Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 24240/94

by Béláné BOCSI

against Hungary

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 21 May 1998, the following members being present:

MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President

N. BRATZA

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs J. LIDDY

MM L. LOUCAIDES

B. MARXER

B. CONFORTI

I. BÉKÉS

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

M. VILA AMIGÓ

Mrs M. HION

Mr R. NICOLINI

Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 15 December 1993

by Béláné BOCSI against Hungary and registered on 31 May 1994 under

file No. 24240/94;

Having regard to:

- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

the Commission;

- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

8 November 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the

applicant on 16 December 1996;

- the supplementary observations submitted by the applicant on

10 April 1997 and the supplementary observations in reply

submitted by the respondent Government on 1 July 1997;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, a Hungarian citizen residing in Füzesabony,

Hungary, was born in 1930 and is a pensioner. Before the Commission she

is represented by Mr I. Horváth, a lawyer practising in Budapest.

The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

parties, may be summarised as follows.

A. Particular circumstances of the case

(a) The proceedings with a view to terminating the applicant's

placement under guardianship

On 26 June 1986 the applicant was committed to the Department of

Neurology and Psychiatry, Heves County Hospital (Heves Megyei Kórház),

Eger. On 10 July 1986 Judge T.G., a single judge at the Eger District

Court (Egri Városi Bíróság), reviewed and approved her forced

psychiatric treatment which eventually terminated on 25 September 1986.

On 17 November 1986 the Heves County Regional Court (Heves Megyei

Bíróság), upon the applicant's appeal, found that the review

proceedings of 10 July 1986 concerning her detention at the Department

of Neurology and Psychiatry had been improper. The Regional Court,

however, discontinued the proceedings having regard to the fact that

the detention had meanwhile ended.

In December 1989 the Heves County Public Prosecutor's Office

(Heves Megyei Foügyészség) initiated guardianship proceedings against

the applicant. The Public Prosecutor's Office recalled that during the

preceding years the applicant had continually been intervening, in an

inappropriate and querulous way, with various authorities to seek

remedies in a civil litigation case of her son. In the opinion of the

Public Prosecutor's Office, she suffered from querulous psychosis. The

Public Prosecutor's Office proposed that forensic psychiatry expertise

be taken.

In March 1990 the Eger District Court found that the applicant

suffered from paranoia and placed her under guardianship within the

meaning of S. 13 of the Civil Code (a Polgári Törvénykönyvrol szóló

1959. évi IV. törvény).

In 1992 the applicant brought an action to terminate

guardianship. In September 1992 the Eger District Court dismissed her

action. The District Court found that the applicant was suffering from

chronic paranoid psychosis, unchanged for years, which prevented her

from appreciating the true state of her affairs generally. The District

Court was relying on psychiatry expertise by the Szolnok Institute of

Forensic Medicine (Szolnoki Igazságügyi Orvosszakértoi Intézet),

according to which the applicant had no insight of her mental disorder

and her thoughts and behaviour were governed by a system of wrong

ideas.

On 15 December 1992 a panel at the Heves County Regional Court,

presided over by Judge T.K., dismissed her appeal. Throughout all these

proceedings she was represented by the lawyer E.G. - the sister of

Judge T.G. - acting as her guardian ad litem (ügygondnok).

On 4 February 1993 the Regional Court notified the applicant and

the guardian ad litem that a further handwritten submission, lodged by

the applicant personally, would be regarded as a petition for review

by the Supreme Court and be forwarded accordingly to the first instance

court for further action. In response to yet another submission by the

applicant, dated 18 March 1993, the Regional Court confirmed that it

had arranged for the first instance court to take action in respect of

the review.

On 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court, setting a 15-day deadline,

returned the petition to the applicant for supplementation requiring,

inter alia, that a legal representative be provided for. This decision

was served upon the applicant on 9 April 1993.

On 22 April 1993 E.G. met the applicant and explained to her

that, in her view, the Regional Court's decision had been in compliance

with the relevant laws and therefore, in the light of S. 270 (1) of the

Code of Civil Procedure (a polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi

III. törvény), no petition for review was called for in the case. The

applicant did not accept E.G.'s views and wished to have a new guardian

ad litem appointed. On 26 April 1993 E.G. submitted her resignation

to the Regional Court and requested that a new guardian ad litem be

appointed for the applicant.

On 13 May 1993 the Supreme Court, in the absence of a legal

representative, rejected the petition ex officio. This decision was

served upon the applicant on 25 June 1993.

Meanwhile, on 27 May 1993 the applicant's son had unsuccessfully

complained about the conduct of the applicant's former guardian ad

litem to the Vice President of the Regional Court (Megyei Bíróság

Elnökhelyettese).

(b) The compensation proceedings

In January 1991 the applicant brought a compensation action

before the Füzesabony District Court (Füzesabonyi Városi Bíróság)

against the hospital where she had been treated for her mental illness

in 1986. She claimed that her impaired eyesight was a consequence of

the psychiatric therapies having been applied to her.

For reasons of competence, the Füzesabony District Court

subsequently forwarded the action to the Eger District Court. On

27 June 1991 the Heves County Regional Court, upon the applicant's

motion to challenge for bias the judges at the Eger District Court,

appointed the Gyöngyös District Court (Gyöngyösi Városi Bíróság) to

proceed with the case.

In February 1992 the Gyöngyös District Court held a preparatory

hearing and, in March 1992, granted the applicant legal aid. Between

May 1992 and January 1993 the District Court was awaiting the

availability of certain documents which were then kept by the Eger

District Court, and subsequently by the Regional Court, in the context

of the applicant's action to terminate placement under guardianship.

Meanwhile, on 10 December 1992 the District Court held a hearing

and exempted the applicant from all procedural costs. Subsequently the

District Court proceeded to obtain expert ophthalmology evidence in the

case. On 8 March 1993 the expert presented her opinion finding no

causal relation between the impugned therapies and the applicant's eye

disease.

On 30 March 1993 the Gyöngyös District Court, relying on the

expert's opinion, dismissed the applicant's action.

On 3 June 1993 a panel at the Heves County Regional Court,

presided over by Judge T.K., dismissed her appeal.

On 7 October 1993 the District Court forwarded the applicant's

petition for review to the Supreme Court. On 28 April 1994 the Supreme

Court refused to give the applicant's case priority.

On 7 July 1994 the Supreme Court upheld the second instance

decision. The Supreme Court's decision was served upon the applicant's

lawyer on 13 October 1994.

During the above proceedings the applicant was represented by

three court-appointed lawyers consecutively.

B. Relevant domestic law

(a) Guardianship

Section 13 of the Civil Code provides that an adult's capacity

to perform legal actions shall be restricted (korlátozott cselekvo-

képesség) if he has been placed under guardianship with such effect.

The court shall place an adult under such guardianship if his capacity

to appreciate the true state of his affairs has - on account of his

mental state, intellectual deficiency or pathologic addiction -

permanently or periodically decreased to a great extent. According to

S. 14, any legal act of a person under such guardianship is valid, with

certain exceptions, only if it is agreed or post facto approved by his

statutory representative.

(b) Code of Civil Procedure

According to S. 74, if a party with no capacity to perform legal

actions has no statutory representative, the court shall appoint a

guardian ad litem for him.

Section 84 provides that any person who, on account of his lack

of sufficient income and property, is not in a position to cover

procedural expenses, shall be entitled, in order to facilitate his

access to justice, to be (i) exempted from paying stamp duties;

(ii) exempted from making down-payments in regard to, and - normally -

from paying, the actual costs incurred during the proceedings;

(iii) exempted from depositing security for procedural costs and

(iv) assisted by a legal aid lawyer.

Section 87 (1) provides that, if a party has been exempted from

procedural costs, the court shall, upon the party's request, appoint

for the purposes of the proceedings a local lawyer as the party's legal

aid lawyer, on condition that such an appointment is necessitated by

the circumstances of the case.

According to S. 270 (1), a party may, unless the law provides

otherwise, request the review by the Supreme Court of the final

judgment, alleging that a breach of law has taken place. Section 73/A

requires the party bringing the petition for review to be represented

by a lawyer in default whereof the petition shall first be returned for

supplementation and then - in the eventual absence of a legal

representative - be rejected ex officio.

Section 312 (2) provides that, in proceedings concerning an

action to terminate placement under guardianship, the party under

guardianship shall have full capacity to conduct legal proceedings. The

court may, nevertheless, appoint a guardian ad litem for him, if need

be.

(c) Law-Decree No. 4 of 1983 on Lawyers (az ügyvédségrol szóló 1983.

évi 4. tvr.) (as in force in the relevant period)

Section 16 (1) provides that a lawyer, (i) who represents the

opposing party in another set of proceedings; (ii) who is a relative,

the guardian or tutor of the opposing party or (iii) whose interest in

the instant case is adverse to that of his client or who is biased

towards his client, cannot represent his client as a legal aid lawyer,

as a court-appointed defence counsel or as a guardian ad litem or ad

hoc.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention about

the Hungarian courts' failure to terminate her placement under

guardianship.

2. Moreover, as regards her action to terminate guardianship, the

applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the

proceedings were rendered unfair by the participation of her allegedly

biased guardian ad litem and an allegedly biased judge. She submits in

particular that the lawyer E.G. was appointed her guardian ad litem in

the case, albeit that she was allegedly biased on account of her

sister's involvement in the improper court review of 10 July 1986.

Moreover, she alleges that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in

charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial since he had previously

taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her

son.

3. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention that, in the case concerning the termination of placement

under guardianship, she did not have access to a review by the Supreme

Court given E.G.'s refusal to represent her as her guardian ad litem.

4. As regards the compensation proceedings, the applicant complains

under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that, for the above reasons,

Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the Regional Court,

was not impartial in this case, either.

5. Furthermore, she complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention that the compensation proceedings lasted unreasonably long.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 15 December 1993 and registered

on 31 May 1994.

On 4 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48

para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.

The Government's written observations were submitted on

8 November 1996. On 16 December 1996 the applicant submitted

observations in reply.

Meanwhile, on 3 December 1996 the Commission decided to grant the

applicant legal aid.

On 10 April 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for

that purpose, the applicant's lawyer submitted observations in reply

to the respondent Government's observations.

On 1 July 1997 the Government submitted supplementary

observations.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention about the Hungarian courts' failure to terminate her

placement under guardianship.

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with

the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

rights and freedoms of others."

The Commission recalls that placement under guardianship may

amount to an interference with the right to respect for one's private

life within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the

Convention (cf. No. 8509/79, Dec. 5.5.81, D.R. 24, p. 131). The

Commission considers that in the present case the court decisions

refusing to terminate the applicant's placement under guardianship may

be seen as an interference with her right to respect for her private

life.

It remains to be considered whether this interference can be

justified on any of the grounds enumerated in Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

The Commission notes that the applicant's placement under

guardianship was maintained in pursuance of S. 13 of the Hungarian

Civil Code and finds, therefore, that the interference was prescribed

by law.

The Commission further finds that the relevant provisions of

Hungarian law providing the placement under guardianship of persons

suffering from mental disorders can be regarded as pursuing the

legitimate aim of the protection of "health or morals" and "the rights

and freedoms of others".

Furthermore, the Commission considers that the maintenance of the

applicant's placement under guardianship could be regarded as being

necessary in a democratic society, since on the evidence before the

relevant courts the applicant was suffering from an illness which

prevented her from appreciating the true state of her affairs

generally.

The Commission, therefore, finds that the interference with the

applicant's private life was justified in accordance with

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. The applicant's

complaint in this respect does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention that the proceedings regarding her action to terminate the

guardianship were rendered unfair by the participation of her allegedly

biased guardian ad litem and an allegedly biased judge. She submits in

particular that the lawyer E.G. was appointed her guardian ad litem in

the case, albeit that she was allegedly biased on account of her

sister's involvement in the improper court review of 10 July 1986.

Moreover, she alleges that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in

charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial since he had previously

taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her

son.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, so far as

relevant, provides as follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... ,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

established by law."

a. As regards the complaint about the lawyer E.G.'s appointment as

the applicant's guardian ad litem in the case, the Commission observes

at the outset that paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention guarantees the impartiality of the tribunal rather than that

of lawyers or guardians.

In any event, considering the duties incumbent on courts to

ensure an effective exercise of procedural rights, the Commission notes

that, according to S. 312 (2) of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure,

in a case concerning an action to terminate placement under

guardianship, the plaintiff has full capacity to conduct legal

proceedings. Consequently, at any time during the proceedings, she

could have appointed a lawyer to represent her. Having regard also to

S. 16 (1) of Law-Decree No. 4 of 1983, the Commission considers that

the relevant Hungarian laws enabled the applicant to dismiss her

guardian ad litem and to appoint an independent lawyer. In this respect

the Commission notes that the applicant never took any action towards

this end in the course of the proceedings.

b. As regards the complaint about lack of impartiality on the part

of Judge T.K., the Commission considers that Judge T.K.'s alleged

involvement in previous actions brought by the applicant's son is not

sufficient to give rise to legitimate doubts as to his impartiality

(cf. Eur. Court HR, Gillow v. the United Kingdom judgment of

24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 28, paras. 72-73).

In these circumstances the Commission finds that there is no

indication of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing

by an impartial tribunal.

It follows that this part of the application must likewise be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that, in the case concerning the

termination of placement under guardianship, she did not have access

to a review by the Supreme Court given E.G.'s refusal to represent her

as her guardian ad litem.

The Government submit that on 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court

returned the applicant's petition for review for supplementation

requiring that a legal representative be provided for. Since the

applicant, despite the Supreme Court's warning, failed to provide for

legal representation or to notify the Supreme Court that she was unable

to do so, her petition for review was eventually rejected ex officio.

The Government maintain that the review proceedings before the

Supreme Court constitute an extraordinary remedy subject to special

formal requirements. However, in the light of the relevant

jurisprudence of the Court (cf. Eur. Court HR, Granger v. the United

Kingdom judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 174, p. 17, para. 44;

Pretto and others v. Italy judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A

no. 71, p. 12), the Government consider that in the present case the

Supreme Court's procedure was in compliance with Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Furthermore, the Government observe that,

in accordance with Sections 84, 87 (1) and 312 (2) of the Code of Civil

Procedure, the applicant had, throughout the proceedings, the right to

appoint an independent lawyer. Legal aid was likewise available to her

and was actually granted by the Gyöngyös District Court in the second

set of proceedings. Lastly, the Government point out that the applicant

is free to bring a similar action anew any time in the future, given

the very nature of the relevant procedure.

The applicant submits that a petition for review by the Supreme

Court is an extraordinary remedy of a sophisticated nature, subject to

severe formal requirements, e.g. compulsory representation by a lawyer,

the non-observance of which leads to the rejection of the petition. She

maintains, recalling the Airey judgment (Eur. Court HR, Airey v.

Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32), that given the

resignation of the guardian ad litem, legal aid should have been

arranged for in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Legal aid

was, in any event, necessitated by the complexity and importance of

what was at stake for her in the case.

Furthermore, the applicant observes that her petition for review

was rejected by the Supreme Court, due to the absence of a lawyer

representing her, on 13 May 1993, although the letter containing the

resignation of her former guardian ad litem had been received by the

Regional Court on 26 April. The fact that her petition was forwarded

to the Supreme Court by the Regional Court without having appointed a

new guardian ad litem resulted in the rejection of her petition for

review ex officio. In her view, both the Regional Court and the Supreme

Court failed to comply with domestic law, i.e. with Sections 74 and

87 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to ensure effective access

to review proceedings. Due to the legal limitations applicable to the

representation of persons under guardianship, she was not in a position

to appoint an independent lawyer, either.

In sum, the applicant, referring to the relevant case-law

(Eur. Court HR, Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February

1975, Series A no. 18; "Belgian Linguistic" judgment of 23 July 1968,

Series A no. 6), considers that the rejection of her petition for

review due to the absence of a legal representative restricted her

right of access to court to such an extent that the very essence of the

right was impaired.

The Commission observes at the outset that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to

set up courts of appeal or of cassation. Nevertheless, a State which

does institute such courts is required to ensure that persons amenable

to the law shall enjoy before these courts the fundamental guarantees

contained in Article 6 (Art. 6). Therefore, Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) is indeed applicable to proceedings in cassation. The way

in which it applies must, however, clearly depend on the special

features of such proceedings (Eur. Court HR, Delcourt v. Belgium

judgment of 17 January 1970, pp. 14-15, paras. 25-26); account must be

taken of the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order

and of the role of the appellate court therein (Eur. Court HR, Fejde

v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-C, p. 67, para.

26). Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not prevent

Contracting States from regulating access to appeal jurisdictions, in

order to ensure the proper administration of justice (No. 12275/86,

Dec. 2.7.91, D.R. 70, p. 47), especially as far as the obligation to

be represented by a lawyer is concerned (No. 16598/90, Dec. 11.12.90,

D.R. 66, p. 260). The requirement of a lawyer to lodge an appeal before

a higher court is a common feature of the legal systems in several

member States of the Council of Europe (Eur. Court HR, Gillow judgment,

op. cit., p. 27, para. 69).

The Commission further recalls that it is essential that the

person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to

be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of

representation. Special procedural safeguards may be called for in

order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their

mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves

(cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Megyeri v. Germany judgment of

12 May 1992, Series A no. 237, p. 11, para. 22). However, a refusal to

appoint a guardian to a person not able to litigate in connection with

a case which has no prospect of success does not interfere with the

right, in civil cases, of access to court (No. 10877/84, Dec. 16.5.85,

D.R. 43, p. 184).

The Commission notes that on 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court

returned the applicant's petition for review for supplementation

requiring that a legal representative be provided for. On 22 April 1993

the then guardian ad litem, while refusing to represent the applicant

before the Supreme Court, explained to her that the Regional Court's

decision had been in compliance with the relevant laws and, therefore,

a petition for review would offer no prospect of success. On

13 May 1993 the Supreme Court, in the absence of a legal

representative, rejected the petition ex officio.

The Commission observes that, according to S. 312 (2) of the

Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, in a case concerning an action to

terminate placement under guardianship, the plaintiff has full capacity

to conduct legal proceedings and, consequently, to appoint an

independent lawyer to represent her before the Supreme Court. A legal

aid system is provided for by Sections 84 and 87 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, aimed at facilitating low-income litigants' access to

justice.

In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the fact

that the Supreme Court, subsequent to the ad litem guardian's

resignation, did not provide the applicant ex officio with a new

guardian ad litem did not amount to a denial of access to review

proceedings. The applicant, whose action had been based on the very

claim that her mental state no longer required her to be placed under

guardianship, could reasonably be expected to arrange for her

representation before the Supreme Court. Her submissions do not,

therefore, disclose any appearance of a breach of her right of access

to court, as enshrined in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

It follows that this part of the application must likewise be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the

Regional Court, was not impartial in the compensation proceedings. She

submits that Judge T.K. had previously taken unfavourable decisions in

respect of other actions brought by her son.

The Commission considers that Judge T.K.'s alleged involvement

in previous actions brought by the applicant's son is not sufficient

to give rise to legitimate doubt as to his impartiality in this set of

proceedings, either (cf. Eur. Court HR, Gillow judgment, op. cit.,

p. 28, paras. 72-73).

In these circumstances the Commission finds that there is no

indication of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing

by an impartial tribunal.

It follows that this part of the application must likewise be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5. Lastly, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention that the compensation proceedings lasted unreasonably long.

The Government submit that the overall length of the proceedings

cannot be regarded as unreasonably long. There were no substantial

periods of inactivity on the part of the courts involved. In

particular, between May 1992 and January 1993 the Gyöngyös District

Court was awaiting the arrival of documents which were kept by the Eger

District Court and the Regional Court for the purposes of the other set

of proceedings pursued by the applicant. However, the Gyöngyös District

Court was not inactive even during this period, namely, it proceeded

to obtain expert ophthalmology evidence.

The applicant submits that the reason forwarded by the Government

to explain the delay of a duration of almost a year, i.e. the non-

availability of certain documents kept by other courts, cannot justify

the protraction of the proceedings.

The Commission observes that the applicant's complaint relates

to proceedings which started in 1991, i.e. prior to 5 November 1992

which is the date of the entry into force of the Convention with

respect to Hungary. However, the Commission recalls that the Convention

only governs, for each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry

into force with respect to that Party (cf. No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78,

D.R. 14, p. 146). The proceedings in question had lasted approximately

one year and nine months prior to 5 November 1992. This period would,

if considered alone, fall outside the scope of the Commission's

considerations ratione temporis. However, in assessing the

reasonableness of the time that elapsed after this date, account must

be taken of the then state of proceedings (cf. Eur. Court HR, Foti and

others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18,

para. 53).

The Commission notes that the Supreme Court upheld the second

instance decision on 7 July 1994 and this decision was served upon the

applicant's lawyer on 13 October 1994. The proceedings in question thus

lasted somewhat less than two years subsequent to 5 November 1992.

The Commission recalls that in civil cases the reasonableness of

the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the

particular circumstances of the case, namely, its complexity, the

conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the judicial authorities

and what is at stake for the applicant. In this instance the

circumstances call for an overall assessment (cf. Eur. Court HR, Ficara

v. Italy judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 196-A, p. 9,

para. 17).

The Commission notes that the proceedings complained of related

to a compensation action. The case did not involve any issues of

particular complexity. Furthermore, no particular delays can be

attributed to the parties. As to the conduct of the judicial

authorities, the Commission observes that, subsequent to

5 November 1992, there occurred no particular delays in the first and

second instance proceedings. Nevertheless, there was, in the review

proceedings, some delay between October 1993 and October 1994.

However, the Commission, having regard to the fact that the

applicant's case was dealt with by three court instances, considers

that the overall length of the proceedings, i.e. some two years after

ratification, does not appear substantial enough to have exceeded an

acceptable limit in the circumstances of the present case (cf., mutatis

mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Cesarini v. Italy judgment of 12 October 1992,

Series A no. 245, p. 26, para. 20). In reaching this finding, the

Commission has taken into account that the proceedings had lasted less

than two years before the Convention's entry into force in regard to

Hungary. The applicant's complaint about the length of proceedings does

not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.F. BUQUICCHIO M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

Secretary President

to the First Chamber of the First Chamber

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