AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 26258/95

                      by Lennart GUSTAFSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, President

           MM.   J.-C. GEUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 27 September 1994

by Lennart Gustafsson against Sweden and registered on 20 January 1995

under file No. 26258/95;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 12 September 1996 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicant on 8 December 1996;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1953.  He resides at

Eringsboda.  He is a member of the Industrial Employees' Recognised

Unemployment Insurance Fund (Industritjänstemännens Erkända

Arbetslöshetskassa; hereinafter "IEAK").

      The applicant has previously submitted two applications (Nos.

16122/90 and 21370/93) concerning unemployment benefits (arbetslöshets-

ersättning).  In the first application, the applicant submitted a

number of complaints under Articles 3, 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention

and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention related to his

problems with IEAK.  On 3 July 1993 the Commission, sitting as a

Committee of three members, declared the application inadmissible under

Article 27 of the Convention as, in so far as the matters complained

of had been substantiated and were within the Commission's competence,

they were not found to disclose any appearance of a violation of the

Convention or its Protocols.  In the second application, the applicant,

invoking Article 6 of the Convention, complained of the proceedings in

a dispute relating to repayment of unemployment benefits, in particular

the lack of an oral hearing in the Supreme Social Insurance Court

(Försäkringsöverdomstolen) and the length of the proceedings.  The

application was declared admissible by the Commission (Second Chamber)

on 7 September 1995.

      Some of the decisions taken in the proceedings complained of in

the applicant's second application are of relevance also to the present

case.  The present case, however, concerns a dispute relating to the

applicant's right to unemployment benefits for a later period of time.

      The facts of the present case, as submitted by the parties, may

be summarised as follows.

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      In the spring of 1987, IEAK decided that the applicant was

entitled to unemployment benefits for a period of 300 days starting on

16 April 1987.

      On 26 February 1988 IEAK informed the applicant that it had

obtained information which indicated that he had received unwarranted

unemployment benefits.  It appeared that the applicant had been

studying at the University of Stockholm's law school since 1 September

1984.  IEAK accordingly intended to investigate the matter further,

inter alia, with a view to determining whether the applicant might be

required to repay part of the unemployment benefits already received.

Pending the outcome of the investigation, IEAK further decided to

withhold payment of the unemployment benefits as from 24 August 1987.

As a consequence, benefits for 238 out of the above 300 days were not

paid to the applicant.

      Following the investigation, IEAK found, on 17 June 1988, that

the applicant was not entitled to unemployment benefits while he was

studying, as he was not in a position to accept an offer of employment.

For this reason, IEAK considered that the applicant had received

unwarranted benefits during the period 1 September 1984 -

23 August 1987 and requested him to repay a total of 98,287 Swedish

crowns (SEK). The decision, which was headlined "Right to benefits -

Repayment obligation", did not specifically refer to the question of

the applicant's right to benefits for later periods, including the

period beginning on 24 August 1987 for which IEAK had withheld payment.

By letter of 27 December 1988, IEAK, however, informed the applicant

that the decision covered also this question and that his request for

payment of these benefits had accordingly been denied.

      On 8 July 1988 the applicant requested IEAK to reconsider the

matter in its entirety.  IEAK replied on 21 July, acknowledging that

the applicant had requested a reconsideration of his entitlement to

unemployment benefits.

      By decision of 3 November 1988, IEAK maintained its position in

the matter.  This decision referred only to the applicant's obligation

to repay unwarranted benefits.  In the above-mentioned letter of

27 December 1988, IEAK, however, stated that this decision constituted

a review of its decision of 17 June 1988 which, as mentioned above,

concerned also the applicant's right to unemployment benefits for later

periods.

      On 22 November 1988 the applicant appealed to the Labour Market

Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen; hereinafter "AMS").

      By letter of 5 December 1988, IEAK acknowledged receipt of the

applicant's appeal which, according to the wording of IEAK's letter,

concerned the question of his right to unemployment benefits.  The

applicant was informed that the appeal would be dealt with at IEAK's

next meeting and would thereafter be forwarded to AMS for examination.

On 19 December 1988, IEAK informed the applicant that his appeal had

been forwarded to AMS and that IEAK, in its observations to AMS, had

recommended that the appeal be rejected.

      On 18 May 1989, in a decision dealing exclusively with the

applicant's obligation to repay unwarranted benefits, AMS rejected the

applicant's appeal.  The amount in question was, however, lowered to

57,722 SEK.

      On 9 June 1989 the applicant appealed against this decision to

the Supreme Social Insurance Court.  He noted, inter alia, that AMS had

not determined whether he was entitled to benefits as from

24 August 1987.  He stated that he had appealed against IEAK's

decisions in all respects and referred to the information given by IEAK

that the decisions covered both this question and his repayment

obligation.  He further claimed that both IEAK and AMS had stated that

the two issues should be dealt with simultaneously.

      On 26 September 1990 the court rejected the applicant's request

for an oral hearing.  Instead, the applicant was given the opportunity

to submit final observations in writing, which he did on

9 November 1990.

      On 11 November 1991, at the court's request, AMS submitted

observations in the case.  These observations were forwarded to the

applicant on 12 December 1991 and he replied on 15 January 1992.

      By judgment of 11 June 1992, the Supreme Social Insurance Court,

agreeing with IEAK and AMS, found that the applicant was obliged to

repay the unemployment benefits he had received during his studies in

1984, 1985 and 1987.  The court, however, found that he was not obliged

to repay the benefits he had received during the summer holidays

between 8 June and 23 August 1987.  He was later informed by IEAK that,

as a consequence of the judgment, the total amount he was obliged to

repay was 52,070 SEK.  Like the appealed AMS decision, the court's

judgment did not deal with the question of the applicant's entitlement

to unemployment benefits as from 24 August 1987.

      By letters of 25 November 1993 and 22 February 1994, the

applicant requested IEAK either to pay him benefits for certain periods

of time or to refer the matter to AMS.  IEAK replied on 16 March 1994,

stating that he had no claims on IEAK.  The applicant maintained his

position in a further letter of 11 April 1994, to which IEAK did not

reply.

      Following the introduction of the present application, the

applicant, in a letter to AMS of 28 November 1994, requested that AMS

or IEAK make arrangements for the payment of the benefits in question

or that AMS examine the matter.

      On 2 December 1994 AMS acknowledged that it had received the

applicant's letter on 30 November 1994.  AMS informed the applicant

that it regarded the letter as an appeal against IEAK's decision.  It

did not indicate which decision, however.  At the same time, AMS

contacted IEAK and inquired whether there was a decision against which

the applicant could appeal.  IEAK replied on 27 January 1995 that the

applicant had previously been informed that he had no claims on IEAK

and that his letter to AMS had to be regarded as a new claim for

unemployment benefits which, accordingly, should first be dealt with

by IEAK.  As a consequence, the matter was closed at AMS on

27 January 1995.

      On 8 March 1995 IEAK requested the applicant to state whether he

had worked or studied between September 1987 and July 1988.  On

30 March 1995 the applicant replied that he had pursued his studies

most of the time until 25 May 1988 and had been unemployed for the

remainder of the period.

      On 3 May 1995 IEAK decided that the applicant was entitled to

unemployment benefits for 45 days between the 35th week of 1987 and the

34th week of 1988, i.e. the period 24 August 1987 - 28 August 1988.

These benefits were, however, set off against the amount the applicant

was obliged to repay following the Supreme Social Insurance Court's

judgment.  This amount was accordingly reduced from 52,070 to

41,465 SEK.  The decision further stated that 230.5 days remained of

the above-mentioned period of 300 days.

      Apparently, the applicant has not taken any further action in the

matter after IEAK's decision of 3 May 1995.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice

      The Act on Unemployment Insurance (Lag om arbetslöshets-

försäkring, 1973:370; hereinafter "the 1973 Act") includes provisions

which govern certain aspects of the activities of the forty

unemployment insurance funds which administer unemployment insurance

in Sweden.  The Act also includes provisions on unemployment benefits.

In order to be insured, according to the Act, a person has to be a

member of an unemployment insurance fund.  Anyone who fulfils the

requirements of the by-laws of a fund, with respect to employment

within the fund's field of activities, has the right to become a

member.  A fund is entitled to State subsidies covering benefits paid

out in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Act.  According to

Section 54 of the 1973 Act, a fund shall collect a fixed membership fee

from each member.

      According to Section 4 of the 1973 Act in its wording as of

1 January 1989, unemployment benefits cannot be obtained by a person

engaged in education unless there are special reasons.  Until

1 January 1989 the issue as to whether an insured person was entitled

to benefits was assessed in the light of the provisions concerning the

obligation to be at the disposal of the labour market.  Unemployment

benefits were according to practice denied if a person was deemed to

be prevented, by his or her studies, from accepting a job offer

(cf. Government Bill 1987/88:114, p. 33 et seq.).

      Under Section 96 a of the 1973 Act, a decision by an unemployment

insurance fund shall be reconsidered by the fund at the request of the

insured person whom the decision concerns.  According to Section 97 in

its wording until 1 October 1995, an appeal could subsequently be

lodged with AMS.  Under Section 98 in its former wording, a decision

by AMS could be appealed against to the Supreme Social Insurance Court

until 1 July 1993 and thereafter to the administrative courts, in the

first instance a county administrative court (länsrätt).  As from

1 October 1995, AMS is not involved in the examination of an

individual's entitlement to unemployment benefits.  Instead, an appeal

against a decision by an unemployment insurance fund is lodged directly

with a county administrative court.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains, under Article 6 of the Convention, that

the dispute concerning his entitlement to unemployment benefits as from

24 August 1987 has not been determined within a reasonable time.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 27 September 1994 and

registered on 20 January 1995.

      On 15 May 1996 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to bring

the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to

invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and

merits.

      The Government's observations were submitted on 12 September 1996

after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.  The

applicant replied on 8 December 1996, also after an extension of the

time-limit.

THE LAW

      The applicant complains that the dispute concerning his

entitlement to unemployment benefits as from 24 August 1987 has not

been determined within a reasonable time.  He invokes Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention which, in relevant parts, reads as follows:

      "1. In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone

      is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time ..."

      The respondent Government submit that the application should not

be dealt with as it is substantially the same as the matter examined

by the Commission in application no. 21370/93.  Should the Commission

not share this opinion, the Government maintain that the application

is inadmissible.  They argue that the applicant, being a university

student, was not entitled to the unemployment benefits in question

under the relevant domestic legislation and thus could not, on arguable

grounds, claim a right to such benefits.  Further referring to the

public law features of the Swedish system of unemployment insurance,

the Government contend that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does

not apply and that the application is, accordingly, incompatible

ratione materiae with the Convention.  In the alternative, the

Government claim that IEAK's decision to withhold payment of

unemployment benefits as from 24 August 1987 has been implicitly dealt

with by AMS on 18 May 1989 and by the Supreme Social Insurance Court

on 11 June 1992.  As the applicant did not introduce the present

complaint until 27 September 1994, it was made out of time.

      As to the merits of the case, the Government submit that the

application is manifestly ill-founded.  Maintaining that the period to

be considered started on 22 November 1988 when the applicant appealed

to AMS and ended on 11 June 1992 when the Supreme Social Insurance

Court gave judgment, they argue that the proceedings entailed a certain

measure of complexity, that the delays that may have occurred were not

attributable to the State and that the matter at stake in the

proceedings was not of considerable importance to the applicant.

      The applicant contests that the present application is

substantially the same as application no. 21370/93 or that his civil

rights were not involved.  He argues that, for certain periods of time

after 23 August 1987, he has been entitled to unemployment benefits

under the relevant domestic legislation.  For instance, he did not

study at all during the autumn of 1988, the spring of 1989 and most of

the autumn of 1989.  Instead, he was applying for a job.  In this

connection, the applicant refers to IEAK's decision of 3 May 1995 to

grant him benefits for certain days after 23 August 1987.  It was thus

important for him to have a decision clearly stating to what extent he

was entitled to benefits after that date.  However, neither AMS nor the

Supreme Social Insurance Court examined, explicitly or implicitly, this

question but only dealt with the repayment issue.  In fact, the court

was prevented from doing that, as such an examination would have gone

beyond the subject-matter of the appealed AMS decision.  The applicant

also maintains that his complaint has not been made out of time as, in

his opinion, the case has not yet been settled.

      The applicant further contends that the proceedings in the case

started on 24 August 1987 and are still going on.  The necessary

information on his studies and job applications are easily accessible

at the university and the employment agency and the delays in the case

have thus been attributable to AMS and the Supreme Social Insurance

Court.  Moreover, the case is not complex and the matter at stake is

of great economic importance to the applicant.

      The Commission first notes that the present application concerns

the examination of the applicant's entitlement to unemployment benefits

as from 24 August 1987, whereas application no. 21370/93 relates to a

different time period.  Although some decisions are of importance to

both applications, the events which have taken place subsequent to the

judgment of the Supreme Social Insurance Court are relevant only to the

present application.  Moreover, the applicant's entitlement to benefits

depends on whether, at any given time, he fulfils the requirements

under the relevant domestic legislation.  The Commission therefore

considers that the present application is not substantially the same

as the matter examined by the Commission in application no. 21370/93.

      The Commission then recalls that when considering the

applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention to the

proceedings in question it has first to ascertain whether there was a

dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds,

to be recognised under domestic law.  The dispute must be genuine and

serious.  It may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but

also to its scope and the manner of its exercise.  Finally, the result

of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question

(cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Zander v. Sweden judgment of

25 November 1993, Series A no. 279-B, p. 38, para. 22).

      In the present case, the Commission recalls that the dispute

between the applicant and IEAK concerned the question whether, as from

24 August 1987, he fulfilled the requirements under the 1973 Act and

thus was entitled to unemployment benefits.  The main issue was

whether, at any given time, he was available to the labour market and

able to accept a job offer.  By decision of 3 May 1995, IEAK considered

that for a period of 45 days in 1987-1988 the applicant was entitled

to unemployment benefits and thus had fulfilled the requirements.

Thus, the Commission finds it established that the applicant could, on

arguable grounds, claim that he had a right to such benefits and that

this was recognised under domestic law.

      The Commission further considers that the dispute was genuine and

serious and that the outcome of the dispute was directly decisive for

the applicant's entitlement to unemployment benefits.  The proceedings

thus involved the determination of a "right" for the purposes of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      As to the question whether the determination involved a "civil"

right, the Commission recalls that the dispute arose between the

applicant and an unemployment insurance fund of which he was a member

and to which he contributed financially in order to be covered in case

of unemployment.  Despite the public law features of the system of

unemployment insurance, the applicant was affected in his relation with

a private contractor.  Moreover, the dispute concerned his means of

subsistence.  Therefore, and having regard to the case-law of the

European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Feldbrugge v. the

Netherlands (judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 99), Deumeland v.

Germany (judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 100), Salesi v. Italy

(judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-E) and Schuler-Zgraggen

v. Switzerland (judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263), the

Commission finds that the applicant's right was a "civil right" within

the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Consequently, this provision applies in the present case.

      As regards the period to be considered, the Commission recalls

that IEAK took decisions on 17 June and 3 November 1988 which,

according to its subsequent letter to the applicant, concerned, inter

alia, the issue relevant to the present application, i.e. the

applicant's entitlement to unemployment benefits as from

24 August 1987.  The applicant appealed to AMS on 22 November 1988, but

in its decision of 18 May 1989 AMS did not address that issue.  This

was pointed out by the applicant in his subsequent appeal to the

Supreme Social Insurance Court.  The court gave judgment on

11 June 1992, approximately three years and seven months after the

applicant's appeal to AMS.  Again, the judgment did not deal with the

issue of the applicant's entitlement to benefits as from

24 August 1987.

      The Commission considers that, at the latest when the Supreme

Social Insurance Court gave judgment in the case, the applicant must

have understood that his entitlement to benefits as from 24 August 1987

was not going to be separately examined by AMS or the court and that

proceedings concerning this issue were no longer pending.  However, he

did not introduce his complaint concerning the length of the

proceedings in this respect until 27 September 1994, i.e. more than

six months after the court's judgment.

      The Commission therefore finds that, under Article 26 (Art. 26)

of the Convention, it cannot examine the applicant's complaint in so

far as it concerns the examination by the Supreme Social Insurance

Court or earlier proceedings.  Furthermore, even assuming that IEAK's

letter to the applicant of 16 March 1994 could be considered as a

decision on the question of the applicant's entitlement to unemployment

benefits as from 24 August 1987, it was also taken more than six months

before the introduction of the present application and therefore cannot

be examined.

      The Commission recalls, however, that IEAK, on 3 May 1995,

decided that the applicant was entitled to unemployment benefits for

certain days between 24 August 1987 and 28 August 1988.  IEAK's

examination originated in the applicant's letter to AMS of 28 November

1994 which was dealt with as a new claim for benefits.  In so far as

the applicant's complaint covers these proceedings, the Commission

finds that it has been submitted within the time-limit prescribed by

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention and accordingly may be examined.

However, the relevant time period - about five months - does not exceed

what could be considered as reasonable in the circumstances of the

case.

      Thus, to the extent the Commission may deal with the applicant's

complaint, it does not reveal any violation of the requirement of a

"hearing ... within a reasonable time" under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

       M.-T. SCHOEPFER                           G.H. THUNE

         Secretary                               President

   to the Second Chamber                   of the Second Chamber