B.W. AND W.W. v. SWITZERLAND
Doc ref: 31233/96 • ECHR ID: 001-3884
Document date: September 10, 1997
- 0 Inbound citations:
- •
- 0 Cited paragraphs:
- •
- 0 Outbound citations:
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 31233/96
by B. W. and W. W.
against Switzerland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 10 September 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. S. TRECHSEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 18 April 1996 by
B. W. and W. W. against Switzerland and registered on 30 April 1996
under file No. 31233/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants, a married couple, are Swiss citizens born in 1969
and 1960, respectively. They reside in Madretsch in Switzerland.
Before the Commission they are represented by Mrs M. Grütter, a lawyer
practising in Bern in Switzerland.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
The first applicant's daughter M. was born in 1992. Shortly
after the birth mother and child were separated. On 2 January 1993 the
Rumisberg Guardianship Office withdrew the first applicant's parental
custody over her child.
On 12 January 1993 the second applicant acknowledged that he was
the father of the child, and on 1 March 1993 he married the first
applicant.
On 4 March 1993 the Rumisberg Guardianship Office also withdrew
the second applicant's parental custody over his child. The Office
relied on S. 310 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch).
This provision states that "if there are no other means to avoid damage
to a child, the guardianship authorities have to take it away from the
parents ... and ensure its adequate placement".
Upon the applicants' complaints, proceedings were conducted
before the District Officer (Regierungsstatthalter) of Wangen a.A., who
sought the views of the Parental Advice Office (Erziehungsberatung) of
the Canton of Bern. The latter submitted psychiatric expert opinions
on each applicant prepared by the Psychiatric Clinic of the Canton of
Solothurn.
At a hearing on 2 December 1993 the second applicant, who was
suffering from alcohol problems, agreed to submit to an antabus
treatment of at least one year; the agreement envisaged an interim
assessment after six months. It was considered that if the treatment
was successful, the child could return to its parents. However, the
antabus treatment could not be accomplished, and on 24 January 1994 the
District Officer dismissed the applicants' complaints.
Upon the applicants' further appeal, the Court of Appeal
(Appellationshof) of the Canton of Bern on 15 March 1995 formally
withdrew the applicants' parental custody over M. and placed her in a
home. The Court also appointed a guardian (Beistand) for the child.
The applicants' public law appeal (staatsrechtliche Beschwerde)
was dismissed by the Federal Court on 6 September 1995, the decision
being served on 20 October 1995.
Relying inter alia on S. 310 of the Swiss Civil Code, the Federal
Court recalled that the second applicant had for a long time suffered
from alcohol problems; in view of these difficulties he had even been
placed in detention. Even after the medical expert opinions had stated
that his alcoholism was one of the major obstacles to parental custody,
the police had found the second applicant driving a car with a blood
alcohol level of 2,95%. Despite his antabus treatment he had committed
a serious accident under the influence of alcohol; he had broken his
arm and was unable to visit his daughter. On another occasion, the
second applicant had been unable to visit his daughter as he had
assaulted his wife under the influence of alcohol.
The Court recalled the conclusions of the medical expert opinions
as regards the applicants and their child. According to these
opinions, the child was very sensitive and needed a tranquil
environment. On the other hand, the first applicant showed a lack of
interest towards the duties resulting from motherhood. She was unable
to resist pressures and had a tendency, in case of difficulty, to flee,
to withdraw, or to break off relations. The second applicant had a
potential to be violent which should not be underestimated. He also
had the tendency to make others responsible for mistakes. His cynicism
and his inability to understand others would not provide the necessary
security which the child required. The Court also recalled that the
persons who were taking care of the child feared restoring parental
custody. The decision continued:
b) It is true that it was disproportionate to separate the
child shortly after her birth from her mother, particularly as
neither the requirements of the child nor the circumstances of
the mother warranted such a severe measure. However, this order
of the Guardianship's Office has entered into legal force and is
not the object of the present proceedings. For the rest, the
subsequent marriage of the parents brought to a head the anyway
complex and delicate circumstances of the girl: The excesses of
alcohol and the outbreaks of violence and assaults of the
applicant and the fact that both married partners are not willing
to cooperate with the circle of persons who should have
facilitated contacts between the parents and the child, have not
favourably affected the reinstitution of parental custody.
Furthermore, the Guardianship's Office cannot be blamed that they
wish at all costs to withdraw guardianship from the parents: Even
during the proceedings before the District Officer it was
suggested to the applicant to submit to an antabus-treatment of
at least one year; after six months an interim assessment would
have been made. In the case of a positive result, the child
would then have been brought home. However, the applicants were
not in a position to keep to this arrangement. Furthermore, the
subsequent events demonstrated that even an antabus treatment did
not ensure that the applicant really abstained from alcohol. In
addition, it must be considered that the child has now been
living outside her family for two years, and a reintegration into
the family would need to be prepared and could only occur
gradually. Apart from the just mentioned personal problems of
the parents, one should also not overlook the difficulties on the
part of the child. Thus, reintegration with the family can only
occur on the basis of a factual cooperation of the parents with
the guardian and those persons who in the past two years have
taken care of the child."
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain of the withdrawal of custody which
amounted to a severe interference with their right to respect for
family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. Thus,
the Federal Court itself considered that the separation at the outset
was disproportionate, and it has not been shown how the applicants'
marriage should have brought the child's situation to a head. The
decisions rely mainly on statements made in the village on the
applicants, thus reflecting their precarious social situation.
However, the parents never had the possibility to show how they would
rear the child. Without doubt, the parents would need assistance,
though none of their problems would justify depriving them of parental
custody. There are no indications of a threat to the well-being of the
child. To the contrary, the child feels happy when she is with her
parents.
In respect of these complaints the applicants also rely on
Article 12 of the Convention.
2. The applicants complain that they did not have an effective
remedy at their disposal within the meaning of Article 13 of the
Convention. Thus, the domestic authorities did not duly consider the
applicants' right to respect for their family life within the meaning
of Article 8 of the Convention.
THE LAW
The applicants complain under Articles 8 and 12 (Art. 8, 12) of
the Convention of the withdrawal of parental custody.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention states, insofar as relevant:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Commission considers that the withdrawal of the applicants'
parental custody over their child M. amounts to an interference with
their right to respect for their family life within the meaning of
Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1)of the Convention. The Commission must
therefore examine whether this interference was justified under Article
8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
The Commission observes that the domestic authorities, when
deciding on the withdrawal of parental custody, relied on S. 310
para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code. The measure was, therefore, "in
accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of
the Convention.
Moreover, when ordering the withdrawal of parental custody, the
authorities considered the well-being of the child. The interference
was therefore imposed "for the protection of health (and) morals (and)
the rights and freedoms of others", namely the child concerned.
Finally, the Commission has examined whether the measure was
"necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8
para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, as interpreted in the Convention
organs' case-law (see Eur. Court HR, Berrehab v. Netherlands judgment
of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 138, p. 15, para. 27).
The Commission notes that the domestic authorities carefully
balanced the various interests concerned, having particular regard to
the situation of the child, and relying on medical expert opinions and
the views of other persons involved. Thus, the Federal Court in its
decision of 6 September 1995 considered that, while the separation of
the child from her mother shortly after birth was disproportionate, the
subsequent marriage of the applicants had not been positive for the
child's needs. The second applicant suffered from alcohol problems and
was prone to violence. The first applicant, on the other hand, had a
tendency, in case of difficulties, of fleeing or withdrawing. The
Court concluded that these circumstances would not be conducive to the
well-being of the child who was of a sensitive nature and required a
secure environment.
The Commission accepts, therefore, that the interference with the
applicants' right to respect for their family life could reasonably be
considered "necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection
of health (and) morals (and) the rights and freedoms of others", namely
the child concerned.
As a result, the interference was justified under Article 8
para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
Insofar as the applicants rely on Article 12 (Art. 12) of the
Convention, no separate issue arises under this provision.
This part of the application is, therefore, manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicants complain under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention that they did not have an effective remedy at their
disposal.
The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention requires a remedy in domestic law only in respect of
grievances which can be regarded as "arguable" in terms of the
Convention (see Eur. Court HR, Powell and Rayner judgment of 21
February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 14, para. 31).
In the present case, the Commission has just found that the
complaints under Articles 8 and 12 (Art. 8, 12) of the Convention are
manifestly ill-founded. The Commission finds that the applicants'
submissions in this respect do not raise any prima facie issue under
the Convention. As a result, no arguable claim can be maintained in
respect of a violation of these provisions. It follows that the
complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is also
manifestly ill-founded.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber