THE FACTS

Whereas the facts as presented by the Applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The Applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1908, and living at

Älvdalen (Sweden).

1. He first wrote to the Commission in September, 1964, complaining

that, as a result of a decision taken by the authorities, the local

hospital at Älvdalen could no longer receive as many patients as

before, and that, in particular, women awaiting their confinement were

obliged to go to the hospital at Mora, which is situated at some

distance from Älvdalen. He considered that this was contrary to Article

3 of the Convention. He did not raise this allegation in the

Application form which he later submitted, or in any of his subsequent

pleadings, and it is possible, therefore, that he did not intend to

pursue this particular complaint.

2. The Applicant also complains of three decisions given on .. July,

1962, by the Ovansiljan District Court for Land Cases (Ovansiljans

domsagas ägodelningsrätt). He has submitted the text of two of these

decisions, but has failed to explain the contents of the third

decision. It seems that he appealed against the three decisions and

that - presumably after his appeal had been rejected by the Svea Court

of Appeal (hovrätt) - the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), on .. May,

1964, decided not to grant him leave to have his further appeal

examined by the Supreme Court.

As regards the two decisions submitted by the Applicant, the contents

may be summarised as follows:

(a) During certain proceedings regarding the partition of land which

had previously been the joint property of the inhabitants of the

village of Brunnsberg, a dispute arose as to whether a certain forest

area belonged to the inhabitants of this village or whether it was the

property of the Crown.

The Applicant and certain other persons maintained that the forest area

had been in the possession of the village community already in the 15th

century, and he referred to certain provisions in Swedish law,

according to which property to a piece of land may be founded on

"possession since time immemorial" (urminnes hävd), even if no legal

title regarding the acquisition of the land can be shown to exist.

On the other hand, the State maintained that the forest area belonged

to the Crown since this area was an integral part of a larger piece of

land in regard to which the Crown had been officially registered as

being the owner.

The dispute was referred to the District Court for Land Cases, which

heard the case on .. June, 1962. The Applicant and another person

appeared before the Court and asked for an adjournment of the hearing

until .. October, 1962, so as to give them an opportunity to instruct

a lawyer in the case. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court

that this request was rejected by the Court. Consequently, the

Applicant and his colleague pleaded in person before the Court, and

they also submitted a number of documents in support of their opinion

that the forest belonged to the village community. They also asked for

legal aid in the case. The representative of the State contested the

statements of the other party, and maintained that the land in dispute

belonged to the Crown.

The Court, by its judgment of .. July, 1962, ruled that the forest area

was the property of the Crown and at the same time rejected the request

for legal aid.

The Applicant alleges that, as a result of this judgment as upheld on

appeal, he and the other members of the village community had been

deprived of their property, and he has submitted substantial

documentation in order to show their right of property. He also adds

that the District Court had rejected their claims without giving them

a fair hearing; in this respect, he points out that an adjournment was

not granted by the Court, and that he was not given adequate

opportunity to present his case and to call evidence. A fair hearing

had also been refused by the Supreme Court which had not admitted his

appeal.

The Applicant invokes Articles 1, 2, 6, paragraphs (1), (3) (a), (b),

(c), (d), and (e), 13 and 14 of the Convention.

(b) While considering that they were the owners of certain land (a

special sort of meadows, called "myrslogar"), the Applicant and other

persons requested that the authorities should determine, by an official

act, the exact boundaries of their land. As the State contested that

the Applicant and the other persons concerned were owners, the dispute

regarding the ownership was referred to the District Court for Land

Cases.

In its judgment of .. July, 1962, the District Court stated that, in

regard to the right of property to some of the meadows concerned, the

Supreme Court had, already in 1944, made a final ruling and that,

therefore, the District Court could not re-examine the question of

ownership. As regards the remaining parts of the land in dispute, the

District Court arrived at the conclusion that the Crown was the owner.

By the same judgment, the District Court also rejected the request for

legal aid submitted by the Applicant and other persons. It seems that

the Applicant had also asked for an adjournment of the proceedings in

this case, but that his request had been rejected by the District

Court.

The Applicant maintains that the Supreme Court's decision of 1944 could

not be binding on him, since he had not been a party to the proceedings

in 1944. Consequently, the District Court ought not to have based its

judgment on this previous decision.

The Applicant also refers to a number of documents which, in his

opinion, support his assertion that he and the other persons concerned

are the real owners of the meadows. He also invokes certain decisions

given by the Supreme Court.

The Applicant apparently relies on the same provisions of the

Convention as mentioned above under (a).

3. The Applicant also complains of certain expropriation proceedings

and his complaint, in this respect, may be summarised as follows:

In regard to the expropriation of certain land for defence purposes,

the State instituted proceedings against the Community of Brunnsberg

as being the owner of the land. The case was dealt with by the

Ovansiljan Expropriation Court (Ovansiljans domsagas

expropriationsdomstol). In addition to the representatives of the Crown

and the Brunnsberg Village, the present Applicant also appeared before

the Court, claiming compensation for the expropriation of the ground

that he owned a share of the property concerned.

By judgment of .. December, 1965, the Expropriation Court agreed to the

proposed measure of expropriation and fixed the compensation to be paid

by the State. As regards the Applicant, however, the Court concluded

that it had in no way been shown that the expropriation concerned his

right and that, therefore, his claims and submissions could not be

examined by the Court.

There is no indication that the Application lodged an appeal from this

decision.

The Applicant alleges that the Court was not impartial, since one of

the lay judges (nämndemän) had a personal interest in the outcome of

the proceedings. In this respect, he submits that the lay judge

concerned owned land in the parish of Älvdalen and that the land-owners

in that parish held a joint interest in the property which was subject

to expropriation. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court that

he had raised this point before the Court but that the Court had found,

after deliberation, that there were no circumstances which could

prevent the judge concerned from participating in the case.

On this point, the Applicant invokes Articles, 6, paragraph (1), 13 and

14 of the Convention.

The Applicant has also submitted a number of documents intended to show

that he had a certain right in the expropriated land and that,

consequently, the Court ought to have decided on his claims in the

case.

It seems that he also objects to the measure of expropriation as such,

which he considers as a violation of the right of property.

THE LAW

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the hospital

facilities at Älvdalen (paragraph 1 of the statement of facts), it is

to be observed that, according to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention, the Commission may receive petitions from any person

"claiming to be the victim" of a violation of a right or freedom

guaranteed by the Convention;

Whereas, in the present case, the Applicant alleges that Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention is violated by reason of the inadequate

hospital facilities at Älvdalen; whereas, however, he does not claim

to be himself a victim of this violation of the Convention;

Whereas it follows that, in regard to this complaint, the conditions

under which the Commission may receive an application from an

individual are not satisfied; and whereas therefore this part of the

Application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof;

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains that he was refused legal

aid in the different proceedings before the District Court for Land

Cases (paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), the

Commission has had regard both to Article 6, paragraph (1)

(Art. 6-1),and to Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), of the

Convention;

Whereas, in respect of Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), it

is to be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1

(Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in Section

I of the Convention; and whereas under Article 25, paragraph (1)

(Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of those rights and

freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an Application

presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group of

individuals; whereas otherwise its examination is outside the

competence of the Commission ratione materiae;  whereas it is true

that, under Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c),of the

Convention, everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right,

subject to certain conditions, to be granted free legal assistance;

whereas, however, as the Commission has frequently stated, the right

to free legal aid in civil cases is not as such included among the

rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention; whereas it follows

that the Application in so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph

(3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), is incompatible with this provision of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2);

Whereas the Commission has also had regard to the general clause of

Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas it

results from this provision that, in the determination of his civil

rights, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing; and whereas an

examination of the case as it has been submitted does not show that the

refusal to grant the Applicant free legal aid constituted in any way

a violation of this right; whereas it follows that the Application, in

so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2),of the Convention;

Whereas the Applicant further complains of the fact that the

proceedings before the District Court were not adjourned and alleges

that in general he was not granted a fair hearing (paragraph 2 (a) and

(b) of the statement of facts); whereas he also complains that in one

case the District Court based itself on a previous court decision which

was not binding on him (paragraph 2 (b) of the statement of facts);

Whereas in these respects an examination of the case as it has been

submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights

and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Article

6 (Art. 6); whereas it follows that these parts of the Application are

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaints as to the conclusion

reached by the Courts regarding the ownership of certain land

(paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), an examination of

the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of

a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and

the Protocol;

Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, the

Commission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance of

the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention;  whereas,

in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where the Commission considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms

limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, the

Commission refers to its decisions Nos. 458/59 (X. v. Belgium -

Yearbook III, page 233) and 1140/61 (X v. Austria - Collection of

Decisions, Volume 8, page 57); and whereas there is no appearance of

a violation in the proceedings complained of; whereas it follows that

this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the decision of the

Expropriation Court and the proceedings before that Court (paragraph

3 of the statement of facts), it is to be observed that, under Article

26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with a

matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the

generally recognised rules of international law; whereas Swedish law

provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal (hovrätt) and for a

further appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) in respect of

the refusal of a lower court to let a third person participate in civil

proceedings (Chapter 49, sections 4 and 5, and Chapter 54, section 3,

of the Swedish Code of Procedure);  and whereas the Applicant

apparently failed to appeal from the Expropriation Court's decision of

.. December, 1965 which included the Court's refusal to recognise him

as party in the proceedings concerned; whereas, therefore, he has not

exhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law; whereas,

moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not

disclosethe existence of any special circumstances which might have

absolved the Applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of

international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his

disposal; whereas, therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of

domestic remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27, paragraph (3)

(Art. 26, 27-3),of the Convention has not been complied with by the

Applicant.

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.