THE FACTS

Whereas the facts as presented by the Applicants may be summarised as

follows:

The Applicants are Dutch citizens and were first represented before the

Commission by a certain Mr. X living at Gasselter Nyveen. After Mr. X's

death in August 1965, the Applicant A has acted before the Commission

on his own behalf and as representative of the other Applicants. The

Applicants are all children of Y and his wife, Z. Y owned one of the

biggest building-contracting companies in the north of the Netherlands.

When he died in 1940, the shares in the company were transferred partly

to his widow, Z, and partly to his children. The widow, however, also

retained a certain right in respect of the shares owned by the

children. It appears that Z is now also deceased.

1. Application No. 1904/63

The Act on Taxation of Increased Fortunes (Wet op de

vermogenaanwasbelasting) provided for a special war-profit tax to be

levied on such increases of fortunes as had arisen in the years 1940

- 1945. The Applicants state that in the determination of this tax, the

Tax Inspector was obliged, according to the relevant legislation, to

refer questions concerning the valuation of shares and bonds to a

special Valuation Commission (Schattingscommissie), if he did not agree

with the tax-payer on the value of such property.

The Applicants state that in the present case the Tax Inspector at

Harlingen estimated that, in 1940, the shares in the Company had only

been worth about 35,000 guilders;  in the opinion of the Applicants

this value was far too low. On the basis of this value it was

considered that a substantial war-profit had been made and a tax

amounting to about 175,000 guilders was imposed on Z.

The Applicants state that, at the beginning of the War, the shares had

already, for tax purposes, been valued at 350,000 guilders and a profit

tax of 151,000 guilders had then been levied;  the value which the Tax

Inspector attached to the shares could therefore not be correct. They

also point to a number of other facts in order to show that the value

of the shares had not increased between 1940 and 1945 and that no tax

should have been imposed.

The Applicants complain that, while the shares owned by Z were valued

by the Valuation Commission, the Tax Inspector refused to send the

shares owned by the children for a similar valuation, although, in

their opinion, he was legally obliged to do so;  they maintain that

these other shares had, in fact, a higher value which should have been

considered when deciding on the value of the company in 1940. It seems

that by letters of ... and ... 1958 the Tax Inspector ultimately

refused to send these shares for valuation. The Applicants then lodged

an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) at Leeuwarden which,

on ... 1959, decided that it was not competent to deal with an appeal

against such a decision. On ... 1961 the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad)

dismissed a further appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal.

The Applicants state that they were told by the President of the Court

of Appeal that they ought to complain to the Tax Inspector's superiors

in the Ministry of Finance. Such a complaint was lodged but, on ...

1963, the Minister of Finance refused to take any action. In referring

to the dismissal of their appeals, the Applicants complain that in

Dutch law no remedy exists in regard to the illegal decision of a Tax

Inspector, as complained of in this case.

They further state that they were responsible as "second degree

tax-payers" for the taxes imposed on their mother and they indicate

that they have actually paid 51,000 guilders of the taxes concerned.

They allege violations of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the

Convention and request compensation.

2. Application No. 2029/63

The Applicants state that Z's shares had first been valued by the State

Auditors (Rijksaccountantsdient) at Leeuwarden. This valuation was

allegedly not correct and, on ... 1958, the Supreme Court refused to

accept the estimates of the auditors and ordered a revaluation. It is

alleged, however, that on ... 1958 the Tax Inspector sent the incorrect

figures to the Valuation Commission without informing it of the

decisions of the Supreme Court. The Applicants further state that the

Valuation Commission, believing that the figures were correct,

confirmed the valuation of the auditors.

The Applicants maintain that appeals relating to the valuation have

been dismissed by the Court of Appeal on ... 1959 and by the Supreme

Court on ... 1963. On ... 1963, the Minister of Finance refused to take

any action.

The Applicants complain of the incorrect valuation of the auditors and

of the Tax Inspector's action in forwarding the figures without giving

adequate information about the Supreme Court's decision. They also

complain that no domestic remedy exists in this regard, although, in

fact, a decision of the Supreme Court has been disregarded.

They allege violations of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the

Convention and request compensation.

3. Application No. 2094/63

The Applicants maintain that they and their brother E deposited a total

amount of 51,000 guilders as security for certain taxes for which they

themselves were liable but that the Tax Collector at Bolsward used this

amount in order to pay their mother's taxes.

They allege that, when doing this, the Tax Collector acted contrary to

law since, according to the relevant legal provisions, property cannot

be seized in payment of taxes unless the Tax Collector presents an

order issued "in the name of the Queen";  the tax-payer will then have

the possibility of raising objections against this order and of having

such objections tried by a Court. The Applicants now complain that by

the Tax Collector's unofficial action they were not only illegally

deprived of their money but also of any remedy before a Court. They

indicate that the Courts have dismissed their appeals and refer to

decisions of the Supreme Court dated ... 1961 and ... 1963. On ... 1963

the Minister of Finance refused to take any action.

The Applicants add that the Tax Collector had at his disposal assets,

deposited or seized, belonging to Z and that these assets should first

have been used in payment of her taxes. They maintain, however, that

although in Dutch law taxes take precedence over other debts, some of

these assets were used by the Tax Collector for other payments. They

allege violations of Article 6 and 13 and request compensation.

4. Application No. 2217/64

As mentioned above, Z inherited a part of the shares in the company and

retained, furthermore, an interest in the shares of her children. She

subsequently transferred to her children her remaining right to their

shares. The Applicants state that the right so transferred was first

considered as a usufruct and its value was estimated at 137,000

guilders. When calculating the war-profit, the Tax Inspector took this

value into account, and the tax was thereby increased.

The Applicants state, however, that on ... 1962 the Court of Appeal at

Leeuwarden reconsidered the nature of the gift and concluded that it

did not concern a usufruct but a "personal right", and this decision

was upheld on ... 1963 by the Supreme Court.

The Applicants consider that, as a consequence of the decision of the

Courts, the gift would have to be revalued, since the previous

valuation was based on the assumption that the right transferred was

a usufruct. Accordingly, they submitted a request for revaluation to

the Tax Inspector at Harlingen, but on ... 1964 this request was

rejected, and subsequently the Minister of Finance refused to

intervene. The Applicants complain that the decisions of the Courts

have not been taken into account when determining the tax and that no

domestic remedy exists.

They allege violations of Articles 6 and 13.

Proceedings before the Commission

Whereas the proceedings before the Commission may be summarised as

follows:

On 11th February 1965, a group of three members of the Commission made

a preliminary examination as to the admissibility of the four

Applications, in accordance with Rule 45, paragraph 1, of the

Commission's Rules of Procedure and the group reported unanimously that

the Applications appeared to be admissible. Consequently, the President

of the Commission, acting in accordance with Rule 45, paragraph 2, of

the Rules of Procedure, gave notice of the Applications to the

Netherlands Government and invited it to submit to the Commission its

observations in writing on the admissibility.

On 16th June 1965, the Netherlands Permanent Representative at the

Council of Europe submitted the Government's written observations.

Subsequently, X submitted a number of pleadings in reply to the

Government's observations.

On 24th September 1965, the Commission examined the four Applications.

The Commission considered that certain passages in X's pleadings

contained insulting and provocative expressions and decided to indicate

to him that, unless he was willing to withdraw or amend these parts of

his submissions, the Commission would consider whether or not it should

declare the Applications inadmissible as being an abuse of the right

of petition within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2), of the

Convention.

On 3rd January 1966, A informed the Commission that X had died in

August 1965. He also asked the Commission to discontinue the

proceedings in regard to the Applications since he could not afford to

engage another person to represent him and the other Applicants.

On 7th January 1966, the Secretary to the Commission replied that it

would be for the Commission to consider what action to take in regard

to the intended withdrawal and that, in the meanwhile, the Applicants

should indicate their position as to the insulting and provocative

expressions used by X.

On 20th January 1966, A informed the Commission that the Applicants

were prepared to withdraw the expressions concerned.

On 26th January 1966, the Secretary stated, in a letter to A, that he

had noted that the only reason given for the proposed withdrawal was

lack of financial means to instruct a lawyer and he pointed out that

the Commission had the power, subject to certain conditions, to grant

legal aid.

On 3rd February 1966, A stated that he no longer wished to withdraw the

four Applications; he considered, however, that he could not ask for

legal aid.

By letters of 8th February, 15th March and 19th April 1966, the

Secretary asked A to indicate whether he was prepared to rely on the

submissions made by X (excluding the insulting and provocative

expressions already withdrawn) or whether he had any further comments

to make.

On 25th April 1966, A informed the Commission that he relied on X's

submissions.

Submissions of the Parties

Whereas the further submissions of the Parties may be summarised as

follows:

1. Application No. 1904/63

The Government stated that under Dutch law the Tax Inspector had no

obligation to ask for a valuation by the Valuation Commission unless

he intended to impose a tax on a certain person on the value of the

shares concerned. However, the Tax Inspector did not, and does not,

intend to impose a war-profit tax on the Applicants and, consequently,

he was not obliged to proceed to a valuation of their shares. An appeal

would only be available in regard to the taxation itself and no tax has

been imposed on the Applicants. They have merely been held responsible

for Z's tax by reason of a gift received from her. The representative

of the Applicants replied that their shares ought to have been valued

since their value was important for the calculation of the tax to be

imposed.

2. Application No. 2029/63

The Government stated that the Supreme Court had not, in its decision

of ... 1958, indicated any opinion as to whether the valuation by the

State Auditors (Rijksaccountantsdienst) was correct but had merely

stated that, contrary to the law, the Valuation Commission had not been

asked to value Z's shares. It is irrelevant whether the Tax Inspector,

when subsequently asking for such a valuation, informed the Valuation

Commission of the contents of the decision of the Supreme Court.

The representative of the Applicants again stated, in reply, that the

incorrect valuation of the Valuation Commission was a result of the Tax

Inspector's failure to inform the Valuation Commission of the Supreme

Court's decision.

3. Application No. 2094/63

The Government stated that the Tax Inspector had fixed, on ... 1949,

the amount for which each Applicant was responsible in respect of the

war-profit tax imposed upon Z. The remedies available in regard to this

decision were exhausted and the final decisions were given by the

Supreme Court on ... 1963. Consequently, the Tax Collector was entitled

to use such assets of the Applicants as were at his disposal as payment

of these amounts. It was not necessary to issue a summons against the

Applicants as he could use the Applicants' claims against the

authorities to balance their debts in respect of the war-profit tax

concerned. This could be done in accordance with Articles 1461 et seq.

of the Civil Code and the Applicants could have instituted civil

proceedings if they did not agree, but they failed to do this. It is

not true that under Dutch law the Tax Collector had first to seize

certain other assets, since, according to Articles 437 and 598 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, it is for the creditor to choose the assets

which he wishes to use in payment of the debt.

The representative of the Applicants contested the Government's

statement that a remedy existed before the civil courts and referred

to a statement by the Minister of Finance. He maintained that the

procedure followed in the present case had been contrary to Dutch law

and repeated that certain property seized from Z or deposited by her

ought to have been used for the payment of the war-profit tax and not

of other debts. 4. Application No. 2217/64

The Government stated that the Tax Inspector, when calculating the

war-profit tax, had rightly taken into account the gifts to the

Applicants, and the Government referred to decisions of the Appeals

Board for Direct Taxes (Raad van Beroep voor de directe belastingen)

of Leeuwarden dated ... 1957, and of the Supreme Court dated ... 1958

and ... 1961. The Applicants' assertion that the Courts had found that

the gift concerned a "personal right" is not correct and the Government

referred in this respect to statements by the Supreme Court in its

decisions of ... 1963. The Tax Inspector was under no obligation to

proceed to a revaluation of the gifts.

The Representative of the Applicants maintained that the courts had

finally decided that the gift concerned a personal right and they

stated that for this reason a revaluation ought to have taken place.

5. Conclusion

The Government stated that the Applicants' complaints were manifestly

ill-founded and added

(a) in regard to the alleged violations of Articles, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of

the Convention, that "the Applicants do not complain of torture or of

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor of slavery or of

compulsory labour, nor of deprivation of liberty or of security, nor

of interference with the right to private life or to correspondence:

apparently these Articles have been enumerated in order to make a weak

contention more impressive";

(b) in regard to the alleged violations of Article 6 of the Convention,

that "there has been no infringement of Article 6, of which notably

paragraph 1 deals with matters pertaining to the subject of these

claims, viz. the fair and public determination of civil rights and

obligations (in casu the extent of taxes to be levied), since it is

evident from the annexe mentioned above that the claimants, in so far

as they have followed the procedure known to Netherlands law, have

received a fair and public hearing of their case within a reasonable

time by an independent and impartial tribunal, whereas, in so far as

they do not make use of the existing procedures, they cannot blame the

Netherlands Government of an act contrary to the Convention";

(c) in regard to the alleged violations of Article 13 of the Convention

that "There has been no infringement of Article 13 since, as stated

under 2, no right whatever of the claimants has been violated and, even

if this had occurred or in so far as they thought this had occurred,

they have been free to use existing legal remedies and, in one

instance, use had been deliberately not made of an existing legal

remedy".

The Government further stated that the Applications might even be

considered as an abuse of the right of petition (Article 27, paragraph

(2), of the Convention) since they had been lodged "following upon many

contentions and complaints made in this cause by the same claimants and

subsequently found inaccurate by several Netherlands tribunals". The

representative of the Applicants replied that the Applicants had been

subjected to mental torture and to degrading and inhuman treatment,

since their money and their business had been confiscated and, as a

result, their mother had died from a heart disease and they had been

obliged to work for people who had previously been their employees. He

stated that there had not been any fair and public hearing since

taxation cases are never dealt with in public, not even by the courts.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the alleged violations of Article 3, 4, 5 and 8

(Art. 3, 4, 5, 8 ) of the Convention, an examination of the case as it

has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of

any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention; whereas it

follows that these parts of the Applications are manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the alleged violations of Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention, the Commission first observes that paragraphs (2) and

(3) of this Article (Art. 6-2, 6-3) are clearly not applicable to the

circumstances of the present case since these paragraphs only concern

persons "charged with a criminal offense"; whereas, however, Article

6, paragraph (1), (Art. 6-1) gives everyone certain procedural

guarantees "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations

or of any criminal charge against him";

Whereas, consequently, the question arises whether the proceedings in

the present case concerned the determination of the Applicants' civil

rights or obligations;

Whereas all the proceedings complained of concerned the impositionof

a tax or the execution of decisions by which a tax had been imposed;

Whereas, in a previous case (Application No. 2145/64 X against Belgium,

Collection of Decisions, Volume 18, page 1), the Commission has already

found that Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), was not applicable to

certain proceedings regarding taxation; whereas the Commission stated

in this previous decision that these proceedings concerned a matter

falling under public law and not under private law, although the fiscal

measure complained of had repercussions on the Applicant's property

rights;

Whereas, in reliance upon with this previous decision, the Commission

finds that the proceedings complained of in the present case fall

outside the competence of the Commission ratione materiae and that,

consequently, these parts of the Application are incompatible with the

provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention. Whereas, in regard to the

alleged violations of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, it is to

be observed that, according to this provision, an effective remedy

shall be given to "everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in

this Convention are violated"; whereas the Commission has held above

that none of the provisions of the Convention invoked by the Applicants

have been violated in the present case;

Whereas it follows that Article 13 (Art. 13) has not been violated and

that these partsof the Applications are manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention.

Now therefore the Commission declares these Applications INADMISSIBLE.