention on remand was ordered against

the applicant.  This circumstance could justify surveillance at that

stage.  In this respect the Commission also observes that three further

co-suspects were arrested on 3 June 1991.

      Moreover, after the surveillance had ceased, even if this had

been as late as the date given by the applicant, he had still more than

half a year before the trial commenced during which time he could

communicate freely with his lawyer in order to prepare his defence.

The applicant has not substantiated that due to the surveillance

exercised by the Investigating Judge the exercise of his right to

defence had been impaired.

      The Commission therefore finds that there is no appearance of a

violation of the applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c)

(Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention about a violation of the principle of

equality of arms in the proceedings on his plea of nullity before the

Supreme Court.  He submits that the Procurator General made submissions

to the Supreme Court of which the applicant was not informed and to

which he had no possibility to react.

      The Government submit that the Procurator General's observations

did not amount to comments on the facts of the case, nor did they

amount to factual arguments, such that the principle of "equality of

arms" was not violated.  This is disputed by the applicant.

      After an examination of this issue in the light of the parties'

submissions, the Commission considers that it raises questions of fact

and law which can only be determined by an examination of the merits.

It follows that this complaint cannot be declared inadmissible as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.  No other grounds for inadmissibility

have been established.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the

      applicant's complaint that he was not given the possibility to

      react to submissions made by the Procurator General in the

      proceedings before the Supreme Court

      and, by a majority,

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                        of the First Chamber