THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the Applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The Applicant is a British subject, born in 1909. He is presently

serving a total of seven years' imprisonment in Wormwood Scrubs Prison,

having been convicted on 13th December, 1963, at the Central Criminal

Court on eleven counts of fraud, forgery and perjury.

I. The Applicant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against his

conviction and sentence. He asked inter alia for a new trial on the

grounds of discovery of fresh evidence. The appeal, which came before

the Court of Criminal Appeal in July, 1964, appears to have been

unsuccessful, having been at least in part abandoned by the Applicant

with leave of the Court after the Court had refused to grant an

adjournment.

II. The Applicant then petitioned the Home Secretary, on 9th February,

1965, 27th July, 1965, 10th September, 1965, 14th October, 1965, 17th

October 1965, 20th December, 1965, 29th December, 1965 and 21st

January, 1966. He states that on 24th March, 1966, these petitions were

rejected in the following terms "... de Courcy has asked for his case

to be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal; for the grant of a free

pardon; for permission to institute a private prosecution for perjury

against D. [a witness for the prosecution] and for an extradition order

to be issued in respect of D. Could de Courcy please be informed that

the Secretary of State has carefully considered these petitions, but

can find no ground for taking action in regard to them."  The

Applicant's wife also petitioned the Home Secretary, without success,

on 29th December, 1965, 13th January, 1966 and 24th January, 1966.

III. The Applicant states that he was wrongly convicted and that he has

been deliberately prevented from establishing this fact. In particular

he states that a certain D., the main prosecution witness at his trial,

influenced by the prosecution, concealed the existence of 1,400

documents until after the Applicant's conviction. According to the

Applicant this witness has made eight signed statements admitting that

his evidence at the Applicant's trial was fabricated. The Applicant

states that other evidence has been discovered which proves him to be

innocent.

The Applicant states his case as follows in his letter of 9th April,

1966: "My allegations and complaints are essentially based on the fact

that since 13.1.66 a whole body of fundamental evidence has been

disclosed which wholly upsets not only the conviction but involves my

vital civil rights, now of active relevance to me and others."

IV. In particular, he complains that the Home Secretary has, since 13th

January, 1966, refused:

(a) to refer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal as was allegedly

the Applicant's constitutional right, and the Home Secretary's

constitutional duty;

(b) to grant a free pardon;

(c) to give permission to institute a private prosecution for perjury

against the principal witness for the prosecution.

(d) to institute extradition proceedings against that witness for the

same purpose;

(e) to give leave to the Applicant "to apply for a writ of habeas

corpus that I be produced before a Judge of the High Court of Justice

to apply for an injunction to restrain the Home Secretary from stopping

me from such proceedings in the UK Courts as are requisite to

demonstrate evidence of my wrongful conviction." (In his letter of 25th

May, 1966, the Applicant makes it clear that his intention was not to

apply for habeas corpus in respect of detention).

V. The Applicant further complains that he has been "shut out by the

Home Secretary from every Court in the United Kingdom" and that he has

been "wholly deprived of all access to any Courts whatsoever." He

states that there has been a decision or directive to this effect.

The Applicant makes the following allegations regarding this complaint.

(a) He has been refused permission to instruct solicitors and counsel;

his letter of 28th February, 1966, states that "all verbal and written

communications have been forbidden";

(b) On 15th February, 1966, the following letters were confiscated:

a letter dated 4th February 1966, in which the Applicant instructed a

solicitor to examine evidence with a view to prosecuting the main

prosecution witness at the Applicant's trial;

a letter dated 5th February 1966, in which the Applicant instructed a

firm of solicitors to issue a writ against the same witness;

a letter dated 7th February 1966, in which the Applicant instructed a

solicitor to make a civil claim against nine persons;

(c) On 1st February, 1966, a letter dated 24th January, 1966, from the

Applicant to the "Master of the High Court" in Rhodesia was

confiscated. This letter, and a previous letter of 21st January, 1966

(which was apparently received and acted on in Rhodesia) related to a

claim made by the Applicant against a company in liquidation in

Rhodesia, which claim had been expunged because no reply had been

received in Rhodesia to letters addressed to the Applicant and dated

20th August and 1st November, 1965;

(d) On 9th March, 1966, a personal application which the Applicant made

to the Master of the Crown Office (in London) was confiscated. This

application was similar to that referred to under IV (e) above, and was

made for the purpose of enabling the Applicant to establish

"documentary evidence of my wrongful conviction which evidence had

become available since the exhaustion of all legal processes open to

me in normal course following upon conviction";

(e) The Applicant states that in a civil action which was brought

against him during or before 1963, his solicitors were informed on 29th

October, 1965, that the hearing was fixed for 7th June, 1966. This

information reached him on 4th May, 1966, much too late for a defence.

It appears that this case has now been adjourned to January, 1967;

(f) The Applicant states that he has been prevented from defending a

civil action in the Supreme Court of the Bahamas. He has submitted

copies of communications between lawyers in the Bahamas and solicitors

in London, showing that judgment was entered against a company called

X. Co. Limited for £133,799, in default of defence;

In a letter dated 31st March, 1966, to the London solicitors, the

lawyers in the Bahamas disclaim responsibility for the judgment,

stating that the request made to these solicitors for instructions to

defend had not been answered;

(g) The Applicant states that the fact that he is not permitted to have

access to civil courts prevents him from taking action to deal with

harmful press publicity;

(h) The Applicant complained on 5th May, 1966, that he was forbidden

from writing "any letters of instruction to solicitors or to any other

party whether in connection with my application to the ... Commission

or ... any other matter, save 2 per day on 5 days a week". On 27th May,

1966, solicitors wrote to the Home Secretary on behalf of the Applicant

asking for the restriction to be removed.

VI. In relation to his imprisonment he states that for 10 months he was

kept in solitary confinement 20 hours out of 24. He states that the

light was kept burning in his cell 24 hours a day.

VII. The Applicant states that "all domestic remedies open to the

Applicant have since 13.1.66 been exhausted."  He also states that the

Home Secretary's decision of 24th March, 1966, "will dispose of any

possible question as to the date of the decisions of which complaint

is made."

VIII. Various approaches have been made in this case, on behalf of the

Applicant, to the Commission, including a request for information from

a Member of Parliament who has been considering the Applicant's case.

Complaints have been received from other persons and companies saying

that their rights depend on the Applicant's claims, and supporting his

application.

The Applicant has also informed the Commission that as he is "an Irish

National by right of birth [he has] felt it proper to bring the

allegations to the attention of the Government of the Republic of

Ireland", and has referred in this connection to Article 24 of the

Convention.

The Applicant reiterates the argument that there is an obvious design

in the proceedings to prevent him from getting justice. He points out

that his correspondence is examined and copied, and wishes to be

assured that there will be no "secret exchanges". He suggests that

propaganda is carried out against him and that the United Kingdom

authorities are "attempting to deter witnesses".

Further, he is anxious for the Commission to act quickly  He asks "for

his person to be produced in Strasbourg forthwith" so that he can

marshal the evidence to be produced to the Commission. He also asks to

be released on parole for the purpose of attending the Commission. The

request to release the Applicant on parole or to send him to Strasbourg

in custody was also made to the Home Secretary by lawyers acting on the

Applicant's instructions.

IX. In relation to his Application to the Commission, the Applicant at

one time complained that he had no access to documents which he

considered relevant as the lawyer who had represented the Applicant at

his trial refused to deliver them to him. It appears that these have

now been delivered to him. The Applicant appears to be considering an

action for negligence against this lawyer in respect of his conduct of

the Applicant's defence.

The Applicant stated in his Application of 21st February, 1966, that

he had been refused leave to make the Application to the Commission or

to instruct solicitors or counsel. On 25th February, 1966, he wrote

that he was now able to make his Application, and to instruct

solicitors and counsel.

The Applicant later complained that because of a decision of the Board

of Trade he was unable to obtain copies of certain accounts for the

purpose of forwarding them to the Commission. The Applicant states that

he has no doubt that this has been arranged between various Government

Departments in the general policy of the Crown to stifle the issues".

The Applicant has sent to the Commission several files of documents,

setting out in detail the evidence relating to his complaints in

particular concerning his conviction. He states, however, that this

does not exhaust the evidence which he wishes to submit. He wishes to

present his case before the Commission in person, under Article 36,

paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure "assisted by his legal

advisers". He asks for his case to be dealt with urgently by the

Commission, and states that the limitation period is running out in

respect of actions which he wishes to bring.

X. The Applicant invokes Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. He seeks

a new trial on the original criminal charges against him. He also

wishes to have the civil rights of himself and others determined in the

Courts.

THE LAW

Whereas in regard to the Applicant's complaints as a whole it is to be

observed that the Commission can only receive an application lodged by

an individual, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals

under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention if the State complained

against has ratified the Convention and has expressly declared that it

recognises the competence of the Commission to receive such

applications;

Whereas the United Kingdom has signed and ratified the Convention;

Whereas, however, by the terms of the declaration made on 14th January,

1966, by the United Kingdom under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention, the competence of the Commission recognised under that

Article extends only to applications whereby a person, non-governmental

organisation or group of individuals claims to be the victim of a

violation of the Convention in relation to any act or decision

occurring or facts or events arising subsequently to 13th January,

1966; whereas, therefore, the Applicant's complaints relating to acts

or decisions occurring or facts or events arising prior to 14th

January, 1966, and in particular the Applicant's complaints relating

to his trial and his appeal therefrom to the Court of Criminal Appeal

are excluded from the competence of the Commission to receive them and

must be rejected ratione temporis in this respect;

Whereas in regard to the Applicant's complaints that, subsequently to

13th January, 1966, he has not been granted a free pardon or a new

trial and that the Home Secretary has not exercised his discretionary

power to refer the Applicant's case to the Court of Criminal Appeal,

it is to be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article

1 (Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in

Section I of the Convention; and whereas, under Article 25, paragraph

(1) (Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of those rights and

freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an application

presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group of

individuals;

Whereas otherwise its examination is outside the competence of the

Commission ratione materiae; whereas the right to be accorded a pardon

is not as such included among the rights or freedoms guaranteed by the

Convention; whereas in this respect the Commission refers to its

constant jurisprudence (see for example Decision No. 2186/64 - L. v.

the Federal Republic of Germany); whereas further the right to obtain

a reopening of proceedings by a retrial or otherwise after the

determination of a criminal charge against him has become res judicata

is also not as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed

by the Convention; (see Decision No. 1237/61, T. v. Austria, Yearbook

V, page 91); whereas it follows that this part of the Application is

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2) of the Convention;

Whereas in regard to the Applicant's complaints that he has not been

enabled to institute a private prosecution for perjury against a

witness at his trial and that extradition proceedings were not taken

against this witness for this purpose, it is similarly to be observed

that these alleged rights are not as such included among the rights and

freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, and that therefore this part of

the Application is also incompatible with the provisions of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2),

of the Convention;

Whereas in regard to such of the Applicant's complaints as appear to

relate to the actions of lawyers who had represented him in civil or

criminal proceedings, it results from Article 19 (Art. 19) of the

Convention that the sole task of the Commission is to ensure the

observance of the engagements undertaken in the Convention by the High

Contracting Parties, being those Members of the Council of Europe which

have signed the Convention and deposited their instruments of

ratification;

Whereas, moreover, it appears from Article 25, paragraph (1)

(Art. 25-1), of the Convention that the Commission can properly admit

an application from an individual only if that individual claims to be

the victim of a violation of his rights under the Convention by one of

the Parties which have accepted this competence of the Commission;

whereas it results clearly from these Articles that the Commission has

no competence ratione personae to admit applications directed against

private individuals;

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is incompatible

with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2) (see Application No. 1599/62, Yearbook of the European

Convention on Human Rights, Volume 6, pages 348, 356);

Now therefore the Commission

1. Declares inadmissible the parts of the Application dealt with above;

2. Adjourns its examination of the remainder of the Application.