Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 34180/96

by Ladislav HAAS and Zlatica HAASOVÁ

against the Slovak Republic

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:

MM J.-C. GEUS, President

M.A. NOWICKI

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

J.-C. SOYER

H. DANELIUS

Mrs G.H. THUNE

MM F. MARTINEZ

I. CABRAL BARRETO

J. MUCHA

D. SVÁBY

P. LORENZEN

E. BIELIUNAS

E.A. ALKEMA

A. ARABADJIEV

Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 17 October 1996

by Ladislav HAAS and Zlatica HAASOVÁ against the Slovak Republic and

registered on 16 December 1996 under file No. 34180/96;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants are Slovak nationals born in 1948 and 1953

respectively. They are spouses and reside in Levoca. Before the

Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. M. Taragel, a lawyer

practising in Spisská Nová Ves.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

A. The particular circumstances of the case

On 6 September 1989 the applicants bought a house in Levoca for

295,570 Czechoslovak crowns. They concluded the purchase contract with

the State which had transferred the house to its ownership in 1988

after the spouses F., its original owners, had emigrated from

Czechoslovakia. On 7 December 1988, i.e. prior to the date when the

house was offered to the applicants, an expert appointed by the State

had evaluated the house at 306,810 Czechoslovak crowns, and the

evaluation was later adjusted to 301,260 crowns.

After the entry into force of the Law on Extrajudicial

Rehabilitation (Zákon o mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách, see "The relevant

domestic law" below) the spouses F. requested that the applicants

restore the house to them. Since the applicants failed to do so,

spouses F. brought an action for restitution of the house before the

Spisská Nová Ves District Court (Okresny súd). On 9 November 1994 the

latter granted the claim and ordered the applicants to vacate the

house.

The District Court noted that the house had been transferred to

State ownership without any relevant legal ground within the meaning

of Section 6 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.

An expert appointed by the court evaluated the house, at the

moment of its purchase by the applicants, at 391,000 crowns. A chief

expert opinion ordered by the court stated that in accordance with

Price Regulation No. 205/88 (Vyhláska o cenách stavieb, pozemkov,

trvalych porastov, úhrade za zriadenie práva osobného uzívania

pozemkov, trvalych porastov a náhrade za docasné uzívanie pozemkov),

the value of the house had been 430,908 crowns. Since the actual

purchase price had been considerably lower, the court concluded that

the applicants had acquired the house contrary to the legal rules then

in force within the meaning of Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on

Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.

The District Court further dismissed the applicant's request that

they should be ordered to vacate the house only after they were

provided with alternative accommodation.

The court noted that the applicants had not been responsible for

the erroneous evaluation of the house and held that they had not

benefited from an unfair advantage in the purchase within the meaning

of Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation. It

therefore decided that the applicants did not have to reimburse the

costs of the proceedings. Since the applicants were unsuccessful in

the proceedings, the court charged them the court fees of 17,200 Slovak

crowns.

The applicants appealed and claimed, inter alia, that they had

acquired the house in good faith. They alleged that Price Regulation

No. 205/88 provided for maximum permissible prices and that the sale

of real property at a lower price could not, therefore, be considered

as being contrary to the rules in force. Finally, the applicants

requested that they should be granted alternative accommodation.

On 25 September 1995 the Kosice Regional Court (Krajsky súd)

upheld the first instance judgment. It noted that Price Regulation

No. 205/88 had been binding and that the purchase price paid by the

applicants had been considerably below the value of the house under

that Regulation. The Regional Court therefore concluded that the sale

of the house had not conformed to the rules then in force.

The Regional Court further found that the applicants' claim for

alternative accommodation had no legal basis in Slovak law.

On 8 December 1995 the applicants restored the house to the

spouses F.

On 7 February 1996 the applicants claimed compensation for all

costs relating to the purchase of the house and to its restitution to

the original owners.

On 30 May 1996 the Ministry of Finance decided to reimburse the

purchase price to the applicants pursuant to Section 11 of the Law on

Extrajudicial Rehabilitation. The Ministry further informed the

applicants that their remaining claims for compensation had no legal

basis in Slovak law.

B. Relevant domestic law

In the preamble to Law No. 87/1991 of 23 March 1991 on

Extrajudicial Rehabilitation the Federal Assembly of the Czech and

Slovak Federal Republic affirmed its will to prevent wrongs which had

been committed in the past from re-occurring.

Section 1 para. 1 of the Law defines its aim as follows:

"This Law shall mitigate certain material and other wrongs arisen

between 25 February 1948 and 1 January 1990 and caused by acts

falling within the sphere of civil law, labour law and by

administrative acts which are incompatible with the principles

of a democratic society respecting the rights of citizens as

enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations [and] the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights..."

Pursuant to Section 4 para. 2 of the aforesaid Law, individuals

who acquired property from the State are liable to restore it if such

an acquisition was either contrary to the legal rules then in force or

if they benefited from an unfair advantage and provided that the State

had taken possession of such property in circumstances defined in

Section 6.

Under Section 6 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial

Rehabilitation, the obligation to restore property includes cases when

the State took possession of such property without any legal ground.

Section 11 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation entitles

individuals who are under the obligation to restore property to recover

the price for which they had acquired such property from the State.

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and

Article 8 of the Convention, that they were ordered to vacate the house

which they had acquired in good faith. In particular, they allege that

the erroneous evaluation of the house, which resulted in its

restitution to the original owners, is imputable to the State and

complain that they were not compensated in full for the damage in this

respect and that they were not provided with alternative accommodation.

They add that the value of the house at the time of its restitution was

945,961 crowns.

THE LAW

1. The applicants complain that they were ordered to vacate the

house which they had acquired in good faith. They allege a violation

of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which reads as follows:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his

possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair

the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary

to control the use of property in accordance with the general

interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions

or penalties."

The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first

sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates

the principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The second rule,

contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers

deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions.

The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that

Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the

use of property in accordance with the general interest (see Eur. Court

HR, Fredin v. Sweden judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192,

p. 14, para. 41).

In the present case the applicants were ordered, pursuant to the

relevant provisions of the Law on Extrajudiciary Rehabilitation, to

vacate a house which they had earlier purchased in good faith from the

State. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

applicants were deprived of their possessions within the meaning of the

second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1).

In order to be justified, it must be shown that the deprivation

of possessions was in accordance with the conditions provided for by

law and in the public interest. Furthermore, not only must the aim of

the deprivation of property be in the public interest, but there must

also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means

employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Eur. Court HR, Holy

Monasteries v. Greece judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A,

p. 34, para. 70). This implies that a fair balance must be struck

between the demands of the general interest of the community and the

requirement to protect the individual's fundamental rights, which

balance would not be found if the individual was found to have bornean

excessive burden (see Eur. Court HR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden

judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 26-28, paras. 69-

73).

The Commission observes in this respect that the applicants were

ordered to restore the house to its original owners pursuant to

Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation as they

had purchased it at a price which had not conformed to Price Regulation

No. 205/88 then in force. Thus the deprivation of possessions in

question was provided for by law.

As to the requirement of a legitimate aim in the public interest,

the Commission recalls that the deprivation of property in pursuance

of legitimate social, economic or other policies may be in the public

interest, even if the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment

of the property (see Eur. Court HR, James and Others v. the United

Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 32,

para. 45). Moreover, because of their direct knowledge of their

society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better

placed than the international judge to appreciate what is "in the

public interest". In performing their assessment the national

authorities therefore enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (ibidem,

p. 32, para. 46).

The Commission recalls that the aim of the Law on Extrajudicial

Rehabilitation is to mitigate certain wrongs caused by acts which are

incompatible with the principles of a democratic society respecting the

rights of citizens. When adopting this Law, the legislators affirmed

that it was their intention to prevent wrongs which had been committed

in the past from re-occurring. Thus the Law on Extrajudicial

Rehabilitation pursues a legitimate aim to safeguard the legality of

legal transactions. It promotes the principles of a democratic society

and provides redress in cases where wrongs were committed in disrespect

of such principles. In these circumstances, and having regard to the

State's margin of appreciation, the Commission accepts that the

deprivation complained of took place not only in the interest of the

original owners of the house, but also in the general interest of the

society as a whole.

There must, however, also be a reasonable relationship of

proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be

realised. In this respect, the Commission finds that in view of the

wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in this

area, an order to restore property which was not acquired in conformity

with the relevant legal rules may be regarded as proportionate to the

legitimate aims pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, No. 33456/96, Zvolensky

and Others v. the Czech Republic, Dec. 14.1.98, unpublished). The

Commission has also noted that the applicants received the purchase

price, and had been living in the house for more than five years.

Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in the particular circumstances of this case.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicants further allege a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention which provides as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family

life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with

the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

rights and freedoms of others."

The Commission considers that the order to vacate the house in

which the applicants were residing amounts to an interference with

their right to respect for their home as guaranteed by Article 8

para. 1 (Art. 8-1). It must therefore be established whether this

interference was compatible with the requirements set out in para. 2

of this Article.

The Commission has found above that the interference complained

of had as its basis Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial

Rehabilitation and it sees no reason why this basis should not be

considered as being accessible, foreseeable and in accordance with the

rule of law (see Eur. Court HR, Kruslin v. France judgment of

24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A, p. 20, para. 27).

The Commission further notes that by the interference complained

of the Slovak authorities sought, inter alia, to protect the rights of

the original owners of the house, which is a legitimate aim under

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

It remains to be determined whether the interference in question

was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of the

aforesaid Article. The Commission recalls that the notion of necessity

implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need

and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim

pursued. In determining whether an interference was "necessary in a

democratic society" the Convention organs have to take into account

that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (see,

mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of

24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31-31, paras. 67-68).

The Commission has found above, when examining the applicants'

complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), that an order to

restore property which was not acquired in conformity with the relevant

legal rules may be a proportionate measure for enforcement of the

legitimate aims pursued, and it sees no reason why it should depart

from this conclusion when examining the case under Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention. In the Commission's view, the domestic courts'

finding that the applicants had no right to alternative accommodation

under Slovak law cannot affect the position in the present case.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS

Secretary President

to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber

Menu

HAAS AND HAASOVA v. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

HAAS AND HAASOVA v. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

LEXI