WOOLHEAD v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 31219/96 • ECHR ID: 001-3704
Document date: May 21, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 31219/96
by Henry WOOLHEAD
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 16 February 1996
by Henry WOOLHEAD against the United Kingdom and registered on
29 April 1996 under file No. 31219/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1944 and resident in
North Weald, Essex. He is represented before the Commission by
Messrs. Biebuyck, solicitors practising in Chelmsford, Essex.
The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as
follows.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
The applicant is a Romany gypsy by birth. From the age of seven
he travelled with his family in search of seasonal, agricultural work
within the Home Counties and East Anglia. Following his marriage in
1962, the applicant occupied a caravan and subsequently a bungalow at
Dobbs Weir, Essex from where he worked with his father trading in scrap
metal and landscape gardening. In the summer months he would travel
further afield to look for work, principally fruit and hop picking.
Whilst the applicant concedes that he has in course of time travelled
less, in part due to a decline in demand for migrant farm labour, he
nevertheless maintains that travelling has remained an integral part
of his way of life.
In 1984 the applicant purchased a site at Carisbrook Farm, North
Weald, Essex comprising 2.5 acres of land and including various nissen
huts and corrugated blockwork and wooden sheds, being some ten in
number, dating from the war.
The site is situated in land designated as part of the local
green belt. Prior to the applicant's ownership of the site, it had
been used for motor vehicle repairs. Epping District Council, as the
local planning authority, had at various times taken enforcement action
to prevent its use as such. Following the applicant's occupancy of the
site in 1988, the District Council issued an enforcement notice against
the use of the site for storing and sorting of electrical components.
In the same year planning permission was refused for a mobile home and
change of use to the storing and sorting of metal. In February 1989
the District Council issued an enforcement notice against the placing
of a mobile home for human habitation on the site. In January 1990 an
appeal against the enforcement notice was dismissed, and in May 1991
an application to retain the mobile home in connection with the
establishment of an agricultural business was refused.
On 28 May 1991 the applicant made a fresh application for
planning permission for a caravan site for one gypsy family comprising
a mobile home, which presently houses the applicant and his wife, a
caravan, which currently houses the applicant's daughter, and parking
facilities for the applicant's touring caravan.
On 5 November 1991 planning permission was refused by the
District Council on grounds that:
"The site is within the Metropolitan Green Belt. The
proposed development is therefore at odds with Government
guidance, as expressed in Planning Policy Guidance Note 2,
together with the stated policies of the adopted Local Plan
and the Approved Essex Structure Plan. The latter states
that within the Green Belt permission will not be given,
except in very special circumstances, for the construction
of new buildings or for the change of use or extension of
existing buildings (other than reasonable extensions to
existing buildings), or for purposes other than
agriculture, mineral extraction or forestry, small-scale
facilities for outdoor participatory sport and recreation,
institutions requiring large grounds, cemeteries or similar
uses which are open in character. In the view of the Local
Planning Authority insufficient reasons have been advanced
to justify a departure from the policy."
The applicant appealed against the decision of the District
Council to the Secretary of State for the Environment. An Inspector
was appointed by the Secretary of State to hold a local inquiry and
report on the merits of the appeal.
Following the inquiry, in his report issued in July 1992, the
Inspector found that the applicant's life style following his
occupation of the Carisbrook Farm site in 1988 was not sufficiently
nomadic that he could be said to enjoy the status of a gypsy within the
meaning of the Caravans Sites Act 1968 but considered that :
"should this appeal fail would have to
abandon his present home and is likely to take up a nomadic
existence again, thus qualifying as a person to whom the
authority would owe a duty under the 1968 Act. ... uch
an outcome would be unlikely to assist the District Council
in its efforts to achieve designation. ... I conclude
that ... there are special circumstances in
this case which, in the light of the advice given in
Circular 28/77, could justify permitting this form of
development in the Green Belt."
The Inspector further considered that "no significant harm to the
character and appearance of the country side results from the presence
of the caravan" and concluded by recommending that the appeal be
allowed.
On 28 October 1992, the Secretary of State dismissed the appeal.
He gave as his reasons for dismissing the appeal the following :
"... No evidence was produced to show that
in the event that the appeal should fail> would have no
option other than to resort to a nomadic way of life, or
that, if he were to do so, there were no alternative sites
for his caravan which were unconstrained by restrictive
planning policies. The fact that there may be insufficient
official local sites is not considered to be relevant in
this case because is understood to find
such sites unacceptable. Furthermore, the District Council
dispute that their refusal to permit your client to retain
his caravan at Carisbrook Farm threatened their application
for designation. The Secretary of State therefore does not
consider arguments are of such weight as to
constitute very special circumstances justifying
inappropriate development of the Green Belt, and in this
respect is unable to accept the Inspector's conclusion.
"... The Secretary of State accepts that the visual impact
of the caravan on this particular site would be minimal but
does not consider that this, in itself, is sufficient to
justify permitting inappropriate development in the Green
belt."
The applicant appealed to the High Court against the Secretary
of State's decision. On 8 October 1993 the Secretary of State's
decision was quashed by consent.
Following this, the applicant and the District Council, at the
invitation of the Secretary of State, requested that the inquiry be re-
opened. The Secretary of State appointed a second Inspector to conduct
a local inquiry and report on the merits. At the inquiry, which was
held over a three day period, the Inspector heard evidence and
representations from the applicant, the District Council, Essex County
Council and various interested parties. In his report, issued on
24 October 1994, the Inspector found, inter alia, that :
"... the main consideration in this case is whether there
are any very special circumstances to justify an exception
to the strong planning policies designed to resist
inappropriate development in the Green Belt. ...
lifestyle was a long way short of nomadic
even before he moved to the site in 1988. Consequently,
although is a Romany gypsy, I do not
believe that he is, or was at that time, a gypsy as defined
by the Caravan Sites Act 1968. ...
... I do not believe that the
lifestyle demands any special site provision or other
special treatment, because neither he nor his immediate
family are nomadic. His long term occupation of bungalow-
type accommodation at Dobbs Weir and at the appeal site
suggests to me that he does not share the aversion to
permanent accommodation said to be experienced by some
gypsies ... I very much doubt that he would return to
a truly nomadic life if he had to leave the site.
As for the difficulty of finding other accommodation and
the possibility of having to go on to the side of the road,
there is virtually no evidence that has
made any sustained effort to find another place to live,
other than at the time of enforcement action, and there are
very few details of his search at that time. The fact the
Council's gypsy site is full does not, in my view,
demonstrate that he would be unable to find alternative
accommodation ... His natural preference for staying in his
local area is, I think, shared by much of the population
but is not an appropriate reason for overriding Green belt
policies. ...
The elected County and District Councils after lengthy
analysis both consider gypsy site provision in the District
to be adequate ... even if the count of unauthorised
gypsy sites did demonstrate a need for 10 to 12 more
pitches in the District ... that does not seem to me to
indicate a pressing need sufficient to justify the
permission for this site in the Green Belt, particularly as
the appeal site would do little to diminish that total.
... the site satisfies some of the County's
criteria for gypsy sites, being relatively well enclosed,
a reasonable distance from residential properties, and
within reach of social and educational facilities ... the
mobile home and caravans do have the effect of
consolidating the existing range of structures. ... The
overall impact of the development would in my view be
harmful rather than beneficial to the character of the
Green belt."
The Inspector concluded by recommending that the appeal be
dismissed.
The Secretary of State dismissed the applicant's appeal on
12 January 1995, giving as his reasons the following :
" takes the view that the
determining issue in this appeal is whether your client has
demonstrated that very special circumstances exist which
are sufficient to override the strong presumption against
development which would be inappropriate in the Green Belt.
puts forward three reasons for special
treatment : his gypsy status, the shortage of suitable
gypsy sites in the area, and the suitability of the appeal
site for gypsy use.
With regard to status, the Secretary of
State is mindful that Circular 1/94 withdraws the previous
guidance indicating that it may be necessary to accept
gypsy sites in protected areas, including Green Belts.
Consequently he takes the view that a gypsy has no more
cause than a non-gypsy to expect permission for
inappropriate development in the Green Belt. Therefore,
whilst seeing no reason to disagree with the second
inspector's arguments for concluding that your client is
not a "gypsy" as defined by section 16 of the Caravan Sites
Act 1968 ... the Secretary of State does not consider that
your client's status is a determining issue.
second Inspector> that the need for more gypsy sites in the
area is not so pressing as to justify a permission for
inappropriate development, particularly since the appeal
site would do little to reduce any shortfall in the number
of pitches ... and disagrees with the first Inspector's
view that situation, should he be forced
to abandon the appeal site, would in itself represent
special circumstances which would justify permitting this
form of development in the Green Belt.
As far as the suitability of the appeal site for gypsy
occupation is concerned, the Secretary of State agrees with
the second Inspector ... that the overall impact of the
development would be more harmful than beneficial to the
character of the Green Belt ... whilst any harmful
visual impact may be no more than minimal ... neither
Inspector found that the development would be positively
beneficial. He therefore agrees with the second Inspector
that the site characteristics themselves cannot be regarded
as special circumstances in favour of the development. ...
In considering the weight of harm in this case, the
Secretary of State has had regard to the purpose of Green
Belts as set out in Planning Policy Guidance Note 2, the
fundamental consideration being the preservation of their
openness. Whilst acknowledging that the scale and adverse
visual impact of the appeal development are limited, he
takes the view that the circumstances adduced in favour of
the development do not outweigh the harm that it would
cause to the purposes and character of the Green Belt. He
therefore concludes that the very special circumstances
necessary to justify inappropriate development in the Green
Belt have not been demonstrated."
The applicant appealed to the High Court against the Secretary
of State's decision. The appeal was dismissed on 21 September 1995.
Pending the outcome of the present proceedings before the Commission,
the District Council has agreed to suspend taking enforcement action.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
The following statements of planning policy issued at central and
local government level are material to the present application.
Planning Policy Guidance Note 2, issued by the Department of the
Environment, outlines general policy for local planning authorities
with regard to development within areas of green belt. Insofar as
material, Planning Policy Guidance Note 2 provides:
"... inside a Green Belt approval should not be given
except in very special circumstances for the construction
of a new building or for the change of use of existing
buildings for purposes other than agricultural, forestry,
outdoor sport, cemeteries, institutions standing in
extensive grounds or other use as appropriate to a rural
area."
Circular 28/77, issued by the Department of the Environment on
25 March 1977, was intended to provide local planning authorities with
guidance on site provision for gypsies. Insofar as material,
Circular 28/77 provided :
"here are areas of open land (including Green Belts ...)
where the land use policies which apply are severely
restrictive to development. It may be necessary, however,
to accept the establishment of Gypsy sites in such areas
... otherwise ... it may be difficult to prevent
unauthorised camping in far less suitable locations. ...
here will clearly be a special obligation to
ensure that arguments in favour of a departure from the
development plan are convincing."
Circular 28/77 was superseded by Circular 1/94 which was issued
by the Department of the Environment on 23 November 1994. Insofar as
material, Circular 1/94 provides :
"As a rule it will not be appropriate to make provision for
Gypsy sites in areas of open land where development is
severely restricted .... Gypsy sites are not regarded as
among those uses of land that are normally appropriate in
Green Belts. Green Belt should not be allocated for Gypsy
sites in development plans."
Policy H12, sets out Epping District Council's policy with regard
to the provision of gypsy sites within the local development plan. So
far as relevant, Policy H12 states that "planning permission will not
be granted for a Gypsy caravan site within the local area."
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that he is prohibited from living in a
caravan on his own land and as such is prevented from following the
traditional lifestyle of a gypsy. The applicant points to the
shortfall of gypsy accommodation within the local area and submits that
in the event that he is prevented from remaining in his caravan he will
be unable to accommodate himself legally elsewhere within the area.
The applicant complains that inadequate regard was given to his
identity and status as a gypsy. The applicant points to the fact that
the relevant planning legislation did not require that particular
consideration be given to the provision of residential sites for
gypsies within the green belt. The applicant complains that the
refusal to grant planning permission amounted, in these circumstances,
to an interference with his right to respect for his home, and his
private and family life under Article 8 para. 1 of the Convention which
is not justified under the terms of para. 2 thereof.
2. The Applicant claims that he has been subject to discrimination
on the ground of his status as a gypsy, contrary to Article 14 of the
Convention taken together with Article 8 thereof. The applicant
complains that the Epping District Council Local Policy H12 and the
Department of the Environment Circular 1/94 directly stigmatise and
discriminate against the provision of housing for gypsy communities
within the green belt. The applicant complains generally that he has
been treated differently from the house dwelling community who are
afforded a better opportunity to provide for their housing needs in
that they are catered for by the provision of new houses in the green
belt area.
3. The applicant complains that the refusal of planning permission
amounts to an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful
enjoyment of his property which is not justified by any legitimate
public interest in breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1.
4. The applicant complains that in the determination of his right
to live in a caravan on his land he has been deprived of a hearing
before an independent and impartial tribunal in breach of Article 6
para. 1 of the Convention. The applicant points to the fact it is the
Secretary of State who adjudicates on the planning appeal. The
applicant submits that the Secretary of State, as a member of the
executive, is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that he is prevented from living in a
caravan on his own land and following the traditional lifestyle of a
gypsy. The applicant complains that there is a shortfall of gypsy
accommodation within the local area and, therefore, that in the event
he is prevented from remaining in his caravan he will be unable to
accommodate himself legally elsewhere within the area. The applicant
complains that in the determination of his right to live in a caravan
on his land inadequate regard was given to his identity and status as
a gypsy. The applicant complains of an interference with the right to
respect for his home, and his private and family life under Article 8
para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention which is not justified under the
terms of para. 2 thereof. Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention,
insofar as material, provides :
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."
The Commission recalls that the applicant was refused planning
permission which would have enabled him to live with his family in his
caravans on his land. Whilst no enforcement action has yet been taken
by the District Council to remove the caravans, the Commission accepts
that in the absence of any undertaking by the District Council to the
contrary this will be the inevitable consequence of the refusal of
planning permission. Accordingly, the Commission finds that in the
circumstances of the present case there has been an interference by a
public authority with the applicant's right to respect for his home
(see Eur. Court HR, Gillow v. the United Kingdom judgement of
24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 19, para. 47 and Buckley v. the
United Kingdom judgement of 25 September 1996, to be reported in
Reports 1996, paras. 52-55).
The Commission has, therefore, to consider whether the
interference with the applicant's right to respect for his home is
justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) as being in accordance
with law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of one
or more of the legitimate aims identified in Article 8 para. 2
(Art. 8-2). The Commission does not, however, consider it necessary,
in light of its finding that the refusal of planning permission amounts
to an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his home,
to decide whether the present case also raises any issue concerning
interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private and
family life (cf Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, loc.
cit., para. 55).
In determining whether the interference was necessary in a
democratic society, the Commission recalls that as a general rule it
is first for national authorities to assess the necessity for any
interference both in respect of the legislative framework and the
measure of implementation (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR,
Leander v. Sweden judgement of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 25,
para. 59). The Commission further recalls the margin of appreciation
accorded to national authorities in the sphere of planning control in
the exercise of discretionary judgement inherent in the implementation
of policies adopted in the interests of the community as a whole (see,
mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Klass and Others v. Germany judgement
of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 23, para. 49 and Buckley v.
the United Kingdom, loc. cit., para. 75).
Nonetheless, whilst it is not the Commission's task to sit in
appeal on the merits of the decision, any decision which has the effect
of interfering with a right protected under the Convention remains
subject to review for conformity with the Convention. Although the
applicant's right to respect for his home has to be balanced against
the wider interests of the local community in effective planning
controls aimed at protecting the environment and public amenity, the
consequences for the individual in the event that he is prevented from
living on his land are of particular importance in defining where the
permissible boundaries of the margin of appreciation lie (see Eur.
Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, loc. cit., paras. 74 and 76).
In circumstances where the applicant's lifestyle is essentially
nomadic, the Commission considers that if the relevant planning
authorities have made no finding that there is available to the
applicant an alternative site to which he can reasonably be expected
to move, there must exist particularly compelling reasons to justify
the resulting level of interference with the applicant's right to
respect for his home if the State is to remain within its margin of
appreciation.
Furthermore, where a discretion capable of interfering with the
enjoyment of a Convention right is conferred on national authorities,
the Commission recalls that the procedural safeguards available to the
individual will be especially material in determining whether a State
has remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the
decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be
fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to
the individual by Article 8 (Art. 8) (see Eur. Court HR, McMichael v.
the United Kingdom judgement of 24 February 1995, Series A no. 307-B,
p. 55, para. 87 and Buckley v. the United Kingdom, loc. cit.,
para. 76).
In the present case, the Commission recalls that in dismissing
the applicant's appeal against the refusal of planning permission, the
Secretary of State, who considered the findings made by the two
Inspectors, made no finding that there were any alternative sites
available to the applicant. Whilst noting the shortfall in the
provision of gypsy caravan sites within the local area, the Secretary
of State considered that the " position, should he be
forced to abandon the appeal site, would in itself represent
special circumstances which could justify permitting this form of
development in the green belt".
The Commission recalls, however, that the first Inspector did not
consider the applicant currently to enjoy the status of a gypsy; and
that the second Inspector, who considered the applicant's lifestyle was
a long way short of nomadic even before he moved to the site in 1988,
and that his occupation of bungalow type accommodation at Dobbs Weir
and the present site did not suggest that he shared an aversion to
permanent accommodation said to be experienced by some gypsies, found
that the applicant's lifestyle was not such as to require any special
site provision or treatment.
The Commission also recalls that the applicant's site is on land
forming part of the local green belt and that its use is therefore
subject to particular control under the relevant planning legislation
and policy. Whilst the applicant's use of the site was considered to
have minimal visual impact on the surrounding countryside and, before
the applicant had purchased it, the site had been subject to a degree
of development in that various nissen huts and corrugated blockwork and
wooden sheds had been put up on the land, the Commission acknowledges
that the relevant planning authorities had to balance the applicant's
right to respect for his home against the interests of the local
community in effective planning controls aimed at maintaining the
openness of the countryside and protecting it from further
encroachment.
The Commission further recalls the finding of the second
Inspector that there was virtually no evidence that the applicant,
during his occupancy of the site, had made any sustained effort to find
alternative accommodation. In this regard, the Commission notes that
the relevant planning authorities had consistently resisted the
applicant's use of the land as a site for his mobile home and that at
no stage during his occupancy of the site could the applicant be said
to have laboured under the assumption that he would be allowed to use
the land for that purpose.
The Commission does not consider that 1) the fact that the site
was within the green belt, having regard to the fact that the site was
considered to have minimal visual impact on the surrounding countryside
and had in any event already been subject to a degree of development,
and 2) the finding of the second inspector that there was little
evidence that the applicant had himself made any sustained effort to
find an alternative site, having regard to the fact that the local
authority was unable to provide or even identify a suitable,
alternative site, would have amounted to sufficient reasons had the
applicant been found to be following an essentially nomadic lifestyle.
However, in light of the first Inspector's finding that the applicant
was not currently of nomadic habit and, more particularly, the finding
of the second Inspector that the applicant's lifestyle was a long way
short of nomadic even before he moved to the site in 1988 and was not
such as to require any special site provision or treatment, the
Commission considers that the reasons given were, in the circumstances
of the present case, sufficient to justify the resulting interference
with the applicant's right to respect for his home such that the
respondent State remained within its margin of appreciation.
Recalling the decision of the Court in Buckley v. the United
Kingdom (loc. cit., para. 79), the Commission notes that the decision-
making process enabled the applicant to appeal to the Secretary of
State, and that the appeal procedure involved an assessment by two
qualified, independent experts, to whom the applicant was entitled to
make representations. The Commission notes that a subsequent appeal
to the High Court was also available to the applicant which enabled him
to challenge the legality, propriety and fairness of the decision
making procedure. The Commission is therefore satisfied that the
procedural safeguards were also such as to afford due respect to the
applicant's interests under Article 8 (Art. 8).
Accordingly, the Commission considers that in the circumstances
of the present case the national authorities did not exceed the margin
of appreciation accorded to them. In conclusion, there has been no
violation of Article 8 (Art. 8).
It follows, therefore, that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant claims to be a victim of discrimination on the
ground of his status as a gypsy contrary to Article 14 of the
Convention taken together with Article 8 (Art. 14+8). The applicant
complains that the Epping District Council Local Policy H12 and the
Department of the Environment Circular 1/94 directly stigmatise and
discriminate against the provision of housing for Gypsy communities
within the green belt. The applicant complains generally that he has
been treated differently from the house dwelling community who are
catered for by the provision of new houses in green belt areas.
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides :
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."
The Commission recalls that the District Council's stated
planning policy under Policy H12 was that "planning permission will not
be granted for a gypsy caravan site within the local area".
In the event that this policy had been determinative of the
applicant's appeal against the refusal of planning permission, the
Commission considers that this may have raised an issue under
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention. The Commission recalls,
however, that it is not its role to review national legislation in the
abstract, but to consider the specific issues raised in the case before
it (see Eur. Court HR, Bellet v. France judgment of 4 December 1995,
Series A no. 333-B, p. 42, para. 34).
The Commission recalls that before the relevant planning
authorities the decisive issue was whether, consistent with Planning
Policy Guidance Note 2, there were very special circumstance to justify
inappropriate development within the green belt. The Commission finds
no evidence that Policy H12 was a determining issue in the refusal of
planning permission and, therefore, that the applicant can in the
result be said to have been directly affected by the measure in
question.
Under Circular 1/94, which was current at the time of the re-
opened inquiry, the Commission recalls that local planning authorities
were advised that gypsy sites were not to be regarded as among those
uses of land normally appropriate within a green belt. The Commission
recalls that under Planning Policy Guidance Note 2, which is of
universal application and, as noted above, was applied in the present
case, the uses of land identified as being appropriate in a green belt
were use for the purpose of "agriculture, forestry, outdoor sport,
cemeteries, institutions standing in extensive grounds or other use as
appropriate to a rural area". Having regard to the uses of land
identified as appropriate to the green belt, the Commission does not,
therefore, find that the house dwelling community were conferred any
material advantage, or that the applicant was at a material
disadvantage by reason of his status as a gypsy under the terms of the
relevant planning policy in seeking to live within the green belt.
Furthermore the Commission finds no evidence in the present case
to substantiate the applicant's general complaint that the house
dwelling community receive more favourable treatment in the provision
of new housing within the green belt.
Accordingly, the Commission finds that the applicant in seeking
to establish his home within the green belt was not subject to
discrimination by reason of his status as a gypsy contrary to
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.
It follows, therefore, that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant complains that the refusal of planning permission
amounts to an interference with the his right to the peaceful enjoyment
of his property which is not justified by any legitimate public
interest. Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1) provides, insofar as
relevant, that:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. ...
The proceeding provisions shall not in any way impair the
right of the State to enforce such laws as it seems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with
the general interest ..."
The Commission recalls its findings with respect to the
applicant's complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. The
Commission does not consider that in the circumstances of the present
case any separate issue arises under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1)
and therefore the Commission, having regard to its reasoning, finds no
violation of this provision.
It follows, therefore, that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention in that in the determination of his right
to live in a caravan on his land he has been deprived of a fair hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal. The applicant points to the
fact that the planning appeal is determined by the Secretary of State
who, as a member of the executive, does not have the characteristics
of an independent and impartial tribunal. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides :
"In the determination of his civil rights ... everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law."
Recalling the decision of the Court in Bryan v. the United
Kingdom (judgement of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335, pp. 13-18,
paras. 30-47) where the same point was raised, the Commission considers
that the scope of the review of the planning decision available to the
applicant on appeal to the High Court, which enabled the applicant,
inter alia, to challenge any decision or finding of the Secretary of
State as being perverse or irrational; or any decision or finding of
the Inspector as having no basis in evidence or as having been made by
reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors,
was sufficient to comply with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).
It follows, therefore, that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber