GROF v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 25046/94 • ECHR ID: 001-4185
Document date: April 14, 1998
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25046/94
by Erika GROF
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
14 April 1998, the following members being present:
MM S. TRECHSEL, President
J.-C. GEUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs G.H. THUNE
MM F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs J. LIDDY
MM L. LOUCAIDES
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
P. LORENZEN
K. HERNDL
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs M. HION
MM R. NICOLINI
A. ARABADJIEV
Mr M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 21 February 1994
by Erika GROF against Austria and registered on 14 September 1994 under
file No. 25046/94;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
12 July 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 17 September 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1959 and residing
in Linz. Before the Commission she is represented by Mr. G. Schmid,
a lawyer practising in Linz.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
On 21 May 1991 the applicant's son was born and she went on
maternity leave. On 19 August 1991 she requested the granting of
maternity leave payments (Karenzurlaubsgeld). Thereupon the Linz
Labour Office (Arbeitsamt) granted the requested payments for the
period from 27 July 1991 to 21 May 1993 in the amount of some AS 160
per day.
On 16 December 1992 the Labour Office withdrew maternity leave
payments for the periods from 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992,
1 March 1992 to 30 June 1992 and from 1 October 1992 onwards. It found
that under the Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungs-
gesetz) mothers were only entitled to maternity leave payments if they
were unemployed. The applicant, however, had a teaching appointment
as lecturer at University. Her income from this appointment, even if
it was not a full-time employment, exceeded the minimum income level
(Geringfügigkeitsgrenze). From 1 February 1993 onwards the applicant
again received maternity leave payments. However, on 9 March 1993
maternity leave payments were withdrawn as from 1 March 1993 onwards
because the applicant had a further teaching appointment.
On 26 February and 23 March 1993 the applicant appealed. She
submitted that maternity leave payments could only be revoked for the
periods in which she actually had held her lectures but not for the
whole academic year. Thus, it should have been taken into account that
she had held her lectures in a concentrated form during a few weeks.
On 23 August 1993 the Upper Austrian Regional Labour Office
(Landesarbeitsamt) dismissed the applicant's appeals. It noted that
during the periods for which the maternity leave payments had been
withdrawn she had received as income from the University payments
between ATS 12,000 and 20,000 per month. These payments had been
considerably above the minimum income level of AS 2,772 for 1991,
AS 2,924 for 1992 and AS 3,102 for 1993.
On 6 October 1993 the applicant, represented by a lawyer,
introduced a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungs-
gerichtshof) against the above decision and, in case the Constitutional
Court would decline to deal with the case, requested the transfer of
the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). She
submitted that the labour authorities had, in an arbitrary manner,
misinterpreted the law, that it had not been clear which officials of
the Regional Labour Office had taken the impugned decision as the
decision had not been properly signed and that, in any event, the
Regional Labour Office could not be considered a tribunal within the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
On 30 November 1993 the Constitutional Court declined to deal
with the applicant's complaint for lack of prospect of success and
transferred the case to the Administrative Court.
On 24 January 1994 the Administrative Court requested the
applicant's lawyer to remedy procedural defects of her complaint,
namely, pursuant to S. 24 para. 1 and 29 of the Administrative Court
Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz), to submit a further copy for
service (Ausfertigung) of the complaint.
Thereupon, the applicant's lawyer sent a photocopy of the
complaint. This photocopy was not signed by the applicant's lawyer.
On 22 March 1994 the Administrative Court decided to discontinue
the proceedings (Verfahrenseinstellung) on the ground that the
applicant had failed to comply with its request of 24 January 1994, as
the document submitted by the applicant's lawyer was merely a photocopy
but not a proper copy for service since it did not bear the lawyer's
signature. Under S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act
complaints which were not in compliance with the procedural
requirements as to the form and contents had to be considered as having
been withdrawn if the complainant did not remedy the defect within the
time-limit fixed by the Court. The Administrative Court pointed out
that in accordance with its constant jurisprudence this provision also
applied in cases such as the one at issue where the complainant had
complied in an incomplete manner with the Court's order to remedy the
defect.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The relevant provisions of the Administrative Court Act, as in
force at the relevant time, read as follows:
S. 21 para. 1:
"Parteien im Verfahren vor dem Verwaltungsgerichtshof sind der
Beschwerdeführer, die belangte Behörde und die Personen, die durch den
Erfolg der Anfechtung des Verwaltungsaktes in ihren rechtlichen
Interessen berührt werden (Mitbeteiligte)."
"The parties in the proceedings before the Administrative Court
are the applicant, the respondent authority and any person who will be
affected in its legal interests if the complaint would be successful."
S. 22:
"In Angelegenheiten der Bundesverwaltung kann der zuständige
Bundesminister, in Angelegenheiten der Landesverwaltung die zuständige
Landesregierung, an Stelle eines anderen beschwerdeführenden
staatlichen Organs oder einer anderen belangten Behörde jederzeit in
das Verfahren eintreten."
"The competent Federal Minister in matters of federal
administration and the competent Regional Government in matters of
regional administration, may at any time enter into the proceedings
replacing as party the public authority which has lodged the complaint
or which is acting as respondent authority."
S. 24:
"(1) Die Beschwerden und sonstigen Schriftsätze sind unmittelbar
beim Verwaltungsgerichtshof einzubringen. Von jedem Schriftsatz samt
Beilagen sind so viele gleichlautenden Ausfertigungen beizubringen, daß
jeder vom Verwaltungsgerichtshof zu verständigenden Partei oder Behörde
eine Ausfertigung zugestellt und überdies eine für die Akten des
Gerichtshofes zurückbehalten werden kann. Sind die Beilagen sehr
umfangreich, so kann die Beigabe von Abschriften unterbleiben.
(2) Die Beschwerden und die Anträge auf Wiedereinsetzung in den
vorigen Stand ... müssen mit der Unterschrift eines Rechtsanwaltes
versehen sein."
(1) The complaint and any other writ shall be filed with the
Administrative Court. Every writ, accompanied by its supporting
documents, must be filed in so many identical copies for service that
the Administrative Court is enabled to serve on all parties or
authorities one authentic copy and that one can be retained for the
file. If the supporting documents are very voluminous it is not
necessary to submit copies.
(2) The complaints and applications for proceedings to be
reinstituted ... must bear the signature of a lawyer.
S. 29:
"Ist die belangte Behörde in einer Angelegenheit der
Bundesverwaltung nicht ein Bundesminister, in einer Angelegenheit der
Landesverwaltung nicht die Landesregierung, so ist außer den sonst
erforderlichen Ausfertigungen der Beschwerde samt Beilagen noch eine
weitere Ausfertigung für den zuständigen Bundesminister oder die
zuständige Landesregierung beizubringen."
"If, in matters of federal administration, the respondent
authority is not a Federal Minister or in matters of regional
administration not the Regional Government a further copy for service
together with the supporting documents for the competent Federal
Minister or the competent Regional Government has to be submitted."
S. 34:
"(1) Beschwerden die sich wegen Versäumung der Einbringungsfrist
oder wegen offenbarer Unzuständigkeit des Verwaltungsgerichtshofes
nicht zur Verhandlung eignen oder denen offenbar die Einwendung der
entschiedenen Sache oder der Mangel der Berechtigung zur Erhebung der
Beschwerde entgegensteht, sind ohne weiteres Verfahren in
nichtöffentlicher Sitzung mit Beschluß zurückzuweisen.
(2) Beschwerden, denen keiner der im Abs. 1 bezeichneten Umstände
entgegensteht, bei denen jedoch die Vorschriften über die Form und den
Inhalt (§§ 23, 24, 28, 29) nicht eingehalten wurden, sind zur Behebung
der Mängel unter Anberaumung einer kurzen Frist zurückzustellen; die
Versäumung dieser Frist gilt als Zurückziehung."
"(1) Complaints which have been lodged out of time or which are
not fit for consideration because the Administrative Court is
manifestly incompetent to deal with the matter as well as applications
which concern a matter already dealt with by the Administrative Court
or which have been lodged by a person not entitled to do so shall be
rejected without any further procedure by a decision taken in camera.
(2) A complaint which is not in conformity with the provisions
on form and contents of a complaint (SS. 23, 24, 28, 29) but which
nevertheless is not suffering from the defects mentioned under
paragraph 1 shall be returned for the purpose of remedying the defect
and a short time-limit shall be set for doing so; if the defect is not
remedied within the time-limit the complaint shall be considered as
withdrawn."
2. With regard to S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act the
Administrative Court has repeatedly found as follows:
"Unter Ausfertigung der Beschwerde (im Sinne des § 29 VwGG) ist
nur ein mit der Unterschrift eines Rechtsanwaltes versehenes
Geschäftsstück zu verstehen. Die Nachreichung der Ablichtung des
ursprünglichen Beschwerdeschriftsatzes, auf welcher keine Unterschrift
des einschreitenden Rechtsanwaltes - auch nicht in Ablichtung -
aufscheint, kann nicht als Befolgung des Mängelbehebungsauftrages
angesehen werden." (B. 17.12.1982, 82/04/0219; B. 12.9.1983,
83/10/212; B. 11.12.1984, 84/04/0188, 0189) quoted after DOLP, Die
Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, 3rd Edition, Vienna 1987, p. 175.
"Only a document bearing the signature of a lawyer may be
considered a copy for service (within the meaning of S. 24 of the
Administrative Court Act). The mere submission of a photocopy of the
writ of complaint, which does not bear the signature of the intervening
lawyer - not even in photocopy - cannot be considered as compliance
with the court's order to remedy procedural defects." (Decision
17.12.1982, 82/04/0219; Decision 12.9.1983, 83/10/212, 11.12.1984,
84/04/0188, 0189) quoted after DOLP, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit,
3rd Edition, Vienna 1987, p. 175.
3. By Federal Act of 13 August 1997 the Constitutional Court Act
(Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz), the Administrative Court Act and the
Administration Fees Act (Gebührengesetz) were amended (Federal Gazette-
I 88/1997). This amendment, inter alia, introduced the obligation to
pay court fees for complaints to the Constitutional Court and the
Administrative Court by means of stamps to be added to one of the
copies for service and amended the rules on public hearings.
Furthermore, a new paragraph 4 was added to S. 34 according to which
further copies for service need not bear the signature of a lawyer.
This amendment entered into force on 1 September 1997.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that she was arbitrarily denied access
to the Administrative Court and that consequently she had no
possibility to have her claim to maternity leave payments, which in her
submissions is a civil right, determined by a tribunal within the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. She also invokes
Article 13 of the Convention.
In her observations of 17 September 1996 the applicant also
complains that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention has been violated
because the Constitutional Court had refused to deal with her
complaint.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 21 February 1994 and registered
on 14 September 1994.
On 15 April 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the
application.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
12 July 1996. The applicant replied on 17 September 1996.
On 18 August 1997 the applicant made further submissions. The
Government did not reply thereto.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that she was denied access to the
Administrative Court and thereby arbitrarily denied a fair hearing of
her complaint relating to the withdrawing of maternity leave payments.
The applicant has invoked Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention but the Commission considers
that in the circumstances of the present case the complaint has to be
examined exclusively under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention which in its relevant part reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations...everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing....by an independent and impartial tribunal..."
The Government submit that in the proceedings before the
Administrative Court the applicant was represented by a lawyer. It
must have been known to the applicant's lawyer that the Administrative
Court applies rather strict criteria as regards its interpretation of
the formal conditions applicable to the procedure of lodging a
complaint and that, therefore, compliance with these formal conditions
is imperative. According to the Administrative Court's case-law
non-compliance with an order to submit the required number of copies
for service of a complaint will result in the discontinuation of the
proceedings. Nevertheless, the applicant's lawyer failed to comply
properly with the Administrative Court's order of 24 January 1994
because he submitted the copy of an unsigned document instead of a
further copy for service of the applicant's complaint. The applicant
therefore has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. In any event, in view of the
above considerations, there is no violation of the applicant's right
of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
This is disputed by the applicant. In her view the requirement
to submit a further copy for the Ministry of Social Affairs was an
outdated anachronism, as it would have been much easier for the
Administrative Court to make a photocopy and send it to the Ministry
concerned. Her lawyer nevertheless submitted a copy to the
Administrative Court. To discontinue proceedings merely because the
signature of the lawyer was missing was an excessive formalism. Since
on the document at issue there was the name and address of the lawyer
there could have been no doubts as to his identity. In any event the
applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention has been violated because the
Administrative Court cannot be considered a tribunal within the meaning
of this provision.
The Commission observes that the proceedings before the
Administrative Court were discontinued by the latter because it
considered that the applicant had failed to comply fully with an order
to remedy procedural defects. The Commission recalls in this respect
that there is no exhaustion of domestic remedies as required by
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention when an appeal has been rejected
because of a procedural mistake by the applicant (see No. 13467/87,
Dec. 10.7.89, D.R. 62, p. 269; No. 18079/91, Dec. 4.12.91, D.R. 72,
p. 263). The Commission finds, however, that in the present case the
question whether or not the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies
within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is so
closely related to the substantive issues of the application that it
cannot be determined separately.
The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to
his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.
In this way the Article embodies the "right to a court", of which the
right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before
courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only (Eur. Court HR,
Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no.
18-A, p. 18, para. 36; Fayed v. the United Kingdom judgment of
21 September 1994, Series A no. 294-B, p. 49, para. 65).
As to whether the proceedings at issue concerned a determination
of the applicant's civil rights and obligations, the Commission recalls
that it is today the general rule that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
applies in the field of social insurance, including even welfare
assistance, insofar as the person concerned claims an individual
economic right flowing from specific rules laid down in a statute (Eur.
Court HR, Salesi v. Italy judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no.
257-E, p. 59, para. 19; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland judgment of 24
June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 17, para. 46).
In the present case the applicant wished to have established that
during certain periods she had been entitled to maternity leave
payments and that the refusal of payments was not in accordance with
the law. The Commission therefore finds that the outcome of these
proceedings was decisive for private rights and obligations and hence
for "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1). Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies.
The applicant was therefore entitled to a determination of her
claims by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
of the Convention. The Labour Office and the Regional Labour Office,
being administrative bodies, cannot be considered as such tribunals.
As regards the Administrative Court the Commission recalls that the
Convention organs have repeatedly found that this Court fulfils the
requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in
matters which are not exclusively within the discretion of
administrative authorities and where the Administrative Court considers
the submissions on their merits, point by point, without ever having
to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or ascertaining various
facts (Eur. Court HR, Zumtobel v. Austria judgment of 21 September
1993, Series A no. 266-A, pp. 12-13, paras. 31-32; Ortenberg v. Austria
judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 295-B, p. 50, paras. 33-34).
In the present case the Administrative Court did not consider the
merits of the applicant's complaint. However, there is nothing to
suggest that in case the Administrative Court would have admitted the
applicant's complaint for examination it would have declined
jurisdiction or that its review would have been too narrow.
The Commission has therefore to examine whether the
Administrative Court's decision to discontinue proceedings on the
applicant's complaint respected her right of access to a court.
In this respect the Commission recalls that the right to a court,
of which the right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is
subject to limitations permitted by implication, since by its very
nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain
margin of appreciation in this regard. However, these limitations must
not restrict or reduce a person's access in such a way or to such an
extent that the very essence of the right is impaired; lastly, such
limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be achieved (see Eur. Court HR, Levages Prestations Services
v. France judgment of 23 October 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1543,
para. 40; Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain judgment of
19 December 1997, para. 33, to be published in Reports 1997).
Furthermore the Commission has repeatedly recognised the right
of the High Contracting States to make access to courts dependent on
the respect by the parties of formal rules relating in particular to
the form of their submissions to a court and to time-limits
(No. 8407/78, Dec. 6.5.80, D.R. 20, p. 179 with further references).
The Commission has found in particular that decisions by the Austrian
Administrative Court to discontinue proceedings after a request for
remedying procedural defects had not properly been complied with
because a further copy for service submitted had not been identical
with the original writ of complaint did not constitute an undue
restriction of the right of access to a tribunal under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (No. 13202/87, Dec. 15.3.90, unpublished; No.
14452/88, Dec. 3.9.90, unpublished).
In the present case the applicant, who was represented by a
lawyer, introduced a complaint with the Administrative Court against
the Regional Labour Office's decision of 23 August 1993. Since the
Regional Labour Office is not a Federal Ministry or a Regional
Government, she had to file her complaint in three copies for service,
according to S. 24 and S. 29 of the Administrative Court Act. The
complaint had, however, only been submitted in two copies for service.
On 24 January 1994 the Administrative Court requested the applicant's
lawyer to remedy this procedural defect by submitting a further copy
for service within a short time-limit. Thereupon, the applicant's
lawyer sent a photocopy of the complaint. This photocopy was not
signed by the applicant's lawyer. On 22 March 1994 the Administrative
Court discontinued the proceedings according to S. 34 para. 2 of the
Administrative Court Act on the ground that the applicant had failed
to comply with the above request as the document submitted by her
lawyer did not bear his signature.
In order to satisfy itself that the very essence of the
applicant's "right to a tribunal" was not impaired by the
discontinuation of the proceedings in the Administrative Court, the
Commission will first examine whether the procedure to be followed for
a complaint, in particular with respect to the production of documents,
could be regarded as foreseeable from the point of view of a litigant
and whether, therefore, the penalty for failure to follow that
procedure did not infringe the proportionality principle (see Levages
Prestations Services v. France judgment, op. cit., p. 1543, para. 42).
As regards the foreseeability of the Administrative Court's
decision the Commission observes that on the basis of S. 24 para. 1 and
S. 29 of the Administrative Court Act the necessary number of copies
for service of a complaint can be calculated without difficulty as
these provisions are not couched in ambiguous terms. Also the
requirement that all copies for service must bear the signature of a
lawyer can be derived from S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act, which
distinguishes between "copies" (Abschriften) and "copies for service"
(Ausfertigungen), and has been clarified in the extensive case-law of
the Administrative Court. The applicant's lawyer could therefore
reasonably have foreseen what number of copies for service in the
proceedings on her complaint was necessary and that all such copies had
to bear his signature.
As regards the proportionality of the sanction, the Commission
finds that the requirement that an important procedural document bears
the signature of the person who submits it and that the same
requirement is laid down for copies of this document which have to be
brought to the notice of the other parties to the proceedings
constitutes a formal condition established for the purpose of ensuring
the proper administration of justice.
In this respect the Commission observes that pursuant to S. 24
para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act a person filing a complaint
with the Administrative Court need not necessarily be represented by
a lawyer but that, more specifically, the complaint must bear the
signature of a lawyer. This shows that in this procedural framework
specific attention is paid to the element whether or not a complaint
is signed by a lawyer.
The Commission also observes that the Administrative Court is one
of the highest judicial organs in the Austrian judiciary. In this
respect the Commission recalls that the manner in which Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies to courts of appeal or of cassation must
clearly depend on the special features of the proceedings concerned and
account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in
the domestic legal order and the role of these courts in them (Brualla
Gómez de la Torre v. Spain judgment, op. cit., para. 38). The
procedure followed in such courts may be more formal. It is precisely
for ensuring that a higher level of formality does not unduly hinder
access to these courts that representation or assistance by a lawyer
is normally required. In the present case the applicant was
represented by a lawyer.
The Commission also notes that the Administrative Court did not
immediately reject the applicant's complaint on the ground that the
necessary number of copies for service had not been submitted. Rather,
pursuant to S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act, it issued
a request to remedy the procedural defects and asked the applicant's
lawyer to submit a further copy for service of the complaint. The
Administrative Court also informed the applicant's lawyer that failure
to comply with this request would result in the discontinuation of the
proceedings. The Commission therefore finds that the Administrative
Court made the applicant's lawyer aware of the procedural defect, gave
him the possibility to remedy it and warned him of the possible
consequences (see Eur. Court HR, Vacher v. France judgment of
17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2149, para. 30).
It is true that as part of an amendment of the Administrative
Court Act (see above "Relevant domestic law", point 3) further copies
for service no longer need to bear the signature of a lawyer. However
this subsequent change of the law as such cannot lead to the conclusion
that the legal situation in force previously had unduly restricted the
applicant in her right of access to a court.
In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the
applicant was unduly hindered in her right of access to a court by the
Administrative Court's decision to discontinue the proceedings.
Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant also complains that the Constitutional Court's
refusal to deal with her complaint constituted a violation of Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
However, the Commission need not determine whether or not the
facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation
of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as, under Article 26
(Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter within a
period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken.
The Commission observes that the applicant for the first time
raised this complaint in her observations of 17 September 1996, while
the last domestic decision in her case had been taken by the
Administrative Court on 22 March 1994. The applicant has, therefore,
not complied with the time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of
the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected
under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M. de SALVIA S. TRECHSEL
Secretary President
to the Commission of the Commission