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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 34618/97

by Barbro JOHANSSON and Sven PETTERSSON

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:

MM J.-C. GEUS, President

M.A. NOWICKI

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

J.-C. SOYER

H. DANELIUS

Mrs G.H. THUNE

MM F. MARTINEZ

I. CABRAL BARRETO

J. MUCHA

D. SVÁBY

P. LORENZEN

E. BIELIUNAS

E.A. ALKEMA

A. ARABADJIEV

Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 22 December 1996

by Barbro JOHANSSON and Sven PETTERSSON against Sweden and registered

on 28 January 1997 under file No. 34618/97;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants, a cohabiting couple, are Swedish citizens. They

were born in 1952 and 1954, respectively, and reside in Saltsjö-Boo.

Before the Commission they are represented by Mr Lennart Hane, a lawyer

practising in Stockholm.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

On 30 April 1996 the president of the Social District Council

(områdesnämnden - hereinafter "the Council") of Boo decided, pursuant

to Section 6 of the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young

Persons (Lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga, 1990:52;

hereinafter "the 1990 Act"), immediately to take the applicants' son

L, born in 1987, into public care on a provisional basis. The decision

was effected the same day.

On 9 May 1996 the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the

County of Stockholm confirmed the Council's decision. The court noted

that the applicants had been abusing alcohol and narcotics for several

years. Apparently, this had affected L who, according to his teachers,

had a self-destructive behaviour at school. The day before the

Council's decision was taken, i.e. on 29 April, a friend of the first

applicant had visited the family and had found the applicants in a

state of intoxication. The first applicant had been bleeding from the

head and blood had been found on the floor of the hall and the kitchen.

Under Section 8 of the 1990 Act, the Council could apply for a

care order concerning L within four weeks from the day its provisional

decision had been put into effect. Finding it necessary to make a

psychological examination of L, the Council requested an extension of

that time-limit. By decision of 21 May 1996, the County Administrative

Court granted the request and extended the time-limit until 18 June.

On 28 May 1996 the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten)

in Stockholm upheld the County Administrative Court's decision of

9 May.

On 18 June 1996 the Council applied to the County Administrative

Court for a care order. The Council submitted a written opinion given

by two psychologists appointed by the Council, according to which L had

certain emotional problems which required professional treatment. The

court held an oral hearing in the case on 1 and 2 July during which it

heard evidence from, inter alia, a psychologist proposed by the

applicants. That psychologist criticised the above written opinion.

Contrary to the psychologists appointed by the Council, he found no

evidence that L had emotional problems. L's behaviour rather indicated

that he had not been negatively affected by any conditions in his home.

Moreover, relations between him and his parents were good.

By judgment of 4 July 1996, the County Administrative Court

rejected the Council's application. The court noted that, after the

provisional taking into care of L, the applicants had refrained from

using drugs and had started to undergo treatment. Furthermore, the

evidence in the case - including the statements made by several

witnesses before the court - indicated that L was a happy young boy who

was well-adapted to friends and school and had good relations with his

parents. Accordingly, the public care of L was discontinued.

On 25 July 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regerings-

rätten) refused leave to appeal against the Administrative Court of

Appeal's decision of 28 May.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicants complain that the provisional taking into care,

which was allegedly made to facilitate an unnecessary psychological

examination of L, violated their right to respect for their family life

under Article 8 of the Convention.

2. The applicants contend that the County Administrative Court and

the Administrative Court of Appeal, in confirming the Council's

decision on provisional care, were not impartial as they failed to take

proper account of the applicant's submissions in the case. They invoke

Article 6 of the Convention.

Furthermore, the applicants claim that the taking into public

care is generally considered as beneficial to a child from a home

which, on the face of it, appears unstable. Allegedly, the courts'

reliance on opinions given by psychologists endangers the judicial

control of the public care. In this respect, they invoke Article 17

of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicants complain that the provisional taking into care

violated their right to respect for their family life. They invoke

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides the following:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public

safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

The Commission recalls that the public care of L was discontinued

on 4 July 1996 following the County Administrative Court's rejection

of the Council's application for a care order. However, between

30 April and 4 July, L was in public care on a provisional basis. The

Commission finds that the provisional care interfered with the

applicants' right to respect for their family life as ensured by

Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. It must therefore be

examined whether that interference was justified under the terms of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2). In this respect, the Commission finds

that the relevant decisions were in conformity with Swedish law.

Moreover, the interference had a legitimate aim, namely the interests

of the child, which in this case fall under the expressions "for the

protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights

and freedoms of others".

It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the child. The

Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court confirmed the

Council's decision on provisional care, having had regard to the

applicants' long-standing abuse of alcohol and narcotics, to the

statements by L's teachers that L had a self-destructive behaviour and

to the events which immediately preceded the provisional taking into

care. In the light of the foregoing the Commission finds that the

provisional care of L was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons

and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish

authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary to

take L into care on a provisional basis. Moreover, the psychological

examination of L must be considered as a relevant measure in cases like

the present one where it is to be determined whether there are

sufficient grounds for committing a child to public care. Accordingly,

the Commission concludes that the relevant decisions can reasonably be

regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicants contend that the courts, in confirming the

Council's decision on provisional care, were not impartial as required

by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. Furthermore, they claim that

the courts' reliance on opinions given by psychologists endangers the

judicial control of the public care. In this respect, they invoke

Article 17 (Art. 17) of the Convention.

The Commission finds that the applicants' submissions fail to

substantiate their claim that the courts deciding in the case were not

impartial. In so far as the allegation concerning the courts' reliance

on psychologists' opinions refers to the present case, the Commission

recalls that the County Administrative Court, by judgment of 4 July

1996, rejected the Council's application for a care order concerning

L although the psychologists' opinion adduced by the Council appeared

to support the application. The court gave its judgment after having

had regard to all the evidence in the case, including statements given

by the psychologist proposed by the applicants and several other

witnesses. It appears that the court assessed the evidence

independently and that it did not consider itself bound by conclusions

drawn by certain psychologists. In view of the above, the Commission

finds that the present complaints fail to disclose any appearance of

a violation of the rights and freedoms of the Convention and in

particular the Articles invoked.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS

Secretary President

to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber

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JOHANSSON AND PETTERSSON v. SWEDEN

JOHANSSON AND PETTERSSON v. SWEDEN