THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1924 and resident in

Amsterdam. He is represented by Mr S, lawyer practising in Amsterdam

and acting under an undated power-of-attorney.

From statements and from documents submitted it appears on .. November

1966 that the applicant was adjudicated bankrupt by decision of the

Amsterdam District Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank). Subsequently he

was charged with two counts of having spent money to the detriment of

his creditors. Count II of the charge which is alone in issue in the

present case reads as follows:

On or about 17 and 18 November 1966, in any event, on or about 24 and

25 November 1966, in any case during or about the period from 16

November to 1 December 1966 in Amsterdam while having been declared by

the Second Chamber of the District Court in Amsterdam as being in a

state of bankruptcy, which state of bankruptcy had not been set aside

or otherwise terminated, in order fraudulently to frustrate the rights

of his creditors having paid on the occasion of the above bankruptcy

or at a time when he knew that bankruptcy could not be avoided to his

creditor A W Vredeveld and his creditor A M Van Buringen in settlement

and payment of his debts, an amount of 3000,- guilders and an amount

of 2500 guilders respectively, in any case sums of money, and having

thereby  granted preferences to these to these creditors". (emphasis

added). ("ob of omstreeks 17 et 18 november 1966, althans of omstreeks

24 en 25 november 1966, in ieder geval in of omstreeks de periode 16

november tot 1 december 1966 te Amsterdam, terwijl hij bij vonnis van

de Arrondissementsrechtbank te Amsterdam, Tweede Kamer van 15 november

1966 in staat von faillissement was verklaard, welke staat von

faillissement toen niet was opgeheven of op andere wijze was geeindigd,

ter bedriegelijke verkorting van de rechten zijner schuldeisers, ter

gelegenheid van genoemd faillissement of op een tijdstip, waarop hij

wist dat het faillissement niet kon worden voorkomen, aan zijn

schuldeissres A W Vredeveld en zijn schuldeiser A M Van Buringen, in

aflossing op of betaling van zijn schulden, respectievelijk een bedrag

van F. 3000,- en een bedrag van F. 2500,- in ieder geval geldsbedragen,

heeft betaald en aldus die schuldeiser(s) heeft bevoordeeld").

On April 1967 the matter came before the District Court in Amsterdam

which acquitted him of the first count but convicted him of the above

charge. The application was sentenced to four months' imprisonment.

Both he and the Public Prosecutor's Office then lodged with the Court

of Appeal (Gerechtshof) in Amsterdam an appeal (Hoger Beroep) against

conviction and sentence and acquittal respectively. Apparently the

applicant alleged that he had not been informed in clear terms of the

charges preferred against him by the prosecution. In this respect he

referred to the passage in the indictment under II by which he was

charged with having paid moneys "on the occasion of the above

bankruptcy or at a time when he knew that bankruptcy could not be

avoided". He explained that it was not clear from the charge whether

the alleged offenses had been committed when bankruptcy proceedings had

already been opened or prior thereto at a time when he knew or should

have known that bankruptcy was unavoidable. He alleged, invoking inter

alia Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention, that both positions

required a different defence and that consequently he had not been

properly informed of the charges against him.

On .. February 1968 the Court of Appeal confirmed the lower court's

acquittal under count I and set aside the conviction and sentence under

count II. At the same time the Court itself convicted the applicant for

fraudulent bankruptcy (bedriegelijke bankbreuk) in accordance with the

charge preferred against him under count II and sentenced him to four

months' imprisonment. It held that it was clear from the said charge

in the indictment that it must be read as referring to acts committed

"on the occasion of the above bankruptcy, in any event at a time when

he knew that bankruptcy could not be avoided" ("ter gelegenheid van

genoemd faillissement, althans op een voorkomen"). The Court explained

that it was the clear intention to set up two alternative periods which

excluded one another, namely:  primarily during the bankruptcy

proceedings and secondarily during a period preceding the opening of

such proceedings. As to the alleged inconsistency with the requirement

of Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention, the Court of Appeal

held that this provision was not applicable in the present case. It

pointed out that the indictment indicated in clear terms the nature of

the charge that was preferred against the applicant by stating that,

while being in a state of bankruptcy, he had paid moneys to two

creditors "in order fraudulently to frustrate the rights of his

creditors on the occasion of the above bankruptcy" ("ter bedriegelijke

berkorting van de rechten zijner crediteuren ter gelegenheid van

genoemd faillissement").

The applicant then lodged with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) a further

appeal (Beroep in Cassatie) against his conviction and sentence. He

alleged again, inter alia, a violation of Articles 1 and 6 of the

Convention and, in particular that he had not been properly informed

of the charges against him. That Supreme Court rejected his appeal on

.. June 1968 holding that the Court of Appeal had been justified in

finding that the charge preferred against him.

The applicant now complains that he was wrongly convicted and sentenced

and that he had not been informed promptly, in a language which he

understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him. He explains that, on 17 November 1966 he had not been

aware of the decision opening bankruptcy proceedings against him which

had been taken from the text of the indictment that the offenses were

alleged to have been committed either during bankruptcy or prior

thereto was unavoidable. Both cases were different and required a

different line of defence. It could not have been expected that the

Court of Appeal would interpret the indictment to mean that the words

used constituted a primary and a secondary alternative.

He alleges violations of Articles 1, 6 and 13 of the Convention. He

also requests damages.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaints concerning his

conviction and sentence, an examination of the case as it has been

submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose

any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in

the Convention and especially in the Articles invoked by the applicant;

Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, the

Commission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance of

the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention; whereas,

in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where the Commission considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms

limitatively listed in the Convention;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions Nos.

458/59 (X. v. Belgium, Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X. v.

Austria - Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57);

and whereas there is no appearance of any such violation in the present

case; whereas it follows that this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains that Article 6, paragraph (1)

(Art. 6-1), of the Convention has been violated by reason of the court

proceedings concerned; whereas he alleges, in particular, that he had

not been informed in detail, and in a language which he understood, of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

Whereas the Commission had regard to Article 6, paragraph (3) (a)

(Art. 6-3-a), of the Convention, which guarantees to everyone charged

with a criminal offence "to be informed promptly, in a language which

he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him";

Whereas the Commission finds that the indictment in the present case

stated clearly what charge was preferred against the applicant and

indicated in clear terms the facts that have been considered by the

prosecuting authority as amounting to the offence of fraudulent

bankruptcy;

Whereas, consequently, an examination of the case as it has been

submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights

and freedoms set forth in the Convention and, in particular, in Article

6 (Art. 6); whereas it follows that this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the remainder of the applicant's complaints, the

Commission equally finds that an examination of the case as it has been

submitted, including an examination made ex officio, fails to disclose

any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in

the Convention and in particular in Articles 1 and 13 (Art. 1, 13);

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE