THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the Applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The Applicant, a German citizen, is at present detained in prison at

Bielefeld. From his lengthy statements and the numerous documents

submitted by him, the facts of his case appear as follows:

The Applicant was born in 1915 near Magdeburg and grew up in Germany

until his parents moved to Poland about 1930. Later he served both in

the Polish Army (1937 - 1939) and in the German Navy (1944 - 1945).

After the war the Applicant remained in Germany and, in 1962, he

married Y.

In 1964, the Applicant's wife instituted divorce proceedings and, on

.. April, a hearing of the parties took place before the Regional Court

(Landgericht) of Bielefeld. After the hearing the Applicant left the

Court together with his wife and, on the street, he hit her on the head

and she fell on the pavement. He then stabbed her with a paper knife

and wounded her with some 18 stabs in the head, neck, shoulder, breast,

arm, thigh and foot. By the intervention of other persons he was

prevented from doing further injury.

The Applicant was arrested on the same day and on .. April 1964, a

warrant for his arrest was issued in which it was stated that he was

suspected of attempted murder. In October 1965, the Applicant was

formally charged (angeklagt) with attempted murder and, on .. November

1965, he was sentenced by the Regional Court of Bielefeld to three

years' imprisonment for dangerous assault and battery. His appeal

(Revision) from this judgement was dismissed by the Federal Court

(Bundesgerichtshof) on .. April 1966.

The Applicant's complaints and the corresponding facts appear as

follows:

I. Length of detention pending trial and pending appeal

1. A warrant for the Applicant's arrest (Haftbefehl) was issued by the

District Court (Amtsgericht) of Bielefeld on .. April 1964. It was

stated that the Applicant was strongly suspected of attempted murder

and that there was a danger that he might escape unless remanded into

custody; reasons were given for these findings.

2. On .. 1965, the Applicant's lawyer, Rechtsanwalt Z. applied for the

cancellation of the detention order. He submitted that the Applicant

would probably not be convicted on a charge of attempted murder (Mord)

under Article 211 or attempted manslaughter (Totschlag) under Article

212 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). He further pointed out

that, under Article 223a of the Code the minimum sentence for dangerous

assault and battery was two months' imprisonment.

This application was refused by the Regional Court on .. 1965 and, on

appeal (Beschwerde) by the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) of Hamm

on .. 1965. The Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of the Regional

Court that the Applicant was strongly suspected of having attacked his

wife with an intention to kill her and stated with reference to Article

120 (new version) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Strafprozessordnung) that the length of the Applicant's detention

pending trial (at that time 13 months) was not out of proportion to the

sentence which he might receive if convicted on a charge of attempted

murder or manslaughter.

The Applicant then instructed his lawyer to lodge a further appeal

against the decision of the Court of Appeal. On .. 1965, Mr. Z replied

that no further appeal lay under Article 304, paragraph (4), of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, the Applicant addressed

several petitions to the Federal Court, which by letters of ... and ...

1965, informed him that it was not competent to deal with these

complaints.

3. In the meanwhile, the Applicant had, without success:

(a) brought criminal charges of "breach of trust in the exercise of his

duties" ("Untreue im Amt") against the investigating judge

(Untersuchungsrichter), Dr. A;

(b) challenged the judges of the Regional Court including the

investigating judge on the ground of partiality and requested the

transfer of his case to another court;

(c) brought criminal charges of defamation against the judges of the

Regional Court and the Court of Appeal.

4. On ... 1965, the investigating judge declared the preliminary

investigation (Voruntersuchung) closed. He stated that the

investigation had been particularly difficult and that it had been

delayed by several petitions of the Applicant which had necessitated

the transmission of the case-file to other authorities.

5. On ... 1965, the Court of Appeal made a new order for the continued

detention of the Applicant. This decision was taken under

Article 121 (new version) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which

states as follows:

"(1) As long as no sentence imposing imprisonment or some preventive

and rehabilitation measure involving a deprivation of liberty has been

passed, a period of remand in custody for the same offence may exceed

six months only in cases where the special difficulty or extent of the

investigations or some other important reason renders the passing of

judgement temporarily impossible and justifies such prolongation.

(2) In the cases mentioned in paragraph (1), the warrant of arrest

shall be withdrawn at the expiry of six months unless its execution is

suspended under Article 116 or the Court of Appeal orders the

continuance of the remand in custody.

..."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

("(1) Solange kein Urteil ergangen ist, das auf Freiheitsstrafe oder

eine freiheitsentziehende Massregel der Sicherung und Besserung

erkennt, darf der Vollzug der Untersuchungshaft wegen derselben Tat

über sechs Monate hinaus nur aufrechterhalten werden, wenn die

besondere Schwierigkeit oder der besondere Umfang der Ermittlungen oder

ein anderer wichtiger Grund das Urteil noch nicht zulassen und die

Fortdauer der Haft rechtfertigen.

(2) In den Fällen des Absatzes 1 ist der Haftbefehl nach Ablauf der

sechs Monate aufzuheben, wenn nicht der Vollzug des Haftbefehls nach

Paragraph 116 ausgesetzt wird oder das Oberlandesgericht die Fortdauer

der Untersuchungshaft anordnet.

...")

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

The Court of Appeal, considering the result of the preliminary

investigation and, in particular, the Applicant's own statements, found

that he was strongly suspected of attempted manslaughter. Having regard

to the sentence which he might receive and pointing out that he had no

fixed address and that his marriage was ruined, the Court further found

that there was a danger that he might escape unless remanded in

custody. With regard to the length of the Applicant's detention (at

that time 16 months), the Court held that it was not out of proportion

to the sentence which he might receive; in this connection, the Court

observed that the minimum sentence for attempted manslaughter was one

year and three months penal servitude, but that there was no reason to

assume that the alleged crime of the Applicant was a particularly light

case. Finally, the Court found that there were certain "important

reasons" within the meaning of the above Article 121, paragraph (1),

of the Code of Criminal Procedure which rendered the passing of

judgment temporarily impossible and justified the prolongation of the

Applicant's detention on remand. These reasons were: the delay caused

by the preparation of an expert opinion on the question of the

Applicant's criminal responsibility and, secondly, the introduction by

the Applicant of several unfounded petitions.

6. the indictment (Anklageschrift) was completed on ... 1965 and, on

... the Applicant was committed for trial.

7. The trial lasted from .. to .. November 1965.

8. In its judgement of .. November 1965, the Regional Court decided

that the period spent by the Applicant in detention pending trial

should be counted as part of his sentence.

9. New orders for the continued detention (pending appeal) of the

Applicant were made by the Regional Court on ... 1965, ... and ...

1966, and by the Court of Appeal on ... 1966.

10. The Federal Court decided on .. April 1966, in respect of the

period which the Applicant had spent in detention during his appeal

proceedings (.. November 1965, until .. April 1966) that the part of

this period which exceeded three months should be counted as part of

his sentence.

With regard to his detention pending trial and pending appeal, the

Applicant now alleges violations of Article 5, paragraph (4), and

Article 13 of the Convention.

II. Conviction and sentence

On .. November 1965, the Regional Court convicted the Applicant on a

charge of dangerous assault and battery. Taking into account his

previous convictions on similar charges, the Court sentenced him to

three years' imprisonment.

The Applicant introduced both an appeal (Revision) and a constitutional

appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) from this judgement. His appeal was

dismissed by the Federal Court on .. April 1966, and his constitutional

appeal was declared inadmissible by the Federal Constitutional Court

(Bundesverfassungsgericht) on ... 1966.

With regard to his conviction and sentence by the Regional Court, the

Applicant admits that he attacked and wounded his wife in the way

described above. He states, however, that he was provoked by her and

complains:

1. that the Regional Court failed to summons certain witnesses as to

the character and general behaviour of his wife;

2. that his sentence was excessive;

3. that the judgement is the result of a conspiracy against him which

was motivated by his Polish origin;  and

4. that Rechtsanwalt Z, who had been appointed by the Court to defend

him, failed in the exercise of his duties.

The Applicant alleges violations of Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (3),

sub-paragraph (d), and Articles 7 and 14 of the Convention.

III. Divorce proceedings

On ... 1965, the Applicant's wife was granted a divorce by the Regional

Court of Bielefeld. The Applicant's appeal (Berufung) from this

decision is pending before the Court of Appeal. His constitutional

appeal against the judgement of the Regional Court was declared

inadmissible by the Federal Constitutional Court on ... 1966.

The Applicant complains that the judges of the Regional Court refused

to summons certain witnesses on his behalf and that various lawyers who

represented him in the divorce proceedings, failed in the exercise of

their duties.

He alleges violations of Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (3),

sub-paragraph (d), and Article 8 of the Convention.

IV. Criminal charges brought by the Applicant

Various criminal charges were brought by the Applicant against:

1. the judges of the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal who were

concerned with the criminal proceedings against the Applicant (see

Parts I and II above);

2. the judges of the Regional Court in the divorce proceedings (see

Part III above);

3. a judge of the District Court (Amtsgericht) of Bielefeld (who had

refused the Applicant's petition that his wife should be put under

guardianship);

4. the Public Prosecutor who participated in the trial of the

Applicant;

5. another Public Prosecutor (who had refused to deal with a petition

of the Applicant on the ground that it had been drafted in improper

terms);

6. Mr. Z, the lawyer who defended the Applicant at his trial;

7. one of the lawyers who represented the Applicant in his divorce

case;

8. the Applicant's wife;

9. his stepson; and

10. several witnesses who had given evidence in the above proceedings

before the Regional Court.

In all these cases, the Public Prosecutor refused to institute

proceedings and the Applicant's appeals (Beschwerden) to the

Attorney-General (Generalstaatsanwalt) remained unsuccessful.

V. Correspondence (Article 8 of the Convention)

1. On ... 1965, the Regional Court, finding that the Applicant's

correspondence had become too voluminous, decided that he should only

be permitted to write one letter per week. This limitation did not

apply to his correspondence with his lawyer, the Office of the Public

Prosecutor and the Court.

With reference to its above decision, the Regional Court refused to

forward 31 letters of the Applicant which were consequently returned

to him. These letters were addressed to: an uncle of the Applicant in

Poland, the Federal Railways (Bundesbahn), Cardinal Jäger, the Jewish

Religious Community (Jüdische Kultusgemeinde), two lawyers in

Düsseldorf, Countess Rosen, Mr. Mikolajewski of Düsseldorf, and 22

witnesses whom the Applicant wished to call.

2. In respect of three letters written by the Applicant to his uncle

in Poland, the Court found that they contained offensive and defamatory

statements and decided that they should consequently not be forwarded

(decision of the investigating judge dated ... 1965, and decisions of

the Criminal Chamber dated ... 1965, and ... 1966).

3. Two letters which the Applicant addressed to witnesses, who had been

summonsed to give evidence at his trial, were stopped by the Regional

Court on the ground that they might influence these witnesses (decision

of --- 1965).

The Applicant alleges violations of Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the

Convention.

VI. Complaints concerning treatment in prison

1. A petition by the Applicant for his transfer to another remand

prison was refused by the Regional Court on --- 1965.

2. Several petitions by the Applicant, in which he objected to his

cell-mates and requested to be housed with other remand prisoners, were

granted by the prison administration. Two further applications of the

same kind were dismissed by the Regional Court on --- and --- 1965.

3. The Applicant's requests that arrangements should be made for his

son Peter (aged 3 years) to visit him in prison were refused by the

Regional Court on --- and --- and by the District Court on --- 1965.

4. On --- 1965 the Regional Court rejected as ill-founded the

Applicant's complaint that the competent Social Officer (Fürsorger) had

failed in the exercise of his duties.

5. The Applicant's objections against the prison physician and his

request to be treated by another doctor were dismissed by the Regional

Court on --- 1966.

With respect to the above decisions of the District Court and the

Regional Court, the Applicant alleges violations of Articles 3 and 8

of the Convention.

THE LAW

Whereas, with regard to the Applicant's complaints concerning the

length of his detention pending trial, Article 5, paragraph (3)

(Art. 5-3), of the Convention states that everyone arrested or detained

in accordance with paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (c) of that Article

(Art. 5-1-c) "shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or

to release pending trial"; and whereas the Applicant was arrested on

.. April 1964, and detained pending trial until .. November, 1965, that

is for a period of over one year and seven months; whereas, according

to the constant jurisprudence of the Commission, the question whether

a period of detention pending trial is "reasonable" or not cannot be

decided in abstracto but must be considered in the light of the

particular circumstances of each case (see Application No. 2077/63,

Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, Volume 7, pages

268, 276 and 278);

Whereas, in the present case, the Commission has taken into account

that the Applicant was arrested and detained on reasonable suspicion

of having committed a crime for which a heavy sentence might be

imposed; that a justifiable delay in the investigation against him was

caused by the preparation of an expert opinion on the question of his

criminal responsibility; and that the introduction by the Applicant of

several unfounded petitions, in particular his challenge of all judges

of the Regional Court including the investigating judge, resulted in

further delay; whereas, therefore, an examination of the case does not

reveal that the detention of the Applicant was unduly prolonged by the

authorities; whereas, consequently, it does not disclose any appearance

of a violation of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3), of the

Convention;

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, with regard to the Applicant's complaints concerning the

duration of the criminal proceedings against him, Article 6, paragraph

(1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention provides that, in the determination

of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a "hearing

within a reasonable time"; whereas the Commission has considered the

question whether the period referred to in Article 6, paragraph (1)

(Art. 6-1), should be calculated from the date of the Applicant's

arrest (.. April 1964) or only from the date on which he was formally

charged ( ... 1965), and, further, whether this period includes both

the Applicant's trial at first instance up to the Regional Court's

judgement of .. November 1965 and his appeal proceedings before the

Federal Court, which lasted until .. April 1966; whereas the Commission

does not consider it necessary to decide this question in the present

case; whereas it finds that, even if the period concerned was

calculated as running from .. April 1964, until .. April 1966, Article

6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), has not been violated in regard to the

time taken up by the criminal proceedings against the Applicant;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission has again taken into

consideration the grounds set out above in its finding regarding

Article 5, paragraph ( ) (Art. 5); whereas it follows that this part

of the Application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the Applicant also complains of his conviction and sentence and

of his divorce proceedings; whereas, in so far as these complaints are

directed against his lawyers, it results from Article 19 (Art. 19) of

the Convention that the sole task of the Commission is to ensure the

observance of the engagements undertaken in the Convention by the High

Contracting Parties, being those Members of the Council of Europe which

have signed the Convention and deposited their instruments of

ratification; whereas, moreover, it appears from Article 25, paragraph

(1) (Art. 25-1) of the Convention that the Commission can properly

admit an application from an individual only if that individual claims

to be the victim of a violation of his rights under the Convention by

one of the Parties which have accepted this competence of the

Commission; whereas it results clearly from these Articles that the

Commission has no competence ratione personae to admit applications

directed against private individuals;

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is incompatible

with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2) (see Application No. 1599/62, Yearbook of the European

Convention on Human Rights, Volume 6, pages 348, 356);

Whereas, in so far as the above complaints give rise to the question

whether the Regional Court failed to ensure that, in the criminal

proceedings against the Applicant, his defence was properly carried out

by his lawyer with the consequence that he was not given a fair hearing

within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, an

examination of the case as it has been submitted, including an

examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of this right; whereas it follows that, in this respect, the

Application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's further complaints concerning his

conviction and sentence and his divorce proceedings, an examination of

the case as it has been submitted, including an examination made ex

officio, does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights

and freedoms set forth in the Convention and especially in the Articles

invoked by the Applicant; whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions

complained of, the Commission has frequently stated that in accordance

with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure

observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the

Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent to deal with

an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed

by domestic courts, except where the Commission considers that such

errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights

and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this

respect, the Commission refers to its decisions No. 458/59 (X. v.

Belgium - Yearbook Volume 3, page 233) and 1140/61 (X. v. Austria -

Collection of Decisions of the Commission, Volume 8, page 57); and

whereas there is no appearance of a violation in the proceedings

complained of; whereas it follows that this part of the Application is

also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph

(2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaint that the numerous

criminal charges brought by him both against judges and public

prosecutors and against third persons were not proceeded with by the

Public Prosecutor, it is to be observed that the Convention, under the

terms of Article 1 (Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms

set forth in Section I of the Convention; and whereas, under Article

25, paragraph (1) (Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of

those rights and freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of

an application presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or

group of individuals; whereas otherwise its examination is outside the

competence of the Commission ratione materiae; whereas neither the

right to have criminal proceedings instituted against judges and public

prosecutors nor the right to have such proceedings brought against

third persons is as such included among the rights and freedoms

guaranteed by the Convention; whereas it follows that this part of the

Application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention;

Whereas, it results from part V of the statement of facts that the

Applicant also complains of certain court decisions concerning his

correspondence; whereas, in this respect, the Commission has had regard

to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which guarantees to everyone

the right to respect for his correspondence; whereas, however,

paragraph (2) of this provision (Art. 8-2) authorises interference by

a public authority with the exercise of this right where such

interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a

democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety

or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of

disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the

protection of the rights and freedoms of others; whereas the Commission

has examined the court decisions mentioned in Part V of the statement

of facts; and whereas it finds that these decisions, which interfered

with the Applicant's freedom of correspondence, were justified under

paragraph (2) of Article 8 (Art. 8-2);

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's further complaint that the

Regional Court refused his petition for transfer to another remand

prison, it is to be observed that the right claimed is not as such

included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention;

Whereas it follows that this complaint is incompatible with the

provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaints concerning the Prison

Doctor, the Social Officer and the cell-mates of the Applicant, en

examination of the case as it has been submitted, including an

examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and

in particular in Article 3 (Art. 3); whereas it follows that this part

of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, the Applicant also complains of several court

decisions refusing his request to arrange for his son Peter, aged 3

years, to visit him in prison; whereas, in this respect, the Commission

has had regard to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which guarantees

to everyone the right to respect for his family life; whereas, however,

paragraph (2) of this provision (Art. 8-2) authorises interference by

a public authority with the exercise of this right under certain

conditions; whereas, in particular, such interference is permitted

where it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society for the protection of health or morals; and whereas the

Commission has already held in a previous case that the term

"protection of health or morals" covers not only the protection of the

general health or morals of the community as a whole but also the

protection of the health or morals of individual members of the

community; that, further, the term "health or morals" includes the

psychological as well as physical well-being of individuals; and that,

consequently a court, when determining a parent's right of access to

his child, may properly take into account the need to keep the child

free from serious psychic disturbance (Application No. 911/60, Yearbook

Volume 4, pages 198, 216, 218; see also Application No. 1449/62,

Yearbook Volume 6, pages 262, 266); whereas the Commission finds that,

in the circumstances of the present case, the refusal of the German

courts to arrange for the Applicant's son to visit him in prison was

justified under paragraph (2) of Article 8 (Art. 8-2) by the need to

keep this child free from serious psychic disturbance; whereas it

follows that the remainder of the Application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application INADMISSIBLE.