AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 29554/95

                      by Hannelore FRANK

                      against Germany

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 24 October 1995

by Hannelore FRANK against Germany and registered on 18 December 1995

under file No. 29554/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant, born in 1945, is a German national, residing in

Wesenberg. In the proceedings before the Commission, she is represented

by Mr. P. Kloer, a lawyer practising in Munich.

     The facts, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as

follows.

     In March 1946 a plot of land situated in Zartwitz in the former

German Democratic Republic, was assigned to the applicant's father as

land reform property (Bodenreformeigentum). The entry into the land

register together with several restrictions was made on 20 May 1946.

     After the death of her father in 1963 the applicant and her

mother moved to Wesenberg. Subsequently, in 1967, one part of her

father's land reform property was nationalised and transferred to the

state-owned farming estate "Walter Ulbricht" and the other part was

transferred to the state-owned enterprise "Inland Fishery". The

applicant's mother died in 1987. The applicant is the heir of her

parents.

     On 10 October 1990 the applicant filed a request with the

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Office for the Settlement of Unresolved Property

Questions (Landesamt zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen - hereinafter

the "Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Office") for restitution of her father's

land reform property.

     The applicant submitted in particular that she and her mother had

been put under pressure and had been forced to move to Wesenberg after

her father's death.  Moreover, she claimed that her mother and herself

would have fulfilled the requirements for taking over the land reform

property. Finally, she pointed out that the house situated on the plot

in question had been reconstructed by her parents, and that she and her

mother had not received any compensation. On 7 June 1993 the applicant

made further submissions, relating in particular to the legal

qualification of land reform property and the question whether or not

it was inheritable. In these and the following proceedings, the

applicant was represented by counsel.

     On 4 October 1993 the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Office  rejected the

applicant's request. It found that the loss of land reform property due

to a waiver, return or withdrawal of the right in accordance with the

legal provisions relating to such property did not fall within the

scope of S. 1 of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions

(Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen). In particular, such

measures following from the special limitations attached to land reform

property, did not constitute an expropriation without compensation

within the meaning of the said Act.

     The Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Office stated that the land reform

property assigned to the applicant's father was subject to various

restrictions in relation to its transfer. According to the 1951

Regulation on the Transfer of Property (Besitzwechselverordnung) it was

not automatically devolved on the heir, but required an assignment by

the County Council (Rat des Kreises). The County Council had the right

to seize the land, a right of which it had made use when nationalising

the land reform property at issue. Since the land had not been assigned

to the applicant, the applicant had never become its owner. As regards

the applicant's argument that the division of the land in 1967 had been

unlawful, the Mecklenburg Vorpommern Office noted that quite apart from

the fact that she had already lost any right to the land reform

property at the relevant time, the division was lawful as any

restrictions had only been imposed on the owner of land reform

property, but not on the authorities. Further, the applicant could not

rely on the 1990 Act on the Rights of Owners of Land Reform Property

(Gesetz über die Rechte von Eigentümern von Grundstücken aus der

Bodenreform) which placed land reform property on an equal footing with

"full property" within the meaning of the German Civil Code

(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), because the applicant was at that time not

the owner of the land reform property.

     Further, the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Office examined whether the

nationalisation constituted a deprivation of the applicant's right to

succeed. However, according to the Regulations on the Transfer of

Property in force at the material time, the heir did not have a right

to the assignment of land reform property. Thus, an assignment was in

the absolute discretion of the authorities.

     The Mecklenburg Vorpommern Office found that the fact that the

applicant and her mother had not received any compensation for the

house which her father had reconstructed did not lead to the conclusion

that they had been expropriated. The Regulations on the Transfer of

Ownership only provided for compensation under certain conditions and

it was not for the proceedings under the Act Regulating Unresolved

Property Questions to establish whether these conditions had been

fulfilled. Finally, in respect of the forced moving away, there was no

causal link between the loss of the property and the alleged threats,

because neither the applicant nor her mother had a right to the

assignment of the land reform property.

      On 20 October 1993 the applicant filed an administrative action

against this decision with the Greifswald Administrative Court

(Verwaltungsgericht). She requested that a number of witnesses be heard

in order to prove, inter alia, that she and her mother had fulfilled

the requirements for assignment of land reform property and had

intended to continue farming the land, which they had only left under

pressure of the authorities. Further, she requested that the files

concerning her father's land reform property be taken as documentary

evidence to show, in particular, that she and her mother had not

received any compensation for the reconstruction of the house and that

the division and nationalisation of the property had violated the laws

of the German Democratic Republic.

     On 10 January 1995 the Greifswald Administrative Court, after

having held an oral hearing, dismissed the action, finding that the

applicant did not have a right to the restitution of her father's

property under the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions.

     The Court stated that land reform property did not constitute

"full property", but was a right in rem (dingliches Recht) which,

according to the 1945 Regulation on the Land Reform of Mecklenburg-

Vorpommern (Verordnung über die Bodenreform), was subject to massive

restrictions. In particular, it could not be sold, leased or divided

and was only assigned to the assignee for agricultural exploitation.

Subsequent Regulations on the Transfer of Ownership explicitly provided

that the property be withdrawn if it was not used in accordance with

its special purpose. Moreover, according to the practice of the

authorities of the German Democratic Republic, land reform property was

not inheritable. The 1951 Regulation on the Transfer of Ownership

already provided that the death of the assignee was a reason for the

retransfer of land reform property to the State. Though subsequent

Regulations did not state explicitly that land reform property was not

inheritable, they usually required that the said property be

transferred to the heirs by the competent authority. In conclusion, the

Court found that the withdrawal of land reform property in accordance

with the relevant legal provisions was an inherent part of that

particular right and did not constitute a deprivation of property

within the meaning of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions.

     However, land reform property constituted an asset within the

meaning of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions. However,

assets could only be restored to the former owner but not to the heirs.

As in 1963, when the applicant's father died, the land reform property

was not inheritable, the applicant did not become his successor and was

thus, neither entitled to restitution nor to compensation.

     The Court also found that there was no indication that the

applicant or her mother had been prevented by unfair machinations

(unlautere Machenschaften) within the meaning of the Act Regulating

Unresolved Property Questions from filing a request for compensation

as regards her father's investments in the house.

     Finally, the Court stated that due to the legal situation it was

not necessary to take the evidence proposed by the applicant.

     On 21 August 1995 the Federal Administrative Court (Bundes-

verwaltungsgericht) refused to grant the applicant leave to appeal.

The Court stated that the question as to whether the heir of the owner

of land reform property had acquired a legal position constituting an

asset which could have been expropriated within the meaning of the Act

Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, had already been answered to

the negative in its decision of 25 February 1994.  According to that

decision, it followed from the inherent limitations of land reform

property that this was true even if the heir fulfilled the requirements

for a transfer of the land. Consequently, the legal position of the

applicant was not one which could be subject to unfair machinations

within the meaning of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions.

Given this legal situation the first instance court had rightly refused

to take the evidence proposed by the applicant.

     On 4 October 1995 the Federal Constitutional Court

(Bundesverfassungsgericht) refused to entertain the applicant's

complaint.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that

she had, in violation of the respective laws of the German Democratic

Republic, been forced to give up her father's land reform property in

the German Democratic Republic in 1963. She further complains that the

courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the proceedings under the

Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, interfered with her claim

to the restitution of her father's property and her claim for

compensation as regards the reconstruction of the house situated on the

property, which in her view have to be considered as "possessions"

within the meaning of this Article. She submits in particular that the

courts wrongly interpreted the laws of the German Democratic Republic

as regards the legal qualification of land reform property and the

question whether or not it was inheritable as well as the question of

compensation for the reconstruction of the house.

2.   The applicant further complains under Article 14 of the

Convention that she was discriminated against in relation to other

owners of land reform parcels, whose property has been acknowledged as

"full property" within the meaning of the German Civil Code by the 1990

Act on the Rights of Owners of Land Reform Property, and had been

restituted to them.

3.   The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that

the Greifswald Administrative Court, in the proceedings under the Act

Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, failed to take the evidence

adduced by her and, therefore, wrongly assessed the relevant facts.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,

(P1-1) which reads as follows:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his

     possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

     conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

     international law.

     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair

     the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary

     to control the use of property in accordance with the general

     interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions

     or penalties."

     The Commission observes that the applicant is the heir of her

father, to whom a plot of land situated in the German Democratic

Republic had been assigned as so-called land reform property.  After

his death in 1963 this land reform property was partly transferred to

a state-owned farming estate and partly to another state-owned

enterprise. According to the opinion of the German courts dealing with

the applicant's request for restitution of this property, land reform

property was not inheritable under the law of the German Democratic

Republic, consequently the applicant had never acquired the position

of an owner and the land had not been expropriated.

     The Commission notes that the present case differs from previous

German cases, in which it was uncontested that an expropriation had

taken place between 1945 and 1949 by the Soviet occupational powers,

and the question arose whether the expropriation resulted in a

continuous situation and whether the responsibility of the Federal

Republic of Germany could be engaged by the fact that the Unification

Treaty excluded restitution as well as full compensation in respect of

such properties (cf. Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and

19549/92 Mayer and Others v. Germany, Dec. 4.3.96, D.R. 85, p. 5;

No. 25043/94, Krug von Nidda und von Falkenstein v. Germany,

Dec. 24.2.97, unpublished).

a.   The applicant complains that the nationalisation of her father's

land reform property was contrary to the laws of the German Democratic

Republic and amounted to an expropriation for which she was not

compensated.

     The Commission notes that the alleged expropriation occurred in

1963 in the German Democratic Republic, that is before the entry into

force of the Unification Treaty in October 1990 and before the

territory of the German Democratic Republic, where the land in question

was situated, became part of the Federal Republic of Germany to which

the Convention and its Protocols are applicable. The German authorities

can, thus, not be held responsible for the alleged expropriation as

such.

     In this respect, therefore, the Commission lacks competence

ratione personae and ratione temporis to examine the circumstances in

which the alleged expropriation took place.

b.   The applicant further complains that the courts of the Federal

Republic of Germany, in the proceedings under the Act Regulating

Unresolved Property Questions, interfered with her claim to the

restitution of her father's property and her claim for compensation as

regards the reconstruction of the house situated on the property, which

in her view have to be considered as "possessions" within the meaning

of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     The Commission recalls that "possessions" within the meaning of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) may be either "existing possessions"

(Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 23 November

1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, para. 48) or valuable assets, including

claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he had at

least a "legitimate expectation" that they will realise (Eur. Court HR,

Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland judgment of 29

November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51; Pressos Compania

Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series

A no. 332, p. 20, para. 31).

     The present case does not concern any "existing possessions" of

the applicant, since the alleged expropriation took place in 1963,

following her father's death.

     As regards the applicant's hopes to realise claims relating to

her father's property, the Commission recalls that the Convention does

not guarantee a right to become the owner of property (cf.

No. 11628/85, Dec. 9.5.86, D.R. 47, p. 270).

     The Commission finds that it follows from the carefully reasoned

decisions of the German courts that land reform property was not

inheritable at the material time and that the heir of the owner of land

reform property was not entitled to the land even if he or she

fulfilled the requirements for an assignment. The applicant, thus,

never had any "legitimate expectation" to acquire her father's land

reform property.

     It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention that she is a victim of discrimination compared with other

owners of land reform property, to whom the property was restituted.

     The Commission recalls that Article 14  (Art. 14) complements the

other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.  It

has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation

to the "rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions.  Although

the application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not presuppose a breach

of one or more of those provisions - and to this extent it is

autonomous - there can be no room for its application unless the facts

at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (Eur. Court

HR, Inze v. Austria judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p.

17, para. 36).

     As the Commission has found above that Article 1 of the First

Protocol (P1-1) is not applicable to the facts of which the applicant

complains, she cannot claim to have been discriminated against in the

enjoyment of her property rights within the meaning of this provision

(Eur. Court HR, Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A

no. 31, p. 23, para. 50).

  This part of the application must therefore also be rejected under

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2), as being incompatible with the

provisions of the Convention.

3.   Finally, the applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of  the

Convention that the Greifswald Administrative Court, in the proceedings

under the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, failed to take

the evidence adduced by her and, therefore, wrongly assessed the

relevant facts.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, as far as

relevant, provides as follows:

     "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

     everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ...

     tribunal ..."

     The Commission, assuming that Article 6 (Art. 6) is  applicable

to the proceedings at issue, recalls that the admissibility of evidence

is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a general

rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them,

whereas it is for the Convention organs to ascertain, whether the

proceedings as a whole were fair (Eur. Court HR, Doorson v. the

Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1996, to be published in Reports of

Judgments and Decisions 1996, para. 67).

     In the present case, the Greifswald Administrative Court refused

to hear the evidence proposed by the applicant on the basis of its

legal evaluation that land reform property was not inheritable and that

the heirs of the owner of such property did not have a right to have

it transferred to them even if they fulfilled the requirements for

assignment. The Commission finds that the Court could reasonably

consider that the proposed evidence was irrelevant. There is no

indication in the file that the applicant, represented by counsel,

could not duly forward her arguments or that the proceedings were

otherwise unfair.

     In these circumstances, the Commission finds that there is no

appearance that the proceedings did not comply with Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber