AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 32779/96

                      by A.L.J.G., L.C.M.G. and H.S.

                      against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 10 September 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, President

           MM.   J.-C. GEUS

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 9 August 1996 by

A.L.J.G., L.C.M.G. and H.S. against the Netherlands and registered on

26 August 1996 under file No. 32779/96;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicants are Dutch nationals, born in 1949, 1950 and 1950

respectively, and reside in the Netherlands. In the proceedings before

the Commission, the applicants are represented by Ms H.H.M. van Dijk

and Mr G.G.J. Knoops, both lawyers practising in the Netherlands.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

     Following an investigation by the Fiscal Intelligence and

Investigation Department (Fiscale Inlichtingen en Opsporingsdienst,

"FIOD") and a preliminary judicial investigation (gerechtelijk voor-

onderzoek) in the course of which, inter alia, the administration of

a number of companies with limited liability owned by the first and

second applicants were seized, charges were brought against the

applicants and one other person, in four separate sets of criminal

proceedings, in relation to unlawful importation of meat from Poland

into the European Union and the sale of this meat in the European Union

as originating from the European Union.

     On 20 August 1992, the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank)

of 's-Hertogenbosch, following adversarial proceedings in which a

hearing was held on 6 August 1992, convicted the third applicant of

being an accessory to the commission of fraud and of being a member,

as a founder and person exercising control, of an organisation whose

aim is the commission of offences and sentenced him to three years'

imprisonment under deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention.

     In two separate judgments of 9 November 1992, the Regional Court

of 's-Hertogenbosch, following adversarial proceedings in which

hearings were held on 6 August 1992 and 26 October 1992,  convicted the

first and second applicants of repeated commission of fraud by a legal

person under the orders and direction of the applicants and of being

a member, as a founder and person exercising control, of an

organisation whose aim is the commission of offences.

     The first and second applicants were each sentenced to four years

and six months' imprisonment under deduction of the time spent in pre-

trial detention and the payment to the Netherlands State of 3.200.000

Dutch guilders corresponding to the estimated value of the proceeds of

the acts of which they had been found guilty.

     All applicants filed an appeal against their respective

convictions with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of 's-Hertogenbosch.

The public prosecutor also filed an appeal against the judgment in the

case of the third applicant.

     On 9 February 1993, a hearing in the third applicant's case was

held before the Court of Appeal. The Court decided to seek the evidence

of the French witness Barbottin who had allegedly bought meat from the

third applicant.

     On 19 March 1993, a hearing took place before the Court of Appeal

in the first and second applicants' respective cases. With the parties'

consent, the proceedings against the first and second applicant were

dealt with simultaneously without formally joining both sets of

proceedings.     The defence requested the Court to summon a number of

witnesses. After deliberating, the Court of Appeal decided to make,

together with the defence, a selection of the proposed witnesses.

Following consultations the Court decided to summon as witnesses the

German veterinaries Lokhan, Moniac, Heinicke, Schönhert, Albrecht,

Stolpe, Greupner, Dierke, Ekenter, Spiss and Valdor in relation to

health certificates, decided to order the hearing by an investigating

judge (rechter-commissaris) of the Polish witnesses Badowski, Trimpka,

Stolik, Zaremka, Beltkowski and Czernie in relation to the weighing of

cattle, the German witnesses Hahn, Harnyss, Koslitz and Netwick in

relation to the sale of cattle, as well as the French witness Barbottin

and the Spanish witnesses San Pedro and Ondras.

     The Court of Appeal rejected the request by the defence to order

an investigation into the authenticity of Spanish customs stamps as the

Spanish customs authorities had already indicated sufficiently clearly

the obvious differences between the stamps on the T1 documents

involved and the official stamps used by the Spanish customs

authorities. The Court of Appeal further ordered that the documents of

the commission rogatory in another set of related criminal proceedings

and the Dutch translation of the interrogation of Mr Barbottin by the

French customs authorities be joined to the applicants' case-file.

     Also on 19 March 1993, the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the

case of the third applicant. The prosecution informed the Court of

Appeal that the address of the witness Barbottin had not yet been

verified by the French authorities, but that permission had been

obtained for a hearing in France of this witness by the Dutch

investigating judge. The defence maintained its request that this

witness be heard. The Court decided to proceed with the attempts to

hear this witness. In reply to the third applicant's request to hear

this witness before the Court of Appeal, the President of the Court of

Appeal informed him that the law did not provide for a possibility to

secure the attendance of this witness before the Court of Appeal.

     On 15 June 1993, with the parties' consent, the Court of Appeal

held a simultaneous hearing in the cases of all applicants without

formally joining the respective proceedings.

     In the third applicant's case, the Court of Appeal heard the

English witness Haste and the witness Badowski. The witnesses Albrecht,

Heinicke and Moniac had failed to appear. After deliberating, the Court

of Appeal decided not to hear the witnesses Malewski, Masur and Wernik.

It stated on this point that it was unclear what these witnesses could

declare about the facts with which the third applicant had been charged

as, insofar as it appeared from the written evidence and the

investigation before the Court of Appeal, the Polish regulations had

been complied with and the Polish documents were in order. The facts

held against the applicant concerned fraud committed in Germany.

     In the first applicant's case, the Court of Appeal rejected the

request by the defence, opposed by the prosecution, to add the

statement given by the English witness Haste to the case-file without

further questions to this witness. The Court held on this point that

a request to add a witness to the list of witnesses to be heard should

be made timely. It did however consider the course of action proposed

by the defence - i.e. first to listen to a witness statement given in

another case which is being dealt with simultaneously yet formally

separated, and subsequently, if this statement is convenient, to

request the trial court to place this witness on the witness list in

its own case under the explicit mention that no further questions will

be put to this witness - to be contrary to the principles of proper

conduct of proceedings (beginselen van goede procesorde).

     The Court of Appeal heard the third applicant, the witnesses

Badowski and Valdor. The witnesses Albrecht, Heinicke and Moniac had

failed to appear. After having deliberated the Court of Appeal decided

not to hear the Polish witnesses Malewski, Masur and Wernik on the same

grounds as stated in the third applicant's case.

     The Court further ordered that the witnesses Albrecht, Heinicke,

Moniac, Hahn and Harnyss, Koslitz and Netwick be summoned and ordered

the investigating judge to hear the German witnesses Albrecht, Heinicke

and Moniac. It further requested the defence, where the results of the

investigating judge's activities would give rise to it, to inform the

Court of Appeal timely whether the summoning of these witnesses to

appear before the court could be cancelled.

     In the second applicant's case, the Court of Appeal rejected the

request of the defence to add the statement of the English witness

Haste on the same grounds as stated in the first applicant's case. It

heard the third applicant, the witnesses Badowski and Valdor. The

witnesses Albrecht, Heinicke and Moniac had failed to appear. After

having deliberated the Court of Appeal decided not to hear the Polish

witnesses Malewski, Masur and Wernik on the same grounds as stated in

the third applicant's case.

     The Court further ordered that the witnesses Albrecht, Heinicke,

Moniac, Hahn, Harnyss, Koslitz and Netwick be summoned and ordered the

investigating judge to hear the German witnesses Albrecht, Heinicke and

Moniac. It further requested the defence, where the results of the

investigating judge's activities would give rise to it, to inform the

Court of Appeal timely whether the summoning of these witnesses to

appear before the court could be cancelled.

     Further hearings were held before the Court of Appeal on

5 October 1993 and on 2 November 1993.

     On 26 January 1994, a further simultaneous hearing in the

applicants' cases was held before the Court of Appeal. In the cases of

the first and second applicants, the defence informed the Court of

Appeal that all witnesses had been heard. The Court heard the

applicants, whereas the President of the Court of Appeal summarised

certain written evidence submitted and it heard pleadings by both the

prosecution and the defence.

     In the third applicant's case, the Court of Appeal granted the

request of the defence to add the witness Van Dam to the list of

witnesses, the President summarised certain written evidence, and the

Court heard the witness Van Dam. After the hearing of Mr Van Dam, the

defence informed the Court of Appeal that all witnesses had been heard.

The Court of Appeal further heard pleadings by the parties.

     On 27 January 1994, final submissions in the applicants'

respective cases were made to the Court of Appeal which subsequently

closed its investigation and set a date for the pronouncement of its

judgment in the respective cases.

     In its two separate judgments of 10 February 1994 in the first

and second applicants' case, the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional

Court's judgment of 9 November 1992, accepted the defence's objections

against the charges relating to events before 3 October 1990, rejected

the defence's plea of nullity as regards the charges, rejected the

defence's argument that the prosecution should be declared inadmissible

on grounds of violated principles of proper proceedings, acquitted both

applicants of a number of charges, convicted them of participation in

the repeated commission of fraud by a legal person under their orders

and direction and of belonging to an organisation whose aim is the

commission of offences. It sentenced the first and second applicants

to four years' imprisonment under deduction of the time spent in pre-

trial detention and payment of a fine in the amount of 500.000 Dutch

guilders. In a separate judgment of the same date, the Court of Appeal

rejected the prosecution's request to order each of the first and

second applicants to pay to the Netherlands State an amount of

3.200.000 Dutch guilders in order to remove unlawfully obtained gains.

     In its judgment of 10 February 1994 in the third applicant's

case, the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court's judgment of

20 August 1992, accepted the defence's objections against the charges

relating to events before 3 October 1990, rejected the defence's plea

of nullity as regards certain charges, rejected the defence's argument

that the prosecution should be declared inadmissible on grounds of

violated principles of proper proceedings, acquitted the applicant of

a number of charges, convicted him of participation in the repeated

commission of fraud by a legal person under his direction and of

belonging to an organisation whose aim was the commission of offences.

It sentenced the third applicant to four years and six months'

imprisonment under deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention.

     In their respective convictions of the applicants, the Court of

Appeal used in evidence:

-    the minutes (proces-verbaal) of two FIOD officials and one

     official of the General Inspection Service of the Dutch Ministry

     of Agriculture, Nature Conservancy and Fisheries containing the

     methods and findings of the preliminary judicial investigation

     of a number of companies transporting meat from Poland through

     EEC territory;

-    a written statement of the Deputy Director of the Spanish

     Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finances on the differences

     between authentic Spanish customs stamps and stamps found on a

     number of T1 documents;

-    findings of a delegation of the European Commission of the EEC

     as regards the existence of the alleged final destination of the

     meat in Tunisia i.e. the company SOC Smaroc and the existence of

     any meat imported via one of the harbours within the EEC;

-    findings of the Dutch Attaché for Agricultural Affairs in Algeria

     as regards alleged importation of Polish meat in Algeria;

-    findings of officials of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture,

     Nature Conservancy and Fisheries as to the public health risks

     of unlawful importation and sale of meat from Eastern Europe;

-    several documents seized from the administration of the companies

     involved;

-    several documents, including T1 and T2 documents, invoices, bills

     of lading and receipts;

-    information from the General Inspection Department confirming the

     registration of a number of vehicles involved;

-    the findings of a police investigation into a number of specific

     transports involving specific vehicles;

-    several tachometer disks from vehicles involved; and

-    statements made in the course of the investigation and subsequent

     proceedings by the applicants and a fourth accused, statements

     by the witnesses Dancewicz, Hahn, Harnyss, Heynickx, Kaddatz,

     Koslitz, Mühl, Netwick, Valdor, Van Boekel, Van Tienen,

     Weigergangs, the truck drivers or truck drivers' assistants

     Bergmans, Bevers, Geers, Langens, Methorst, Van Deurzen, Van de

     Wakker, Van Halder, Vos, and Vos-Timmermans.

     The Court of Appeal rejected the objection raised by the defence

that the statements of the truck drivers had been unlawfully obtained.

It also rejected the argument that these statements were not reliable

since they had been given under pressure. The Court of Appeal did not

find it established that unacceptable pressure had been exerted on

these witnesses when they gave their statements and, noting that none

of them had withdrawn any statement but merely altered more or less

important elements in their account, found it plausible that any

discrepancies between their statements given to the police and

subsequently to the investigating judges could be explained by the

effects of the lapse of time between these two events and possible

external influences between these two questionings.

     As regards the differences in the weight figures stated on the

various documents, the Court of Appeal did not find it established how

these weights had been determined, but considered it plausible that

these weights had, in general, been estimated.

     As regards the defence's objections against the T-documents

submitted, the Court of Appeal accepted the objection for a large

number of documents, but not all of them. As regards a number of

documents the Court of Appeal found it established that, where the

vehicle registration number on these documents did not correspond to

a car owned by either the first or second applicant, this was due to

an obvious clerical error in that it was not plausible that entire

loads of cows had been transported in an Opel Kadett or a Nissan

Vanette.

     On 21 February 1995, each of the applicants filed an appeal in

cassation, which is limited to points of law, with the Supreme Court

(Hoge Raad) against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in his

respective case. The first applicant submitted 29 points in cassation

consisting of about 200 complaints. The second and third applicants

each submitted 28 points in cassation consisting of about

200 complaints.

     Upon request of the Public Prosecution Department (Openbaar

Ministerie) which needed sufficient time to reach its conclusions, the

Supreme Court adjourned its proceedings three times, the first time

until 25 April 1995, the second time until 23 May 1995 and the last

time on 27 June 1995.

     On 30 August 1995, the applicants submitted their respective

replies to the conclusions of the Procurator General (Procureur-

Generaal) to the Supreme Court. On 25 September and 4 October 1995, the

applicants submitted further replies to these conclusions to the

Supreme Court.

     In two separate judgments of 13 February 1996, the Supreme Court

rejected the first and second applicants' respective appeals in

cassation. It decided not to consider the applicants' submissions of

25 September and 4 October 1995, finding it contrary to due proceedings

to react repeatedly to the conclusions of the Public Prosecution

Department. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 10 February 1994

as regards the qualification of the facts found proven, corrected this

qualification at its own motion and rejected the appeal in cassation

for the remainder.

     Insofar as the first and second applicants complained that the

Court of Appeal had refused to add to their case-file the statement of

the witness Haste made in the proceedings against the third applicant,

the Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeal appeared to assume

that this request concerned a witness who was no longer in the court

room, which the Supreme Court found understandable given the contents

of the minutes (proces-verbaal) of the hearing held on 15 June 1993 in

the third applicant's case. The Supreme Court found that the Court of

Appeal had applied correct standards in rejecting the defence's request

and accepted the reasons given by the Court of Appeal for rejecting the

request.

     As regards the applicant's complaint of the use in evidence of

a number of documents in relation to a number of aspects of the

charges, the Supreme Court accepted the Court of Appeal's reliance on

these documents in connection with other means of evidence. It further

rejected a complaint that certain minutes of the investigation could

not be referred to as formal minutes (ambtsedige processen-verbaal).

Acknowledging that the Court of Appeal had erroneously referred to

these documents as formal minutes, it found that the Court of Appeal

could lawfully consider them as lawful documentary evidence (wettige

bewijsmiddelen) referred to in Article 344 para. 1 (5) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering).

     As regards the complaint concerning the use in evidence of

statements by the third applicant, the Supreme Court noted that the

defence was aware of these statements and had relied on them in its

submissions to the Court of Appeal. It, therefore, did not find that

the interests of the defence had been harmed by the use of these

statements by the Court of Appeal.

     The Supreme Court further rejected the complaint of the use of

foreign documents not accompanied by an official translation and the

use in evidence of Spanish documents for lacking a basis in either the

law or the facts.

     Insofar as the applicants complained that the Court of Appeal had

found that certain customs stamps were not authentic although the

stamps on the documents at issue in the present case had never been

examined, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeal had found

that the stamps on the documents at issue in the present case were

identical to stamps on other documents which, after an investigation

into their authenticity, had been found not authentic. The Supreme

Court accepted that, in these circumstances, the Court of Appeal could

find that the stamps on the documents at issue in the present

proceedings were equally not authentic.

     Referring to Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act (Wet

op de Rechterlijke Organisatie), the Supreme Court further rejected

many elements of the applicants' appeal in cassation as not prompting

a determination of legal issues in the interest of legal unity and

legal development.

     Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act reads:

(Translation)

     "If the Supreme Court considers that a complaint submitted cannot

     lead to cassation and does not prompt a determination of legal

     issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development, it

     can limit itself to this finding when giving the reasons of its

     decision on that point."

     On 14 March 1996, the first and second applicants and a third

person addressed a joint request for revision (herziening) of their

convictions to the Supreme Court. All applicants filed a joint request

for revision on 6 May 1996. These proceedings are currently still

pending.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicants complain that they did not receive a fair hearing

within the meaning of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3(d) of the Convention in

that the Court of Appeal rejected their request to hear the witnesses

Malevsky, Masur and Wernik, stating on this point that the Polish

documents were in order whereas in its judgments of 10 February 1994

the Court of Appeal found it established that the addressee mentioned

on a number of these customs documents had been put there fraudulently

and further found that it had not been established how the weights

indicated on these documents had been determined, finding it plausible

that these weights in general had been assessed, whereas the Polish

documents contained a meticulous indication of the number of animals

and their weight whilst lists of individually weighed animals were

attached to the invoices.

     The first and second applicants further complain under Article

6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) that the Court of Appeal rejected their request

to hear the witness Haste also in their case. They complain in

particular that the Supreme Court accepted the reasons given by the

Court of Appeal on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of the

facts stated in the formal minutes of the hearing held on 15 June 1993

before the Court of Appeal.

     The first and second applicants further complain under Article

6 para. 1 of a violation of the principle of equality of arms as the

prosecution was able to put questions to the witness Haste in the

proceedings against the third applicant. Having thus become aware

beforehand that the statement of this witness would be exculpating for

the first and second applicants, the prosecution subsequently opposed

the hearing of this witness in the cases of the first and second

applicants.

     The applicants further complain under Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and

3 (d) of the Convention that the trial courts found it established that

certain Spanish customs stamps had been forged rejecting repeated

requests of the defence to order an investigation into the authenticity

of these stamps. The applicants submit that the trial courts based

themselves on findings concerning stamps on documents concerning

another set of criminal proceedings although these documents were not

included in the applicants' case-file.

     The applicants also complain under Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and

3 (c) of the Convention that the Court of Appeal incorrectly

interpreted and distorted evidence given by the witness Methorst, a

truck driver, as regards acts committed by the second applicant. They

complain that they were only confronted with the Court of Appeal's

findings in its judgment and were thus unable to challenge the evidence

given by this witness.

     The applicants complain under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) of the

Convention that, on 6 August 1992, the Regional Court rejected their

request to hear the French witnesses Chevalier and Serac on the alleged

sale of meat to these persons' respective firms. The applicants further

complain that, although the defence had not requested the hearing of

these two witnesses in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, the

Court of Appeal should have summoned these witnesses ex officio.

     The applicants further complain under Article 6 paras. 1 and

3 (d) of the Convention that the trial courts used in evidence

statements given by truck drivers, inter alia Bergmans, Deurzen and

Vos, to the FIOD without having ordered ex officio the hearing of these

witnesses in the course of the trial against the applicants given that

these witnesses had later altered their statements when they gave

evidence before the investigating judge on 22 September 1992.

     The applicants also complain under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention that the Procurator General to the Supreme Court did not

deal with all points raised in the applicants' appeal in cassation.

They further complain that the Supreme Court refused to take notice of

the additional reply to the conclusions of the Procurator General to

the Supreme Court. They finally complain that the Supreme Court

rejected several parts of their appeal in cassation under Article 101a

of the Judicial Organisation Act without giving further reasons.

THE LAW

1.   The applicants submit a number of complaints that the criminal

proceedings against them were not in conformity with the requirements

of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads

as follows:

     "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

     him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a ...

     tribunal established by law....

     2.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

     innocent until proved guilty according to law.

     3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

     minimum rights:

     ...

           c.    to defend himself in person or through legal

     assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means

     to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the

     interests of justice so require;

           d.    to examine or have examined witnesses against him and

     to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his

     behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;"

     The applicants raise a number of complaints as to the trial

courts' taking of evidence and findings in their respective cases.

Insofar as these complaints relate to the proceedings before the

Regional Court, the Commission observes that the Regional Court's

judgments in the applicants' cases were quashed by the Court of Appeal.

In these circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that the

applicants can no longer claim to be a "victim" within the meaning of

Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention in respect of the proceedings

before the Regional Court.

     As regards the applicants' complaints in respect of the findings

of the Court of Appeal in their respective cases, the Commission

recalls at the outset that it is not competent to examine alleged

errors of fact or law committed by national courts, except where it

considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of

the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (cf. No. 25062/94,

Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83 p. 77).

     Insofar as the applicants' complaints relate to the taking and

assessment of evidence by the Court of Appeal, the Commission recalls

that, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the

evidence before them as well as the relevance of the evidence which the

defence seeks to adduce. More specifically, Article 6 para. 3 (d)

(Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention leaves it to them, again as a general

rule, to assess whether it is appropriate to call witnesses, in the

autonomous sense given to that word in the Convention system; it does

not require the attendance and examination of every witness on the

accused's behalf (cf. Eur. Court HR, Engel v. the Netherlands judgment

of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 38, para. 91; Bricmont v. Belgium

judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 158, p. 31, para. 89; and Vidal

v. Belgium judgment of 22 April 1992, Series A no. 235-B, p. 32, para.

33).

     The Commission notes that in the proceedings before the Court of

Appeal a number of witnesses, including both witnesses called by the

Court itself and witnesses proposed by the defence, have in fact been

heard and that, on 26 January 1994, the defence in the cases of the

first and second applicants informed the Court of Appeal that all

witnesses had been heard. The Commission further notes that at that

point in the appeal proceedings the defence did not complain of the way

in which these witnesses had been heard or ask for the hearing of other

witnesses. As regards the third applicant, the Commission observes that

on 26 January 1994, the Court of Appeal acceded to the defence's

request to hear one further witness and that the defence did not

request the Court of Appeal to hear any other additional witnesses or

complain of the way in which witnesses had been heard in the

proceedings on appeal.

     In these circumstances, the Commission finds no indication that

in this respect the applicants were deprived of a fair hearing within

the meaning of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) of the

Convention.

     Insofar as the applicants' complaints as to the taking of

evidence relate to other forms of evidence submitted to and assessed

by the Court of Appeal, the Commission notes that the Supreme Court

accepted the Court of Appeal's decisions and findings as regards this

evidence as lawful. Noting that the applicants were convicted following

adversarial proceedings in which they were provided with ample

opportunity to hear witnesses, to challenge the evidence against them,

to state their respective cases and to submit whatever they found

relevant to their cases, the Commission finds no indication that the

proceedings at issue, as regards the taking of evidence, were contrary

to the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, including

the principle of equality of arms.

     Insofar as this complaint has been substantiated, the Commission

further finds no indication that the applicants' rights under Article

6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention were infringed in the

proceedings at issue.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicants further complain that the Procurator General to

the Supreme Court did not deal with every point of the applicants'

appeal in cassation, that the Supreme Court refused to take notice of

the applicants' additional replies to the conclusions of the Procurator

General and that the Supreme Court rejected a number of their

complaints in cassation under Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation

Act without giving any substantial reasoning for its rejection.

     As regards the complaint that the Procurator General's

conclusions were incomplete, the Commission notes that the scope of an

appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court is limited to points of law.

Furthermore, it has not been alleged nor has it appeared that the

Supreme Court's competence to consider an appeal in cassation is

limited to those elements which were examined by the Procurator General

rather than to the points raised by an appellant in cassation

proceedings.

     In these circumstances, the Commission is of the opinion that,

even assuming that the Procurator General did not deal with every issue

raised in the applicants' appeal in cassation, this did not affect the

scope of the applicants' cassation proceedings and thus did not affect

the fairness of the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

     Insofar as the applicants complain that the Supreme Court did not

take notice of their additional replies to the conclusions of the

Procurator General, the Commission recalls that, given the rights of

the defence and respect for the principle of equality of arms,

appellants in cassation should be given the possibility to respond to

conclusions submitted to a cassation court by the Public Prosecution

Department (cf. Eur. Court HR, Borgers v. Belgium judgment of 30

October 1991, Series A no. 214-B).

     In the present case, the applicants were given the opportunity

to respond to the Procurator General's conclusions and they did in fact

avail themselves of this opportunity. In the light of a proper

administration of justice, the Commission considers that the rights of

the defence and respect for the principle of equality of arms do not

include an unlimited right for the defence to reply to such

conclusions.

     Noting that the applicants did avail themselves of their right

to reply and that their initial reply was accepted by the Supreme

Court, the Commission cannot find that the Supreme Court's decision not

to take notice of the applicant's additional replies to the Procurator

General's conclusions deprived them of a fair hearing within the

meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in the proceedings

before the Supreme Court.

     As regards the applicants' complaint that the Supreme Court

rejected parts of their appeal in cassation under Article 101a of the

Judicial Organisation Act without giving specific reasons, the

Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments, but cannot be

understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (cf. Eur.

Court HR, Ruiz Torija v. Spain judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A

no. 303-A, p. 12, para. 29; and Hiro Balani v. Spain judgment of

9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-B, p. 29, para. 27).

     The Commission further recalls that when a State provides for an

appeal to a Supreme Court, it may prescribe the conditions and

procedure (cf. No. 12972/87, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54 p. 207) and that

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not require that a decision

whereby an appeal tribunal, basing itself on a specific legal

provision, rejects an appeal as having no chance of success be

accompanied by detailed reasons (cf. No. 8769/79, Dec. 16.7.81, D.R.

25 p. 240).

     The Commission notes that the Supreme Court, referring to Article

101a of the Judicial Organisation Act authorising this procedure,

rejected part of the applicant's complaints in cassation, which is

limited to points of law, as not prompting a determination of legal

issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development. The

Commission cannot find this procedure to be contrary to the

requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (see

also No. 30059/96, Dec. 26.2.97, unpublished).

     It follows that this part of the application must also be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              G.H. THUNE

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber