THE FACTS

Whereas the facts of the case as presented by the Applicant may be

summarised as follows:

The Applicant is a Netherlands citizen, born in 1910.

Although residing at Eindhoven (Netherlands), he has worked since 1952

in Belgium.

His complaints may be summarised as follows:

1. Contributions to the Dutch social security system

While referring to a Treaty of 29th August, 1947, between Belgium and

the Netherlands and to a certain Ordinance of the European Economic

Community (EEC), the Applicant states that, as long as he is employed

in Belgium, he is insured exclusively under the Belgian social security

system and he receives children's allowances in Belgium. Consequently,

he is obliged to pay contributions under the social security scheme in

Belgium, but has no similar obligation in the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, during periods of unemployment, he receives unemployment

relief and children's allowances in the Netherlands and during such

periods he falls under the Dutch social security system in general.

In 1960, he was unemployed for 83 days and during that time he received

in the Netherlands unemployment relief and children's allowances. As,

during this period of unemployment, the Applicant still under the Dutch

social security system, he had to pay contributions according to the

Dutch Old Age Pensions Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet) and the Widows and

Orphans Act (Weduwen-en Wezenwet), and he now complains of the way

these contributions were calculated.

In this respect, he states that, instead of deciding the amount of such

contributions exclusively on the basis of his income in the Netherlands

during the period of unemployment, the Tax Inspector at Eindhoven took

into account his income during the whole year 1960. The result was that

he was in fact obliged to pay contributions in the Netherlands in

respect of a part of the salary and the children's allowances which he

had received in Belgium.

In the Applicant's opinion, this way of calculating these contributions

was contrary to the Treaty of 1947 and to a certain EEC Ordinance, as

in fact he had to pay contributions twice (in Belgium and in the

Netherlands) in respect of the same income.

As the Applicant found this unreasonable, he lodged an appeal with the

Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) at 's-Hertogenbosch. By decision of ...

1963, the Court rejected his appeal on the ground that his

contributions had been calculated according to the rules laid down in

an Order issued on 22nd December, 1959 by the Secretaries of State for

Social Affairs and Public Health and for Finances and that, moreover,

this way of calculating was not contrary to the Treaty and the

Ordinance referred to by the Applicant.

The Applicant lodged a further appeal (beroep in cassatie) which was

rejected on ... 1964 by the Judges' Chamber (Raadkamer) of the Supreme

Court (Hoge Raad).

The Applicant concludes that, as a result of the decisions taken by the

Netherlands courts, he has been obliged to pay contributions twice (in

Belgium and in the Netherlands) in respect of the same income; that

this implies an unjust "punishment" imposed on him for working outside

the Netherlands; that another unreasonable result is that the amount

of contributions which a person has to pay in the Netherlands is

increased according to the number of his children (the Applicant here

refers to the fact that the children's allowances received in Belgium

were included in the amount on the basis of which the Dutch authorities

calculated his contributions in the Netherlands); and that, in his

case, the result was particularly unreasonable, since a part of the

children's allowances which he had received in 1960 related to the year

1959 and should therefore, in no circumstances, have been included in

his income for 1960.

He alleges a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

2. Taxation in the Netherlands in respect of Belgian children's

allowances

In the Applicant's opinion, it follows from the Treaty of 1947 and the

EEC Ordinance concerned that as a Dutch citizen working in Belgium he

is entitled to the same treatment as a Belgian worker in respect of

social security benefits.

However, whereas the children's allowances received by a Belgian worker

are not subject at all to taxation, the Belgian children's allowances

which he receives are subject to taxation by the Netherlands

authorities.

Although he considers this practice incorrect, it does not appear that

he has lodged any appeal on this point. As regards his taxation for the

year 1960, he expressly states that he lodged no appeal, since he was

ill at the relevant time.

3. Proceedings before the Supreme Court

As stated above, the Judges' Chamber of the Supreme Court rejected, on

... 1964, the Applicant's appeal from the decision of the Court of

Appeal regarding his contributions to the Dutch social security

schemes.

The Applicant alleges that he did not receive a "fair hearing" before

the Supreme Court as he had not been invited to appear. There had been

no public hearing and judgment had not been pronounced publicly. He

also considers that, in view of the issues involved in the case, the

Supreme Court was obliged, according to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty,

to submit the case to the Court of Justice of the European Communities

before deciding on the Applicant's appeal. He alleges violations of

Article 6, paragraphs (1), (2), (3) (c), of the Convention.

THE LAW

Whereas the Applicant complains of the manner in which social security

contributions and taxes are calculated in the Netherlands and, in

particular, of the obligations which have been imposed upon him in this

regard by the Netherlands authorities;

Whereas, in respect of the social security contributions, he alleges

himself to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention which provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture

or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment";

Whereas the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article

3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in the present case;

Whereas the Applicant's complaint also gives rise to the question

whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of the Protocol (P1-1)

which in its first paragraph guarantees to everyone "the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions" and further provides that "no one shall

be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and

subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

principles of international law"; whereas the Commission has not

considered it necessary to examine the present complaint in relation

to the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1) since it is clear that the

second paragraph of that Article (Art. 1-2) expressly reserves the

right of a State "to enforce such laws as it deems necessary ... to

secure the payment of taxes or other contributions"; whereas, having

regard to this provision, it is also clear that Article 1 of the

Protocol (P1-1) has not been violated in the present case;

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the alleged violations of Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention, the Commission first observes that paragraphs (2) and

(3) of this Article (Art. 6-2, 6-3) are clearly not applicable to the

circumstances of the present case since these paragraphs only concern

persons "charged with a criminal offense";

Whereas, however, Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), gives everyone

certain procedural guarantees "in the determination of his civil rights

and obligations or of any criminal charge against him"; whereas,

consequently, the question arises whether the proceedings in the

present case concerned the determination of the Applicant's civil

rights or obligations;

Whereas the proceedings before the Supreme Court complained of by the

Applicant concerned the determination of his contributions to social

security schemes; whereas, in previous cases (Applications Nos.

2145/64, Collection of Decisions, Volume 18, page 1, and 1904/63,

2029/63, 2094/63 and 2217/64, Collection of Decisions, Volume 19, page

106), the Commission has already found that Article 6, paragraph (1)

(Art. 6-1) was not applicable to certain proceedings regarding

taxation;

Whereas the Commission stated in these previous decisions that the

proceedings complained of concerned a matter falling under public law

and not under private law, although the fiscal measures concerned might

have had repercussions on the property rights of the Applicant;

Whereas the same reasoning applies to the proceedings complained of in

the present case; whereas it follows that these proceedings did not

concern the determination of the Applicant's civil rights and

obligations within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1),

of the Convention and that the complaint as to these proceedings falls

outside the competence of the Commission ratione materiae;

Whereas, therefore, this part of the Application is incompatible with

the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application INADMISSIBLE.