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DAVID ISAACK KIZITO v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 32238/96 • ECHR ID: 001-3895

Document date: September 11, 1997

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DAVID ISAACK KIZITO v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 32238/96 • ECHR ID: 001-3895

Document date: September 11, 1997

Cited paragraphs only

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 32238//96

by Rwebuga DAVID ISAACK KIZITO

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 11 September 1997, the following members being present:

Mrs. J. LIDDY, President

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

C.L. ROZAKIS

L. LOUCAIDES

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

Mrs. M. HION

Mr. R. NICOLINI

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 25 June 1996 by

Rwebuga DAVID ISAACK KIZITO against the United Kingdom and registered

on 15 July 1996 under file No. 32238/96;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Ugandan national, born in 1971, and currently

residing in the United Kingdom. He is represented by Mr Akena Adoko,

a barrister residing in London.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

On 11 April 1993, the applicant entered the United Kingdom and

applied for asylum stating that his father was the leader of the

National Federal Movement and that he had been arrested on 18 November

1992 as part of a police investigation into his father's activities.

He further stated that he had been released on 23 March 1993 after his

mother had bribed officials in order to have the charges against the

applicant changed from treason to assault of police officers.

The applicant's request for asylum was rejected by the Home

Secretary in May 1995. It was found that the applicant had failed to

provide sufficient evidence to substantiate his claims. It was noted,

in particular, that the applicant had been able to leave Uganda on his

own passport and had passed through regular Ugandan border control

channels. This appeared from a Ugandan exit stamp dated 10 April 1993.

It was held that this cast doubts as to the veracity of the applicant's

account.

It was further noted that a general amnesty was in force since

1987 covering everyone provided they were not involved in criminal

activities, that a number of prominent Ugandan exiles had returned to

Uganda and that, although there were still a number of problems, the

general security and political situation in Uganda had improved.

The Home Secretary concluded that, against the background of the

present political and security situation in Uganda, the applicant's

alleged past circumstances did not constitute a well-founded fear for

persecution.

On 2 June 1995, the applicant filed an appeal with the Special

Adjudicator, who dismissed it on 1 May 1996 finding that, even assuming

his account was credible, the applicant had fallen short of

demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution.

The applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Immigration

Appeal Tribunal. His request was rejected on 15 May 1996.

Directions were set for his removal to Uganda on 12 June 1996.

The applicant's application for judicial review was rejected by

the High Court on 11 June 1996. His renewed application was rejected

by the Court of Appeal on 20 June 1996.

On 25 June 1996, the police came to the applicant's home in order

arrest him for removal purposes. The applicant was not at home at that

time. It appears that he is currently in hiding in the United Kingdom.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 1 of the Convention that

he was denied the protection of his rights and freedoms.

The applicant complains that the proceedings at issue fell short

of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.

The applicant complains that the decisions taken in his case

constitute discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14 of the

Convention.

The applicant complains that the decisions taken in his case are

contrary to Article 17 of the Convention.

The applicant finally complains of the short period he was given

to lodge his application for leave and no time to file an application

to the Commission, which he considers to be contrary to Articles 1, 14,

17, 25 and 26 of the Convention.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that his rights under Articles 1, 6, 14,

17, 25 and 26 (Art. 1, 6, 14, 17, 25, 26) of the Convention have been

violated in the proceedings on his request for asylum.

The Commission recalls at the outset that the Convention does not

guarantee, as such, a right of asylum or any right to enter, reside or

remain in a State of which one is not a national (cf. No. 21808/93,

Dec. 8.9.93, D.R. 75, p. 234).

The Commission further recalls its constant case-law that

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not applicable to proceedings

concerning the granting of political asylum or residence permits for

aliens (cf. No. 9285/81, Dec. 6.7.82, D.R. 29, p. 205; and No.

13162/87, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54, p. 211).

It follows that the applicant's complaints of the proceedings and

decisions taken in his case, which concerned his request for asylum,

must be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions

of the Convention.

Since the scope of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention is

limited to the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, it

follows that also the applicant's complaints under this provision in

connection with his asylum request must be rejected as incompatible

ratione materiae.

However, although the applicant has not raised this argument, the

Commission recalls that an expulsion decision may give rise to an issue

under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, which prohibits torture and

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and hence engage the

responsibility of a State under the Convention, where substantial

grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faced

a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention in the country to which he or she is to be

expelled. A mere possibility of ill-treatment, however, is not in

itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of this provision (cf. Eur.

Court HR, Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of

30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 103 and p. 37,

para. 111).

In the light of the applicant's submissions, the Commission does

not find that refusal to allow the applicant entry into United Kingdom

raises an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

The Commission further finds no issues under Articles 1, 17 and

25 (Art. 1, 17, 25) of the Convention in the present case.

Furthermore, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is a

provision of a procedural nature from which no substantive rights can

be derived.

It follows that, insofar as the matters raised fall within the

scope of the Convention, the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY

Secretary President

to the First Chamber of the First Chamber

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