AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 32788/96

                      by Robert CRABTREE

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 9 April 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 14 May 1996 by

Robert CRABTREE against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 August

1996 under file No. 32788/96;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen born in 1957 and resident in

Bristol, England. Before the Commission he is represented by Brian Cox,

a solicitor practising in Bristol. The facts as submitted by the

applicant may be summarised as follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     The applicant is a single man who was appointed as a foster carer

by the Avon County Council in 1988. The applicant was entrusted with

the long term care of between two and three teenage persons at any one

time and although his methods were unorthodox, by all accounts he

proved successful as a foster carer, in particular with young persons

who had proved very disruptive.

     In February 1991, the applicant was favourably reviewed by the

County Council as part of the review process of all persons appearing

on the foster carer register. Later that year, the applicant became

aware that one of the teenage children in his care had taken an

interest in pornography and had videotaped a sex orientated film. In

order to deal with the situation the applicant discussed the video with

the young person and also discussed with him a pornographic magazine

in order to put such matters into proportion to life generally.

However, in October 1991 the social services department received a

report which expressed concern that a child placed with the applicant

had been shown a pornographic video and magazine. At the request of

Mrs B., the newly appointed service manager, the matter was

investigated and the results were presented to a meeting of the

fostering panel of which she was chairperson on 26 November 1991.

     Following this meeting, Mrs B. wrote to the applicant telling him

that although the panel had received a clear account of his reasons for

allowing the video to be shown it was concerned that he did not appear

to accept that his behaviour was inappropriate. Mrs B. also informed

the applicant as to the conclusions of the panel, namely that

(a)  the care and commitment which he offered to children in his care

was highly valued by the social services department;

(b)  that registration for the children in his care be continued, but

decisions as to further placements be deferred and...

(d)  that he be informed within 5 days of a plan of how the social

services department intends to proceed.

     According to the applicant, he was asked to undertake a programme

of work with the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Children (NSPCC) but when no specific reason was given for this

request, he feared a hidden agenda and was reluctant to agree. The

programme did not go ahead. From February 1992 onwards the applicant

alleges that criticisms were made and problems created for him by

support workers and in particular the support worker who had been

assigned to work with him, but had no experience in dealing with young

persons in the setting of a foster carer's home.

     By letter of 30 April 1992, the applicant was informed of the

foster panel's regret at his decision to withdraw from the programme

with the NSPCC. He was informed that the work was to address the

following specific areas:

     "Issues around sexuality, sex education and gender issues.

     The issue of your vulnerability as a single male foster

     carer. To assess the damage to your relationship with the

     social services department and how trust might be rebuilt."

     However, given that this work remained undone, the panel informed

the applicant that it was not in a position to make any decision

regarding his future registration as a foster carer.

     The applicant requested a change of support worker on 15 April

1992 and also stated that he did not want that support worker to attend

the review meeting, which was due to take place in accordance with his

statutory review on 18 May 1992. The applicant believed that the

service manager, Mrs B. and her support workers had difficulty with the

applicant's methodology and that they were undermining the value of his

work with the foster children in his care. The applicant lodged formal

complaints against the Family Placement Team on 1 July and 14 July

1992, some of which were investigated by a Mrs W., service manager, who

upheld them.

     On 30 June 1992 the applicant submits that he met with the team

manager of his social worker, Mr R., to discuss the matters in dispute

and to complete the statutory review which had commenced in May 1992.

Mr R. agreed to change the support worker in the light of the

applicant's concerns.

     Recognising that relations between the Family Placement Team and

the applicant had deteriorated considerably, the Assistant Director of

the Department of Social Services of the Avon County Council, convened

a meeting on 9 October 1992. This meeting was attended by eight people

including Mr R., area regional manager for the area, Mr Rg., the team

manager of the family placement team and Miss L., a family placement

team social worker. At the meeting concern was expressed about the

applicant's attitude towards the department and the relationship

between them had broken down. It was decided that a meeting of the

fostering panel should be arranged urgently to review the applicant's

registration as a foster carer and that a recommendation should be made

to the panel that he be deregistered. The applicant submits that he was

unaware of this meeting and the matters which were discussed.

Furthermore, he was told that a unanimous decision was taken at that

meeting that he posed an unacceptable level of risk, that he should be

removed as a foster carer and that there should be a formal meeting of

the fostering panel to make the final decision.

     On 12 October 1992 the applicant was invited to a meeting of the

fostering panel due to take place on 14 October. The social worker

offered to deliver the relevant papers for the meeting to him so that

she could discuss them with him. However, the applicant recalls that

he simply received the documents the day before the meeting, which gave

him insufficient time to consider the matters or to gather any evidence

which would rebut the suggestions made and the decision to deregister

him as a foster carer.

     The special meeting of the fostering panel took place at 2.30 pm

on 14 October 1992. In the absence of Mrs B., whose presence was

considered inappropriate in the light of the complaints made against

her by the applicant, it was chaired by Mr R. The other panel members

were Mr Rg, Miss B. and Miss W., team managers in the department. The

applicant had already submitted complaints against Mr R., Mr Rg and

Miss W. The meeting was also attended by Miss L. and Mr M. against whom

the applicant had also lodged complaints. The applicant was accompanied

by Mrs M., chair of the Avon Family Placement Association whose role

was that of an advocate/moral supporter to the applicant. The purpose

of the meeting was to consider the applicant's statutory review and

other matters of concern relating to his registration as a foster

carer. It was also intended to consider the recommendation received

from the meeting of 9 October 1992 that the applicant be deregistered.

     The applicant was invited to join the meeting at 2.45 pm and he

immediately objected to the presence of those persons against whom he

had made complaints. When the chairperson, Mr R., decided to proceed

notwithstanding the objections the applicant was asked to present his

case which he did until 4 pm at which time he was asked to leave. Not

having completed his submissions he left the meeting under protest. The

fostering panel continued with its deliberations (Miss L. and Mr M. who

were not members of the fostering panel also participated) and

following a reminder from Mr R. that

     "whatever the decision it had to be based on what was

     reasonable given all the factors presented in the reports

     and that the welfare of the children and young people was

     of paramount consideration,"

the panel took the decision to deregister the applicant. The reasons

given for this decision were the applicant's inability to work in

partnership with Avon social services department, in particular with

relation to agreed care plans for some of the young people placed with

him and concerns about aspects of the applicant's approach to the care

of young people.

     In January 1993 the applicant instituted proceedings for judicial

review seeking an order that the decision to remove him as a foster

carer should be quashed on grounds, inter alia, that there had been a

breach of natural justice in that the panel included persons against

whom he had made complaint and that he had insufficient time to prepare

and present his case. Following a hearing in March 1993, at which the

applicant was represented by counsel, Thorpe J noted that

     "although at first sight the procedure appears something

     less than fair, it is very important to realise that the

     panel assembled ... was not a panel hand-picked for a

     specific task. The fostering panel is a panel that

     discharges its necessary responsibilities by regular

     meetings in relation to all registered carers."

     The judge noted that the only exceptional member of the panel was

Mr R., the chairperson, who was there as Mrs B.'s senior. The judge

also considered it necessary to look at the reality of the situation

(in particular that the relationship between the applicant and the

department had been deteriorating rapidly for six months, that the

relevant reports had been available to the applicant and he was able

to put his own views to the panel) and the judge finally concluded that

the rules of natural justice were not breached to a degree that would

justify the court's intervention.

     In a judgment of 15 November 1996, delivered by Lord Justice

Neill, the Court of Appeal admitted that at first sight the procedure

which was adopted appeared less than fair but that regard had to be had

to the context, in particular, the nature of the decision-making body

in question and the nature of its task. In this regard, it was noted

that decisions of administrative bodies have to be taken by those with

knowledge of the facts and that members of those bodies may, because

of previous knowledge, have a predisposition towards a certain result.

However, the court did not find that this meant that such a body could

not reach a fair decision. Referring to the facts, the Court did not

find that the decision reached on 14 October amounted to an uncritical

acceptance of the recommendation made following the meeting on

9 October. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the question of the

applicant's continuing registration as a foster carer was considered

by the panel with some care and at length at the meeting on 14 October

1992, given their duty to place the interests of the children in their

care at the forefront of their deliberations. It was noted that the

difficulties between the applicant and the social services department

were serious and getting worse and that given the complaints made by

the applicant, it would have been unrealistic to have expected the

council to have set up a fresh body to consider his annual review. The

Court noted that the panel took the exceptional course of inviting the

applicant to attend the meeting and that he had the benefit of an

advocate/moral supporter. In conclusion the Court found that

     "in the circumstances of the case the panel as constituted

     under the chairmanship of Mr R., the general manager for

     the area, was not an unfair body to adjudicate."

     Furthermore, the Court did not find that the presence of Miss L.

and Mr M. was unfair given that they had been asked to work with the

applicant in the Summer of 1992 to look at some of the areas of

concern. Those who attended the fostering panel were those who had been

most closely involved with the applicant and who could best decide

whether or not he could remain as a carer. As regarded the complaints

of lack of time, the Court noted that the applicant was well aware of

the difficulties which had arisen over the previous year, he had the

reports and a considerable number of matters were canvassed in his

presence. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

B.   Relevant Domestic Law

     The Foster Placement (Children) Regulations 1991 came into force

on 3 April 1991 pursuant to the Children Act 1989. Under

regulation 4(1) the approving authority is required to review at

intervals of not more than one year the suitability of the foster carer

and his household. On conclusion of this review, under regulation 4(3)

the approving authority must prepare a report and and give notice to

the foster-parent of its decision. Under regulation 4(4) where on

review the approving authority is no longer satisfied that the foster-

parent and his household are suitable, it may terminate the approval

from a date to be specified in the notice given under reg. 4(3).

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that the decisions of the fostering panel

on 9 October 1992 and 15 October 1992 are in breach of Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention in that:

(a)  that the principal decision to remove the applicant as a foster

carer was made on 9 October 1992 at a meeting attended by persons who

could not make a fair and reasoned judgment as they were persons in

dispute with the applicant and were sitting in judgment of the

complaints raised against them;

(b)  that the applicant was unaware of the meeting of 9 October 1992,

was not given the opportunity to present argument or evidence to the

panel and in consequence that there was no fair hearing in respect of

a matter which has affected the applicant's livelihood;

(c)  that the persons sitting in judgment at the meeting on 14 October

1992 were those who were in dispute with the applicant and in

consequence prejudiced and unable to make a fair judgment;

(d)  that the applicant was not given full proper advance notice of

the matters being raised against him and was given little time to

obtain evidence to prepare for the hearing;

(e)  that the applicant was excluded from parts of the meeting which

were addressed by those presenting against him, namely Mr M. and

Miss L., and those persons were given the opportunity to address the

panel prior to the applicant's admission to the meeting and remained

present whilst the panel made their final decisions;

(f)  that the applicant was not given full or sufficient time to

present arguments to the panel and that the panel was unaware of the

full extent of his comments on very detailed and complicated papers

which had been presented to the panel by themselves and upon which

their decision was presumably made;

(g)  that the applicant was never given the opportunity to examine

witnesses;

(h)  that the social services fostering panel and social workers

having advised the applicant to lodge complaints acted unreasonably and

unfairly in considering those complaints and have used those matters

unjustly and in breach of the spirit of the complaint procedure to

justify their decision to remove him as a foster carer and took no

account at all of the considerable success which he has had with young

teenagers and the damage caused to them by the deregistration.

2.   The applicant also complains that contrary to Article 14 of the

Convention he has been discriminated against as a single male foster

carer with regard to his dealing with young persons.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant claims that the fostering panel which took the

decision to deregister him as a foster carer did not constitute a fair

hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal consistent with

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) provides:

     "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

     or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

     to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

     independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

     In relation to the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

to the present case, the Commission finds that it does not have to

decide whether the right to work as a home foster carer is a "civil

right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) because the

application is manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.

     The Commission recalls that although Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

embodies a "right to a court", it does not oblige Contracting States

to submit disputes over civil rights to a procedure which at every

stage fulfills the requirements of a tribunal under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1). (Eur. Court HR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and de Meyere v.

Belgium judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 23, para. 51).

Given that the fostering panel may not have satisfied the requirements

of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) as to impartiality and fairness, it

falls to the Commission to examine whether the applicant had access to

an independent judicial body with full jurisdictional control control

over the prior procedure which itself provided the guarantees of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (see e.g. Eur. Court HR, Bryan v. the

United Kingdom judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 17,

para. 40).

     The Commission notes that the applicant sought judicial review

in courts at two levels of jurisdiction of the decision of the

fostering panel to deregister him as a foster carer. It further notes

that the judicial review proceedings could not result in the court

substituting its own decision on the merits of the fostering panel's

decision. Nevertheless, in this case, it was open to the domestic

courts to quash the panel's decision if it found that it had been made

by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant

factors; if the evidence relied on was not capable of supporting a

finding of fact; if the decision was perverse or irrational or the

procedure disclosed unlawfulness, breach of natural justice or

unfairness (see eg. Eur. Court HR, Bryan, op. cit. paras. 25-26, 44).

     In the present case there was no challenge made in the domestic

courts as to the reasoning of the fostering panel and there was no

dispute as to the facts. The High Court and the Court of Appeal had

jurisdiction to entertain the procedural grounds of the applicant's

application and the Commission notes that these submissions referred

essentially to questions of fairness and impartiality, i.e. whether the

fostering panel was biased in reaching its decision. In concluding that

the panel did not act unfairly, the Commission finds that the domestic

courts carefully examined the nature of the fostering panel, the

statutory duty which it exercised and the need for those taking the

decision about the applicant's registration as a foster carer to have

special knowledge of the situation in question.

     For these reasons, given the special functions of the fostering

panel and the nature of the complaints raised by the applicant, the

Commission finds that in this case judicial review of the panel's

decision and procedures by the High Court and Court of Appeal fulfilled

the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   In relation to the applicant's complaint under Article 14

(Art. 14) together with Article 6 (Art. 6) that he was the victim of

discrimination on the grounds of his status as a male foster carer the

Commission recalls that difference in treatment of people in analogous

situations is only contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) where it lacks

reasonable and objective justification (see eg. Eur. Court HR, Van der

Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 21 November 1982, Series A no. 70,

Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) judgment of 18 February 1991, Series 1 no.

192, p. 19, para. 60).      Notwithstanding that the applicant has

failed to show that he is in an analogous situation to a female or

married foster carer, the Commission notes that he has failed to

substantiate the complaint that he has been subjected to any difference

of treatment.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                              J. LIDDY

        Secretary                                 President

   to the First Chamber                      of the First Chamber