THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1923 and at

present detained in Wormwood Scrubs prison, London.

1. In January 1967 the appointed liquidator of a company called Z Trust

brought a civil action against the applicant for payment of nearly

£420,000. The company was registered in Liechtenstein but had a place

of business in London.

By judgment of .. October, 1967, given by Master A at the High Court

of Justice, Queen's Bench Division the applicant was ordered to pay the

money claimed by the liquidator. It is stated in the judgment that the

order was made. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the

Judge in Chambers, but on .. April 1968, was refused leave to defend

the action pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and

was again ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum in question plus costs.

An appeal from this judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on

.. May, 1968 and the judgment confirmed. The applicant was heard in

person by the Court of Appeal. In its decision the Court of Appeal

states that the applicant had several times changed the grounds of his

defence. At first he had put the plaintiffs to proof, later he sought

to say that by an agreement the money which he had obtained was to be

treated as a loan and he would have 20 years in which to pay, then he

challenged the competence of the liquidator to bring the action. In

support of the latter argument he had stated that the plaintiffs were

not a company at all, that it had not existed in England and was not

a legal entity. The Court rejected this argument by saying that no

matter what the position of this company was in Liechtenstein, insofar

as the English side of the business was concerned the British

legislation enabled a liquidator to be appointed in England. The Court

of Appeal also refused the applicant's request for leave to appeal to

the House of Lords.

Nevertheless the applicant petitioned the House of Lords which rejected

his petition for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision

on .. June, 1968.

The applicant states that solely upon the above mentioned judgment

against him he was adjudicated bankrupt. He alleges that the plaintiffs

obtained the judgment by deliberately deceiving the Master, by

misrepresentation and concealment of the facts, and by calculated

perversion of the course of justice. He complains that he was not given

permission to defend the action of call any evidence although he had

denied the debt.

He alleges violation of Article 6, paragraph (1) of the Convention and

requests the Commission to set aside the judgment against him and to

direct the British Government that the action against him be

adjudicated again in a fair and open hearing.

2. On .. March, 1968, the applicant was convicted after a trial lasting

42 days by the Central Criminal Court, inter alia,

(1)  of having conspired with his co-accused, B, to cheat and defraud

such persons as had taken out insurance policies with the W Insurance

Company Limited by fraudently applying for their own benefit the

proceeds of premiums paid upon such policies;

(2)  of uttering certain forged valuable security with intent to

defraud knowing the same to be forged;

(3)  of, being Director, making a false entry in the balance sheet of

W.

The applicant was sentenced to a total of 8 years imprisonment. In

addition two considerable fines were imposed and a sentence of 12

months imprisonment in default of the payment of any fine.

The facts as they appear from the judgment of the Court of Appeal and

which are related to those of the above mentioned civil proceedings may

be summarised as follows:  The applicant had founded W in 1963. He

enlisted the co-accused, B, to help him run the company. Up to 1966 the

company had developed considerably and its premium income was running

at a rate of about £4,000,000 a year. Nevertheless in the same year it

was unable to pay claims made under the policies it had issued. It was

accordingly wound up on .. July, 1966.

The applicant and B had, in 1964, opened a bank account in the name of

the above mentioned Z Trust Company with a London bank. Into this

account W had paid over £400,000 out of the money received as premiums.

These sums were paid out to the applicant and B who used them for their

own purposes. According to the court the evidence showed clearly that

Z was a mere shadow with an impressive name which the applicant had

acquired for a few hundred pounds. The sums withdrawn by the applicant

and B from Z's account were loaned to them by Z, unsecured,

unreceipted, bearing interest at the rate of 3 per cent and not

repayable for 20 years. These business transactions led to the

financial disaster of W.

The applicant appealed against conviction and sentence, but his appeal

was rejected by the full Court of Appeal on .. July, 1968. In its

judgment the Court of Appeal, which, it appears, carefully examined the

affair, states that the trial judge "reviewed the evidence fully and

accurately and directed the jury upon the law correctly and lucidly".

The Court of Appeal held that the applicant's complaint that the jury

had been biased against him by a virulent press campaign, and by a

television interview which was conducted as a trial against him before

the criminal proceedings had commenced, did not justify quashing his

conviction. With regard to the press campaign, which was mounted in

July, 1966, the Court stated that the failure of W was a matter of

public concern and the free press had the right and the duty to comment

on such topics. The private individual is, according to the Court's

findings, adequately protected by the law of libel.

With regard to a television programme in which the applicant has been

interviewed in February, 1967, and questioned about his responsibility

for the failure of W although it was already obvious that he was about

to be arrested and tried on charges of gross fraud, the Court expressed

serious concern and stated that "trial by television" is not to be

tolerated in a civil society. It held, however, that the interview,

thought regrettable, also afforded no grounds for quashing the

applicant's conviction because he voluntarily went to the television

interview although he knew what he would be questioned about and

because the trial did not take place until eleven months after the

interview. The Court found that in the circumstances there was no real

risk that the jury was influenced by the pre-trial publicity.

The applicant's petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords was

rejected on .. December, 1968. The applicant was represented by

counsel.

The applicant has submitted various copies of newspaper clippings, and

excerpts from books called "... " and "..." in which he is

characterised as a dubious or fraudulent businessman. All these

publications had appeared before his trial. He has also submitted a

recording of his television interview of .. February, 1967 in which he

was severely attacked by the interviewer. The applicant has further

submitted copies of letters which were published in The Times on ..

July, 1968 and in which the writers condemned the "trial by

television". A New York University professor expressed his opinion in

one of these letters that the United States Supreme Court would have

reversed the applicant's conviction on the ground of the public

campaign before the trial.

The applicant states that he had asked the Lord Chancellor and the

Attorney-General to be tried by a court of judges but this request was

rejected.

He further states that he did not voluntarily give the television

interview as was assumed by the Court of Appeal but was blackmailed

into giving it. He alleges that he was given the alternative to appear

and to answer question or to be attacked in his absence in which case

the viewers would be informed that he had been given the opportunity

of answering questions but was not prepared to do so.

The applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial and that the

Court of Appeal wrongly upheld his conviction. He points out that most

of the evidence used against him consisted of company accounts, balance

sheets, etc., which the lay-jury could not understand. He concludes

that consequently the jury accepted the allegations of the prosecution

only because they were brainwashed by what they had read about him in

the newspapers and seen on television.

He alleges violation of Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (2), of the

Convention and requests the Commission to intervene and establish his

rights.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to civil proceedings instituted against the

applicant by the appointed liquidator of the Z Trust Company, an

examination of the case as it has been submitted, including an

examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and

in particular Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1); whereas it follows

that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains of the fact that the press had

given extensive coverage to his case and that he was publicly accused

in a television interview before his trial and whereas he alleges that

this publicity had a prejudicial effect in that it influenced the jury

against him; whereas in this regard he invokes Article 6, paragraphs

(1) and (2) (Art. 6-1, 6-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission notes that the full Court of Appeal extensively

examined the merits of the applicant's case and found that his

conviction was well founded;

Whereas the Court of Appeal sits and determines appeals without a jury;

whereas consequently any errors which were committed by the jury as a

result of bias caused by such previous publicity and which allegedly

affected the judgment of the trial court, would have been rectified by

the decision of the full Court of Appeal, dated .. July, 1968; whereas

in this respect the Court of Appeal had, in fact, special regard to the

applicant's complaint that there had been prejudicial publicity

concerning his case and found that there was no real risk that the jury

was influenced by the publicity"; whereas the Court of Appeal further

found that "the case for the Crown was so overwhelming that no jury

could conceivably have returned any different verdicts" against the

applicant;

Whereas the Commission, having examined the case as it was submitted

by the applicant, finds no reason itself to adopt an opinion other than

the expressed by the Court of Appeal; whereas accordingly the

Commission does not find any appearance of a violation of the rights

and freedoms set forth in the Convention and especially in the Article

invoked by the applicant; whereas it follows that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains generally of his conviction

and sentence, as pronounced by the Central Criminal Court on .. July,

1968 an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not

disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set

forth in the provisions of the Convention other than Article 6,

paragraph (1) and (2) (Art. 6-1, 6-2); whereas in respect of the

decisions complained of, it has to be recalled that in accordance with

Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, the Commission's only task is

to ensure observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in

the Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent to deal

with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been

committed by domestic courts, except where the Commission considers

that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the

rights and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in

this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions Nos. 458/59 (X v.

Belgium - Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X v. Austria -

Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57); and whereas there is no

appearance of a violation in the proceedings complained of; whereas it

follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE