AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 27348/95

                      by Micheál Ó'Cathail

                      against Ireland

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 9 April 1997, the following members being present:

           Mr.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, Acting President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 19 December 1994

by Micheál Ó'Cathail against Ireland and registered on 16 May 1995

under file No. 27348/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Irish citizen, born in 1944 and resident in

County Dublin. The applicant is separated from his wife (A), a Russian

citizen and they have two children G and M, born in April 1977 and

January 1979, respectively. The facts of the case as submitted by the

applicant may be summarised as follows.

     The applicant's previous application to the Commission

(No. 15601/89) was declared inadmissible by the Commission on

10 October 1991. It related to complaints under Articles 3, 4 and 6 of

the Convention in respect of separation proceedings which commenced in

1988. The applicant and A were initially awarded joint custody of G and

M in May 1988 by the Circuit Court. However, in June 1988 the High

Court (on appeal) ordered, inter alia, the applicant to leave the

family home and to pay maintenance. A was awarded custody of G and M

and the applicant was given access to G and M at weekends.

On 24 November 1989 an interim protective court order was obtained by

the Eastern Health Board in relation to G. The applicant was not

legally represented from 1990. On 31 October 1991 the Circuit Court

made a small adjustment in maintenance but maintained the effective

position as regards access and custody. This was the final decision

referred to in the Commission's previous decision.

     On 11 December 1991 the High Court made an order requiring the

applicant to cease all contact with his sons and that he deliver M's

passport to the High Court Central Office. In May 1992, on appeal from

the Circuit Court, the High Court confirmed to the applicant that he

could receive some information about G and M.

     On 29 July 1992 the High Court made certain orders in relation

to the proceeds of the sale of the family home largely in favour of A

which orders, with certain alterations to the sums of money involved,

were confirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal on 22 April 1993.

The applicant initially alleged on appeal that the relevant High Court

judge acted malevolently in that he did not allow the applicant to

affirm prior to giving his evidence. The Supreme Court noted that the

applicant withdrew the allegation of malevolence as regards the trial

judge before the Supreme Court. On 4 and 8 February 1994 the Eastern

Health Board and the solicitor acting for A confirmed in letters that

both children were progressing satisfactorily.

     On 22 July 1994 the High Court rejected the applicant's ex parte

habeus corpus application (against the Eastern Health Board and A's

solicitor) alleging that G and M were being unlawfully detained.

The High Court considered that there was no evidence that anybody was

being unlawfully detained. On 28 July 1994 the Supreme Court rejected

the applicant's appeal finding that it was quite clear that custody of

G and M was in accordance with previous court orders made pursuant to

statute (the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964). The applicant submits

that he issued these proceedings in the hope of seeing his children

even in court.

     On 14 October 1994 the High Court (on appeal from the Circuit

Court) ordered that the applicant's wife deliver to the applicant,

through the Family Law Registrar, the results of M's Junior Certificate

examination, that certain other outstanding applications of the

applicant's be listed for hearing in February 1995, that the applicant

be restrained from bringing further applications to the court in

respect of family matters without the leave of the court and that the

applicant be restrained from interfering in any way directly or

indirectly with A, G or M.

     On 19 January 1995 the High Court, pursuant to the applicant's

motion for further information about G and M, ordered that a doctor

psychiatrically assess G and M and report to the High Court on his

findings. The purpose was to consider giving the assessment results to

the applicant but the report was not to indicate the whereabouts of the

children and the applicant was not to attend at the place of assessment

or interfere with the children in any way. On 10 February 1995 the High

Court heard further submissions from the parties and confirmed that the

assessment should be completed. On 27 February 1995 the High Court

Registrar called the applicant to say that neither of the applicant's

children wished to be assessed.

     On 1 March 1995 the applicant was accorded liberty to apply to

the High Court to ensure that the previous two assessment orders of the

High Court not be frustrated or made effectively void by delay.

On 13 March 1995 the High Court ordered, inter alia, that such an

application be set down for hearing on 24 March 1995 and on 16 March

1995 the applicant filed the necessary papers. The affidavits filed in

connection with this application alleged a lack of impartiality and

inappropriate behaviour on the part of various judges and alleged that

a High Court judge had, in July 1992, refused the applicant's request

to affirm evidence.

     On 24 March 1995 the applicant's motion as regards implementation

of the assessment orders of the High Court was considered in substance

and was rejected. The court noted, inter alia, that the way to enforce

those assessment orders was to issue contempt proceedings. However, the

court went on to note that that court would not enforce "contempt

proceedings against anybody in respect of a situation where that boy

does not wish to be assessed". The court noted that it was entitled to

take into account the views and wishes of the children (who were

16 years and almost 18 years old, respectively) and that neither of

them wished to be assessed. The evidence before the court was a letter

from M (who was 16 years old at the time) which the court refused to

show to the applicant and on the basis of which the court noted that

M did not want to be assessed. As regards G (who was almost 18 years

old), the Eastern Health Board submitted that G was doing very well and

was mentally fine but that he had refused to attend the assessment. The

court also refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

     The applicant had lodged another motion with the High Court on

20 March 1995 requesting that the order of 14 October 1994, which

required the applicant to obtain the leave of the court in order to

issue further applications, be lifted. The High Court simply allowed

the applicant to proceed with current motions.

     On 3 April 1995 the applicant made an ex parte application to the

President of the High Court requesting discovery of the letter from M

which had been referred to in the hearing of 24 March 1995.

This application was refused on the same date. On 3 April 1995 the

applicant's motion for leave to state a case to the Supreme Court from

the decision of the High Court of 24 March 1994 was also rejected by

the High Court on the basis that the applicant had not shown to the

judge any point of law which would warrant leave to state a case to the

Supreme Court. On 24 April 1995 the President of the High Court refused

an application by the applicant to have certain persons in the Eastern

Health Board found in contempt of court for failure to comply with the

assessment orders of the High Court made in January and February 1995.

     On 12 April 1995 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court from

the order of the High Court of 24 March 1995. He later added the

decisions of the High Court of 3 and 24 April 1995 to that Supreme

Court appeal. On 19 May 1995, the Supreme Court heard the appeal and

found that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and

rejected it.

     In or around this time, the applicant also applied to the Circuit

Court for an order that he be granted access to G and M and for an

order that certain information in relation to G and M be given to the

applicant. These applications were refused and the applicant appealed

to the High Court.

     On 27 July 1995 the High Court ruled on those appeals. It found

that it had no jurisdiction under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964

to make any order in relation to G since he had now reached the age of

majority. As to M, the court noted that M was almost 17 years old and

that he had not seen the applicant for over three and a half years.

The judge noted that there was no evidence before him as to what in

fact were M's wishes and he adjourned the matter requesting the High

Court Registrar to attempt to make contact with M, to talk with him

alone and to ask M what were his wishes as regards contact with his

father. In the meantime, the orders of the High Court of 14 October

1994 were to stand. Finally, the judge directed State agencies,

contacted by the High Court Registrar for information about M, to

furnish the information requested.

     These appeals were again before the High Court on 3 October 1995.

The court confirmed that the High Court Registrar had been unable to

locate M. However, the court noted that it did not consider that M had

come to any harm and that it would appear to be the case that A and M

were avoiding the applicant. The matter was adjourned for full judgment

until 13 October 1995.

     On 13 October 1995 the High Court found that the welfare of M

would be better served by refusing the applicant access. It referred

to the fact that M did not wish to attend the psychiatric assessment

ordered by the court in early 1995 and to the contents of the letter

from M (and which was considered by the High Court on 24 March 1995).

The High Court inferred from this that M did not want any involvement

with the applicant. It also referred to M's age noting that he was

almost an adult and that a considerable length of time had passed since

he had seen his father. The High Court also refused to read the

contents of, or to show, M's letter to the applicant who contested,

inter alia, its authenticity. The court noted that M's letter had been

send by A's solicitor in confidence to the judge who had presided on

24 March 1995 with a covering letter from that solicitor which

indicated that the letter was indeed from M. To show that letter to the

applicant would be, according to the court, a breach of that

confidence. On requesting leave to appeal, the applicant was informed

that there was no further appeal to the Supreme Court since the matters

before the High Court were appeals from the Circuit Court.

     As regards information being supplied to the applicant, the High

Court saw no reason why the applicant should not get certain

information about M and ordered that A, who had custody of M, furnish

the required information within a month of service of the order of the

High Court. The High Court recognised that the applicant may experience

some difficulty in serving the order (in light of the lack of clear

indications at the time as to A's and, consequently, M's whereabouts)

but noted that the applicant could bring an application for further

directions in relation to the service of the order if he encountered

difficulties in that respect.

     On 18 December 1995 the Circuit Court found that A was in

contempt of the order of, inter alia, the High Court order dated

13 October 1995. It ordered that A return M to the jurisdiction, that

M be produced before the Circuit Court, that the department of Foreign

Affairs issue a temporary passport for M to the applicant, that any

passport presently lodged in court in M's name be returned to the

applicant and that the matter be listed for mention on 17 January 1996.

     However, on 24 January 1996 the Circuit Court, while continuing

the order that A was in contempt of court, discharged the remaining

orders of 18 December 1995, the Circuit Court recognising that such

remaining issues were High Court matters. The Circuit Court also

granted liberty to the applicant to bring an application to vary the

current maintenance order against him and rejected his application for

an order finding the Department of Foreign Affairs in contempt of

court.

     On 20 March 1996 the High Court rejected the applicant's motion

requesting relief on an ex parte basis for the implementation by that

court of the Circuit Court's orders as regards M's passport. The High

Court pointed out that it could not treat the application as one for

ex parte relief without proceedings before the High Court being issued.

In addition and since the applicant required the leave of the court to

issue such proceedings, that court considered the applicant's motion

as an application for leave to take proceedings. However, the applicant

had no draft proceedings before the court outlining his intended cause

of action and the High Court pointed out to him that if he drafted such

proceedings the High Court would consider such a leave application.

Since, therefore, the High Court had no basis upon which to hear the

application, it was refused.

     On 22 March 1996, the President of the High Court refused leave

to the applicant to issue High Court proceedings effectively to obtain

similar orders as had been made (18 December 1995) and subsequently

discharged (24 January 1996) by the Circuit Court. The President found

that the proceedings did not disclose any reasonable cause of action

and that they were frivolous and vexatious. The applicant appealed to

the Supreme Court and on 29 March 1996 that appeal was rejected.

     On 1 February 1996 the applicant applied to vary the maintenance

order against him and on 21 February 1996 the Circuit Court

substantially reduced the maintenance previously payable. On 15 March

1996 the applicant made another maintenance application to the Circuit

Court and on 17 April 1996 the Circuit Court discharged the maintenance

order altogether.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant takes issue with the decisions of the courts

against him submitting that those decisions constitute a violation of

his rights as a father. He further considers that the courts acted in

a biased and intolerant way and that there was a deliberate ploy to

deny him information about his sons. He also complains about the denial

of his right to affirm prior to giving evidence in certain hearings.

     The applicant states that he makes these complaints on his own

behalf and on behalf of his children and he invokes Articles 3, 4, 5,

6, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.   The Commission notes the applicant's statement that he makes this

application on his own behalf and on behalf of his children, M and G.

However, the Commission recalls that the applicant does not have

custody of his children and has not had access to or contact with them

for a considerable period of time namely, at least since the order of

the High Court of 11 December 1991. In such circumstances, the

Commission cannot accept that the applicant can introduce an

application to the Commission on his children's behalf.

2.   The Commission has examined the various decisions of the domestic

courts of which the applicant complains in light of the six-month

time-limit laid down by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. In this

respect, the Commission recalls that the applicant did not raise

Article 8 (Art. 8) in his previous application and that the date of

introduction of the present application is 19 December 1994.

     Accordingly, the Commission considers that the complaints about

the decisions on custody and access taken in May and June 1988 have

been introduced by the applicant outside of that time-limit.

The applicant's later application for a re-consideration of access

based on current circumstances, which was rejected by the High Court

in July 1995 (in relation to G) and in October 1995 (in relation to M),

is not sufficient to re-start the running of the time-limit as regards

the earlier access decisions.

     The complaint in relation to the interim care decision taken on

24 November 1989 in relation to G is also out of time, there being no

evidence of any further proceedings or appeals in that respect within

six months of the date of the introduction of the application.

In addition, the complaint about the decision of 11 December 1991

prohibiting all contact by the applicant with his children was also

introduced outside of the relevant time-limit. In this latter respect,

the Commission considers that the subsequent proceedings as regards

obtaining certain information in relation to the children constitute

a separate matter (dealt with at 3. below).

     Similarly, the Commission considers the complaints about the

decisions of May and June 1988 in relation to the imposition of

maintenance and of 31 October 1991 as regards the level of maintenance

to be out of time. Later applications for a reconsideration of the

imposition and level of maintenance (dealt with by the Circuit Court

in February and April 1996 on the basis of the prevailing

circumstances) are insufficient to restart the running of the six-month

time-limit as regards the earlier maintenance decisions. Furthermore,

the courts' decisions as regards the family home of May and June 1988,

July 1992 and April 1993 were handed down outside of the six-month

time-limit set down by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

     The applicant also complains that he was denied the right to

affirm (as opposed to taking an oath to which oath the applicant

alleges he has a religious objection) prior to giving evidence in May

and June 1988 before the Circuit and High Courts. He claims, in

particular, that the Circuit Court judge, in May 1988, referred to him

as a fundamentalist catholic and stated that "I say that the

averred rather than taking the oath when giving evidence".

The applicant also alleges that he was allowed to affirm by a certain

High Court judge in December 1991 but that it subsequently became clear

to him that that judge had not in fact accepted his evidence given in

December 1991 because on 29 July 1992 the same judge insisted that he

take a religious oath. However and even assuming that the decision of

the Supreme Court of April 1993 was the final decision in this respect,

the Commission considers that these complaints have also been

introduced outside of the time-limit set down by Article 26 (Art. 26)

of the Convention. The Commission does not consider that the

applicant's later reference to his alleged inability to affirm in an

affidavit, filed in the context of proceedings to enforce the High

Court assessment orders of 19 January 1995 and 10 February 1995,

constitutes an effective remedy in relation to his complaint about

affirming evidence and, accordingly, the relevant six-month time-limit

does not run from the date of that reference.

     Accordingly, the Commission must declare these complaints

inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant complains that the remaining decisions of the

courts against him constituted a violation of his rights as a father.

The Commission has considered these complaints under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention which Article had been invoked by the

applicant. The relevant parts of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

provide as follows:

     "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family

     life ...

     2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

     with the exercise of this right except such as is in

     accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

     society in the interests of national security, public

     safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

     prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

     health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

     freedoms of others."

     The Commission considers that it does not have to decide whether

the decisions of which the applicant complains constituted an

interference with his family life because the complaints of the

applicant in these respects are, in any event, inadmissible for the

reasons set out below.

(a)  The Commission has examined whether any interference with the

applicant's family life by such decisions of the courts would be

justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, namely,

whether it is "in accordance with the law", pursues one or more of the

legitimate aims set out in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and whether it

is "necessary in a democratic society" for one or more of those

reasons. In this respect the Commission notes that the courts'

decisions were rendered in the exercise of the courts' jurisdiction

under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964. The Commission accordingly

finds that the decisions in question were in accordance with the law

and that they pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the children's

health and rights.

     As to whether the measures were necessary within the meaning of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, the case-law of the

Convention organs establishes that the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and that it is

proportionate to the aim pursued. Furthermore, in determining whether

an interference is necessary, the Convention organs will take into

account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States

who are in principle in a better position to make an initial assessment

as to the necessity of a given measure (Eur. Court HR, W. v. the United

Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 27, para. 59).

Moreover, when determining whether or not the decisions were necessary,

the Commission observes that it is not its task to take the place of

the competent national courts and make a fresh examination of all the

facts and evidence. The Commission's task is to examine whether the

reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and

sufficient" (Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68). The Commission has thus considered

below the remaining decisions against the applicant.

-    As regards the decisions in relation to the supply of information

to the applicant about his children, the Commission notes that the

applicant is effectively claiming that, while the courts recognised

that he should obtain certain information, those courts refused to

enforce their orders in this respect.

     In the first place, the High Court on 24 March 1995 considered

the issue of non-compliance by the respondents with its previous orders

for a psychiatric assessment of M and G. The High Court concluded, on

the basis of a letter from M and on the basis of the submissions of the

Eastern Health Board, that neither G nor M wanted to be assessed for

the purpose of giving information to the applicant. The judge referred

to the relatively advanced ages of the children (M being 16 years old

and G being almost 18 years old) and stated that the court would not

enforce contempt proceedings if the reason for the refusal to comply

with assessment orders was the relevant child's unwillingness to be

assessed for the purpose of supplying information to his father.

Accordingly, on 24 April 1995 the High Court rejected contempt of court

proceedings issued by the applicant as regards the enforcement of the

assessment orders. The Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear

the appeal from the decision of 24 March 1995.

     Secondly, in March 1996 the High Court found that proposed

proceedings by the applicant, effectively to attempt to enforce the

High Court order of 13 October 1995 to supply information, did not

disclose a cause of action and were frivolous and vexatious.

The Supreme Court rejected an appeal the same month. However, the

Commission is cognisant of the position in March 1996 - M was at that

stage 17 years old, the High Court had, as recently as 13 October 1995

in the context of an access appeal, established that M did not want any

involvement with the applicant and there is no evidence that M's point

of view had changed since October 1995.

     The Commission considers that it is clear that the High Court

balanced what it considered to be the applicant's legitimate claim to

information about his children against what it found to be the wishes

and interests of the children. It is of the view that the High Court's

position, that it would not enforce contempt proceedings or take other

enforcement action which ran counter to the established wishes of the

children, to be justifiable. It is true that the applicant was refused

access to M's letter and disputed, inter alia, its authenticity.

However, the Commission notes that the High Court judge found, on

24 March 1995, that that letter indicated that M had no interest in

information going to his father. The Commission considers it plain that

M's position would have also covered the contents of his letter which

was not directed to the applicant but (as the High Court subsequently

noted on 13 October 1995) was submitted in confidence to the High Court

judge who presided on 24 March 1995.

-    As regards the decisions of the courts on access, the Commission

notes that, by the time the applicant applied for a re-consideration

of access (between April and July 1995), G was either close to or over

the age of majority. The High Court considered the Circuit Court appeal

in relation to access to G on 26 and 27 July 1995 and found that it no

longer had jurisdiction under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 in

relation to G who had since April of that year reached the age of

majority. As regards M, on 27 July 1995 the High Court adjourned the

appeal hearings to allow the High Court Registrar establish M's wishes.

On 3 October 1995 the High Court judge confirmed that the Registrar had

been unable to locate M. While noting its failure in this respect, the

court also noted that it did not consider that any harm had come to M

and that it would appear to be the case that A and M were deliberating

avoiding the applicant.

     On 13 October 1995 the High Court gave its judgment on the access

matter concerning M and noted that it must have regard to the welfare

of M which was the paramount consideration upon which to base its

decision on access. It noted that M was then almost 17 years old, that

he had not seen the applicant in over three and half years, that he had

not turned up for the psychiatric assessment ordered in early 1995 by

the High Court and that M did not want any involvement with the

applicant. The judge was satisfied that the interests of M were best

served by denying access.

-    As regards the 1996 decisions on maintenance, the Commission

notes that there is no evidence of any application for a variation of

the maintenance order made after the order of the court in 31 October

1991 until 1996 at which stage the Circuit Court dealt with the two

maintenance applications promptly (within periods of three and four

weeks, respectively from the date of the relevant applications). On the

first occasion, the Circuit Court initially considerably reduced the

level of maintenance (February 1996) and, on the second occasion,

discharged the maintenance order altogether (April 1996). In such

circumstances, the Commission does not consider, even assuming the

decisions on maintenance affected the applicant's family life, that

such decisions disclose any lack of respect for his rights under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (No. 24875/94, Dec. 6.9.96, D.R.

86, pp. 74 at 81).

-    As regards the decision of 14 October 1994, the Commission notes

that that decision is essentially a re-affirmation of the decision of

December 1991 which restrained the applicant from having any contact

with his children, in respect of which latter decision the applicant's

complaint is out of time (see 2. above). In any event and apart from

the general allegations of bias which have been considered below under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the applicant has not made any

submissions whatsoever as to why he considers that this order should

not have been made against him.

-    Finally and as regards the rejection of the habeas corpus

applications by the High and Supreme Courts on 22 and 28 July 1994,

respectively, the Commission notes that such proceedings relate to the

lawfulness of the detention of persons and that both courts found that

the custody of G and M was clearly lawful, it being in accordance with

court orders made pursuant to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964.

It is also noted that the applicant submits that he issued these

proceedings in the hope of seeing his children even in court.

(b)  As regards the procedural requirements implied in Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention to ensure effective respect for family life

(Eur. Court HR, H. v. United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series

A no. 120, pp. 27-28 and 59, paras. 87-90 and W. v. United Kingdom

judgment, loc. cit., pp. 28-29, pp. 63-65), the Commission is satisfied

that, although the applicant was unrepresented since 1990, he was given

every possibility of putting forward any views which in his opinion

would be decisive for the outcome of the relevant proceedings.

     It is true that the applicant has been involved in proceedings

in relation to various matters concerning his family since 1988.

However, the core matters of custody, access and maintenance were all

decided by the courts in 1988. In April 1993 the Supreme Court made its

final decision as regards the family home. The proceedings seeking a

re-consideration by the courts of access and maintenance were not

issued until 1995 and 1996, respectively at which stage they were dealt

with quickly. The proceedings requesting further information were first

commenced by the applicant in late 1994 and a considerable number of

related applications and appeals had been dealt with by the Circuit,

High and Supreme Courts by 29 March 1996.

     In such circumstances, the Commission also considers that the

length of each of the numerous sets of proceedings was reasonable and

that it did not lead to a de facto determination of the issues involved

by the mere effluxion of time or deprive the applicant of a decision

upon the merits of the case. The Commission therefore finds that the

application does not disclose any lack of respect for the applicant's

family life in light of the procedural requirements implicit in

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

     The Commission therefore concludes, bearing in mind the margin

of appreciation accorded to the domestic authorities, that in the

circumstances of the present case any interference with the applicant's

family life by decisions of the above courts of which he complains was

justified as being necessary in a democratic society for the protection

of the health and rights of the children. Consequently, this part of

the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.   The applicant also raises Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention

in relation to the decisions of the courts against him. In particular,

he alleges that the courts acted in a biased, intolerant and bigoted

way and that there was a deliberate ploy by the courts to deny him

information about his children. However, the Commission finds no

evidence to support these allegations and considers these submissions

unsubstantiated.

     The Commission has also considered under Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention the order made on 14 October 1994 which required the

applicant to obtain the consent of a court prior to issuing

proceedings. However, the Commission considers that in light of the

variety and substantial number of applications with which the applicant

was allowed to proceed, this order against him did not deny the

applicant the very essence of his right of access to court and was

proportionate to the aim of ensuring the proper administration of

justice (No. 11559/85, Dec. 2.12.85, D.R. 45, p. 281).

     Furthermore, the Commission has considered under this Article the

non-disclosure to the applicant of M's letter sent to the judge who

handed down the decision of 24 March 1995. The Commission notes its

comments above as to the position adopted by M in that letter. In any

event and insofar as the applicant challenges the authenticity of that

letter, the Commission notes that the High Court, in dealing with this

point in its judgment of 13 October 1995, noted that the letter was

sent to the High Court by A's solicitor whose covering letter (which

was read to the applicant during the hearing on 13 October 1995) made

it clear that that solicitor considered that the letter was written by

M. The Commission further notes, in this respect, that the decision of

3 April 1995 to refuse discovery of M's letter to the applicant related

to an ex parte motion rather than adversarial proceedings between two

parties.

     Accordingly, the Commission must declare the complaints of the

applicant under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention manifestly ill-

founded and inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

5.   The applicant in his first letter to the Commission in the

present application also invoked Articles 3, 5, 9, 10, and 12

(Art. 3, 5, 9, 10, 12) of the Convention but he has not specified in

what respects. However and insofar as such complaints have been

introduced within the time limit set down by Article 26 (Art. 26) of

the Convention, the Commission does not find any evidence from the

submissions of the applicant of treatment which would amount to a

violation of those Articles.

     Accordingly, the Commission must declare these complaints

manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                               M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

     Secretary                                Acting President

to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber