AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 33186/96

                      by Charlene Sarah Edith WEBB

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 2 July 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 2 August 1996 by

Charlene Sarah Edith WEBB against the United Kingdom and registered on

25 September 1996 under file No. 33186/96;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a citizen of Bermuda, born in 1966 and currently

in custody in Bermuda. She is represented before the Commission by

Ms. Cordella Stewart, a solicitor practising in London. The facts of

the case as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The particular circumstances of the case

      On 28 March 1995, the Supreme Court of Bermuda convicted the

applicant of two counts of conspiracy to import prohibited drugs, two

counts of importation of prohibited drugs and two counts of possession

of controlled drugs. In each case the drugs were respectively cocaine

and cannabis. The applicant was sentenced to a total of 12 years

imprisonment.

      The prosecution case was that during 1993 a group of United

States servicemen stationed at the US Naval Base, Bermuda, became

involved in a criminal conspiracy to import prohibited drugs from the

United States to Bermuda, and that the applicant, a citizen of Bermuda,

was involved in this conspiracy. Two of those involved were C.S. and

O.F., both serving members of the US Armed Forces stationed in Bermuda.

O.F. was detained in September 1993. He was interviewed by the US

Investigation Officer and the Bermuda Police. During the investigation

both O.F. and C.S. (who had been named by O.F.) admitted involvement

in a drug importation circle and agreed to co-operate with the

authorities. Their co-operation involved the carrying of a "dummy"

package of drugs, which was subsequently found in the applicant's

handbag. The applicant admitted knowing O.F. and receiving packages

from him, but stated they were unsolicited gifts. She later resiled

from this admission, stating it was obtained under oppression.

      Prior to the applicant's trial, O.F. and C.S. were charged,

convicted and sentenced by a US court martial. O.F. and C.S. were

treated more leniently as a result of their co-operation with the US

military authorities.  O.F. and C.S. also entered into an agreement

with the Attorney General of Bermuda, whereby they were granted

immunity from prosecution by the civil authorities in Bermuda on three

express conditions, namely that they each give evidence for the

prosecution at the applicant's trial, that neither commit perjury in

the course of giving evidence and that the testimony they give be

consistent with the statements they had previously given to the Bermuda

police.

      Before the commencement of the trial, the applicant's counsel

applied to the judge to exercise his discretion to exclude the evidence

of O.F. and C.S., on the grounds that the immunities and conditions

imposed upon them rendered them unreliable witnesses. The judge

rejected the application and admitted the evidence of O.F. and C.S.

      The prosecution also adduced evidence of various letters and a

facsimile that were said to implicate the applicant. The applicant

denied authorship of these letters. The prosecution called a work

colleague of the applicant, who testified that the handwriting was that

of the applicant.

      At the close of the prosecution case, counsel for the applicant

made a submission to the judge that there was no case to answer,

relying upon the conditions under which O.F. and C.S. gave evidence,

which it was alleged made their evidence unreliable.  The applicant's

counsel applied to the judge to allow the jury to remain in court while

the submission was made and ruled upon, contrary to normal practice.

The judge permitted the jury to remain during the submission of no case

to answer. The judge rejected the submission of no case to answer and

allowed the trial to continue. In his final summing up the judge gave

a direction on how to assess the credibility of O.F. and C.S. and

alerted the jury to the fact that they gave evidence after having made

pre-trial agreements with the US authorities. The judge also warned the

jury of the dangers of relying upon the evidence of O.F. and C.S.

without independent confirmation, and gave a clear direction on

corroboration evidence.

      The applicant appealed against her conviction to the Court of

Appeal of Bermuda. Her grounds of appeal included the fact that the

trial judge should not have admitted the evidence of O.F. and C.S., or

that alternatively he should have carefully directed the jury as to the

possible unreliable nature of their evidence. Further grounds of appeal

were that the submission of no case to answer was heard in the presence

of the jury and that an identification of handwriting should not have

been given by a non-expert.

      On 30 November 1995 the applicant's appeal was dismissed by the

Court of Appeal of Bermuda. The Court of Appeal, in a fully reasoned

judgment, dealt with each of the applicant's grounds of appeal. It

found that the judge was not required to exclude the evidence of O.F.

and C.S, and that he gave adequate directions on how the jury should

deal with that evidence. It also noted that the applicant's counsel had

requested the jury to be present for the submission of no case to

answer, and that even bearing in mind the later case of Crosdale v. R.

([1995] 2 All ER 500), there was no prejudice to the applicant in the

fact that the judge had departed from the ordinary Bermudian procedure

of considering the submission of no case to answer in the presence of

the jury, although it accepted that there had been an irregularity. As

to the handwriting evidence, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial

judge that the evidence was not evidence on comparison of handwriting

(which might have required an expert), but a statement by the witness

that he recognised the handwriting as the applicant's. Accordingly, it

could be admitted.

      The Court of Appeal refused special leave to appeal to the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ("the Privy Council"). The

applicant renewed her application for special leave to the Privy

Council. At a hearing in London on 5 February 1996 the applicant's

counsel addressed the Privy Council at an oral application for special

leave. The Privy Council refused leave.

Relevant domestic law

      The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the final

appellate court for Bermuda. It is a Commonwealth and not an English

Court, which sits in London for convenience only. The practice and

procedure of the Privy Council is governed by the Judicial Committee

Rules 1957. If the supreme domestic court refuses an appeal, special

leave for an appeal may be sought from the Privy Council itself. The

Privy Council does not as a rule grant special leave unless the case

raises a point of "great and general importance" or in cases of "grave

injustice", such as where there has been a disregard of legal process

or a violation of natural justice (Halsburys Laws of England, Vol 10

Para 786).

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains that her trial was unfair and in

violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.  In particular she

complains that the Court admitted in her trial the evidence of two

accomplices and the evidence of a non-expert witness to identify her

handwriting. She complains that the trial judge heard and rejected a

submission of no case to answer in the presence of the jury. Finally

she complains that the Privy Council failed to give reasons for its

refusal of special leave to appeal.

THE LAW

      The applicant invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention, claiming that her trial was unfair. Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides so far as relevant:

      "In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

      everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ..."

      The applicant complains that the admission of the evidence of

O.F. and C.S., and the admission of the evidence of a non-expert as

regards her handwriting, rendered the trial unfair.

      The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has made a

declaration under Article 63 extending the Convention to Bermuda and

that an Article 25 declaration has also been made in respect of

Bermuda. The Commission accordingly has jurisdiction and is competent

to consider the applicant's complaints about proceedings in Bermuda.

      The Commission recalls that the admissibility of evidence is

primarily governed by the rules of domestic law. The admissibility and

assessment of evidence are in principle matters for the national

courts. The Commission's task under the Convention is to ascertain

whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, were fair (Eur. Court

HR, Bricmont v. Belgium judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 158,

p. 31, para. 89 and Saidi v. France judgment of 20 September 1993,

Series A no. 261-C, p. 56, para. 43).

      The Commission notes that O.F. and C.S. had been charged,

convicted and sentenced by the US court martial prior to giving

evidence. Further O.F. and C.S. were granted immunity from prosecution

in the civil jurisdiction. With regard to the condition imposed upon

O.F. and C.S., that they give evidence in accordance with their

statements to the Bermuda Police, the Commission notes that there was

also an express obligation on O.F. and C.S. not to commit perjury. The

judge further gave a clear direction on assessing the credibility of

witnesses and the dangers of convicting on uncorroborated evidence, and

the Court of Appeal confirmed this. The Commission considers that in

these circumstances the exercise of the judge's discretion to admit the

evidence of O.F. and C.S. cannot be said to have rendered the trial

unfair within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      The applicant criticises the fact that the judge permitted a work

colleague of the applicant to give evidence on the applicant's

handwriting and authorship of certain documents. There is no indication

that the witness was not familiar with the applicant's handwriting and

it was for the jury to weigh this evidence against the applicant's

denial of authorship. In these circumstances the Commission does not

consider that the judge's admission of such evidence, amounts to

unfairness within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      The applicant complains that the submission of no case to answer

was heard and dismissed in the presence of the jury. The Commission

notes that the general rule is that such submissions are made in the

absence of the jury, so as not to risk any prejudice to the defendant

and that the practice of holding the submission in the presence of the

jury has been the subject of judicial criticism. The Commission also

notes that in R v. Crosdale ([1995] 2 All ER 500) the Privy Council

held that the jury should not be present during a submission of no case

to answer due to the risk the jury will be influenced by what they

hear, particularly from the judge. However in the present case the

applicant's counsel requested that the jury remain for the submission.

The submission was made on the ground that the evidence of O.F. and

C.S. was too unreliable to found a conviction. The applicant's counsel

referred to the immunities granted to O.F. and C.S. in return for their

giving of evidence on certain conditions, thus making the jury fully

aware of the circumstances and conditions in which these witnesses gave

their evidence. Further the judge, in his summing up, drew attention

to the pre-trial agreements of O.F. and C.S. with the US Authorities,

and warned the jury about the dangers of convicting on uncorroborated

evidence. Moreover, the Court of Appeal was categoric that the

applicant had suffered no harm as a result of the presence of the jury.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that the fact the jury

remained for the submission and rejection of no case to answer, cannot

amount to unfairness within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1).

      The applicant complains that the Privy Council did not give

reasons for its refusal of leave to appeal.

      The Commission recalls that the manner in which Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) applies in relation to appeal proceedings depends on the

special features of the proceedings involved. Account must be taken of

the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order and the

role of the appeal court therein: in the case of leave to appeal

proceedings, the nature of those proceedings and their significance in

the context of the proceedings as a whole must be considered, together

with the powers of the appellate jurisdiction and the manner in which

the proceedings are actually conducted (see Eur. Court HR, Monnell and

Morris v. the United Kingdom judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A

no. 115, p. 22, para. 58, where no oral hearing was required on an

application for leave to appeal to the English Court of Appeal).

Further, where a supreme court refuses to accept a case on the basis

that the legal grounds for such a case are not made out, very limited

reasoning may satisfy the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention (see, for example, E. & G. Müller-Eberstein v. Germany, No.

29753/96, Dec. 27.11.96, concerning the Federal Constitutional Court

in Germany, which rejects decisions in summary proceedings by reference

to the statutory provisions governing the Federal Constitutional

Court).

      The Commission first notes that there was an oral hearing before

the Privy Council at which counsel for the applicant was heard. The

Commission do not consider that the facts disclose any evidence of a

lack of equality of arms.

      The Commission further notes that special leave to appeal to the

Privy Council will only be given where a case raises a point of "great

and general importance" or in cases of "grave injustice". In the

context of appeals to the Privy Council, where there has been a full

appeal before the Court of Appeal, it must be apparent to litigants who

have been refused leave that they have failed to satisfy the Privy

Council that their case involves either a point of "great and general

importance" or a "grave injustice". The factual position is therefore

similar to the position before the Federal Constitutional Court in

Germany, where no detailed reasons for rejection of a case are given.

      The Commission, having considered the proceedings as a whole,

considers that there is no indication of unfairness in the present case

such as would constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1).

      It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

      M.F. BUQUICCHIO                             J. LIDDY

         Secretary                                President

   to the First Chamber                     of the First Chamber