M.S. v. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Doc ref: 29031/95 • ECHR ID: 001-3946
Document date: October 22, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 29031/95
by M.S.
against the Slovak Republic
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 22 October 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs G.H. THUNE, President
MM J.-C. GEUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 28 March and
8 August 1995 by M.S. against the Slovak Republic and registered on
31 October 1995 under file No. 29031/95;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
4 October 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 22 December 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Slovak citizen born in 1945. He is a doctor
and resides in Cífer. The facts of the case, as submitted by the
applicant, may be summarised as follows.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
1. Proceedings concerning the dismissal from the hospital in Modra
On 4 November 1991 the applicant started attending a practical
course in endocrinology notwithstanding that he had not obtained his
employer's permission. On 25 November 1991, after he had been twice
requested to resume his work, the applicant was dismissed from the
hospital in Modra.
On 21 April 1992 the Bratislava - vidiek District Court (Okresny
súd) refused to quash the decision to dismiss the applicant as the
latter had acted negligently in that he had stopped working in order
to attend the practical course. On 22 July 1992 the Bratislava
Regional Court (Krajsky súd) dismissed the applicant's appeal. It held
that the first instance court should have rejected the claim because
it had been lodged out of time.
On 26 February 1993 the Supreme Court (Najvyssí súd) rejected the
applicant's appeal on points of law as this remedy was not available
in the applicant's case. The applicant then sought redress with the
Constitutional Court (Ústavny súd). He alleged a violation of his
right to education.
On 4 October 1994 the Constitutional Court rejected the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. It recalled that it could only examine
alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms which occurred
after 15 February 1993, whereas the final decision in the applicant's
case had been taken by the Bratislava Regional Court on 22 July 1992.
The Constitutional Court further noted that the applicant could have
sought redress with the Constitutional Court of the former Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic but had failed to do so.
2. Proceedings concerning the dismissal from the Railways Hospital
On 12 May 1993 the applicant was dismissed from the Railways
Hospital in Bratislava. On 8 October 1993 he challenged the lawfulness
of the dismissal before the Bratislava 3 District Court. On 24 June
1994 the action was dismissed as it had been lodged after the expiry
of the two months' time-limit prescribed by law.
The applicant appealed to the Bratislava City Court (Mestsky súd)
and claimed that the first instance court had misinterpreted his
action. On 29 November 1994 he requested the City Court to consider
his action as a claim for protection of his honour and reputation. The
appeal was dismissed on 30 November 1994.
The City Court found it evident from the applicant's submissions
that he had challenged the lawfulness of his dismissal. In the court's
view, the action could not be transformed into an action for protection
of honour and reputation as requested by the applicant. The court
noted that the applicant was free to lodge a separate action if he
considered that his right to honour and reputation had been violated.
The applicant lodged a petition (podnet) with the Constitutional
Court. He complained, inter alia, that he had been dismissed
unlawfully and that the general courts had misinterpreted his action
and refused to examine it as an action for protection of his honour and
reputation.
The petition was dismissed on 14 June 1995. The Constitutional
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to examine labour disputes. It
further found that the mere fact that the applicant had been
unsuccessful in his claim could not be considered as a violation of his
fundamental rights.
3. Proceedings concerning the sickness benefits
The applicant concluded, as from 1 January 1989, a contract of
employment with the Institute for Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases
("the Institute"). The Institute has its main seat in Nitra and the
applicant worked in the Institute's tuberculosis sanatorium located in
Horné Lefantovce ("the sanatorium"). On 17 January 1989 he was
granted, at his own request, unpaid leave until 31 January 1989. At
the latter date the applicant's contract of employment was terminated.
The applicant contracted an infectious inflammation of an eye and
was unable to work from 20 January to 19 February 1989. On 1 March
1989 he claimed sickness benefits from the Institute and submitted
medical certificates delivered by the doctors who had treated him.
Part II of certificate No. H 934140 was entitled "Notification
of termination of incapacity to work" and stated that it served as the
last certificate for payment of sickness benefits. The reverse side
of the certificate comprised a chart reserved for both the health
insurance commission (i.e. the trade-union organ competent to decide
on claims for sickness benefits) and the employer of the claimant. The
former had to confirm in the chart that it agreed with the payment of
the benefits and the latter had to certify that the formal requirements
for payment of the sum due were met. The aforesaid chart was stamped
by the sanatorium's insurance commission and signed by its
representative on 5 March 1989.
The diagnosis set out in the medical certificates submitted by
the applicant implied that the applicant had suffered an injury. On
7 April 1989 an accountant of the Institute's department of personnel
and salaries in Nitra therefore requested the applicant to specify, by
completing a form, how he had suffered the injury. The letter stated
that the requested information was necessary in order to determine
whether or not sickness benefits could be paid to the applicant.
On 27 May 1989 the applicant returned the form to the Institute.
In the form the applicant pointed out that he had suffered no injury
and in the accompanying letter he explained that the diagnosis set out
in the medical certificates was incorrect.
On 31 May 1989 the director of the Institute informed the
applicant that he had requested the Institute's doctor and the
department of personnel and salaries to examine the applicant's case
because the medical certificates implied that the applicant had
suffered an injury. The letter further stated that the applicant would
be notified of any further information thus obtained.
As he had received no further information from the Institute and
the benefits had not been paid to him, the applicant lodged his claim,
on 11 February 1992, with the Nitra District Court. An accountant of
the Institute stated before the court that the benefits had not been
paid as the applicant had failed to duly complete the form which had
been sent to him on 7 April 1989. The accountant further stated that
the medical certificates concerning the applicant's disease implied
that the applicant had suffered an injury, and that in such cases the
supervisory authorities required that such a form be completed.
On 17 December 1993 the District Court dismissed the applicant's
action, mainly on the ground that during his illness the applicant had
not been examined by his employer's doctor as required by the
regulations.
The applicant appealed to the Bratislava Regional Court. The
latter established that the applicant claimed, inter alia, sickness
benefits for the period of his illness and compensation for lost
earnings and personal suffering.
On 27 April 1994 the Regional Court quashed the first instance
decision and discontinued the proceedings as regards the claim for
sickness benefits. It held that the general courts lacked jurisdiction
to decide on such claims. The Regional Court upheld the first instance
decision to dismiss the claim for compensation for lost earnings as it
had been lodged out of time.
On 31 May 1995 the applicant lodged a petition with the
Constitutional Court. He complained, inter alia, that the way in which
the general courts had dealt with his case was unlawful and violated
his fundamental rights.
On 14 June 1995 the Constitutional Court rejected the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. In the reasons for its decision the
Constitutional Court pointed out that the applicant's right to have his
claim examined by an independent and impartial tribunal in procedures
established by law as guaranteed by Article 46 para. 1 of the
Constitution was respected in the proceedings before the general
courts.
The Constitutional Court further held:
[Original]
"Ústavny súd nemá právomoc preskúmavat zákonnost rozhodnutí
vseobecnych súdov, a preto ani v prípadnom zistení nezákonnosti
nemôze tieto zrusit alebo napravit."
[Translation]
"The Constitutional Court lacks jurisdiction to examine whether
decisions of general courts are lawful and, therefore, even if
unlawfulness of such decisions is established, they cannot be
quashed or modified by the Constitutional Court."
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. Article 46 para. 1 of the Constitution provides as follows:
[Translation]
"Any person is entitled to claim his or her rights by procedures
established by law before an independent and impartial court of
law or other public authority ... in cases specified by law."
2. Legislation concerning health insurance
a) Health Insurance Act
Until 30 June 1990 the health insurance was administered,
pursuant to Section 54 of Act No. 54/1956 of 30 November 1956 on Health
Insurance of Employees (the Health Insurance Act), by the Central
Trade-Union Council.
Pursuant to Section 44 para. 4 of the aforesaid Act, a right to
sickness benefits became statute-barred a year after the claim for such
benefits had been granted.
Section 58 of the Health Insurance Act provided that decisions
delivered by the competent trade-union organs on issues relating to
sickness benefits were enforceable if no remedy against them was
available.
The Health Insurance Act was amended, as from 1 July 1990, by Act
No. 180/1990 in that, inter alia, the administration of health
insurance was transferred to organs subordinated to the Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs, and the limitation period for claims
concerning sickness benefits was extended to three years. However,
pursuant to Section IX para. 2 of Act No. 180/1990, the running of
periods which had not expired by 1 July 1990 remained unchanged.
b) Regulation No. 91/1958
During the relevant period, the organisation and implementation
of the health insurance scheme was governed by a document elaborated
by the Central Trade-Union Council and published as the Prime
Minister's Regulation No. 91 of 22 December 1958. The below mentioned
provisions of this Regulation are relevant in the present case.
Section 7 vested the powers relating to the implementation of the
health insurance scheme at the level of individual enterprises and
institutions in trade-union councils existing within them. In order
to carry out this function, the trade-union councils established their
insurance commissions.
Pursuant to Section 12, the heads of enterprises or institutions
were personally responsible for the exercise of administrative
functions relating to the implementation of the health insurance scheme
including payments of sickness benefits.
Para. 1 of Section 16 provided for due and timely payment, by
the administration of enterprises and institutions, of benefits granted
by the trade-union organs.
Pursuant to para. 2 of Section 16, the head of the enterprise or
institution was entitled to suspend the payment of a benefit if it had
been granted in violation of the law or if the amount granted was
incorrect. In such cases, the head of the enterprise or institution
was under the obligation to submit the case for decision to the trade-
union council. If the trade-union council refused to accept the
opinion of the head of the enterprise or institution, the latter was
to submit the case to the District Trade-Union Council. Its decision
was binding.
In accordance with Sections 36 and 37, a claim for sickness
benefits was to be submitted to the officer appointed by the employer,
usually the accountant. The claims for sickness benefits were to be
decided upon by the trade-union organ established within the
organisation in which the claimant was employed.
Pursuant to Section 38 para. 1, if the trade-union organ granted
the benefit, it was payable and no decision was communicated to the
claimant. No appeal was available in such a case.
Para. 2 of Section 38 provided that if the claim was refused, the
claimant was to be informed accordingly by a member of the trade-union
organ which had decided upon it. Such a decision could be appealed
against before the competent trade-union organs.
Section 38 para. 5 entitled the District Health Insurance
Administration to decide in lieu of the competent trade-union organ in
an enterprise or institution if such an organ refused to start the
proceedings or failed to decide on a claim for sickness benefits within
the time-limit set by the District Health Insurance Administration.
Section 46 provided that decisions of the trade-union organs in
matters relating to health insurance became final if no remedy was
available against them. Decisions by which a claim for sickness
benefits was granted were enforceable as soon as they became final.
3. Code of Civil Procedure
Act No. 519/1991 amended the Code of Civil Procedure in that,
inter alia, the decisions of administrative organs became reviewable
by courts unless the law provided otherwise. It entered into force as
from 1 January 1992. Pursuant to Section III para. 4 (a) of the
aforesaid Act, actions against decisions of administrative authorities
could be examined by courts only in cases when the available remedies
had been exhausted and the decisions complained of became final after
the entry into force of Act No. 519/1991, i.e. not prior to 1 January
1992. Appendix A to the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in accordance
with Section 248 para. 3 of the Code, for cases in which judicial
review of administrative organs' decisions is excluded. Until
1 December 1995 the aforesaid Appendix comprised also decisions
concerning claims for sickness benefits.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that in the proceedings which concerned
his dismissal from the hospital in Modra the courts refused to examine
his claims and decided arbitrarily. He alleges a violation of
Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
The applicant further alleges a violation of Article 6 of the
Convention in that he had been arbitrarily dismissed from the Railways
Hospital, and that the courts had misinterpreted his action and refused
to examine it as an action for protection of his honour and reputation.
Finally, the applicant complains under Article 6 of the
Convention that his fundamental rights were violated in that the
Bratislava Regional Court discontinued the proceedings concerning his
claim for sickness benefits and that he could not obtain redress before
the Constitutional Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The part of the application which concerns the applicant's
dismissal from the hospital in Modra was introduced on 28 March 1995.
The remainder of the application was introduced on 8 August 1995. The
application was registered on 31 October 1995.
On 26 June 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
4 October 1996. The applicant replied on 22 December 1996.
THE LAW
1. a) The applicant alleges a violation of his rights under
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and under Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-2) in the proceedings concerning his dismissal from the
hospital in Modra.
The Commission notes that the final relevant decision in the
applicant's case was taken by the Bratislava Regional Court on
22 July 1992. Since this part of the application was introduced before
the Commission on 28 March 1995, the applicant has failed to respect
the six months' time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention.
It is true that the applicant sought redress also before the
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, those remedies
were incapable of remedying the situation complained of as the courts
concerned lacked jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's claims. For
this reason, these remedies cannot be regarded as effective and the
decisions of the aforesaid courts cannot be regarded as final within
the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention (see, mutatis
mutandis, No. 9863/82 and No. 10924/84, Dec. 6.12.84, D.R. 39, pp. 93,
116).
b) The applicant alleges a violation of his rights under Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention in that the courts misinterpreted his action
relating to his dismissal from the Railways Hospital in Bratislava.
The Commission recalls that this part of the application was
introduced on 8 August 1995 whereas the final decision on this claim
was taken by the Bratislava City Court on 30 November 1994. The
applicant has, therefore, failed to respect the six months' time-limit
laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
The Commission notes that the Constitutional Court lacked
jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's petition. For this reason,
its decision of 14 June 1995 cannot be considered as final within the
meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
c) The applicant further alleges a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention in that the courts refused to quash the decision
concerning his dismissal from the Railways Hospital in Bratislava.
The Commission recalls that the courts could not examine the
lawfulness of the dismissal because of the applicant's procedural
mistake, namely the failure to lodge his action within the time-limit
laid down in Slovak law. The applicant has not, therefore, complied
with the requirement as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid
down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention (see No. 10107/82, Dec.
12.7.84, D.R. 38, p. 90).
It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected
pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
2. Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention in the proceedings concerning his claim for health
insurance benefits. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,
insofar as relevant, provides as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law..."
The Commission notes that in its decision of 14 June 1995 the
Constitutional Court, despite its conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction
to deal with the applicant's case, made a finding on the merits of the
applicant's complaint. The Commission does not consider it necessary
to determine whether in these circumstances the Constitutional Court's
decision of 14 June 1995 can be regarded as final within the meaning
of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention as, in any event, this part
of the application is inadmissible for the reasons set out below.
The Government submit that the record from the meeting of the
sanatorium's insurance commission at which the applicant's claim had
been examined was eliminated after the expiry of the time-limit set
for its keeping in the archives.
They contend that the medical certificates concerning the
applicant's incapacity to work were stamped by the sanatorium's
insurance commission and signed by its representative on 5 March 1989,
and that the applicant has never been informed that the insurance
commission or any other body competent to decide on his claim rejected
it. The Government conclude, with reference to Section 38 para. 1 of
Regulation No. 91/1958, that the insurance commission granted the
applicant's claim on the aforesaid date.
The Government further contend that, during the one year
limitation period set out in Section 44 para. 4 of the Health Insurance
Act, the applicant neither lodged a request for judicial enforcement
of the insurance commission's decision, nor did he request, after the
employer had not paid the benefits to him, that the competent trade-
union organs decide on his claim anew. The Government therefore
consider that the applicant's right to the benefits became statute-
barred on 5 March 1990.
The applicant agrees with the Government that his claim for
sickness benefits was granted by the insurance commission. He
considers, however, that the insurance commission decided on his claim
only after he had explained, by his letter addressed to the director
of the Institute on 27 May 1989, that he had suffered no injury.
The applicant further submits that contrary to the promise
contained in the letter of 31 May 1989, the director of the Institute
did not inform him about any further developments in his case. The
applicant points out that it is not possible to identify the date when
the insurance commission decided on his claim. He therefore considers
irrelevant the Government's objection according to which his right to
the benefits lapsed on 5 March 1990.
The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention applies only to disputes ("contestations") over a "right"
which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under
domestic law (see Eur. Court HR, Skärby v. Sweden judgment of 28 June
1990, Series A no. 180-B, p. 36, para. 27).
It is not contested between the parties that the sanatorium's
insurance commission granted the applicant's claim and the Commission
has before it no information that would contradict this fact. What is
disputed, however, is the date on which the relevant decision was
taken.
The Commission notes that the applicant has never been officially
notified of the insurance commission's decision granting his claim.
In fact, Section 38 para. 1 of Regulation No. 91/1958 provided that
such decisions were not to be communicated to the claimants.
The Commission further notes that the only available document
that indicates the date when the insurance commission examined the
applicant's claim is the medical certificate No. H 934140. Part II of
this document stated that it served as the last certificate for payment
of sickness benefits.
The reverse side of the aforesaid document was reserved for
remarks by both the insurance commission (i.e. the body entitled to
decide on such claims) and the administration of the enterprise or
institution employing the claimant (which was, pursuant to Section 12
of Regulation No. 91/1958, responsible for the exercise of the
administrative functions relating to the implementation of the health
insurance scheme including payments of sickness benefits). The former
was to confirm that it agreed with the payment of the benefits and the
latter had to certify that the formal requirements for payment of the
sum due were met. This document was stamped by the sanatorium's
insurance commission in Horné Lefantovce and signed by its
representative on 5 March 1989.
The Commission has noted that after this date the applicant was
contacted by the accountant of the Institute's headquarters in Nitra.
Since the certificates submitted by the applicant implied that the
applicant had suffered an injury, the accountant requested the
applicant to specify, by completing a form, how he had suffered the
injury. The letter stated that the requested information was necessary
in order to decide whether or not sickness benefits could be paid to
the applicant.
On 27 May 1989 the applicant informed the administration of the
Institute that he had suffered no injury. On 31 May 1989 the director
of the Institute informed the applicant that he had requested the
Institute's doctor and the department of personnel and salaries to
examine the applicant's case. Subsequently, the applicant received no
further information concerning his claim.
At the hearing before the Nitra District Court which was held on
17 December 1993 the accountant of the Institute stated that the
benefits had not been paid as the applicant had failed to duly complete
the form which had been sent to him on 7 April 1989 and that completing
of the form was a prerequisite condition for payment of the benefits.
In the Commission's view, the above facts indicate, as it is
suggested by the Government, that after 5 March 1989 the
representatives of the Institute contacted the applicant in the
exercise of the administrative functions relating to the payment of
sickness benefits which were incumbent upon the director of the
Institute by virtue of Sections 12 and 16 of Regulation No. 91/1958.
The Commission has before it no information that would indicate
that after 5 March 1989 the applicant's claim was examined again by the
sanatorium's insurance commission or any other organ competent to
decide on it. In these circumstances, the Commission finds no reason
for disagreeing with the respondent Government's affirmation that the
sanatorium's insurance commission granted the applicant's claim on
5 March 1989 and that the extinctive one year time-limit set out in
Section 44 para. 4 of the Health Insurance Act started to run as from
this date.
The Commission has also considered the applicant's objection that
he had no knowledge of the date on which the insurance commission had
decided on his claim and, accordingly, when the aforesaid limitation
period started to run.
In this respect, the Commission notes that under Section 38
para. 1 of Regulation No. 91/1958 decisions by which the insurance
commission granted a claim for sickness benefits were not notified to
the claimants. However, the Commission sees no reason why the
applicant could not ask the director of the Institute for an
explanation after he had returned the form and the benefits were still
not paid to him. The applicant was also free to ask the insurance
commission to inform him whether and when a decision on his claim had
been taken. On the basis of the information thus obtained the
applicant could have requested, before his right to benefits lapsed,
an enforcement of the insurance commission's decision.
Even assuming that the Director of the Institute suspended the
payment of the benefits in accordance with Section 16 para. 2 of
Regulation No. 91/1958 and that the trade-union council failed to
decide on his claim as required by the aforesaid Section, the applicant
could have sought redress with the District Health Insurance
Administration. The latter was entitled, pursuant to Section 38
para. 5 of Regulation No. 91/1958, to decide in lieu of the competent
trade-union organ in an enterprise or institution if it refused to
start the proceedings or failed to decide on a claim for sickness
benefits within the time-limit set by the District Health Insurance
Administration.
The Commission further notes that between 31 May 1989 and
11 February 1992 the applicant, who is a doctor and can therefore
legitimately be expected to have appropriate knowledge of the
legislation relating to the health insurance, apparently undertook no
action with a view to having the benefits paid.
In these circumstances, the Commission considers it irrelevant
that the decision of the sanatorium's insurance commission was not
notified to the applicant. The Commission therefore accepts the
Government's objection that the right claimed by the applicant lapsed
on 5 March 1990 pursuant to Section 44 para. 4 of the Health Insurance
Act.
Accordingly, the right which the applicant claimed before the
courts on 11 February 1992 was no longer recognised under Slovak law.
The guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention do
not, therefore, extend to the proceedings complained of.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
