AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                    Application No. 25701/94

                    by The Former King Constantinos of Greece

                    and 8 members of his family

                    against Greece

     The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

21 April 1998, the following members being present:

          MM   S. TRECHSEL, President

               J.-C. GEUS

               A. WEITZEL

               J.-C. SOYER

               F. MARTINEZ

               C.L. ROZAKIS

               L. LOUCAIDES

               B. MARXER

               M.A. NOWICKI

               B. CONFORTI

               N. BRATZA

               I. BÉKÉS

               D. SVÁBY

               G. RESS

               P. LORENZEN

               K. HERNDL

               E.A. ALKEMA

               M. VILA AMIGÓ

          Mrs  M. HION

          MM   R. NICOLINI

               A. ARABADJIEV

          Mr   M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 21 October 1994

by the Former King Constantinos of Greece and 8 members of his family

against Greece and registered on 17 November 1994 under file

No. 25701/94;

     Having regard to :

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     9 October 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicants on 29 May 1996;

-    the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 21 April 1998;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The application has been introduced by:

1.   the former King Constantinos of Greece (hereinafter "the former

King"),

2.   his wife, the former Queen Anne Marie of Greece, his five

children:

3.   the Princess Alexia,

4.   the Princess Theodora,

5.   the Prince Pavlos,

6.   the Prince Nikolaos, and

7.   the Prince Theodoros,

8.   his sister, the Princess Irene,

9.   his aunt, the Princess Ekaterini.

     The former King and his family do not possess a surname. However,

on certain occasions, the name "Glucksborg" has been applied to them

by the Greek State.

     The first to seventh applicants live in London, the eighth

applicant lives in Madrid and the ninth applicant lives in

Buckinghamshire. Before the Commission the applicants are represented

by Messrs. Nathene & Co., Solicitors in London.

     The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be

summarised as follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     In 1864 a crowned democracy was established in Greece, when

George I, son of the Danish King Christian IX, was elected as King and

ascended the throne. The former King Constantinos of Greece is a direct

descendant of King George I. He ascended the Greek throne in 1964, at

the age of twenty-four, in succession to his father King Paul I.

     On 21 April 1967 there was a military coup in Greece. The former

King remained in the country until 13 December 1967, when he left for

Rome.

     On 15 November 1968 the military regime promulgated a new

constitution (the former had been enacted in 1952), which was amended

in 1973 when the former King was overthrown (see below). Article 21 of

the 1968 Constitution (as amended in 1973) guaranteed the right to

property and provided that nobody was to be deprived of property save

insofar as such deprivation was carried out in the public interest and

upon payment of full compensation, the amount of which was to be

determined by the civil courts. However, Article 134 para. 3 of the

same Constitution provided for a unique legislative measure to be

enacted, which would have the effect of confiscating the moveable and

immoveable property of the former King and the Royal family.

     Between 21 April 1967 and 31 May 1973 the military dictatorship

formally maintained the crowned democracy, despite the former King's

self-imposed exile.

     On 1 June 1973 the military regime purported to abolish the

crowned democracy, to declare the former King and his heirs deposed and

to establish a Presidential Parliamentary Republic.

     In October 1973 the military dictatorship issued a legislative

decree No. 225/1973, pursuant to Article 134 para. 3 of the 1968

Constitution (as amended in 1973), whereby all moveable and immoveable

property of the former King and Royal family was confiscated with

effect from the date of publication of the decree in the Government

Gazette (4 October 1973), and whereby title to the confiscated property

passed to the Greek State. Land belonging to the former King at Tatoi

(Attica) and at the island of Kerkyra (Corfu), as well as land at

Polidendri belonging to the former King, Princess Irene and Princess

Ekaterini, were specifically mentioned as forming part of the

immoveable property being confiscated.

     The above decree provided for compensation in the sum of Drs.

120.000.000 to be distributed amongst the members of the Royal family

whose property was confiscated, and this sum was deposited in a bank

account to be claimed by the Royal family. The former King's share of

the compensation was stated to be Drs. 94.000.000 and Princess Irene's

share Drs. 12.000.000. No compensation was provided for Princess

Ekaterini. It was further provided that the compensation had to be

claimed by 31 December 1975. No part of it was ever claimed.

     On 24 July 1974 the military dictatorship in Greece was replaced

by a civilian Government under the leadership of Mr. Karamanlis.

     By a legislative Act of 1 August 1974 ("the First Constitutional

Act of 1974"), the Government revived the Constitution of 1952, except

for the provisions relating to the form of government (Article 1).

     Article 10 of this Act provided that, until the National Assembly

was reconvened, legislative power vested in the Council of Ministers

was to be exercised through legislative decrees. Article 10 para. 2

provided that such legislative decrees would be capable of having

retrospective effect as regards any issues arising from any

Constitutional Acts after 21 April 1967. Article 15 provided that the

1968 Constitution (as amended), as well as any other Constitutional Act

or act of a constitutional character passed under the military

dictatorship after 21 April 1967, was repealed.

     Pursuant to Articles 1 and 10 of the First Constitutional Act of

1974, the Government issued a legislative decree (No. 72/1974) which

provided for the property of the former King and the Royal family to

be administered and managed by a seven member committee until the form

of regime had been finally determined.

     The above decree was implemented by three Ministerial decisions:

1.   By decision No. 18443/1509 of 1 October 1974, a seven member

     committee was formed.

2.   By decision No. 21987 of 24 October 1974, it was provided that

     "the delivery [of the property] of the Royal family from the

     State to the committee" was to be made by 31 December 1974.

3.   By decision No. 25616 of 23 December 1974, it was provided that

     the delivery of the property of the Royal family to the committee

     would continue until completion, before delivery to its owners

     or to a person nominated by them.

     Between 1974 and 1979 all the moveable and immoveable property

of the former King and Royal family in Greece was administered and

managed in the name of the committee established pursuant to L.D.

72/1974, on behalf of the former King and Royal family. In 1979 the

property was delivered to them.

     On 17 November 1974 there were elections to the National

Assembly, and the Assembly was thereafter reconvened. A referendum was

held on 8 December 1974, the outcome of which was in favour of a

Parliamentary Republic. By Resolution D 18/18.1.1975, the National

Assembly resolved and declared, inter alia, that democracy in Greece

was never lawfully abolished, and that the revolutionary coup of

21 April 1967, as well as the situation which resulted as a consequence

up to 23 July 1974, constituted a coup d'état which aimed to encroach

upon the power and the sovereign rights of the people.

     In 1975 the National Assembly enacted the present Constitution,

which came into force on 11 June 1975.

     On 12 February 1975 all Embassies were informed by the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs that "all members of the former Royal family retain

their Greek nationality (ithageneia)" and that if there was a request

to renew the Royal passports, a joint (family) passport should be

issued, in the name of "Constantinos, Former King of Greece" and in

comparable form for the other members of the Royal family.

     In 1981 the socialist "PA.SO.K." party under the leadership of

Mr. Papandreou was elected to power in Greece. From January 1984

onwards discussions were held with the former King regarding his

property. By 1988 an agreement in principle had been reached between

the Government and the former King relating to the property and tax

liabilities of the Royal family. However, the agreement was never

executed because of the ill-health of the Prime Minister,

Mr. Papandreou.

     On 1 July 1983 the Danish Prime Minister's Department stated that

"from King Christian IX [the former King's ancestor] onward no Danish

King or other member of the Danish Royal Family is or has been bearing

the name of 'Glucksborg' or any other surname".

     The 1992 agreement

     In 1990 the conservative "New Democracy" party was elected to

power.

     In 1992 an agreement was reached between the former King and the

Greek State, in the following terms:

1.   The former King transferred an area of 200.030 square metres of

     his forest at Tatoi to the Greek State for the sum of Drs.

     460.000.000.

2.   The former King donated an area of 401.541,75 square metres of

     his forest at Tatoi to a foundation for the benefit of the

     public, namely the "Universal Hippocration Medical Foundation and

     Research Centre".

3.   A foundation for the benefit of the public, namely the National

     Forest of Tatoi was created, and the former King donated an area

     of 37.426.000 square metres of his forest at Tatoi to the

     foundation.

4.   The former King, the Royal family and the Greek State waived all

     legal rights in connection with, and discontinued all pending

     legal proceedings concerning the Royal family's tax liabilities.

5.   The former King and the Royal family agreed to pay to the Greek

     State the sum of Drs. 817.677.937 in respect of inheritance tax,

     income tax and capital taxes, together with interest and

     surcharges. The payment to be made by the former King would be

     set off against any sums due to the former King pursuant to the

     agreement.

     The agreement was contained in and evidenced by notarial deed

No. 10573/1992 of 3 June 1992. On 28 September 1992 the division of

Scientific Studies (dieythinsi Epistimonikon Meleton) of the Greek

Parliament issued a report on a draft bill ratifying the above

mentioned notarial act. The report stated inter alia that legislative

decree No. 225/1973 was repealed by legislative decree No. 72/1974 and

that the property thereby "reverted to its former ownership status".

Subsequently the agreement was incorporated in and given the force of

law by Law No. 2086/1992. It has since been implemented.

     It should be noted that in Law No. 2086/1992 the name

"Glucksborg" as applied to the Royal family is stated to be "devoid of

any legal foundation".

     Remaining property and ownership titles

     In addition to the property which was the subject of Law

No. 2086/1992, the former King, Princess Irene and Princess Ekaterini

own the following property in Greece:

     a)   The former King owns a further area of 41.990.000 square

          metres of land and a building at Tatoi. This property was

          formed during the reign of King George I (the first

          applicant's grand-father), through successive purchases of

          pieces of land:

- By deed No. 24101/15.5.1872, King George I purchased from Scarlatos

Soutzos the "Liopessi-Mahonia" estate and from Soutzos' wife the

adjacent "Tatoi" estate, for a total of Drs. 300.000.

- Under Law No. 599/17.2.1877, the Greek State transferred to King

George I the forest known as "Bafi", of approximately 15.567.000 square

metres. A part of approximately 1.000.000 square metres of the above

property was subsequently exchanged for another property of equal area,

adjacent to "Tatoi" estate and belonging to local landowners, who were

paid by King George I Drs. 3.000 to compensate for the difference in

value of the exchanged properties.

- By deed No. 55489/4.4.1891, King George I purchased from Andreas

Syngros a part of the "Kiourka" estate, which is adjacent to the

"Tatoi" estate, for Drs. 110.000.

- By certificate No. 382/20.10.1878, the mortgage registrar of

Marathonas attests that the "Keramydi" estate belongs to King George

I and was devolved to him by his predecessors in title Ioannis

Malakindis, Dimitrios, Vassilios and Panagis Dionyssiotis, George

Kyriazis, George Sardelis and Stamata Sykaminioti. These persons had

acquired the property in parts through successive purchases from 1844

to 1878.

     By his holograph will dated 24 July 1904, King George I made the

"Tatoi" estate a family trust (familia-fideicommis) in order to serve

as a permanent residence of the reigning King of the Greeks. However,

according to the then prevailing Byzantine-Roman Law, a family trust

lasts only for four successions, which means that the trust is released

in the fourth successor.

     Following the death of King George I on 5 March 1913, Tatoi

devolved to his successor, King Constantinos I, and following the

latter's deposition from the throne in 1917, to his second-born son,

King Alexander. After the latter's death in 1920 Tatoi came back to

King Constantinos I who had in the meantime returned to the throne.

After the latter's resignation from the throne in September 1922, Tatoi

came to his first-born son and Crown Prince George II.

     Then, following the abolishment of the Crown and the proclamation

of the Republic by resolution of the fourth Constituent Assembly dated

25 March 1924, the Greek State expropriated Tatoi by Law

No. 2312/14/20.8.1924, while the "Bafi" estate came ipso jure and

without any compensation to the State, since it was donated by it.

     Following the return of King George II to the throne, Emergency

Law of 22 January 1936 gave Tatoi back to the King "in full ownership

and possession", with the exception of the "Bafi-Keramydi" estate

which, in the meanwhile, had been allotted to landless refugees. The

explanatory report of this law stated inter alia that the expropriation

had been in breach of Article 11 of the Constitution of 1911, according

to which a compulsory expropriation must always be preceded by

compensation to the owner determined by the courts.

     After the death of George II on 1st April 1947, his brother Paul

came to the throne. Legislative Decree 1136/5/11.10.1949 stated the

following: "The Tatoi estate, which was returned ... to the late King

George II, has become the unreserved, free and exclusive property of

H.M. King Paul from his accession to the throne". Following King Paul's

death on 6 March 1964, the property came to his son and successor

Constantinos II (the first applicant), by virtue of his father's

holograph will dated 8 December 1959.

     b)   The former King and Princess Irene each own 101,5/288 of an

          area of 33.600.000 square metres of land at Polidendri, and

          Princess Ekaterini owns 36/288 of that area.

     By virtue of deed No. 38939/1906, Hassan Efendi Leondaritis, a

landowner of Larissa, transferred and sold to Crown Prince Constantinos

I the estate known as "Polidendri", for the amount of Drs. 397.500.

Following the death of Constantinos I, the estate devolved to his

intestate heirs as follows: to his wife Sophia 2/8 ab indivisio, and

to each of his children George II, Paul, Helen, Irene, Ekaterini and

the daughter of his predeceased son Alexander, Alexandra, 1/8 ab

indivisio.

     By virtue of deeds Nos. 79847 of 18 February 1924 and 80452 of

24 March 1924, the above co-heirs and co-owners (with the exception of

Ekaterini) transferred and sold 7/8 ab indivisio of the estate to

Athanassios Galeos, a captain of the merchant marine, for the amount

of Drs. 4.585.000. As regards the 1/8 ab indivisio share of Ekaterini,

a price of Drs. 650.000 was preliminarily agreed and the land was

leased to the new owner pending the completion of the required

formalities, whereupon the land would be transferred to him.

     By virtue of deed No. 4289 of 20 March 1925, Athanassios Galeos

and other people formed the "Forest Company" (Anonimos Dasiki Etairia),

to which Athanassios Galeos transferred the 7/8 ab indivisio of the

estate he had acquired. This company was dissolved by resolution of its

General Assembly dated 12 May 1938. By deed No. 22408 of 7 October

1939, the liquidators of the company transferred and sold to Crown

Prince Paul the 7/8 ab indivisio of the estate for the amount of Drs.

4.000.000 which was paid with funds from the dowry of his wife,

Princess Frederica. After his death, 14/32 of his share to "Polidendri"

devolved to his widow, and 14/96 to each of his three children, Sophia,

Constantinos (the first applicant) and Irene (the eighth applicant).

In 1968 Princess Sophia declined the inheritance, and her share of the

estate was added to the share of the remaining heirs pro rata. After

the death of Queen Frederica on 6 December 1981, and in the absence of

a will, her 49/96 ab indivisio share on "Polidendri" devolved to her

children in equal shares, i.e. each child received 49/288 of her share.

     c)   The Mon Repos estate at the island of Kerkyra

     The original title on this property is minutes No. 278 of 1st

June 1864 of the Provincial Council of Kerkyra, by which the Council

decided to offer to King George I the house in which the British

Magistrate of the Supreme Council once lived, together with the

surrounding area, situated at the place known as "Aghios Pandeleïmon

of Garitza". The existing records from that time do not indicate the

area, exact location and limits of the donated estate.

     Between 1870 and 1912 King George I enlarged the above estate by

successive purchases of certain smaller or bigger tracts of land

belonging to third parties, situated around or inside the farm. After

two purchases made by George II, Mon Repos took its final shape of

approximately 238.000 square metres.

     Following the death of King George I, Mon Repos devolved to

Prince Andreas, by virtue of King George's holograph will dated 24 July

1904.     After the 1922 Revolution and by decision No. 1767/1923, the

compulsory expropriation of Mon Repos was proclaimed in favour of the

State in order to be used as the summer residence of the reigning King.

In 1931 the administrative eviction of Prince Andreas was ordered.

Legal proceedings were then instituted, and by judgment No. 57/1934,

the Kerkyra Court of Appeal (Efeteio) ordered the return of the Estate

to Prince Andreas. Following the restoration of the crowned democracy,

Emergency Law No. 514/1937 expressly provided that Mon Repos be

conceded and transferred in full ownership and possession to Prince

Andreas.

     By deed No. 11909/1937, Prince Andreas sold Mon Repos to King

George II against a life annuity payable by yearly instalments of Drs.

400.000. King George II died on 1st April 1947. His co-heirs donated

their shares to King George's brother, King Paul, who acquired full

ownership of Mon Repos (deeds Nos. 3650/1957, 3816/1957 and 5438/1959).

Following King Paul's death, and by virtue of his holograph will, Mon

Repos devolved to his widow Frederica (usufruct) and to his son, the

first applicant (bare ownership). The usufruct was terminated by the

death of Queen Frederica on 6 December 1981, and the first applicant

acquired full title ownership of Mon Repos.

     On or about 5 August 1994 the building of Mon Repos was broken

into and physically entered. It is now occupied by the Municipality of

Kerkyra.

     Rescission of the 1992 agreement

     Following the elections of autumn 1993, a Government under the

leadership of Mr. Papandreou was again returned to power in Greece.

This Government introduced Law No. 2215/1994 which was passed by the

Greek Parliament on 16 April 1994 and became law with effect from

11 May 1994. It provides as follows:

1.   Law 2086/1992 is repealed and Deed No. 10573/1992 rescinded. Any

     acts carried out pursuant thereto are void and of no legal

     consequence (Article 1). The acts so declared void and of no

     legal consequence include the "Universal Hippocration Medical

     Foundation and Research Centre" at Tatoi and the National Forest

     of Tatoi.

2.   The Greek State becomes the owner of the moveable and immoveable

     property of the former King, Princess Irene and Princess

     Ekaterini (Article 2).

3.   Title to the property Mon Repos on the island of Kerkyra is

     transferred to the Municipality of Kerkyra (Article 4 para. 2).

4.   Taxes already assessed are written off. All legal proceedings

     pending before the administrative Courts or the Council of State

     (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) in respect of inheritance and other

     taxes, surcharges and penalties are discontinued. Amounts paid

     by the former King and other members of the Royal family in

     respect of tax may be claimed back from the Greek State, but the

     State may oppose any set-off of such a claim against any claim

     of the State against the Royal family (Article 5 para. 1).

5.   Any agreements concerning any property of the Royal family,

     except leasehold agreements, are declared void. Any leases of

     land belonging to the Royal family continue as if entered into

     between the lessees and the Greek State (Article 5 para. 2).

6.   Any legal proceedings brought by the former King or other members

     of the Royal family before any Greek court using the designation

     "King" or any other royal designation, even if combined with the

     word "ex" or "former", will not be recognised (Article

     6 para. 4).

7.   Preconditions are imposed for the continued recognition of the

     Greek nationality of the former King and the Royal family, and

     for the retention of their Greek passports:

          - A declaration must be submitted to the Registrar of

          Births, Marriages and Deaths (liziarxeio) of Athens to the

          effect that the former King and Royal family unreservedly

          respect the 1975 Constitution and accept and recognise the

          Greek Republic.

          - A further declaration must be submitted to the Registrar

          to the effect that the former King and Royal family

          unreservedly waive any claim relating to the past holding

          of any office or possession of any official title.

          - The former King and Royal family must register in the

          Municipal Register of Citizens (mitroa arrenon i

          dimotologia) under a name and a surname. The law expressly

          refers to the first applicant as "Constantinos Glucksborg".

8.   Any legislative provision contrary to this legislation is

     automatically repealed (Article 6 para. 5).

     Legal proceedings before the Greek courts

     The applicants have brought several legal proceedings before the

Greek courts, concerning the titles to their estates.

     The applicants have also challenged the constitutionality of Law

No. 2215/1994. Following two conflicting judgments issued by the Court

of Cassation (Areios Pagos) and the Council of State, the case was

referred to the Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio).

     The judgment issued by the Special Supreme Court on 25 June 1997

     The Court first examined whether the applicants were entitled to

bring legal proceedings before it without using a surname. The Court

made reference to Articles 20 of the Greek Constitution and 6 para. 4

of Law No. 2215/1994 and held that "the indication 'former King' is

mentioned in the legal documents not as a title of nobility which is

forbidden by the Constitution, but in order to define the identity of

this litigant, who for the reasons stated earlier, has no surname ...

It concerns a reference to a historic fact, which, like other elements,

can indeed designate the identity of the above person, so that this

person may enjoy judicial protection".

     As regards the question of the Royal property, the Court stressed

that it "was from the beginning a political question", that the

property rights of the applicants were linked to the form of Government

and that "during the reign of the Royal family, the property that

belonged to the King and the Royal family was treated like a special

group of property". The Court noted inter alia the following:

     "When the Constitution by Article 1 defines the form of the

     regime, by the same provision, which is historically interpreted,

     in the framework of the political and constitutional conjuncture

     ... in which it was voted, pursuant to the regulations of the

     First Constitutional Act and of legislative decree No. 72/1974

     that was issued on the basis of its Article 10, also solves the

     issue of the Royal property. In other words, the referendum

     renders irrevocable the devolvement of this property to the

     State, in a way that its return by law to the former King was

     contrary to the Constitution. Therefore, Article 1 of Law No.

     2086/1992 ... whose regulations imply that the former Royal

     property continued to belong to the deposed monarch and the

     members of the former Royal family, and actually connect these

     persons with the property, contravenes the Constitution."

     Consequently, the Special Supreme Court, by thirteen votes to

four, held that Law No. 2215/1994 is constitutional. According to the

Greek Constitution the judgments of the Special Supreme Court are

irrevocable and binding on all Greek courts (Article 100 para. 4).

B.   Relevant domestic law

     The domestic law relevant to the present application, other than

the Law Nos. 2086/1992 and 2215/1994 already mentioned above, is

contained in the Greek Constitution of 1975.

     Article 4 paras. 1, 2, 3 and 7

     "1. All Greeks are equal before the law.

     2. Greek men and women have equal rights and equal

     obligations.

     3. All persons possessing the qualifications for

     citizenship as specified by law are Greek citizens.

     Withdrawal of Greek citizenship shall be permitted only in

     case of voluntary acquisition of another citizenship or of

     undertaking service contrary to national interests in a

     foreign country, under the conditions and procedures more

     specifically provided by law. ...

     7.  Titles of nobility or distinction are neither conferred

     upon nor recognised in Greek citizens."

     Article 5

     "1.  All persons shall have the right to develop freely

     their personality and to participate in the social,

     economic and political life of the country, insofar as they

     do not infringe upon the rights of others or violate the

     Constitution and moral values.

     2.  All persons living within the Greek territory shall

     enjoy full protection of their life, honour and freedom,

     irrespective of nationality, race or language and of

     religious or political beliefs.  Exceptions shall be

     permitted only in cases provided by international law."

     Article 9 para. 1

     "1. ... Personal and family life of the individual is

     inviolable."

     Article 17 paras. 1, 2 and 4

     "1.  Property is protected by the State; rights deriving

     therefrom, however, may not be exercised contrary to public

     interest.

     2.  No one shall be deprived of his property except for the

     public benefit which must be duly proven, when and as

     specified by law and always following full compensation

     corresponding to the value of the expropriated property at

     the time of the court hearing on the provisional

     determination of compensation.  In cases in which a request

     for the final determination of compensation is made, the

     value at the time of the court hearing of the request shall

     be considered.

     4.  Compensation shall in all cases be determined by civil

     courts. Such compensation may also be determined

     provisionally by the court after hearing or summoning the

     beneficiary, who may be obliged, at the discretion of the

     court, to furnish a commensurate guarantee for collecting

     the compensation as provided by law."

     Article 20 para. 1

     "1. Every person is entitled to receive legal protection by

     the courts and may plead before them his views concerning

     his rights or interests, as specified by law."

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicants allege that Law No. 2215/1994 violates their

Convention rights in the following manner:

a.   The applicants complain that the Law in itself and its effects

upon them constitute degrading treatment or punishment, in breach of

Article 3 of the Convention, by reason of subjecting the continued

recognition of their nationality and the retention of their passports

to conditions which themselves violate their rights under the Greek

Constitution and the Convention.

b.   The applicants next complain that the Law in providing that no

action may be brought by them before the Greek courts if they use a

Royal designation, even if coupled with the prefix "ex" or "former",

violates their right of access to a court, guaranteed by Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention.

c.   The applicants further complain that the Law in providing that

no action may be brought by them before the Greek courts if they use

a royal designation, even if coupled with the prefix "ex" or "former",

and requires, as a pre-condition for continued recognition of

nationality and retention of passports, the adoption of a surname,

namely that of "Glucksborg", violates their right to respect for their

private and family life, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

d.   The applicants also complain that the Law in denying their title

to property they own and confiscating, or authorising the confiscation

of that property, violates their right to property, in breach of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

e.   The applicants further complain that they have been subject to

discriminatory treatment, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention,

read on its own and together with Articles 6 para. 1 and 8 of the

Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

2.   Following the judgment issued by the Special Supreme Court, the

applicants finally complain that the latter was lacking independence

and impartiality, in breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 21 October 1994 and registered

on 17 November 1994.

     On 15 May 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on 9 October

1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The

applicants replied on 29 May 1996, after two extensions of the time-

limit.

     On 7 September 1996 the Commission decided to adjourn the

examination of the case pending the outcome of the proceedings before

the Special Supreme Court.

     On 12 January 1998 the Commission decided to invite the parties

to an oral hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.

     The hearing took place on 21 April 1998. The parties were

represented as follows:

For the Government:

Mr Vassilios Kontolaimos, Senior Adviser (Paredros), Legal Advisory

Council of the State (Nomiko Symvoulio ton Kratons), Acting Agent

Mrs Kyriaki Grigoriou, Legal Assistant (Dikastikos Antiprosopos), Legal

Advisory Council of the State, Acting Agent

Mrs Mania Telalian, Member of the Special Legal Service (Eidiki Nomiki

Ypiresia) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Acting Agent

Mr Peter Duffy Q.C., Barrister, Counsel

Professor Nicolaos Alivizatos, Counsel

Professor Michail-Constantinos Stathopoulos, Counsel

Mrs Maria Demitriou, Barrister, Counsel

Mr Charis Pampoukis, Adviser

Mr Georgios Katrougalos, Adviser

Mr Elias Kastanas, Adviser

Mr Petros Liacouras, Adviser

Mr Dimitri Konstas, Permanent Representative of Greece to the Council

of Europe, was also present at the hearing.

For the applicants:

Lord Anthony Lester Q.C., Barrister, Representative

Miss Monica Carss-Frisk, Barrister, Representative

Mrs Nathene Arnaoutis, Lawyer, Representative

Mr John Bravos, Lawyer, Representative

Professor Apostolos Georgiadis, Adviser

Mrs Angeliki Georgiadis, Lawyer, Adviser

     The first, second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth applicants were

also present at the hearing.

THE LAW

1.   The applicants complain that Law No. 2215/1994 which provides

that no action may be brought by them before the Greek courts if they

use a royal designation, even if coupled with the prefix "ex" or

"former", violates their right of access to a court, in breach of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, read on its own

together with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, in that it is

imposed for punitive political reasons and lacks an objective and

reasonable justification.

     The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention provides as follows:

     "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...

     everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent

     and impartial tribunal established by law ..."

     Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

     opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

     minority, property, birth or other status."

     The Government note that the Special Supreme Court permitted the

applicants to bring proceedings before it under the name of their

choice. The Government state in this respect that they will not impose

a specific surname to the applicants. Therefore the Government argue

that the applicants can no longer claim to be victims of a violation

of the Convention within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention.

     The applicants reply that it is not clear whether the validity

of the relevant provisions of Law No. 2215/1994 is affected or not by

the fact that the Special Supreme Court allowed them to bring legal

proceedings before it without using a surname. According to the

applicants, the judgement of the Special Supreme Court did not declare

those provisions invalid. It merely accepted the fact that the

applicants do not have a surname and that the personal particulars

concerning the former King and the other applicants mentioned in the

documents before it were sufficient to identify them for the purpose

of the proceedings before that court.

     The Commission recalls its case-law according to which it falls

in the first place to the national authorities to redress any alleged

violation of the Convention (No. 10668/83, Dec. 13.5.87, D.R. 52, p.

177). Thus, where the national authorities have explicitly or in

substance recognised and subsequently redressed the alleged violation,

the applicant can no longer claim to be victim of a violation of the

Convention (No. 12719/87, Dec. 3.5.88, D.R. 56, p. 237).

     In this case, the Commission notes that the Special Supreme Court

held that the applicants were entitled to bring legal proceedings

before it without using a surname: indeed, in order to determine his

procedural identity, the first applicant had designated himself as

"Constantinos, former King".

     The Commission considers accordingly that the Special Supreme

Court has implicitly held that the relevant provisions of Law

No. 2215/1994 are contrary to Article 20 para. 1 of the Greek

Constitution (which provides that every person is entitled to receive

legal protection by the courts) and should not therefore be applied.

The Commission recalls in that respect that the judgments of the

Special Supreme Court are irrevocable and binding on all Greek courts.

     In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the alleged

violation of the Convention regarding the applicants' right of access

to a court was rectified at the domestic level. Consequently, the

applicants can no longer claim to be victims of a violation of their

rights under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicants further complain that Law No. 2215/1994 which

requires, as a pre-condition for continued recognition of nationality

and retention of passports, the adoption of a surname, in particular

that of "Glucksborg", constitutes a degrading treatment or punishment,

in breach of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, and violates their

right to respect for their private and family life, in breach of

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, read on its own and in connection

with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

     Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads as follows:

     "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

     treatment or punishment."

     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:

     "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The Government submit that the applicants have not exhausted

domestic remedies as they have taken no legal action to redress the

alleged violations of the Convention. In particular the Government

claim that, following the judgment of the Special Supreme Court, the

applicants may initiate any legal proceedings they deem appropriate

before any Greek court, under whatever name they choose to use; they

may also address themselves under the same name to any competent

administrative authority.

     Alternatively, the Government submit that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded. The Government first stress, as

a matter of historical fact, that it is not accurate to say that the

applicants have no name to relate to, given that the Royal house of

Schleswig-Holstein-Sontenburg-Glucksborg is the house of Christian IX

of which the applicants are direct descendants. However, Law

No. 2215/1994 does not compel the applicants to have a specific

surname, but leaves open to the family the choice of any non-royal

surname should they wish to register in accordance with it.

     In this respect, the Government argue that it is manifestly

within the margin of appreciation of a Contracting State which has

moved from monarchy to a presidential republic to require the former

King and his family to register under a surname like all other citizens

and to declare formally acceptance of the Constitution and the

country's republican status. In a democratic society such a requirement

does not constitute a lack of respect for the applicants' right to

private and family life, nor can it be regarded as being humiliating

or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

     The applicants stress from the outset that they have always

recognised the Republic and the 1975 Constitution, and that they make

no claim to any title or privilege available to them during the time

of the crowned monarchy.

     As regards domestic remedies, the applicants consider that they

are not obliged to attempt to exhaust any domestic remedies as regards

their rights under Articles 3 and 8 (Art. 3, 8) of the Convention. They

consider that the judgment of the Special Supreme Court amounts to a

manifest denial of justice; it is therefore evident that there is no

realistic prospect of their being granted an effective remedy in

respect of their rights in the Greek courts.

     The applicants further consider that the effect of Law

No. 2215/1994 is to compel them to change the names given to them at

birth and recorded in official documents, by adopting a surname which

was never theirs. They claim that, unlike the members of some Royal

houses, they themselves and their ancestors have never possessed a

surname. There is no foundation as a matter of historical fact or Greek

law for associating the Greek Royal family with the name "Glucksborg",

as the 1994 Law seeks to do. This was expressly recognised in the 1992

agreement reached between the Greek State and the former King, and was

also accepted by the Special Supreme Court in its judgment.

     Furthermore, the applicants do not accept the Government's

argument that their choice of a surname under the 1994 Law is not

restricted to a specific name, given that Article 6 para. 5 of this Law

expressly refers to the former King as "Constantinos Glucksborg".

     The applicants conclude that, in any event, even if Law

No. 2215/1994 leaves it open to them to adopt another surname, this is

as much an interference with their private life as the imposition of

a specific surname, involving as it does an enforced change of the name

by which they have been recognised all their lives.

     The Commission does not consider that it is required to rule on

the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies raised by the

Government, since this part of the application can be rejected for the

following reason.

     The Commission recalls that Article 8 (Art. 8) does not contain

any explicit reference to names. Nonetheless, since it constitutes a

means of personal identification and a link to a family, an

individual's name does concern his or her private and family life (see

Eur. Court HR, Burghartz v. Switzerland judgment of 22 February 1994,

Series A no. 280-B, p. 28, para. 24).

     The Commission further recalls that in the particular sphere

under consideration the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of

appreciation. The Commission's task is not to substitute itself for the

competent Greek authorities in determining the most appropriate policy

in regulating use of surnames in Greece, but rather to review under the

Convention the decisions that these authorities take in the exercise

of their power of appreciation (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR,

Stjerna v. Finland judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 299-B,

p. 61, para. 39).

     The Commission notes that all Greek citizens have surnames and

would therefore see no harm in obliging the applicants to have a

surname too. Furthermore the Commission notes that it has been

expressly stressed by the respondent Government that the applicants may

have the surname of their choice. In the Commission's view this

position is also supported by the text of Law No. 2215/1994.

     In view of these circumstances the Commission finds that the

requirement to have a surname does not amount to a degrading treatment

or punishment, nor does it constitute a lack of respect for the

applicants' private and family life within the meaning of the

Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   The applicants next complain that Law No. 2215/1994, which

deprives the first, eight and ninth applicants of their title to their

property and confiscates, or authorises the confiscation of that

property, violates their right to property, in breach of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), read on its own and in connection with Article

14 (P1-1+14) of the Convention.

     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his

     possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

     conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

     international law.

     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair

     the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary

     to control the use of property in accordance with the general

     interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions

     or penalties."

     The Government first contend that, with the exception of the

first applicant, the rest of the applicants cannot claim to be victims

of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     The Government further allege that this complaint is inadmissible

ratione materiae. In particular the Government note that a common

feature all over Europe is the existence of a clear-cut distinction

between, on the one hand, public and, on the other, private possessions

of monarchs. Public possessions are owned by the States and their use

is put at the disposal of the monarchs for the exercise of their

function as Heads of State. The Government submit that such properties,

held under special privileges and immunities, do not come within the

concept of property or possessions protected under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). On the other hand, the private property of

European monarchs has no privileges whatsoever compared with the

property of ordinary citizens. It is acquired, used and transferred in

accordance with the common rules of domestic civil law, as applied to

all transactions between private individuals. According to the

Government, such private possessions would reasonably be protected

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     In the present case, the Government argue that the acquisition

of all three contested estates by the former Royal family did not occur

in accordance with the general provisions of Greek civil law but

because of the functions of the beneficiaries. The Government add that

the most significant particularity of the legal status of the alleged

"Royal property" of the Greek Crown lay in the fact that it had always

had a sui generis and quasi-public character. According to the

Government, this is demonstrated by the fact that the property in

question had not only been assimilated to State property for procedural

purposes (i.e. special time-limits, award of State privileges for the

recovery of debts, prohibition of provisional forced execution, etc),

but it had also benefited from substantial State prerogatives (i.e.

non-prescription of claims, plain prohibition of usucaption,

criminalisation of trespass, etc). The Government conclude that, no

matter how each of the contested estates had been acquired, these

lands, which include constitutionally protected forests, historical and

archaeological sites, were conserved in their integrality and even

expanded only because of the privileges attached to the monarchs'

public status.

     The Government further contend that the complaint under Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) is in any case inadmissible ratione temporis,

because any violation of this Article took place before 20 November

1985, i.e. when Greece recognised the right to individual petition. In

particular, the Government submit that the applicants' property was

expropriated by virtue of legislative decree No. 225/1973, and has

remained expropriated by virtue of that decree and as a result of the

establishment under the 1975 Constitution of a Presidential

Parliamentary Republic. The Government conclude that Law No. 2215/1994

was a confirmation of the existing constitutional position as was later

decided by the Special Supreme Court; accordingly any taking of

property occurred years earlier and any ownership complaint is now

inadmissible.

     Alternatively, the Government argue that the applicants have not

exhausted domestic remedies. In any event, the Government submit that

the transfer of the properties in question to the Greek State satisfied

the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     As regards the Government's argument that the application is

inadmissible ratione materiae, the applicants reply that there is

manifestly no foundation whatever, as a matter of historical fact or

Greek law, for the Government's novel argument that the property which

is the subject of their claim never belonged to the Royal family. The

applicants stress that this argument has never been advanced by any

Government of Greece except in the course of the proceedings before the

Commission. The fact that the Royal family has owned private property

was consistently recognised by public authorities throughout the period

of the so-called "crowned democracy" which was established when the

first applicant's ancestor, George I, was elected King in 1863. Such

private property was always recognised to be distinct from any property

that was made available to the Royal family by virtue of the

constitutional status of the King (i.e. the Royal Palace in Athens),

which is not and has never been the private property of the Royal

family.

     The applicants further submit that the fact that the Royal family

owned private property was clearly recognised even during the period

of the unconstitutional military dictatorship between 21 April 1967 and

24 July 1974. The 1968 Constitution included a provision, Article 134

para. 3, which provided for a unique legislative measure to be enacted

to expropriate or confiscate the movable and immovable property of the

former King and his family. A legislative decree was subsequently

issued by the dictatorship to confiscate the property of the Royal

family. These measures would have served no purpose if the Royal

property had always belonged to the State. After the fall of the

dictatorship, a legislative decree of 1974 recognised that the property

confiscated by the dictatorship belonged to the Royal family. In 1979

the property was delivered into the possession of the Royal family.

Protocols governing the delivery of the immovable and movable property

were duly signed by the appropriate governmental authorities and by the

Special Committee. The status of the property was in no way affected

by the outcome of the referendum of 8 December 1974 which resulted in

the establishment of a Presidential Parliamentary Republic. The status

of the property of the Royal family simply was not in issue in that

referendum. Nor was the status of the property affected by the

enactment of the 1975 Constitution. If it had been, the State would not

have returned the property to their possession in 1979 in recognition

of their ownership of it.

     Furthermore, the applicants stress that from 1974, they filed tax

returns and paid tax in respect of the property in question. They

cannot understand how lands could be properly taxable unless they were

owned by the tax-payers, nor how the Government could properly and in

good faith have demanded and accepted the payment of such taxes except

on that basis.

     The applicants conclude that there is no basis in Greek law for

the notion of a connection between the constitutional role of the

former King and the status of his property. Greek civil law does not

recognise a so-called sui generis concept of ownership.

     As regards the Government's argument that the application is

inadmissible ratione temporis, the applicants reply that they are

complaining about Law No. 2215/1994, which was enacted and came into

force in 1994. In any case, legislative decree No. 225/1973 was never

a valid law, having been issued by an unconstitutional military

dictatorship in order to persecute them and inflict a personal

punishment upon them. Furthermore, the effect of this decree was to

deprive the applicants of all their property, without prior

compensation determined by the courts and corresponding to the value

of the property, in other words, a general confiscation. As such, the

taking contravened not only the fundamental principles of the rule of

law, but also all Greek Constitutions from 1827 onwards.

     Even assuming that this Decree was ever valid, the applicants

argue that it was repealed after the fall of the dictatorship on

24 July 1974. In this respect the applicants invoke in particular

Article 15 of the First Constitutional Act of 1974, which provided that

the 1968 Constitution, as well as any other Constitutional Act or act

of a constitutional character passed under the military dictatorship

after 21 April 1967, was repealed.

     The applicants further claim that legislative decree No. 225/1973

was repealed by legislative decree No. 72/1974. In this respect they

refer to the report issued on 28 September 1992 by the division of

Scientific Studies of the Greek Parliament, which stated inter alia

that legislative decree No. 225/1973 was repealed by legislative decree

No. 72/1974 and that the property thereby "reverted to its former

ownership status".

     The applicants stress that it is tantamount to bad faith for the

Government now to argue that the Royal family did not own the property

in question before the coming into force of Law No. 2215/1994.

     As regards the Government's argument that the taking of their

property was justified by reasons of public interest, the applicants

submit that nothing in the Government's case justifies the enactment

of a special measure for confiscating their property without

compensation. Furthermore, the applicants claim that the right to

reclaim taxes paid since 1992 could not possibly constitute a fair

compensation for the expropriation of all their private property. As

for the wholly inadequate compensation offered to them in respect of

the arbitrary and illegal confiscation of their property by the

dictatorship in 1973, the applicants submit that this is in any case

of no relevance to the taking of their restored property which occurred

in 1994.

     The applicants conclude that the Government have failed to offer

any credible or sufficient justification for the taking of their

property, which was motivated by political and personal antipathy,

rather than by any genuine desire to serve the public interest.

     The Commission must first examine whether the first, eighth and

ninth applicants qualify as possible victims of a violation of Article

1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     In the Commission's view, an applicant cannot claim to be the

victim of a breach of one of the rights and freedoms protected by the

Convention unless there is a sufficiently direct connection between the

applicant as such and the injury he maintains he suffered as a result

of the alleged breach (No. 24581/94, Dec. 6.4.95, D.R. 81, p. 123).

     In the present case the Commission notes that before the

enactment of Law No. 2215/1994 the property in question was claimed by

the former King and Princesses Irene and Ekaterini. Therefore, the

Commission considers that these applicants are personally affected by

the application of Law No. 2215/1994 as regards property issues, and

that they may accordingly claim to be victims of a violation of Article

1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     As regards the objection raised by the Government as to the

applicants' failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Commission

recalls that under the Greek Constitution the courts are obliged not

to apply a law whose contents contravene the Constitution. Accordingly,

the only way by which the applicants could seek judicial protection of

their property rights was by challenging the constitutionality of Law

No. 2215/1994, which stipulated that the Greek State is the owner of

the moveable and immoveable Royal property.

     Consequently, having held that Law No. 2215/1994 is not contrary

to the Constitution, the Special Supreme Court's decision renders

henceforth ineffective any further attempt of the applicants to

institute civil or administrative proceedings in order to seek judicial

protection of their property rights. The Commission recalls in that

respect that the judgments of the Special Supreme Court are irrevocable

and binding on all Greek courts. Therefore, the Commission considers

that there is no point in pursuing such proceedings as the applicants

have no prospect of success.

     It follows that the objection based on the non-exhaustion of

domestic remedies cannot be upheld.

     In the light of the parties' observations, the Commission

considers that this part of the application raises serious questions

of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination

should depend on an examination of the merits. This part of the

application cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been

established.

4.   Following the judgment issued by the Supreme Special Court on the

constitutionality of Law No. 2215/1994, the applicants lastly complain

that the latter Court lacked independence and impartiality, and denied

them justice in breach of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

     The Government affirm that the applicants have received a fair

hearing before the Special Supreme Court, and consider that the

applicants have adduced no concrete evidence whatsoever to support

their allegations. Therefore the Government firmly reject the

applicants' criticism of the independence and impartiality of the Greek

judiciary.

     The applicants contend that the Special Supreme Court rendered

its judgment on wholly spurious and extra-judicial grounds, evidencing

a lack of independence and a bias in favour of the Greek Government.

In particular the applicants complain that the Special Supreme Court

upheld Law No. 2215/1994 as being consistent with the Constitution,

despite the fact that this legislation was arbitrary and plainly

motivated by the political hostility of the Greek Government towards

the former King and his family.

     The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for the

purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention must be

determined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the

personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also

according to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge

offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this

respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Hauschildt v. Denmark

judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, para. 46).

     As to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judge

must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (ibid, para. 48),

and no evidence has been produced in the present case which might

suggest bias on the part of the magistrates of the Special Supreme

Court. The Commission notes moreover that the case was decided by a

majority and that the opinion of the four judges who dissented is

included in the text of the judgment.

     The Commission considers therefore that the outcome of the

proceedings before the Special Supreme Court is not sufficient in

itself to justify apprehensions as to the impartiality of this court.

     As to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite

apart from the judges' conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may

raise doubts as to their impartiality. In this respect even appearances

may be of a certain importance (op. cit.).

     However, the Commission considers that the applicants have not

produced anything to suggest that the necessary safeguards of the

Special Supreme Court's independence and impartiality were lacking in

the present case.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,

     the complaint concerning the alleged violation of the first,

     eighth and ninth applicants' right to a peaceful enjoyment of

     their possessions, and also the complaint that these applicants

     were discriminated against in the enjoyment of this right,

     and, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

        M. de SALVIA                        S. TRECHSEL

         Secretary                           President

      to the Commission                   of the Commission