AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 31006/96

                      by David and Roselie WEBB

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 2 July 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 27 March 1996 by

David and Roselie WEBB against the United Kingdom and registered on

15 April 1996 under file No. 31006/96;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     30 May 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 3 July 1996;

-    the further observations submitted by the Government and the

     applicant on 19 December 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicants, who are married, are British citizen born in 1948

and 1945 respectively and resident in Salisbury. They are represented

before the Commission by Mr. Luke Clements, a solicitor practising in

Hereford. The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as

follows.

a.   Particular circumstances of the case

     The applicant are Romany gypsies. They have lived in a caravan

in or about the Wiltshire area all their lives as have their forebears

for generations.

     Due to the difficulties facing the applicants in continuing their

nomadic life, in particular finding places for lawful encampment, in

or about 1990 the applicants moved onto land which they had purchased.

They applied for planning permission for the stationing of their

caravan.

     Planning permission for a "mobile home" for agricultural use was

refused on 25 October 1990 by Salisbury district council ("the district

council") and an enforcement notice issued on 12 December 1990.

     Further caravans were moved onto the applicants' site (apparently

those of their two adult daughters who live with them).

     Following a public inquiry on 28 August 1991, the applicants'

appeal against the refusal of planning permission was rejected on

planning grounds alone by the planning inspector, who also indicated

that it was for the district council to consider any further

application raising gypsy status on its merits.

     The applicants' application for permission to use their land for

a 15 pitch gypsy site was refused by the district council on

23 April 1992. Following the issue of summonses for failure to comply

with enforcement notices, the applicants were prosecuted in the

magistrates' court. The first applicant was convicted of non-compliance

on 23 February 1993.

     In or about January 1993, further caravans moved onto the site.

These caravans were removed following the issue of an injunction by the

High Court on 26 January 1993.

     On 15 March 1993, the applicants made a further application for

planning permission for change of use of the land to accommodate a

gypsy family including the construction of vehicular access. The

district council proposed to use its powers under section 178 of the

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("TCPA 1990") to enter onto the

applicants' land and remove their caravans. The applicants' application

for leave to seek judicial review of this proposal was rejected on

29 October 1993. Following the death of the father of the second

applicant in January 1994, the local authority cancelled their proposed

action.

     The applicants' further application lodged in December 1993 for

change of use of the land to site one caravan to house one gypsy family

was refused on 11 March 1994. The grounds stated that the development

would be detrimental to the character of the "special Landscape Area",

unrelated to any established settlement and would pose a source of

danger and cause inconvenience to highway users.

     During 1994, the district council and the Wiltshire County

Council identified two alternative sites at Zeals (35-40 miles away)

for which the purchase prices were £45 000 and £40 000 respectively.

A meeting was held on 21 October 1994 attended by the applicant and his

wife, their adviser, the chairman of the National Gypsy Council (NGC)

and officers of the County Council, at which the availability of these

two sites was discussed. A number of possibilities, including the

leasing of the land with an option to buy in the future, were raised.

     On 28 December 1994, the chairman of the NGC wrote to the County

Council stating:

     "Personally, I cannot see what more the County and District

     Councils can do for ; they have gone to a

     great deal of time and expense in searching for a suitable

     alternative piece of land, which they have then taken him

     to see, and... he has already agreed that the land at Zeals

     is suitable for him... I am concerned... that a planning

     application has not been submitted on the land at Zeals,

     even though the meeting took place over two months ago, and

     I can no longer see where the County Council have any

     responsibility towards this family; certainly if

     applicant> does not submit a planning application in

     respect of the Zeals land but instead chooses to go his own

     way, he will receive no further support from ourselves."

     Following a public inquiry in January 1995, the applicants'

appeal against the refusal of planning permission was refused. In his

letter of 17 March 1993, the planning inspector noted that the

applicants' gypsy status was accepted by the district council and that

their gypsy status and other personal circumstances were material

considerations to be taken into account. He found however that the

development would seriously harm the scenic qualities of the open and

attractive rural landscape. He observed that the applicants had lived

in the area for 25 years, had aged relatives nearby, and that positive

progress in finding alternative sites had foundered on problems of

cost, lack of planning permission and the family's reluctance to move

35-40 miles away. These were however insufficient reasons to set aside

the planning considerations.

     The applicants applied to quash the planning inspector's decision

letter pursuant to section 288 of the TCPA 1990.

     By letter dated 1 September 1995, the County Council informed the

applicants that one of the alternative sites at Zeals was no longer

available, as being required for highways operational use.

     The application in respect of the planning inspector's decision

was dismissed by a Deputy High Court judge on 3 October 1995.

     By letter dated 24 October 1995, the district council informed

the applicants that the second of the alternative sites at Zeal had

been sold to another purchaser. It was stated that no additional land

was available.

     On 25 October 1995, the district council decided to exercise its

powers under section 178 of the TCPA 1990 to enter onto the applicants

land and remove the family's caravan. By letter dated 3 November 1995,

the district council warned the applicants of "extreme measures" and

informed them that they would retain the family's home and possessions

as security for the costs of the eviction.

     On 16 November 1995, the applicants sought leave to apply for

judicial review of the decision to enter their land and remove their

caravan.

     By letter dated 17 November 1995, the local authority official,

acting as gypsy liaison officer for the County Council, stated that he

could confirm that the applicants had made great efforts to look for

alternative pieces of land. He stated that the County Council had

reviewed its entire landholdings in the area for a possible site and

that 10 parcels of land were considered in detail by the County and

District Councils but none found to be suitable. While the applicant

had also identified other parcels of land in Hampshire and other

adjoining district council areas, these were found to be unacceptable

when canvassed with the planning authorities. He confirmed that at the

present time there was no alternative suitable accommodation available

to the applicants within the area.

     On 22 November 1995, the High Court judge dismissed the

application. He stated, inter alia, that notwithstanding the

circumstances of the case, the situation at English law did not even

arguably give rise to a claim for judicial review.

     On 27 March 1996, the applicants' renewed application to the

Court of Appeal was refused.

     In the District there are three official gypsy caravan sites with

a total of 62 permanent pitches - Dairyhouse Bridge and Lodge Hill

which the Government state have no waiting list at this time, and

Oaktree Farm, which had a waiting list of 2/3 names. There is a transit

section at the Oaktree farm site which is unused and its entrance

blocked, where the District Council is stated as being willing to make

a space available for a temporary period, to allow the applicants to

pitch their caravan lawfully while looking for a site to buy with

planning permission or until a permanent pitch of the appropriate size

becomes available on one of the official sites. This proposal was put

to the applicants by letter of 22 May 1996 by the District Council. The

applicants state that these sites are unsuitable - the site at

Dairyhouse Bridge is exceedingly insanitary and subject to flooding and

the site at Load Hill is unfit for habitation, since it is verging on

being a scrap heap.

b.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     On 3 November 1994, the Criminal Justice and Public Order

Act 1994 came into force and repealed previous legislation which had,

inter alia, imposed a duty on local authorities to provide adequate

accommodation for gypsies in their area, conferred a power on the

Secretary of State to direct local authorities to provide sites and

annulled a grants scheme whereby one hundred per cent grants were

available to local authorities to cover the costs of creating gypsy

sites. It also repealed the power of the Secretary of State to

designate areas where adequate provision for gypsies had been made or

where it was not necessary or expedient to make such provision. The

effect of designation had been to render it a criminal offence for a

gypsy to station a caravan in the area on the highway, unoccupied land

or on occupied land without the consent of the owner.

     Pursuant to section 77 of the 1994 Act, a local authority may

direct an unauthorised camper to move. An unauthorised camper is a

person residing in a vehicle on the highway, unoccupied land or

occupied land without the owner's consent. Failure to comply with such

a direction as soon as practicable, or to re-enter the land within

three months is a criminal offence. Local authorities may apply to a

magistrates' court for an order authorising them to remove caravans

parked in contravention of such a direction (section 78).

     New guidance on gypsy sites and planning in light of the 1994 Act

was issued to local authorities by the Government in Circular 1/94

(5 January 1994). The Circular stated:

     "In order to encourage private site provision, local

     planning authorities should offer advice and practical help

     with planning procedures to gypsies who wish to acquire

     their own land for development. ...The aim should be as far

     as possible to help gypsies to help themselves, to allow

     them to secure the kind of sites they require and thus help

     avoid breaches of planning control..."

     "As with other planning applications, proposals for gypsy

     sites should continue to be determined solely in relation

     to land-use factors. Whilst gypsy sites might be acceptable

     in some rural locations, the granting of permission must be

     consistent with agricultural, archaeological, countryside,

     environmental and Green Belt policies..."

     On the enforcement powers under the 1994, a Circular 18/94-76/94

stated:

     "The Secretaries of State recognise that in certain

     circumstances it may be in the public interest to evict an

     unauthorised gypsy encampment and they accept that this

     must remain a matter for local discretion. The Secretaries

     of State consider that it would usually be legitimate for

     a local authority to exercise the new eviction powers when

     gypsies camped unlawfully in their area refuse to move onto

     an authorised local authority site.

     ... The Secretaries of State continue to consider that

     local authorities should not use their powers to evict

     gypsies needlessly. They should use the powers in a humane

     and compassionate fashion and primarily to reduce nuisance

     and to afford a higher level of protection to private

     owners."

     These circulars cancelled previous circulars 28/77 and 57/78

which, inter alia, advised local authorities that the special need to

accommodate gypsies should be taken into account as a material

consideration in reaching planning decisions.

COMPLAINTS

Article 3

     The applicants submit that they are Romany gypsies who define

their ethnicity by the accommodation which they occupy. This lifestyle

is effectively rendered unlawful or illegal in the region where they

live. The State is effectively proposing to drag them from their land,

seize their home and possessions and sell them in circumstances where

they have nowhere else that they can reasonably go. The opportunity to

follow their traditional lifestyle will be destroyed. This constitutes,

they submit, inhuman and degrading treatment.

Article 8

     The applicants adopted the reasoning of the majority of the

Commission in the Buckley case (No. 20357/94, Comm. Report 25.1.95

paras. 76-85, to be included in Reports 1996: see reference to Court

judgment below). The applicants submit that the treatment suffered is

of greater severity than in the Buckley case. They have been prosecuted

and are to have their home and possessions forcibly confiscated and

thereby to be rendered homeless. They submit that the State accepts

that there is no alternative gypsy caravan accommodation and that their

only option is destitution or housing.

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

     The applicants submit that the actions of eviction and

confiscation will disclose an unreasonable deprivation of possessions

in that it fails to strike a fair balance between the general interest

of the community and the requirements of the protection of the

fundamental interests of the applicants. The deprivation will render

them not only destitute but will deprive them of their entire

possessions and render them without shelter.

Article 13 of the Convention

     The applicants submit that despite the courts' acknowledgment of

their "very stark" predicament the courts are unable to intervene

because the mechanism of judicial review does not allow the court to

consider whether the actions of the council violate the provisions of

the Convention.

Article 14 of the Convention

     The applicants submit that they have been discriminated against

in their enjoyment of the above provisions.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 27 March 1996 and registered

on 15 April 1996.

     On 16 April 1996, the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the Government and to ask for written observations on

the admissibility and merits of the application. It refused the

applicants' request for Rule 36 to be applied but decided to give the

case priority under Rule 33 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure.

     The Government's observations were submitted on 30 May 1996 and

the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 3 July 1996.

     On 22 October 1996, the Commission invited the parties to make

further submissions in light of the Court's judgment in the Buckley

case (Eur. Court HR judgment of 23 September 1996).

     The Government and the applicant submitted further observations

on 19 December 1996.

THE LAW

1.   The applicants complain of a violation of their right to respect

for their private and family life and home contrary to Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention, in that they have been refused permission

to live in their caravan on their land and are subject to enforcement

measures.

     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority

     with the exercise of this right except such as is in

     accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

     society in the interests of national security, public

     safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

     prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

     health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

     freedoms of others."

     The Government submit that to the extent that there is any

interference with the applicants' rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) this

pursues the legitimate aim of environmental and planning control, and

is applied in a proportionate way. They point out that the applicants

took up residence without obtaining the necessary prior permission,

that their occupation has been found by the planning inspector to cause

unacceptable harm to the rural amenity of the area and that they have

been afforded opportunities to move elsewhere, of which they have

failed to avail themselves. The Government submit that the interests

of the applicants received fair and proper regard by the responsible

planning authorities when exercising their discretion in the

implementation of policy in the planning sphere.

     The applicants submit that the interference with their rights

under Article 8 (Art. 8) is disproportionate. They submit that no fair

balance is struck between the interests of gypsies and planning

control. Local authorities no longer have the duty to provide official

sites and grants for such purposes have been withdrawn. While the

Circular guidance to local authorities professes an intention to

provide that the planning system recognises the need for accommodation

consistent with gypsies' nomadic lifestyle, it at the same time

withdrew previous guidance which indicated that it might be necessary

to accept gypsy sites in green belt or areas of outstanding beauty and

indicated that proposals for gypsy sites should continue to be

determined solely in relation to land-use factors. They refer to the

fact that 80% of all planning applications are granted but up to 90%

of gypsy applications are refused. They also contend that they have not

had and do not have a viable alternative open to them to remaining on

their own land. The sites which were stated as available for sale were

prohibitively expensive, there were no sites available elsewhere and

as regards the offer made in May 1996 of the Oaktree farm transit site,

this is unsuitable and used for temporary periods ie. a maximum stay

of 28 days and nothing is said about where the applicants might go at

the expiry of that period.

     The Commission finds, first of all, that the measures taken in

respect of the applicants' occupation of land in their caravan

constitutes an interference with their right to respect for their

family and private life and their home. It also notes in that respect

that the applicants are gypsies for whom living in a caravan is an

integral and deeply-felt lifestyle and that this traditional lifestyle

attracts the guarantees of Article 8 (Art. 8) as concerning their

private life (see Buckley v. the United Kingdom, No. 20348/92, Comm.

Report 11.1.95, para. 64).

     According to the constant case-law of the Convention organs, an

interference under the first paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8) entails

a violation unless it is "in accordance with the law", has an aim that

is legitimate under Article 8 paragraph 2 (Art. 8-2) and is "necessary

in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim (see, inter alia, Eur.

Court HR, W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A

no. 121, p. 27, para. 60 (a).

     As regards the criterion "in accordance with the law", the

Commission finds, and the applicants do not dispute, that the measures

were taken pursuant to the relevant provisions governing town and

country planning and the aims pursued by the measures included the

protection of the rights of others (through highway safety, the

preservation of the environment and public health).

     The case-law of the Commission and Court establish that the

notion of "necessity" implies that the interference corresponds to a

pressing social need and that it is proportionate to the aim or aims

pursued. In assessing the proportionality, regard must be had to

whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the

general interest of the community and the requirements of the

protection of the individual's fundamental rights. In this context, the

importance of the right to respect for home, which is pertinent to

personal security and well-being, must be taken into account. The case-

law indicates that while there are no explicit procedural requirements

in Article 8 (Art. 8), the decision-making process leading to measures

of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the

individual's interest (Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 25 September 1996 to be reported in Reports 1996,

para. 76). Further, in determining whether an interference is justified

the Commission and Court will take into account that a margin of

appreciation is left to the Contracting States, which are in principle

in a better position to make an initial assessment of the necessity of

a given interference (see eg. Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment

of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68). In the area of

town planning which involves the exercise of discretionary judgment in

the implementation of policies adopted in the interest of the

community, the Court has stated that the national authorities enjoy a

wide margin of appreciation (Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United

Kingdom judgment op. cit. para. 75).

     The Commission recalls that the applicants' appeal against

refusal of planning permission was considered by the planning inspector

who held a public inquiry. The planning inspector had regard to the

applicants' arguments and their personal circumstances as gypsies,

noting their links with the district and difficulties in finding

alternative sites, but considered that these were outweighed by the

planning considerations, ie. that the development would seriously harm

the scenic qualities of the rural landscape.

     The Commission observes that efforts were made by the local

authorities to find alternative sites or solutions. It notes that while

two sites were available for purchase at a price beyond the applicants'

means, it is not apparent that the applicants pursued the possibilities

mooted at the meeting of 21 October 1994 of leasing the land with the

option to buy at a later date. Further, while the official sites in the

area may not be as satisfactory as the land on which the applicants are

currently living, the Commission notes that there are no, or short,

waiting lists for these sites and it is likely that if they had applied

for places, a site would have become available. The reason for

declining the use of the transit site offered by the District Council

in May 1996 appears to be a reluctance to move onto a temporary site.

There is no indication in the letter from the District Council that

this disused site could only be used for a maximum period of 28 days

as alleged rather than for a longer period while other options were

explored.

     The Commission concludes that, notwithstanding the impact on the

applicants' home and private and family life of the refusal of planning

permission and the requirement to move elsewhere, it is not established

that they have no viable alternative or that it is disproportionate to

the legitimate aims pursued. The responsible planning authorities in

exercising their discretion had proper regard to the applicants'

interests, which were protected by adequate procedural safeguards (see,

mutatis mutandis, the Buckley judgment op. cit. para. 84). Even though

in the present case the applicants allege that the local authority is

threatening to seize their caravan and possessions, with the view to

possible sale, by exercising powers under the Criminal Justice Act

1994, the Commission notes that the local authority is only proposing

to take this step after five-six years of unlawful occupation, after

the conclusion of appeal and judicial review proceedings and after not

inconsiderable efforts had been made to find other solutions acceptable

to the applicants. Since it has not been established that the

applicants have no choice but to remain on their land and face seizure,

the Commission finds that the decision of the local authority to resort

to further enforcement measures is not disproportionate.

     Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation, the Commission

finds that the measures may regarded as necessary in a democratic

society for the protection of the rights of others. It follows that

this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicants complain that they are being subjected to

treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3), which provides:

     "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

     degrading treatment or punishment."

     The Government deny that the removal of the applicants' caravan

from the site on which it is unlawfully stationed amounts to degrading

treatment. They point to the fact that the applicants have been

involved in unlawful conduct for five years, that they are subject to

legitimate and necessary planning control measures and that alternative

accommodation has been offered to them.

     The applicants state that whether or not they have been lawfully

stationed on their land is irrelevant where treatment is objectively

degrading by Convention standards. They have nowhere else to go and the

threat to seize their home and possessions if carried out will

effectively result in destroying their lifestyle as gypsies. This is,

they submit, "manifestly degrading" treatment within the meaning of

Article 3 (Art. 3).

     The case-law of the Convention organs establishes that ill-

treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall

within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The

assessment of that minimum is relative and depends on all the

circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and

its physical or mental effects. Further, the Court has held that

treatment may be considered as degrading where it is such as to arouse

feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and

debasing an individual and possibly breaking his or her physical and

moral resistance (see eg. Eur. Court HR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, paras. 162 and

167).

     The Commission recalls that the applicants are gypsies who follow

a particular lifestyle, which includes living by tradition in caravans

or mobile homes. It notes that they are threatened with seizure, and

possibly sale, of their caravan if they fail to comply with the

enforcement order. While this will have grave consequences for the

applicants, the Commission notes above that it has found that the

applicants have had other alternatives offered to them and that it is

not established that they have no other choice but to remain on their

land until evicted.

     In the circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant's

complaints fail to disclose treatment of such a nature or degree as to

render it either inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   The applicants also complain that the measures taken against them

disclose an unreasonable deprivation of property contrary to Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which provides:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

     his possessions except in the public interest and subject

     to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

     principles of international law.

     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

     impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

     deems necessary to control the use of property in

     accordance with the general interest or to secure the

     payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

     The Commission recalls that the applicants have not yet been

subject to any measure of seizure or deprivation of property. The

planning measures implemented so far have related to the control of use

of their land. However, insofar as the measures may disclose a threat

of deprivation of property and a control of use, the Commission finds

that these are compatible with the requirements of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), in respect of which its findings under Article

8 (Art. 8) as to the legitimate aim pursued and the striking of a fair

balance between the individual interests and the general interest in

preservation of the environment are equally pertinent.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.   The applicants claim that they have been discriminated against

in the enjoyment of their rights under Articles 3, 8 and 13

(Art. 3, 8, 13) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,

(P1-1) invoking Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention which provides:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

     ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

     political or other opinion, national or social origin,

     association with a national minority, property, birth or

     other status."

     The Government submit that there is no evidence of discrimination

against the applicants, but that on the contrary planning policies, the

decision of the Inspector and the decisions of the courts have

manifestly treated their gypsy status as a factor in their favour.

     The applicants submit that the recent changes in legislation and

policy which remove the gypsies' former position in the planning system

ignores the need for special provision to be made if gypsies are to be

enabled to continue to follow their traditional way of life, and that

this infringes Article 14 (Art. 14). They refer to the applicable

guidance and the statements of the Government to the effect that the

fact that the applicants are gypsies cannot excuse them from compliance

with the planning controls which apply to all sections of the

community.

     The case-law of the Convention organs establishes that it is not

every difference in treatment which constitutes discrimination within

the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention. It must be

established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar

situation enjoy preferential treatment and that there is no reasonable

or objective justification for this distinction (see eg. Eur. Court HR,

Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 21 November 1982, Series A

no. 70 and Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) judgment of 18 February 1991,

Series A no. 192, p. 19 para. 60).

     The Commission observes that in the present case the applicants

submit that it is a failure to make special allowance for their gypsy

status in the application of planning controls that constitutes

discrimination. It notes that a difference in treatment may arise,

indirectly, where rules are applied generally but where a particular

group, due to a characteristic personal to them, as a result face

severe obstacles in complying and suffer a correspondingly greater

prejudice from the application of those rules.

     However, even assuming that the applicants can claim to be

penalised by the application of general planning laws on the basis of

their status as gypsies, the Commission recalls that whether a

difference in treatment constitutes discrimination in the sense of

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention depends on whether or not there

exists an objective and reasonable justification. This requires that

the difference pursues a legitimate aim and that there is a reasonable

relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim

sought to be realised. In this assessment of whether and to what extent

differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different

treatment, Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation which will

vary according to the circumstances, subject-matter and background (see

eg. Eur. Court HR, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment

of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, para. 177).

     Having regard to the above, the Commission recalls that in the

present case the local planning authorities took the applicants' gypsy

status into account in seeking to assist them to find suitable

alternative sites where they could lawfully site their caravan without

harm to a special landscape area and that their gypsy status was a

material consideration taken into consideration by the Inspector in

examining their appeal. It notes the importance of control of

development and preservation of the environment and the wide margin of

appreciation enjoyed by the domestic authorities in the area of town

and country planning control. It finds that there has not been such

disregard of the applicants' position and difficulties as gypsies as

to disclose discrimination contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.   The applicants also invoke Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention, which provides that :

     "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

     Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

     before a national authority notwithstanding that the

     violation has been committed by persons acting in an

     official capacity."

     The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not

require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation

of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to

have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court

HR, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988,

Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).

     The Commission finds that the applicants cannot be said, in light

of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of

their Convention rights.

     It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                              J. LIDDY

        Secretary                                 President

   to the First Chamber                      of the First Chamber