AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 29035/95

                      by T.W.

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 14 January 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    J.-C. GEUS, President

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 10 July 1995 by

T.W. against Sweden and registered on 31 October 1995 under file

No. 29035/95;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 18 February 1997 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicant on 17 April 1997;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born on 31 December 1987 and

resident in Helsingborg. Before the Commission he is represented by

Mr Olle Karlsson, a lawyer in Helsingborg, who is instructed by the

applicant's mother and custodian.

      The facts, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as

follows.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

      Already in August 1987 the Social Council (socialnämnden) of

Helsingborg had begun to investigate who could be the applicant's

father. Initially this investigation concerned only R, whom the

applicant's mother had referred to as the father. In January 1988 the

Social Council contacted R, who denied being the father. In

February 1988 the Social Council requested that a legal genetic blood

test be carried out in respect of the applicant, his mother and R. The

samples were taken between May and October 1988. In January 1989 the

results of the tests excluded the possibility that R could be the

father.

      After the applicant's mother had named V as the possible father

the Social Council, in March 1989, began an inquiry in this respect.

In September 1989 A stated to the Social Council that he might be the

father. In November 1989 the mother denied having had any sexual

intercourse with him. In March 1990 the Social Council requested that

a legal genetic blood test be carried out in respect of the applicant,

his mother and A. The samples were taken in September 1990. The results

of October 1990 did not exclude A as the father. In January 1991 the

Social Council contacted V, who doubted that he was the applicant's

father. The applicant and V failed to show up for certain appointments

fixed by the Social Council.

      On 14 February 1991 the applicant instituted paternity

proceedings against A and V before the District Court (tingsrätten) of

Helsingborg. The applicant was represented by a legal aid lawyer

jointly appointed by the mother and the Social Council. A preparatory

hearing scheduled for April 1991 was postponed, the District Court

having granted V's request for a legal genetic blood test involving the

applicant, his mother and himself. In June 1991 the District Court

ordered V to pay a fine for having failed to supply the necessary blood

sample. In October 1991 the District Court again directed V to supply

the sample. In December 1991 the District Court held a preparatory

hearing and decided to seek police assistance to have V supply the

sample. The sample was taken in March 1992. In April 1992 the District

Court directed V to submit a further sample at the request of the

laboratory. In July 1992 the District Court again decided to seek

police assistance to have V supply the fresh sample. The sample was

taken the same month. In September 1992 the results were communicated

to the applicant's counsel for comments within two weeks. She was

granted an extension of one month so as to be able to consult with the

mother. In October 1992 the mother withdrew her claim that V might be

the father. On 28 October 1992 the District Court dismissed the

paternity action against V and ordered that the applicant, his mother

and A should undergo an extended legal genetic blood test. Samples were

supplied in December 1992 and the results were received by the District

Court on 12 March 1993. It indicated that A was the applicant's father

with a probability degree of more than 99.999 %. The applicant's lawyer

was requested to comment thereon within three weeks but was granted a

two-week extension due to difficulties in reaching the applicant's

mother. Further observations were submitted in May and June 1993. In

August 1993 the District Court fixed its oral hearing for September

1993. Before the District Court the applicant's mother stated under

oath that she could not think of any men other than R and V who might

have conceived the applicant.

      In its judgment of 30 September 1993 the District Court noted

that the applicant's mother had denied having had sexual intercourse

with A during the period of conception. However, the result of the

blood test had shown with a very high probability that he was the

applicant's father. Having regard to the circumstances as a whole, it

had thus been shown with a reasonable degree of probability that he was

the father.

      Unlike the Social Council the applicant's mother was unwilling

to accept the District Court's judgment on the applicant's behalf. Due

to this conflict of interests she sought representation by a new legal

aid counsel, whereas the previous counsel continued to represent the

applicant on behalf of the Social Council.

      In his appeal to the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) of Skåne and

Blekinge of 19 October 1993 the applicant through his mother withdrew

his paternity claim against A and requested that the case be struck

off. It was important, so the applicant argued, that an "incorrect" or

"faulty" ("felaktig") father not be found. The applicant wished to make

further observations in support of his appeal within one month, should

his appeal not be struck off.

      The Court of Appeal did not strike the case off its list and in

January 1994 it authorised with retroactive effect the applicant's

mother's change of legal aid counsel. The Social Council joined the

appeal proceedings, arguing that the District Court's judgment should

stand. Written observations were submitted between March and

August 1994.

      In June and December 1994 A contacted the Social Council, stating

his wish to establish bonds with the applicant and expressing his

concern about the duration of the paternity proceedings. He was advised

to await the outcome of the proceedings.

       At the Court of Appeal's hearing in October 1994 the applicant's

mother disclosed the name of yet a further potential father. The

hearing was adjourned until November 1994 for an additional inquiry and

the calling of two experts of the National Legal Serological Institute

(Statens Rättsserologiska Institut). At the resumed hearing they

confirmed the very high probability that A was the applicant's father.

      On 15 November 1994 the Court of Appeal upheld the District

Court's judgment as far as the paternity matter was concerned. In

December 1994 the applicant's mother sought leave to appeal to the

Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen). On 17 January 1995 such leave was

refused.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      According to the Parental Code (Föräldrabalken), a man shall be

declared to be the father of a child if he is found to have had sexual

intercourse with the child's mother during the relevant period and it

is probable, with regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case,

that he is the father of the child (chapter 1, subsection 5). Whenever

necessary, the local social council is under a duty to inquire into the

paternity of a child and institute proceedings on behalf of the child

to have the paternity confirmed. The inquiry should be conducted

without delay and shall, failing special reasons to the contrary, be

completed within one year from the birth of the child (chapter 2,

sections 1, 4, 6 and 8). The mother may institute paternity proceedings

independently of the Social Council, if she has custody of the child

(chapter 3, section 5). The competent court shall ensure that the

paternity question is properly investigated (chapter 3, section 9).

      According to chapter 49, section 6 of the Code of Judicial

Procedure (Rättegångsbalken), any party who is of the opinion that the

proceedings in a case have been delayed without cause by a district

court's order may appeal against that order separately. No other

separate appeals lie open with regard to a delay in the proceedings.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that the paternity proceedings as a

whole, starting with the Social Council's investigation, lasted some

seven years, which is excessive.

2.    The applicant also complains that he did not receive a fair

trial. Allegedly, the courts applied the relevant Swedish law wrongly

by declaring A to be his father, although only the second of the two

conditions set out in the Parental Code had been met.

      The applicant invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 10 July 1995 and registered on

31 October 1995.

      On 27 November 1996 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to

communicate to the respondent Government the applicant's complaint

concerning the length of the proceedings.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

18 February 1997.  The applicant replied on 17 April 1997, after an

extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains about the length of the paternity

proceedings. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

which, as far as relevant, reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is

      entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by

      [a] ... tribunal ..."

      The Government consider that the applicant has not exhausted the

domestic remedies, as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention. He did not appeal separately against the District Court's

order of 28 October 1992 that he, his mother and A undergo an extended

legal genetic blood test. This order delayed the proceedings with four

and a half months. In an appeal on this point the applicant could

reasonably have argued that an extended blood test regarding A would

cause an unnecessary delay, as the applicant's mother had stated that

she and A had not had sexual intercourse.

      In the alternative, the Government accept that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) is applicable but submit that the complaint is manifestly

ill-founded, as the delays in the proceedings cannot be attributed to

the State. In the Government's view the period to be taken into

consideration for the purposes of assessing the length of the

proceedings began only on 14 February 1991, when the applicant

instituted paternity proceedings against A and V. During the preceding

inquiry by the Social Council the applicant was represented by his

mother and custodian, who could at any time have instituted court

proceedings on his behalf. The period to be taken into consideration

ended, according to the Government, with the Supreme Court's decision

of 17 January 1995.

      Should the Commission consider that the period to be taken into

consideration started at the time of the applicant's birth, the State

cannot in the Government's view be held responsible for the mother's

and V's failure to attend certain meetings organised by the Social

Council. Furthermore, it proved difficult to reach R and to have him

deliver the necessary blood sample. Even after the result of the legal

genetic blood test had ruled him out as the applicant's father, the

applicant's mother delayed the Social Council's work by insisting that

he was the father. The mother's refusal to admit that A could be the

father made the Social Council inquire into other alternatives.

      In any event, so the Government argue, the duration of the

proceedings was not unreasonable in the light of the particular

features which complicated the case. No fewer than four men were at one

point or other considered the applicant's potential father. Although

R was ruled out at an early stage of the Social Council's inquiry, the

inquiry in respect of him meant that when the court proceedings began

the Social Council had not yet obtained any blood test regarding V.

That test therefore had to be ordered by the District Court itself.

Moreover, due to a conflict of interests the applicant's mother and the

Social Council could no longer represent the applicant jointly in the

appeal proceedings. The appointment of a new counsel at his mother's

request necessitated more work on the part of the Court of Appeal.

      As regards the applicant's conduct during the court proceedings,

the Government consider that he must be held accountable for his

mother's unwillingness or inability to disclose as early as possible

the names of all the potential fathers, including A. Specific delays

were also caused by counsel's difficulties in reaching the mother,

which led to certain adjournments of the proceedings before the

District Court. Moreover, before the Court of Appeal the applicant

through his mother initially withdrew his paternity claim against A.

His subsequent change of mind created more work for the Court of

Appeal.

      Finally, as regards the conduct of the defendants, the Government

recall that V's refusals to present himself for the necessary blood

tests required that the District Court issue him with a fine and seek

police assistance for enforcement purposes. This procedure lasted in

itself one year and four months.

      The applicant refutes the Government's preliminary objection. The

remedy open to him under the Code of Judicial Procedure would not have

prevented the delays in the proceedings effectively and cannot thus be

considered a remedy within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26).

      The applicant considers that the period to be taken into

consideration began with the opening of the Social Council's inquiry

in August 1987 and ended with the Supreme Court's decision in

January 1995. The proceedings thus lasted more than seven years. Even

if the period were considered to have started in February 1991 the

proceedings lasted about four years, which is in any case excessive for

the examination of a paternity action.

      The applicant furthermore argues that the case was not

particularly complex and the delays in the proceedings cannot be

attributable to his mother. She did not deliberately conceal the names

of his potential fathers and was simply not aware of having had sexual

intercourse with A. Her statement that she had been the victim of a

sexual offence possibly after having been drugged was not taken

seriously. Furthermore, before the District Court A had been unable to

say with certainty whether he had had sexual intercourse with the

applicant's mother. In these circumstances she could not reasonably be

expected to waive her right to appeal against the judgment establishing

that A was the father.

      The Commission reiterates that in civil proceedings the period

to be taken into account in the assessment of the length of the

proceedings normally begins to run from the moment the court action was

instituted. It is conceivable, however, that in certain circumstances

the period may begin to run earlier. Thus, the period may commence

already with the lodging of an objection in preliminary administrative

proceedings, if the applicant is unable to seise the competent court

before the matter has been examined by the administrative authority

(see Eur. Court HR, König v. the Federal Republic of Germany judgment

of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, pp. 33-34, para. 98).

      In the present case the Commission notes that under domestic law

the Social Council was under a duty to inquire without delay into the

paternity and to institute court proceedings on behalf of the applicant

to have the paternity confirmed. Nevertheless, together with the

applicant's mother the Social Council lodged a paternity action on the

applicant's behalf only in February 1991.

      The Commission notes, however, that domestic law did not prevent

the applicant's mother from lodging a paternity action on her son's

behalf in her capacity as his custodian. This course of action she

could have opted for independently of the Social Council and thus

without awaiting the outcome of its inquiries. In these circumstances

the Commission can accept that the period to be taken into

consideration for the purpose of assessing the length of the

proceedings under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention began

when the paternity action was lodged jointly by the Social Council and

the applicant's mother, i.e. on 14 February 1991. It ended on

17 January 1995, when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The

proceedings thus lasted some three years and eleven months.

      The reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed

in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having

regard to the criteria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular

the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the

relevant authorities and the importance of what is at stake for the

applicant in the litigation (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Duclos v. France

judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, no. 25, pp. 2180-2081,

para. 55). Special diligence is required in cases concerning civil

status (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Taiuti v. Italy judgment of 27

February 1992, Series A no. 229-I, p. 93, para. 18; Bock v. the Federal

Republic of Germany judgment of 23 March 1989, Series A no. 150, p. 23,

para. 49).

      The Commission considers that the present case was somewhat

complex on the facts, considering the number of potential fathers named

by the applicant's mother both before and during the court proceedings.

As for the conduct of the authorities, the Commission notes that the

case was pending before the District Court for two years and seven

months. The applicant's appeal was pending for a little more than one

year, whereas the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal within two

months. However, the Commission cannot detect any important delay at

any of the three court levels for which the authorities could be held

responsible. It notes, in particular, that one of the potential fathers

and defendants, V, on two occasions attempted to obstruct the

proceedings before the District Court by refusing to undergo the

necessary blood tests. This led the District Court to impose a fine on

him and to seek police assistance. However, neither in that connection

nor more generally was there any significant period of inactivity which

could be imputed to the District Court or the Court of Appeal.

      As for the applicant's own conduct, the Commission accepts that

he must be held accountable for what appears to have been his mother's

unwillingness to accept that A be found to be his father in spite of

the convincing expert evidence adduced. The Commission finds it

particularly striking that at the appeal stage the applicant's mother,

though speaking in the name of her son, first sought to have A's

paternity quashed and the case struck off and, when not succeeding in

this, stated the name of yet another purported father. The Commission

has not ignored the mother's allegation that, having possibly been

under the influence of drugs, she could not be aware of all potential

fathers of the applicant. On the other hand, there is no substantiation

of this alleged offence against her. In these circumstances any delay

in the proceedings can reasonably be held against the applicant due to

his mother's behaviour.

      It is true that what was at stake for the applicant was of

considerable importance to him in view of his young age and his

relation with A, who was eventually found to be his father. Indeed A,

seeking to establish bonds with the applicant, contacted the Social

Council to express his concern about the duration of the proceedings.

There is no indication, however, that as a party to the same

proceedings he made any attempt to have the court proceedings speeded

up.

      Making an overall assessment, the Commission therefore considers

that the length of the proceedings was not excessive in the specific

circumstances of this case.

      It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant complains that he did not receive a fair trial due

to the manner in which the courts applied domestic law.

      The Commission recalls that it is unable to deal with a complaint

that errors of law have been committed by domestic courts, except where

it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation

of any of the rights and freedoms set out by the Convention (see, e.g.,

No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83, p. 77). It is in principle within

the discretionary powers of the domestic courts to evaluate the

evidence before them. In the applicant's case the courts placed

decisive weight on the results from the extended legal genetic blood

test involving him, his mother and A and on the expert interpretations

of those results. The Commission finds nothing to suggest that the

courts' assessment of evidence was arbitrary or otherwise not legally

justified. Accordingly, there is no indication of a violation of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in this respect.

      It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               J.-C. GEUS

      Secretary                                   President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber