AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 34986/97

                      by Ayse AKIN

                      against the Netherlands

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 July 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    J.-C. GEUS, President

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    F. MARTINEZ

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 30 October 1996

by Ayse AKIN against the Netherlands and registered on 19 February 1997

under file No. 34986/97;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Turkish national, born in 1940, and resides

in Amsterdam. Before the Commission she is represented by Ms M.D. van

Aller, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant and her husband are the foster parents of the

applicant's niece Sükran. On 5 September 1982, a son, Bahtiyar, was

born to Sükran and her husband in Amsterdam. As from Bahtiyar's birth

up to and including the third quarter of 1990, Sükran received child

care benefits (kinderbijslag) for Bahtiyar under the General Child Care

Benefits Act (Algemene Kinderbijslagwet - hereinafter referred to as

"the Act").

      In its decision of 18 August 1989, the First Instance Court (Sulh

Hukuk Mahkemesi) of Ayancik (Turkey) noted that the applicant and her

husband had remained childless, that their relatives Sükran and her

husband had entrusted their child Bahtiyar as from his birth to the

care of the applicant and her husband, and that the latter now sought

to adopt Bahtiyar. Having established that all parties involved,

including Bahtiyar, agreed to this adoption, the First Instance Court

pronounced Bahtiyar's adoption by the applicant and her husband.

      Pursuant to this judgment, Bahtiyar's family name in official

documents was changed to the applicant's family name, including his

Turkish passport issued on 7 November 1989 and his Dutch passport

issued on 12 June 1990. This change in Bahtiyar's family name was

further annotated on 15 May 1990 in his birth certificate at the

Register of births, deaths and marriages (Burgerlijke Stand) of

Amsterdam under the specification that he had been adopted under

Turkish law.

      As from April 1990 Bahtiyar lives with the applicant and her

husband and, on 9 May 1990, was registered as such in the Amsterdam

Municipal Population Register (Bevolkingsregister).

      At some unspecified point in time, the applicant requested child

care benefits under the Act in respect of Bahtiyar as from the second

quarter of 1990 up to and including the second quarter of 1991. By

letter of 17 July 1991, the Social Insurance Bank (Social

Verzekeringsbank) informed the applicant that her request was rejected

as she did not meet the conditions for these benefits. This letter

ended with the following paragraph:

(Translation)

      "We inform you that you may file an appeal against the above

      decision. To this end you should submit a, preferably reasoned,

      request for a so-called formal confirmation. Such a request needs

      to be received by us within a reasonable time (that is to say

      within two months). Failure to respect this time-limit may result

      in your request not being dealt with."

      By letter of 11 February 1992, the Social Insurance Bank further

informed the applicant that her request for child care benefits for

Bahtiyar over the fourth quarter of 1991 was rejected as she did not

meet the conditions for these benefits.

      In order to be able to file an administrative appeal, the

applicant's lawyer requested the Social Insurance Bank, by letter of

27 February 1992, to issue a formal confirmation (voor beroep vatbare

beschikking) of the decisions of 17 July 1991 and 11 February 1992.

      This formal confirmation was issued on 11 May 1992. According to

this confirmation the applicant's request for formal confirmation of

the decision of 17 July 1991 was inadmissible for not having been

submitted within a reasonable time. In addition it was stated that the

applicant did not meet the conditions for child care benefits for the

period as from the second quarter of 1990 up to and including the

second quarter of 1991. It was further stated that the applicant did

not meet the conditions for child care benefits for the fourth quarter

of 1991 as Bahtiyar could not be regarded as the applicant's own or

foster child under the Act.

      On 4 June 1992, the applicant filed an administrative appeal with

the Appeals Tribunal (Raad van Beroep) of Amsterdam.

      On 28 August 1992, the Social Insurance Bank transmitted the

applicant's case-file to the Appeals Tribunal. On 30 December 1992, the

Social Insurance Bank submitted a written reaction to the applicant's

appeal to which the applicant responded by letter of 7 April 1993.

      Following a hearing held on 28 January 1994, the Administrative

Section of the Regional Court (Sectie Bestuursrecht Arrondisse-

mentsrechtbank) of Amsterdam, having replaced the Appeals Tribunal

following statutory changes, rejected the applicant's appeal as ill-

founded by judgment of 11 March 1994.

      In its judgment the Regional Court noted that Bahtiyar's natural

mother Sükran lives about 300 metres from the applicant, that she

visits Bahtiyar nearly daily and that, until the beginning of 1991, she

gave the applicant and her husband an amount of 300 Dutch guilders at

regular intervals. It further noted that Sükran had transferred the

child care benefits she had received for Bahtiyar for the second and

third quarter of 1990 to the applicant's bank account and that the

Social Insurance Bank had informed her on 8 October 1990 that this was

not correct and that the applicant herself should apply for child care

benefits for Bahtiyar.

      Insofar as the applicant's request for formal confirmation had

been declared inadmissible for having been submitted out of time, the

Regional Court noted that, in conformity with the constant case-law of

the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep), the applicant

had been informed in the letter of 17 July 1991 of the existence and

length of the period within which a formal confirmation for appeal

purposes is to be requested and that the applicant's request had been

submitted more than seven months after that date. It held that in these

circumstances the Social Insurance Bank had correctly declared this

request inadmissible for having been submitted out of time.

      As regards the refusal to grant the applicant child care benefits

for the fourth quarter of 1991, the Regional Court recalled that,

according to the case-law of the Central Appeals Tribunal, a person's

"own children" within the meaning of Article 7 of the Act are

legitimate children under Dutch law, which status can be created by an

adoption under Dutch law. Insofar as it concerns an adoption pronounced

abroad, it depends on the circumstances of each case whether, for the

purposes of the Act, a child can be considered as the adoptive parents'

"own child". The Regional Court held that in the determination of this

question it is important to determine whether the conditions for and

the legal effects of a foreign adoption may be equated to those of an

adoption under Dutch law.

      Noting the differences in legal effects between adoption under

Turkish law and adoption under Dutch law, i.e. that under Turkish law

an adopted child remains an heir-at-law of its natural family and that

the adoption under Turkish law may be reversed at all times, the

Regional Court held that Bahtiyar could not be considered as the

applicant's own child for the purposes of the Act.

      As to the question whether Bahtiyar could be considered as the

applicant's foster child for the purposes of the Act, the Regional

Court recalled the case-law of the Central Appeals Tribunal, according

to which a child may be considered as a foster child where it is

maintained and cared for by foster parents as their own child. In

addition to a financial tie between them there must be an emotional tie

in the sense of a close exclusive relation - the foster parents

replacing the natural parents - and the child may no longer find itself

in the natural parents' sphere of influence.

      Applying this case-law to the applicant's situation, and noting

in particular that Bahtiyar's natural parents only live about 300

metres from the applicant, that they have regular contacts with

Bahtiyar and have financially supported the applicant until the

beginning of 1991, the Regional Court concluded that Bahtiyar could not

be regarded as the applicant's foster child under the Act.

      On 25 April 1994 the applicant filed an appeal with the Central

Appeals Tribunal. On 23 December 1994 the Social Insurance Bank replied

to the applicant's appeal and, by letter of 22 January 1996, the

applicant made further submissions to the Central Appeals Tribunal

including an argument that the Central Appeals Tribunal had violated

Article 6 of the Convention by its failure to schedule a hearing. The

applicant urged the Tribunal to examine her case at the shortest

possible notice in order to avoid a further violation of Article 6 of

the Convention.

      By judgment of 1 May 1996, following a hearing held on 13 March

1996, the Central Appeals Tribunal upheld the Regional Court's decision

of 11 March 1994.

      The Central Appeals Tribunal upheld the reasoning of the Regional

Court as regards the decision to declare inadmissible for being out of

time the applicant's request for formal confirmation of the decision

of 17 July 1991.

      As to the refusal to grant the applicant child care benefits for

the fourth quarter of 1991 on the basis of the finding that Bahtiyar

could not be considered as the applicant's own child or foster child

under the Act, the Central Appeals Tribunal considered that the

Regional Court had been correct in its reasoning and findings in

respect of the question whether Bahtiyar could be considered as the

applicant's own child.

      After having considered the applicant's submissions as to the

consequences under family and civil law (familierechtelijke gevolgen)

of the Turkish adoption at issue, the Central Appeals Tribunal added

that doubts could in fact arise as to the recognition of that adoption

in the Netherlands legal order, since it concerned a child born in the

Netherlands, holding also Dutch citizenship, and having parents

residing in the Netherlands of whom the mother also holds Dutch

citizenship.

      In respect of the question whether Bahtiyar could be considered

as the applicant's foster child for the purposes of the Act, the

Central Appeals Tribunal held that this should be answered on the basis

of its constant case-law, i.e. whether the foster parents could be

considered as having replaced the natural parents, which must be shown

by a narrow exclusive tie between the foster parents and the child.

      The Central Appeals Tribunal found that this requirement had not

been met in the present case. It specified that the natural parents

were not prohibited from having regular contacts with their child, and

it had not been made plausible that a full transfer of the tasks of

care and education had taken place. In the present case, where since

the departure of the child from its natural family uninterrupted and

intensive contacts between them continued to exist, the Tribunal found

that no specific point in time could be indicated on which these tasks

had been fully transferred to the applicant and her husband. In this

respect the Tribunal further pointed out that the applicant had

submitted that Bahtiyar's adoption under Turkish law rather than under

Dutch law had been a deliberate choice since an adoption under Turkish

law allows a stronger remaining link with the natural parents.

      In the light of these findings, the Central Appeals Tribunal

concluded that the decisions at issue were not contrary to the

applicant's rights under Articles 8, 12, 14 and 18 of the Convention.

      As regards the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention that the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time, the

Central Appeals Tribunal held that, even assuming that this requirement

had not been respected, this could not lead to granting children

allowance in violation of applicable statutory provisions.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice

      At the relevant time a person wishing to contest a decision of

an administrative organ in the field of social security schemes had to

request formal confirmation in writing. Such formal confirmation, which

included the grounds on which the decision was based, was an

admissibility requirement for an administrative appeal.

      Although there were no statutory time-limits under the various

social security laws for requesting formal confirmation, the Central

Appeals Tribunal ruled that this should be done within a "reasonable

time", which that tribunal construed to mean generally within two

months (cf., Centrale Raad van Beroep judgment of 19 March 1974,

Rechtspraak Sociaal Verzekeringsrecht 1974, no. 288). An administrative

organ might declare inadmissible such a request if it was filed too

late.  A decision of an administrative organ declaring a request for

formal confirmation inadmissible was itself a decision of which formal

confirmation might be requested with a view to an appeal.

      There was no statutory time-limit within which formal

confirmation had to be given.

      When formal confirmation had been issued, an appeal lay to the

Appeals Tribunal.  It had to be lodged within one month (Article 83 of

the Appeals Act).

      From the Appeals Tribunal a further appeal lay to the Central

Appeals Tribunal (Article 145 of the Appeals Act); it too had to be

lodged within one month.

      On 1 January 1994 the Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet

Bestuursrecht) entered into force (cf. Eur. Court HR, Van de Hurk v.

the Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 15,

para. 39).  It lays down new uniform rules of administrative procedure

which apply also to cases such as the present one.

      Anyone wishing to challenge a decision of an administrative organ

may lodge an administrative objection with that body, provided that he

or she does so within six weeks (Article 6:7).

      If the administrative organ fails to decide within a reasonable

time, or refuses to do so, the party seeking review may lodge an appeal

with the Regional Court without waiting any longer for a decision

(Articles 6:2, 6:12 and 8.1.1).  It is thus no longer necessary to

request formal confirmation of a decision of an administrative organ.

      A further appeal lies to the Central Appeals Tribunal (Article 18

of the Appeals Act).

      Adoption under Dutch law, is subject to a number of conditions

set out in Article 228 of the Netherlands Civil Code (Burgerlijk

Wetboek), which include amongst others that:

-     the child must be younger than fifteen at the time of the first

      request for adoption. If the child is older than fifteen, it must

      have no objections to the adoption;

-     the child may not be the natural or legitimate grandchild of the

      adopting parents;

-     each of the adopting parents must be at least eighteen years and

      maximum fifty years older than the child; and

-     the child must have been cared for and educated in the family of

      the adopting parents for a period of at least one year.

      As a result of an adoption under Dutch law, the adopted child

becomes the legitimate child of its adoptive parents and the legal

family relations between the child and its natural parents cease to

exist. The adopted child obtains the family name of the adoptive father

and becomes an heir-at-law of its adoptive parents and other new

relatives. The adoptive parents are to respect all statutory

obligations parents have in respect to their children. Although under

Dutch law adoption is in principle irreversible, an adopted child may

request the Regional Court within a period between two and three years

after coming of age to reverse the adoption, the reasonability of the

request and the adopted child's interest being the criteria to be

applied in the determination of such a request (Article 231 of the

Netherlands Civil Code).

      Adoption is dealt with in Articles 253-258 of the Turkish Civil

Code (Nedeni Kanun). Under Turkish law an adopted child does not obtain

the status of a legitimate child of its adoptive parents. The child

concerned does, on the other hand, obtain the family name of its

adoptive parents and becomes an heir-at-law of the adoptive parents.

All rights and obligations of the natural parents are transferred to

the adoptive parents. There are no age limits in respect of the child

to be adopted. An adoptive parent must at least be thirty-five and

there must be an age difference of at least eighteen years between the

child and the adoptive parent.

      Where a child has been adopted abroad by parents residing in the

Netherlands who wish to have the foreign adoption and the ensuing legal

effects formally and fully recognised in the Netherlands, the adoptive

parents may seek recognition of the foreign adoption by a Dutch judge.

In such proceedings, the Dutch judge will apply the conditions for

adoption under Dutch law although the judge may take the nationality

of all parties involved including the links between the parties and the

legal system of their country of origin into account. If no such

recognition is sought it is nevertheless possible that certain legal

effects are recognised without any judicial intervention in the

Netherlands depending on the particular circumstances of each case.

      In an unpublished judgment of 8 April 1987 of the Regional Court

of Utrecht, submitted by the applicant, it was held that, pursuant to

unwritten rules of Dutch international private law, an adoption

judgment pronounced by a Turkish court in respect of a minor Turkish

national has the same legal consequences in the Netherlands legal order

as it has in the Turkish legal order and that for the acceptance of

these consequences in the Netherlands no further decision is required.

The Regional Court added, however, that an exception to this rule is

made where the above legal effects are inconsistent with Dutch ordre

public. After an ex officio examination of whether there were facts and

circumstances which should lead to a finding that a recognition of the

Turkish adoption judgment at issue would be contrary to Dutch ordre

public and after having found that a further investigation was not

required, the Regional Court concluded that the Turkish adoption

judgment at issue was to be recognised.

      In order to meet the expenses for the care and education of

children younger than eighteen parents insured under the General Child

Care Benefits Act may be granted benefits under this Act. It is one of

the general social insurances (volksverzekeringen) in the Netherlands.

It is to be differentiated from the employment related social security

schemes (werknemersverzekeringen) in the Netherlands.

      The insured under this Act are in principle all persons younger

than 65 years of age who either reside in the Netherlands or who do not

reside in the Netherlands but are gainfully employed there and subject

to payment of Dutch income taxes. Entitlement to benefits under the Act

is not subject to the condition that the person concerned has

contributed to the scheme (see Eur. Court HR, Van Raalte v. the

Netherlands judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and

Decisions 1997-I, pp. 180-182. paras. 21-28).

      Article 7 para. 1 under a. and b. of the General Child Care

Benefits Act reads as follows:

(Translation)

      "Pursuant to the provisions of this Act the insured is entitled

      to children's allowance for his own children and stepchildren for

      whom he provides care and maintenance provided these children:

      -    are younger than sixteen years of age and belong to his

           household;

      -    are younger than sixteen years of age, not belonging to his

           household, and who are maintained to an important extent at

           his expense."

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

that she did not receive a fair hearing in the proceedings at issue in

that it was found that she had not filed her request for a formal

confirmation within a reasonable time whereas, due to the unclear

wording of the letter of 17 July 1991, it was unclear to her that this

period had already started to run.

2.    The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention that she did not receive a fair trial in that the Dutch

courts at issue incorrectly found that an adoption under Turkish law

cannot be equated to an adoption under Dutch law and, consequently,

concluded that Bahtiyar could not be considered as the applicant's own

child or foster child under the relevant provisions of the General

Child Care Benefits Act.

3.    The applicant also complains that the proceedings have exceeded

a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention

4.    The applicant complains that the refusal of the Dutch

administrative courts to accept her adoption of Bahtiyar and thus deny

the consequential legal effects under Dutch law is contrary to her

rights under Article 8 of the Convention.

5.    The applicant complains that the Dutch administrative courts'

refusal to acknowledge that she, her husband and Bahtiyar together form

a family is contrary to Article 12 of the Convention.

6.    The applicant complains that the Dutch administrative courts'

refusal to accept Bahtiyar as her own child deprives him of the

personal security and safety guaranteed to him by Article 5 of the

Convention.

7.    The applicant complains that the Dutch administrative courts'

refusal to accept her adoption of Bahtiyar under Turkish law

constitutes treatment which discriminates between children adopted

under Turkish law who have subsequently sought formal recognition of

this adoption from a Dutch judge and children adopted under Turkish law

who have not sought a subsequent recognition from a Dutch judge.

8.    The applicant finally complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

that, given the finding of the Central Appeals Tribunal that Bahtiyar

cannot be considered as the applicant's own child since he is still an

heir-at-law of his natural parents, he is unjustly deprived of his

inheritance, i.e. the future inheritance of his parents. The applicant

further submits that, according to the Netherlands authorities, one has

to choose between either seeking a recognition of a Turkish adoption

and consequently losing the right to inherit or waiving the right to

benefits under the General Child Care Benefits Act by not seeking a

recognition from a Dutch judge of an adoption under Turkish law.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention:

-     that she did not receive a fair hearing in the proceedings at

      issue in that it was found that she had not filed her request in

      time for a formal confirmation of the decision stated in letter

      of 17 July 1991;

-     that she did not receive a fair trial in that the Dutch courts

      at issue incorrectly found that an adoption under Turkish law

      cannot be equated to an adoption under Dutch law; and

-     that the proceedings have exceeded a reasonable time within the

      meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as

relevant, reads:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...

      everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable

      time by a ... tribunal ..."

a.    The Commission considers that the proceedings at issue can be

regarded as constituting a determination of the applicant's civil

rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention and thus fall within the scope of this

provision (cf. Eur. Court HR, Duclos v. France judgment of 17 December

1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, pp. 2179-2180, para.

53).

      As to the findings of the domestic courts in the applicant's

case, the Commission recalls that under the terms of Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention the Commission is not competent to examine

alleged errors of fact or law committed by national courts, except

where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (cf.

No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83, p. 77).

      The Commission notes that the applicant's case was determined

following adversarial proceedings before the Regional Court and,

subsequently, the Central Appeals Tribunal. It has not been submitted

nor has it appeared that the applicant was not or was insufficiently

enabled to state her case and to submit whatever she found relevant to

the outcome. In these circumstances, the Commission finds no indication

that the proceedings at issue fell short of the requirements of

Article 6 (Art. 6) as regards fairness of proceedings.

      As indicated above, the conclusions reached by the courts in the

applicant's case as regards the admissibility of the applicant's

request for formal confirmation of the decision stated in the letter

of 17 July 1991 or the legal effects of an adoption under Turkish law

for the purposes of obtaining an allowance under the Netherlands

General Child Care Benefits Act cannot, as such, be reviewed by the

Commission under the terms of Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b.    As to the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the length of the proceedings, the

Commission considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file,

determine the admissibility of this complaint at this stage and

considers that it is therefore necessary to give notice of this part

of the application to the respondent Government in accordance with Rule

48 para. 2(b) of its Rules of Procedures and to invite them to submit

their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of this

part of the application.

2.    The applicant further complains that the refusal of the Dutch

administrative courts to accept her adoption of Bahtiyar and thus deny

the consequential legal effects under Dutch law is contrary to her

rights under Articles 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:

      "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family

      life ..."

      The Commission recalls that the right to adopt is not, as such,

included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and

that there is no positive obligation for Contracting States under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention to grant to a person the status

of adoptive parent or adopted child (cf. No. 31924/96, Dec. 10.7.97,

D.R. 90, p. 134).

      However, a State cannot separate two persons united by an

adoption contract, or forbid them to meet, without engaging its

responsibility under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (cf. No.

6482/74, Dec. 10.7.75, D.R. 7, p. 75). However, the case-file does not

disclose that such a situation arises in the applicant's case.

      The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the facts of the

case do not disclose a violation of the applicant's rights under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected for being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant complains that the Dutch administrative courts'

refusal to acknowledge that she, her husband and Bahtiyar together form

a family is contrary to Article 12 (Art. 12) of the Convention.

      Article 12 (Art. 12) of the Convention provides:

      "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and

      to found a family, according to the national laws governing the

      exercise of this right."

      The Commission recalls that the adoption of a child by a couple

might, in certain circumstances, be said to constitute the foundation

of a family. However, Article 12 (Art. 12) of the Convention does not

guarantee a right to adopt or otherwise integrate into a family a child

which is not the natural child of the couple concerned (cf. No.

7229/75, Dec. 15.12.77, D.R. 12, p. 32).

      The Commission notes that the applicant and Bahtiyar both

permanently reside in the Netherlands, but that the applicant has not

sought to obtain a formal recognition under Dutch law of Bahtiyar's

adoption in Turkey. Moreover it appears that it was an explicit choice

of the applicant to adopt him under Turkish law rather than under Dutch

law given the differences in the legal effects of adoption under both

legal systems.

      In these circumstances, the Commission cannot find that the

decisions at issue were contrary to the applicant's rights under

Article 12 (Art. 12) of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected for being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the  Convention.

4.    The applicant complains that the Dutch administrative courts'

refusal to accept Bahtiyar as her own child deprives him of the

personal security and safety guaranteed to him by Article 5 (Art. 5)

of the Convention.

      Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention prohibits unlawful and

arbitrary deprivation of liberty and guarantees certain rights to

persons deprived of their liberty. The Commission finds no issue under

this provision in the present case.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.    The applicant complains that the Dutch administrative courts'

refusal to accept her adoption of Bahtiyar under Turkish law

constitutes treatment which discriminates between children adopted

under Turkish law who have subsequently sought formal recognition of

this adoption from a Dutch judge and children adopted under Turkish law

who have not sought a subsequent recognition from a Dutch judge.

      Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

      minority, property, birth or other status."

      The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the

Convention and its Protocols and that there can be no room for its

application unless the facts of the case fall within the scope of one

of more of such provisions. It safeguards individuals placed in

relevantly similar situations from discrimination. A difference in

treatment is contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) if is has no objective

and reasonable justification (cf. No. 20769/92, Dec. 29.6.94, D.R. 78,

p. 111; and No. 23419/94, Dec. 6.9.95, D.R. 82, p. 41).

      The Commission notes that the applicant seeks to compare the

situation of children adopted abroad in respect of whom recognition has

been sought from a Dutch judge and children adopted abroad in respect

of whom no such recognition has been sought.

      Even assuming that the matter raised by the applicant would fall

within the scope of the Convention, the Commission does not find that

these two categories of adopted children find themselves in a

relevantly similar situation which would enable a comparison to be made

for the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected for being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.    The applicant finally complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) that - given the finding of the Central Appeals Tribunal that

Bahtiyar cannot be considered as the applicant's own child since he is

still an heir-at-law of his natural parents - he is unjustly deprived

of his inheritance, i.e. the future inheritance of his parents. The

applicant further submits that, according to the Netherlands

authorities, one has to choose between either seeking recognition of

a Turkish adoption and consequently losing the right to inherit or

waiving the right to benefits under the General Child Care Benefits Act

by not seeking a recognition from a Dutch judge of an adoption under

Turkish law.

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) provides as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his

      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

      international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair

      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary

      to control the use of property in accordance with the general

      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions

      or penalties."

      The Commission understands the present complaint as consisting

of two elements; the first one concerning Bahtiyar's position as an

heir-at-law and the second one the applicant's entitlement to child

care benefits in respect of Bahtiyar.

      As regards the first element, the Commission observes in the

first place that no complaint has been lodged by or on behalf of

Bahtiyar with the Commission as regards the consequences of the

decision at issue in respect of his inheritance rights. Consequently,

under the terms of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, the

Commission cannot consider this aspect of the present complaint.

      The Commission further does not find it established that the

domestic courts' conclusion that Bahtiyar cannot be considered as the

applicant's adopted son for the purposes of the Act, as such, deprives

the applicant of the possibility to appoint him as her heir.

      As to the second element of the present complaint, the Commission

notes at the outset that it does not appear from the applicant's

submissions that she has relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1),

either in form or in substance, in the proceedings before the domestic

courts, which is one of the requirements for exhaustion of domestic

remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

(cf. No. 19601/92, Dec. 19.1.95, D.R. 80, p. 46).

      Even assuming that the applicant would have complied with this

requirement and even assuming that the benefits at issue can be

regarded as a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) (cf. Eur. Court HR, Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16

September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, pp. 1141-

1142, paras. 39-41), the Commission considers that neither this

provision nor any other provision of the Convention guarantees, as

such, a right that decisions by a foreign judicial authority obtain

immediate legal effect in a given domestic jurisdiction without any

form of judicial recognition in the latter legal order.

      Moreover, the Commission notes that a Dutch judicial recognition

of Bahtiyar's adoption by the applicant under Turkish law is not

necessarily a conditio sine qua non for the applicant obtaining child

care benefits in respect of Bahtiyar, since such benefits may also be

granted to a foster child provided it is established that the foster

parents have fully replaced the natural parents as regards the care and

education of the child concerned. Noting the particular circumstances

of the present case, the Commission cannot find the domestic courts'

conclusion as regards this point to be unreasonable or arbitrary.

      The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the decision

complained of cannot be regarded as contrary to the applicant's rights

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission,

      DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicant's

      complaint that the proceedings have exceeded a reasonable

      time; and

      unanimously,

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              J.-C. GEUS

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber