AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 35137/97

                      by Yilmaz DILEK

                      against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 July 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    J.-C. GEUS, President

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    F. MARTINEZ

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 10 October 1996

by Yilmaz DILEK against the Netherlands and registered on

28 February 1997 under file No. 35137/97;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Turkish national, born in 1961, and resides

in Rotterdam. He is represented by Ms G.E.M. Later, a lawyer practising

in The Hague.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

a.   The particular circumstances of the present case

     The applicant entered the Netherlands on 3 November 1987 and, on

25 January 1988, was employed on a permanent basis. On 5 July 1988 he

married a Dutch national. On 7 September 1988 the applicant was granted

a Dutch residence permit valid for one year in order to live with his

spouse and to work in the Netherlands. On 23 May 1989, a son was born

to the applicant and his wife. On 19 September 1989, on the basis of

his marriage, the applicant was granted an indefinite right to remain

pursuant to Article 10 para. 2 of the Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet).

     On or around 19 June 1990, the applicant and his wife separated.

On 26 June 1990, the applicant's wife started divorce proceedings

before the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Rotterdam. As

his residence right was dependent on his marriage, the applicant

applied for an independent residence permit on 27 July 1990.

     His request for an independent permit was rejected on

8 August 1990 by the State Secretary of Justice (Staatssecretaris van

Justitie, hereinafter referred to as "the State Secretary"). Insofar

as the applicant relied on Article 8 of the Convention, the State

Secretary did not find it established that there were any contacts

between the applicant and his son and, further, that it had not

appeared that the applicant had made any contributions to the costs of

his son's upbringing. In these circumstances the State Secretary did

not find that the tie between the applicant and his son could be

considered as "family life" under Article 8 of the Convention. On 7

March 1991, the applicant filed a request for review (herziening) of

this decision with the State Secretary.

     On 27 February 1991, the Regional Court of Rotterdam pronounced

the applicant's divorce. By decision of 21 May 1991, it appointed the

applicant's former wife as guardian (voogdes) and the applicant as

auxiliary guardian (toeziend voogd) over his son. The Regional Court

further ordered the applicant to pay 300 Dutch guilders monthly to his

former wife as a contribution to the costs of their son's upbringing

and education. As regards parental access, the applicant and his wife

had concluded an agreement according to which the applicant had access

to his son every Saturday and Sunday between 12.00 and 18.00 hours.

     On 18 December 1991, the applicant's former wife filed a criminal

complaint against the applicant for assault and refused the applicant

access to his son as from that moment. On 2 September 1992, the

applicant requested the Regional Court of Rotterdam to determine an

access arrangement (omgangsregeling) to the effect that he would be

given access to his son one day every two weeks.

     On 22 September 1992, the applicant was heard by the Advisory

Commission for Aliens Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken)

in connection with his request for review of the decision of

8 August 1990. Following this hearing, the Advisory Commission advised

the State Secretary for Justice to reject the applicant's request for

revision.

     Having noted the advice of the Advisory Commission, the State

Secretary rejected the applicant's request for review on

13 January 1993. On 15 March 1993, the applicant filed an appeal with

the Council of State (Raad van State).

     In March 1993, the applicant lost his job and was granted

unemployment benefits.

     On 18 March 1993, the applicant started summary proceedings (kort

geding) before the President of the Regional Court of The Hague seeking

an injunction on his expulsion pending the outcome of his appeal to the

Council of State.

     By decision of 22 January 1994, the Regional Court of Rotterdam

determined an access arrangement to the effect that the applicant had

access to his son one afternoon per fourteen days in the presence of

his son's grandmother.

     By judgment of 4 March 1994, the President of the Regional Court

of The Hague sitting at Haarlem rejected the applicant's request for

an injunction on his expulsion. Noting that since the separation from

his wife the applicant had not had any contacts with his son, the

President considered that the family life between the applicant and his

son was not of such a nature that, in balancing the interests involved,

the applicant's expulsion would be contrary to Article 8 of the

Convention.

     As to the argument that regular contacts between the applicant

and his son had been established in the meantime, the President held

that this could not lead to a different decision as these contacts did

not exist at the time the decision challenged by the applicant before

the Council of State was taken. As the Council of State can only

examine the appeal in the light of the facts and circumstances at the

time the challenged decision was taken, it would be unable to take

these re-established contacts into consideration. The President,

therefore, concluded that the applicant's appeal had not a reasonable

chance of success and, consequently, rejected the applicant's request

for an injunction. The applicant filed an appeal with the Court of

Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.

     On 28 January 1995, the applicant was expelled from the

Netherlands. Shortly after having been expelled, he returned to the

Netherlands and, on 12 October 1995, filed a new application for an

independent Dutch residence permit.

     On 28 November 1995, the applicant submitted further arguments

for this new application, including an argument relating to the

Association Agreement between the European Economic Community and

Turkey which had not been raised before. Pursuant to this Agreement

Turkish nationals who have had a residence permit for stay with a Dutch

spouse and who are gainfully employed qualify for an independent

residence permit valid for one year after having lawfully resided in

the Netherlands for at least one year and where the person concerned

is certain of employment for at least another year.

     In this context the applicant explained that, as from

25 January 1988, he had been employed for an indefinite duration by the

M. company, that on 24 November 1990 he was dismissed from this company

following its bankruptcy, that already as from 18 November 1990 he had

been employed by the M. company's successor C. for whom he worked until

March 1993 when C. went bankrupt. After that date he obtained

unemployment benefits to which he was entitled until 25 March 1995. The

applicant further submitted that at the time of his expulsion he met

the conditions for a residence permit under the rules on the

legalisation of the status of illegal immigrants having resided and

worked in the Netherlands for at least six years. In support of this

argument the applicant submitted certain documents, including written

statements from his employers M. and C., and salary and social security

payment slips covering the period of January 1989 to February 1994.

     As from 15 November 1995, the applicant is registered at the

Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel) as owner of a one-man-

business.

     On 11 December 1995, the applicant submitted his grounds of

appeal against the judgment of 4 March 1994 of the Regional Court of

The Hague.

     On 10 April 1996, following a hearing held on 15 January 1996,

the Administrative Law Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the

Council of State rejected the applicant's appeal against the State

Secretary's decision of 13 January 1993. It recalled that, under

Article 11 para. 5 of the Aliens Act, a residence permit may be refused

on public interest grounds and that the Netherlands have a restricted

immigration policy given the situation of its population and labour

market. It noted that, with the exception of obligations derived from

international agreements, an application for a residence permit in the

Netherlands is granted only if the individual's presence serves an

essential national interest or if there are compelling reasons of a

humanitarian nature.

     As to the applicant's arguments under Article 8 of the

Convention, the Administrative Law Division accepted that the refusal

to grant the applicant a residence permit constituted an interference

with his right to respect for his family life within the meaning of

this provision.

     The Administrative Law Division noted, however, that the

applicant and his son had only lived together for about one year and

did not find it established that since December 1991 there had in fact

been any contacts between the applicant and his son or that he had made

any financial contribution to the costs of his son's upbringing and

education. It further noted that, on 2 September 1992, the applicant

had filed a request with the Regional Court of Rotterdam to determine

an access arrangement of one day per fourteen days which had not yet

been decided upon when the decision of 13 January 1993 had been taken.

In any event, the Administrative Law Division found that this access

arrangement would not in itself be a decisive element in balancing the

interests involved.

     The Administrative Law Division held that it was not convinced

that the ties between the applicant and his son were so close that the

interest of these ties should be given decisive weight. It further

considered, as regards the applicant's professional activities, that

on the Dutch labour market other people, having priority over the

applicant, were available for this kind of work.

     The Administrative Law Division concluded that the State

Secretary, after having balanced the interference with the applicant's

right to respect for his family life against the economic interests of

the State, could find that the interference with the applicant's rights

under Article 8 of the Convention was not disproportionate and that the

refusal to grant him a residence permit was thus justified under

Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention.

     On 17 April 1996, the applicant's lawyer informed the

Administrative Law Division that she had not been given access to the

applicant's case-file despite her request of 30 November 1995, after

having taken over the applicant's case from another lawyer, to be

provided with certain documents. The applicant's lawyer, referring to

a number of documents and submitting a number of recently obtained

documents, all relating to the applicant's history of employment in the

Netherlands, requested the Administrative Law Division to grant a

revision (herziening) of its decision of 17 April 1996 on the basis of

incorrect conclusions as to the facts of the applicant's employment

history.

     The revision request was rejected by the Administrative Law

Division on 1 November 1996. It noted that certain documents relating

to the applicant's employment history had been submitted on

30 November 1995 after the expiry of the time-limit for making

submissions. When the applicant's lawyer nevertheless sought to submit

these documents in the course of the hearing held on 15 January 1996,

the Administrative Law Division rejected this request.

     The Administrative Law Division considered that no circumstances

had appeared on grounds of which the applicant would have been unable

to submit these documents at an earlier stage of the proceedings at

issue and, consequently, held that this point did not constitute a

ground for revising its decision. It further held that no other facts

or circumstances had been submitted which could constitute a ground for

a revision. It added that the extraordinary remedy of revision is not

intended to provide an unsuccessful party in proceedings with an

opportunity to reopen the debate.

     On 13 November 1996, the State Secretary rejected the applicant's

request of 12 October 1995 for a residence permit. The State Secretary,

noting the applicant's employment situation at the relevant time,

considered that he did not meet the requirements for a residence permit

pursuant to the Association Agreement and further held that he did not

meet the requirements for a residence permit pursuant to the rules on

the legalisation of the status of illegal immigrants having resided and

worked in the Netherlands for more than six years.

     In this decision it was further noted that, according to a

written statement dated 21 October 1996 by the applicant's former wife,

the applicant had availed himself in 1994 only twice of the access

arrangement determined by the Regional Court of Rotterdam of

11 January 1994. It was further noted that it had not appeared that the

applicant had made any contributions to the costs of his son's

upbringing or that there had been any contacts between the applicant

and his son.

     The State Secretary concluded that the State's interests in

securing the economic well-being of the country outweighed the

applicant's interests as regards respect for his rights under Article 8

para. 1 of the Convention and that, therefore, the refusal to grant him

a residence permit was justified under Article 8 para. 2 of the

Convention. The applicant was further ordered to leave the Netherlands

within four weeks. On 9 December 1996, the applicant filed an objection

(bezwaarschrift) against this decision with the State Secretary.

     On 26 February 1997, the applicant filed a request with the

Regional Court of The Hague for an interim measure (voorlopige

voorziening) allowing him to await the outcome of the appeal

proceedings in the Netherlands. These proceedings are currently still

pending. A hearing has been scheduled for 6 August 1998.

     On 15 May 1997, the Court of Appeal of The Hague handed down its

judgment on the applicant's appeal against the judgment of 4 March 1994

of the Regional Court of The Hague. It noted that the facts set out in

the judgment of 4 March 1994 had not been disputed, that on

10 April 1996 the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State

had rejected the applicant's appeal in the proceedings on the merits

(bodemprocedure) and that the Administrative Law Division had further

rejected the applicant's request for revision on 1 November 1996. As

the applicant's appeal of 10 March 1994 was limited to the refusal to

order an injunction on his expulsion pending the proceedings before the

Council of State, the Court of Appeal considered that the applicant's

appeal no longer had an object.

     However, as the President of the Regional Court had also awarded

costs against the applicant, the Court of Appeal nevertheless examined

the substance of the applicant's appeal.

     After having examined the applicant's various submissions as

regards his employment history, the Court of Appeal rejected the

applicant's argument that he met the conditions for an independent

residence permit pursuant to the Association Agreement. It further

rejected the argument that the applicant met the conditions for a

residence permit under the rules on legalisation of the status of

illegal immigrants having resided and worked in the Netherlands for

more than six years.

     Insofar as the applicant relied on Article 8 of the Convention,

the Court of Appeal considered that the applicant had only lived with

his son for about one year, noted the history of the arrangement of the

applicant's access to his son and found that it had not been submitted

nor appeared that the applicant, after the rupture of the initial

access arrangement in December 1991, had continued to pay any

contribution towards the costs of his son's upbringing and education.

It finally found established that on the Dutch labour market other

people, having priority over the applicant, were available for the kind

of work the applicant was doing at the relevant time.

     The Court of Appeal did not find it established that, at the time

of the decision of 13 January 1993, the tie between the applicant and

his son was so strong that it should be given decisive weight when

balancing the right to respect for the applicant's private and family

life with his son against the State's interest as regards the economic

well-being of the country. It concluded that, on balance, the refusal

to grant the applicant a residence permit was justified under Article 8

para. 2 of the Convention.

     After having rejected all arguments advanced by the applicant,

the Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court's judgment of

4 March 1994 and made a cost order against the applicant.

     By decision of 11 November 1997, the State Secretary rejected the

applicant's objection of 9 December 1996. As regards the applicant's

arguments under Article 8 of the Convention, the State Secretary

referred to the findings in the judgment of 15 May 1997 of the Court

of Appeal of The Hague.

     On 19 November 1997, the applicant requested the State Secretary

to review the decision of 11 November 1997. In support of this request

the applicant submitted a copy of the Commission's Decision on

admissibility in the case of Çiliz v. the Netherlands (Application

No. 29192/95, Dec. 27.6.96), copies of written statements by his former

wife stating that she had received from the applicant 200 Dutch

guilders on 28 July 1990 and 250 guilders on 5 August 1990 and monthly

amounts of 300 Dutch guilders during the period from February to

December 1991, and copies of the applicant's unemployment benefits

payment slips from which it appears that between 12 July 1993 and

11 September 1994 a weekly amount of 93,75 Dutch guilders was withheld

and paid to the Children Welfare Council (Raad voor de

Kinderbescherming) in respect of his son.

     On 26 June 1998, the applicant informed the Commission that, by

letter of 8 January 1998 to the State Secretary, he had submitted a

statement of his former wife as to his contacts with his son. Without

explicitly referring to the contents of this statement, the applicant

submitted that since the beginning of 1997 he sees his son weekly and

that he has contacts by telephone. He further submitted that he makes

financial contributions to the costs of his son's education and

upbringing.

     On 19 February 1998, the State Secretary informed the applicant

that there were no reasons for a review of the decision of

11 November 1997. The applicant's objection against that decision is

currently still pending.

b.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     In general, an application for a residence permit in the

Netherlands is granted only if the individual's presence serves an

essential national interest or if there are compelling reasons of a

humanitarian nature (klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard) (see also

Eur. Court HR, Nsona v. the Netherlands judgment of 28 November 1996,

Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, pp. 1993-1994, paras. 64-

65). A residence permit may be refused on public interest grounds

(Article 11 para. 5 of the Aliens Act).

     At the relevant time, foreigners married to either a Dutch

national, a recognised refugee or a holder of a permanent residence

permit were granted a residence permit as there were considered to

exist compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature. After one year of

legal residence in the Netherlands they acquired ex iure an indefinite

right to remain pursuant to Article 10 para. 2 of the Aliens Act.

     This right expired ex iure when the spouses no longer co-habited

(Section 47 para. 1 (a) of the Order on Aliens [Vreemdelingenbesluit]).

If, at that time, the foreigner had been married for more than three

years and had legally resided with his spouse in the Netherlands for

at least one year during the time directly preceding the dissolution

or breakdown of the marriage, he would be eligible for an independent

residence permit (see also Eur. Court HR, Berrehab v. the Netherlands

judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 138, pp. 10-11, paras. 14-15).

     An independent residence permit in order to work in the

Netherlands following the dissolution or breakdown of a marriage could

be granted if at the time of the request for such a permit the

foreigner was certain of employment for at least another year. However,

an independent residence permit was not refused if, inter alia, there

were compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature to accept the

individual's presence in the Netherlands.

     An "essential national interest" as mentioned above is considered

to exist where a foreigner is employed in a sector where there is not

a sufficient number of capable people available on the labour market

to fill all vacancies. To establish whether this is the case, regard

is only had to the number of registered unemployed people enjoying

priority (prioriteit genietend aanbod). For example, on the Dutch

labour market citizens of the European Union have priority over most

other foreigners.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that the refusal to grant him a residence

permit is contrary to his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. He

submits that since his return in 1995 he re-established weekly contacts

with his son and makes regular contributions to his former wife for the

costs of his son's upbringing and education.

2.   The applicant complains under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention

that the Council of State did not find it established that he had in

fact been working in the Netherlands between 21 June 1989 and

1 June 1990. He complains in particular that he had not been granted

access to his case-file at the Council of State. It appeared that his

former lawyer had not requested access and his current lawyer was not

granted access. He further submits that he transmitted a number of

documents related to his work to the Council of State but the State

Secretary objected to these submissions. These documents indicated that

he had in fact worked between 21 June 1989 and 1 June 1990.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that the refusal to grant him a residence

permit is contrary to his rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.

I.   Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life ...

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of ... the economic well-being of the country..."

     The Commission accepts that there is family life within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) between the applicant and his

son (cf. Eur. Court HR, Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment of 21 June

1988, Series A no. 138, p. 14, para. 21; and No. 12411/86, Dec. 4.3.87,

D.R. 51, p. 245) and that thus the refusal of the Dutch authorities to

grant the applicant a residence permit constitutes an interference with

the exercise of his right to respect for family life.

     It must therefore be examined whether or not this interference

can be considered as justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8

(Art. 8-2).

     The Commission observes that the refusal to grant the applicant

a residence permit was taken in accordance with Section 11 para. 5 of

the Aliens Act. It was, therefore, taken in accordance with Dutch law.

     The Commission accepts, moreover, that the decision was taken in

line with the policy followed by the Dutch authorities to regulate the

labour market in view of the population density. The legitimate aim

pursued was, thus, the preservation of the country's economic well-

being (cf. Berrehab judgment, loc. cit., p. 15, para. 26).

     The question which remains to be answered is whether or not the

decision was "necessary in a democratic society".

     The Commission considers that Article 8 (Art. 8) does not impose

a general obligation on States to allow aliens to remain on their

territory for the purpose of enjoying access to children of a broken

marriage. Whether a refusal to allow an alien to re-enter or remain in

a particular country for this purpose is necessary will depend on the

facts of the individual case. A fair balance must be struck between the

competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole,

and in the assessment of this balance the Contracting State enjoys a

certain margin of appreciation (cf. Keegan v. Ireland judgment of

26 May 1994, Series A no. 290, p. 19, para. 49).

     Although the applicant alleges that, since his return to the

Netherlands in 1995, he has re-established contacts with his son in

that he sees him weekly, the Commission finds that this assertion has

remained insufficiently substantiated. It notes that in the domestic

proceedings it was not found that, since 1991 and apart from twice in

1994, there had been any contacts between the applicant and his son.

In this respect, the Commission further notes that it was not before

8 January 1998 that the applicant informed the State Secretary that he

sees his son, as from the beginning of 1997, on a weekly basis and that

he makes financial contributions to the costs of his son's education

and upbringing, whereas this assertion was only brought to the

Commission's attention on 26 June 1998 without any further

substantiation. Furthermore, no explanation was provided as to why this

assertion was not raised earlier in the domestic proceedings at issue.

     In these circumstances the Commission considers that, unlike the

respective situations in the cases of Berrehab v. the Netherlands (loc.

cit.) and Çiliz v. the Netherlands (No. 29192/95, Dec. 27.6.96,

unpublished), it has not been established that at the relevant time the

applicant has had in fact more or less regular contacts with his son

since his return in 1995. Furthermore, apart from twice in 1994, it has

not been established that, between his return to the Netherlands in

1995 and the beginning of 1997, the applicant has actively sought to

establish such regular contacts by, for instance, seeking to avail

himself of the access arrangement as determined by the Regional Court

of Rotterdam. Moreover, it has not been submitted nor has it appeared

that, during this period, the applicant's former wife objected to

contacts between the applicant and his son on the basis of this access

arrangement.

     On the other hand, the Commission observes that the applicant has

made certain financial contributions to the costs of his son's

upbringing and education over the periods July - August 1990, February

- December 1991 and July 1993 - September 1994. Although the applicant

has submitted that, since his return to the Netherlands in 1995, he

makes financial contributions on a regular basis towards the costs of

his son's upbringing, the Commission finds that this assertion has also

remained insufficiently substantiated. There is no indication in the

applicant's case-file that he has in fact made such contributions since

September 1994. Also his assertion on this point in his letter of

8 January 1998 to the State Secretary has remained unsubstantiated and

no explanation has been provided as to why this assertion has not been

raised earlier in the domestic proceedings.

     In these circumstances, the Commission is of the opinion that the

applicant's right to respect for his family life does not outweigh

valid considerations relating to Dutch immigration policy and that a

proper balance has been struck between the interests involved when the

domestic authorities determined the applicant's case on the basis of

the facts before them. It therefore finds that the Dutch authorities'

refusal to grant the applicant an independent residence permit cannot

be regarded as disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and,

accordingly, may reasonably be regarded as being necessary in a

democratic society.

     It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant complains under Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of

the Convention that the Council of State did not find it established

that he had in fact been working in the Netherlands between 21 June

1989 and 1 June 1990. He complains in particular that he had not been

granted access to his case-file at the Council of State.

     Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:

     "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or

     of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a

     fair ... hearing ...  by a ...tribunal..."

     Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides:

     "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

     Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

     national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

     committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

     Insofar as the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission recalls its constant case-

law, that this provision is not applicable to proceedings concerning

residence permits for aliens (cf. No. 9285/81,  Dec. 6.7.82, D.R. 29

p. 205; and No. 33124/96, Dec. 25.2.97, unpublished). Consequently, the

Commission cannot examine the applicant's complaints of the proceedings

at issue under this provision.

     Insofar as the applicant relies on Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention, the Commission notes that the applicant's case, including

his arguments that his expulsion would amount to a violation of his

rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, has been examined

by several national authorities, i.e. the State Secretary, the

Administrative Law Division of the Council of State, the Regional Court

and the Court of Appeal. The Commission is, therefore, of the opinion

that the applicant had effective remedies within the meaning of Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, of which he did in fact avail himself.

     It follows that this part of the application must also be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              J.-C. GEUS

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber