THE FACTS

Whereas the facts apparently not in dispute between the Parties may be

summarised as follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1927 and

resident in London.

The applicant owns three houses in the London Borough of B. In June

1961, the Borough Council - then Q Borough Council - gave instructions

that a survey should be carried out in an area which was the area where

the applicant's houses are situated. This survey was carried out by two

Public Health Inspectors between July 1961 and October 1963. The result

of that inspection was that the Chief Public Health Inspector made a

report to the Council. In November 1963 the Council adopted a

recommendation of its Public Health Committee that the offices of the

Council be authorised to commence preparing a representation to the

Minister of Housing for slum clearance of that area under the Housing

Act 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 1957 Act).

On .. January 1964, the Chief Public Health Inspector to the Q Borough

Council represented to the Public Health Committee of that Council that

a number of properties in A, including the applicant's houses, were

unfit for human habitation and that the most satisfactory method of

dealing with the conditions in that area was the demolition of all the

buildings.

The Council's committee considered this report and recommended that the

Council should pass resolutions declaring that they were satisfied that

the dwelling houses in 16 clearance areas referred to, all of which are

within the Compulsory Purchase Order area, are unfit for human

habitation, and that the most satisfactory method of dealing with the

conditions in the area was to demolish all the buildings. The Council

adopted this report on .. February,19664 and resolved to purchase the

properties under Section 43, paragraph (1) of the 1957 Act.

On .. August, 1964, the Council, acting under Section 43 (3) of the

1957 Act, made the A Redevelopment (Extended Area) Compulsory Purchase

Order No. 1 1964, which covered 22 1/2 acres with approximately 450

houses involved of which 266 were declared unfit for human habitation.

The Order was deposited for inspection by interested parties on and

after .. September, 1964, and the required statutory notices were

served on owners, lessees and occupiers. The Order was submitted to the

Minister on .. October,1964. The applicant's properties were included

in the schedule to the Order as houses unfit for human habitation.

On .. September, 1964, an objection to the Compulsory Purchase Order

was made by the applicant. The grounds for objection were stated to be

that the houses were not unfit and should not be compulsorily acquired

in any event. The applicant also claimed a "well maintained" payment

if, by some chance, the circumstances gave rise to compulsory purchase.

On .. June,1965, the Town Clerk of B was informed by the Minister (the

area of the Borough of Q having, by that time, become part of the area

of the London Borough of B) that a public local enquiry would be held

at 10.30 a.m. on .. November,1965 at the Town Hall, W, and a formal

notice for publication was sent to him on .. September, 1965.

The notices served on the applicant under paragraph 3 (4) of the Third

Schedule to the 1957 Act stated as principal grounds for unfitness in

respect of all the applicant's houses deficiencies in repair,

stability, freedom from damp, drainage and sanitary conveniences, and

facilities for the storage of food.

On .. October, 1965, the applicant wrote to the Ministry asking for the

inquiry to be adjourned and the venue changed. On .. October, 1965, the

applicant, as Chairman of the A Property Owners and Residents

Association (which Association had become formed two weeks previously),

together with many other members of the Association, went to the

Ministry of Housing and Local Government to complain that the

Association had not had enough time to collect the views of their

members and prepare a collective case by .. November, 1965;  and that

people affected by the Order did not realise its implications. The

Association also wished the venue of the inquiry to be changed from W

to A.

On .. October, 1965, the Association were informed that the inquiry

would be opened, as arranged, on .. November, 1965, but that it would

be held at A instead of at W.

At the opening of the inquiry the applicant stated that he had served

a writ on the Council claiming that the declaration of the clearance

area was null and void, and submitted that the inquiry was therefore

also unlawful. The inspector appointed by the Minister to conduct the

inquiry announced that this and other objections to the formalities

would be reported to the Minister, but he did not consider there to be

sufficient reason for adjourning the inquiry or altering the procedure.

The applicant, at the inquiry, called five witnesses;  three tenants,

a builder an decorator and surveyor and valuer. He argued that the

classification of the houses as "fit" and "unfit" was misleading; that

the tree houses should not be so classified or included in  a clearance

area;  that if it were decided that the properties were unfit, payment

of good maintenance grants should be made;  that the Council's

statement of case had not been properly served on objectors; and that

he had insufficient time to prepare his case. He further alleged that

the issue had been prejudiced by previous discussions between the

Council and the Ministry. He complained also about the size of the

order and the procedure of the inquiry was also questioned.

The inspector made an inspection of the relevant properties and his

report noted that the three properties with which this application is

concerned had been built ninety to one hundred years earlier. The

report confirmed the "unfit" classification as regards two of the

applicant's houses on the grounds given by the Council, and also that

they did not qualify for "well maintained" payments. With regard to the

third, the inspector found that the house had few serious defects and

was not unfit. However, he considered that the acquisition by the

Council of this was reasonably necessary for the purpose of securing

a cleared area of convenient shape and dimensions or for the

satisfactory development or use of the cleared area.

The Minister's decision on the issues raised was given in a letter

issued on .. December, 1966. No. ... P Road was reclassified as "added

land", which meant that compensation for that property would be at full

market value. Subject to that modification, all three properties were

included in the Compulsory Purchase Order as confirmed by the Minister.

The applicant brought a motion in the Queen's Bench Division of the

High Court of Justice to quash the Compulsory Purchase Order.

The grounds of this motion were set out as follows:

"Neither the Council nor its officers either on its behalf or in

pursuance of their statutory duty in that behalf at any time considered

whether any method of dealing with the conditions alleged to exist in

the relevant area other than the demolition of all the buildings in

that area would be the most satisfactory method of dealing with the

alleged conditions but acted throughout in pursuance of a preconceived

design to acquire the dwelling houses in the said area and in

particular those the property of the applicant's compulsorily on a

basis of site value only as houses included in a clearance area as

houses unfit for human habitation.

Neither the Council nor its Officer on whose report it acted were ever

satisfied in a bona fide manner or at all that the most satisfactory

method of dealing with the conditions in an area declared to be a

clearance area was the demolition of all the buildings therein.

After the properties in the area had been classified by the Council as

"unfit", the Minister met the representatives of the Council for

discussions concerning the Compulsory Purchase Order.

Before the inquiry was held by the Minister, the Minister authorised

by letter a programme of building which included part of the building

works included in the Council scheme for the redevelopment of the area

covered by the Compulsory Purchase Order.

The procedure at the inquiry held by the Minister did not provide

sufficient opportunity for applicants and objectors generally to have

reasonable knowledge of the case the Council had prepared against them.

The inquiry was held in conditions which placed objectors at an

overwhelming disadvantage, covering as it did the compulsory purchase

of over four hundred houses in a multiplicity of ownerships.

The Minister, through his inspector appointed to hold the inquiry,

indicated that the object of the inquiry was to ascertain whether the

properties were unfit or not, whether they were to qualify for "well

maintained" payments, whether the Council could discharge its statutory

rehousing obligations and whether the Council could carry out its

proposals if the Order were confirmed.

The Minister through his inspector indicated that he did not want time

spent on evidence concerning the condition of the properties as he

would be inspecting these himself, and that no representations would

be heard after the inquiry had been closed. The inspector did invite

representations during inspection.

The inspector did not inspect the properties, which formed the basis

of his findings concerning fitness or unfitness, in a manner which

could by any reasonable standard be found acceptable.

The inspector did not report to the Minister on the hardships and

injustice involved of which he was informed many times during the

inquiry.

The Minister did not take into consideration the many applications for

Certificates of Fitness sewed pursuant to Section 69 of the Housing Act

1957.In the premises the applicants were substantially prejudiced in their

interests in property owned by them and rights which might otherwise

have been exercisable by them in respect thereof."

The High Court, however, dismissed on .. October, 1967 the motion by

Order dated .. November, 1967. In the grounds of the decision the court

held that under paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule to the Housing Act

1957 its powers on the applicant's motion were limited to a finding

only as to whether or not the Compulsory Purchase Order concerned was

within the powers of the Act or any requirements of this Act had not

been complied with. Subject to these two grounds, the Order could not

be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever, either before or

after the Order has been confirmed. Consequently it was beyond the

powers of the court to consider whether the inspectors or the Minister

of Housing had been wrong on questions of fact or opinion falling

within their powers. In particular, it was not possible for the Court

to consider the question as to whether individual properties had been

wrongly classified as being unfit for human habitation and should

therefore not have been demolished.

As regards the applicant's separate allegations the Court held that the

Council had, in fact, adequately considered the matters referred to in

the applicant's motion and that it had not acted in pursuance of a

preconceived design. Furthermore, the Minister of Housing had not acted

in a manner which was incompatible with his obligation to perform

quasi-judicial functions. Referring to the applicant's allegations

concerning the inquiry the judge pointed out that he could only

interfere on this ground if the defects in the way this inquiry was

conducted were so fundamental that there was really nothing that could

fairly be called an inquiry at all. As the Council had complied with

their statutory obligations and the usual procedure, the failure to

produce several documents and plans before the inquiry did not make the

inquiry defective to such an extent. The inquiry was not held contrary

to the principles of natural justice and consequently the applicant's

allegations were to be rejected.

The Court furthermore held that it was beyond its powers to consider

the hardships resulting from the rules that only site vile would be

paid as compensation for houses which are unfit for human habitation.

It pointed out that this was a matter of the policy of Parliament and

that it was not competent to mitigate its consequences.

The applicant did not lodge an appeal with the Court of Appeal. He

complains that any further remedy would have been ineffective, the

Court having no power to act where the correct procedure had been

followed;  if procedures were duly observed it could furthermore not

be said that the authorities acted contrary to natural justice.

The applicant alleges violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of

Article 1 of the First Protocol.

As to the violation of Article 6 of the Convention he points out as

follows:

The procedures of the Council of B were carried out in a grossly unfair

manner. The decision was based on a report from the Public Health

Inspector but the buildings were classified without inspection. The

result was that many houses were classified unfit that were not unfit.

Moreover, no opportunity was given by the Council for owners to be

heard before houses were classified or before the Clearance Order was

made.

He complains also that the Council of the London Borough of B, in

determining this matter, had not acted impartially nor was the Council

an impartial tribunal.

As far as the Minister's procedure was concerned the applicant states

that the Minister's decision was takin in an unfair and partial manner.

The unfairness began, as the applicant alleges, with the Minister's

approval of the B Building Scheme in authorising a programme of

building which included part of the clearance area. This authorization

was given after the objections to the Compulsory Purchase Order had

been sent to the Minister. The inquiry held by the Minister, in

particular, contradicted the principles of natural justice and was

unfair and biased in favour of the Council insofar as a vast volume of

documentation was produced at the inquiry which was not made available

to objectors beforehand.

As to the violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol the applicant

sets out as follows:

The Council makes a Compulsory Purchase Order and the Minister of

Housing confirms the Order. The owner has his property taken from him

and is given compensation. The amount of compensation given for houses

which are fit for human habitation is based on the market value of the

property. If the property concerned was classified as unfit for

habitation, the amount of compensation is based on the site value only.

An objection made to the Minister may be disregarded if the Minister

is satisfied that the objections relate to the question of

compensation. This may be the subject of determination by the Lands

Tribunal, which, however, may not alter the basis of compensation, i.e.

site value.

The applicant alleges that he was expropriated without adequate

compensation. He states that, due to the arbitrary classification of

his houses as unfit for human habitation, he is only entitled to a

compensation under Section 59 of the Housing Act, which means site

value instead of market value. He alleges that there was no domestic

remedy of any kind available to prevent confiscation of an unfit house

if the procedure laid down by the 1957 Act was observed, because the

Court cannot alter the basis of compensation which was decreed by

Parliament.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was lodged with the Secretariat of the Commission on

22nd December, 1967, and entered in the special register provided for

by Rule 13 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure on 17th June, 1968.

On 31st May, 1969, the case was submitted to a group of three members

for a preliminary examination in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules

of Procedure. On 17th July, 1969, the Commission examined the

application and decided to give notice to the United Kingdom Government

in accordance with Rule 45, paragraph (3) (b) of its Rules of Procedure

of this application and to invite it to submit their observations on

the question of admissibility.

The United Kingdom Government submitted its observations on 23rd

September, 1969, and the applicant submitted his observations in reply

on 3rd November, 1969.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

The submissions of the parties may be summarised as follows:

1. The principal issues of the law governing the compulsory acquisition

of land under Part III of the Housing Act 1957

(a)  Government's observations

Background of the Housing Act 1957:

During the period from 1800 until 1975 (when the Public Health Act of

that year gave local Government authorities wide powers in relation to

drainage and water supply, the cleansing of houses, and the conditions

of streets and buildings), over three million houses were built in

England and Wales. There were no restrictions on the erection of

houses, nor was there any provision for ensuring adequate standards of

sanitation. Many houses were built cheaply and at a hight density. The

period since 1866 has been marked by a continuously increasing effort

to deal with the problems of dwelling houses unfit for human habitation

erected during that earlier period and later. Later scale programmes

for the clearance of unfit dwellings, or "slum clearance", and their

replacement by houses erected according to adequate standards of

building and sanitation did not, however, get under way until after the

adoption, after the first Great War, of the "site value" principle,

that is to say the payment of compensation for lands acquired for slum

clearance on the basis of the value of the cleared site with no element

for the buildings thereof or their materials. The financial burden on

local government authorities (and hence on the community) of clearing

slums and rehousing their inhabitants at rents which do not show an

economic return on the capital costs of new housing was, and remains,

considerable, and it was concluded that effective measures on any scale

could be attempted only if the cost of clearance were commensurate with

the value of the land and no public moneys were paid for structures or

material which, by definition, had come to the end of their useful

lives and were acquired, simply in the process of clearance, to be

cleared away. Apart from the question of the financial burden to the

community, the "site value" basis of compensation is logically

justifiable since a structure unfit for human habitation should have

no rental value as a house and thus no capital value as one.

The effectiveness of the site value principle was demonstrated when,

following the introduction of the concept of "clearance areas" in the

Housing Act 1930, it became the duty of local Government authorities

which instituted clearance programmes either to acquire slum houses and

to demolish them themselves or to order the houses to be demolished by

the owners.

In the twenty-eight years preceding 1919, only 32 clearance schemes

were completed in the whole country. But from 1931 to 1939, about

300,000 houses were cleared or closed, the rate of clearance rising

from 1,784 in 1931 to 71,747 in 1938. During the second Great War and

for some years afterwards the clearance programme was suspended. It was

resumed in 1955, and since then more than 820,000 houses have been

demolished or closed under slum clearance programmes in England and

Wales; yet, following a survey carried out in 1967, it is estimated

that there are still some 1,800,000 unfit houses remaining, about

1,000,000 of which are in potential clearance areas.

The Housing Act 1957 is the principal Housing Act for England and Wales

and consolidates previous enactments. Parts II and III contain the law

dealing with the clearance of unfit houses. Certain changes have been

effected by later Acts, in particular by the Housing Act 1969, but the

changes, even if they had applied at the material time, would not have

affected the treatment of any of the three properties in question.

Accordingly the legislation will be described as it existed at the

material time.

Part III (sections 42 to 75) of the 1957 Act contains powers, similar

to those introduced in earlier legislation, for dealing with any area

containing unfit houses where the most satisfactory method of dealing

with the conditions in the area is the demolition of all the buildings

in it, with the object of doing away with the social evil of bad

housing and enabling the local government authorities to secure the

proper redevelopment of the land.

The criteria by which the unfitness of a house for human habitation is

to be judged for the purposes of the 1957 Act are set out in section

4 of that Act. The section does not attempt to define a specific test

but requires regard to be had to the condition of the house in respect

of repair, stability, freedom from damp, natural lighting, ventilation,

water supply, drainage and sanitary conveniences, and facilities for

the storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of

waste water. A house is deemed to be unfit for human habitation if, and

only if, it is so far defective in one or more of those matters that

it is not reasonably suitable for occupation in that condition.

Various duties are imposed on local Government authorities under the

1957 Act to take action in respect of unfit houses. Section 3 required

local Government authorities to cause their districts to be inspected

from time to time to ascertain whether any houses are unfit for human

habitation. In particular, Part III, section 42, provides that a local

Government authority, where they are satisfied that the houses in an

area unfit for human habitation and that the most satisfactory method

of dealing with these conditions is the demolition of all the

buildings, shall declare the area to be a clearance area. The clearance

area is to be defined on a map in such a manner as to exclude buildings

that are not unfit. The section also provides that before a local

Government authority declare a clearance area, t hey shall satisfy

themselves that, insofar as suitable accommodation for persons who will

be displaced is not available, the authority can provide or secure the

provision of such accommodation - a provision which places a

considerable financial burden on the community. The Minister of Housing

and Local Government is required to be informed of the declaration and

of the number of the occupants of the buildings in the area.

When an order has been made under section 42 declaring an area to be

a clearance area, section 43 (1) of the 1957 Act provides that the

local government authority shall secure the clearance of the area in

either of the following ways, or by a combination of both of them;

-  by making a clearance order requiring owners to demolish the

buildings (but leaving the ownership of the land unaffected); or

-  by purchasing the land, and themselves carrying out or arranging for

the carrying out of demolition.

In the latter case, the local government authority may make a

compulsory purchase order, authorising them to purchase compulsorily

land in the clearance area and any necessary "added land" (section 43

(3)). Such an order does not take effect unless confirmed by the

Minister. A local government authority which have so acquired land

compulsorily are under a duty (section 47) to cause the buildings to

be vacated so soon as may be, and to demolish the buildings within six

weeks of their being vacated or such longer period as may, in the

circumstances, be reasonable (or, alternatively, to sell or let the

land subject to a condition requiring demolition).

Procedure regulating compulsory purchase

The procedure for authorising compulsory purchase under Part III of the

1957 Act is set forth in Part I of the Third Schedule to the Act. All

owners, lessees, and occupiers (except tenants for a month or less have

a right to object to the order, and are required to be served with

notice to that effect before the order is submitted to the Minister.

If objections are made, a public local inquiry or hearings held by an

inspector appointed by the Minister, and the inspector reports thereof

to the Minister, before a decision on confirmation is reached. In the

case of objectors who allege that their houses are not unfit, paragraph

3 (4) of the Third Schedule to the Act requires the local government

authority to serve separate individual notices stating what facts they

allege as their principle grounds for being satisfied that the houses

are unfit. After considering the inspector's report and the objections,

the Minister may, if he thinks fit, confirm the order. Where the

Minister confirms the order, he may do so with or without modification

and, in particular, he may modify the order in respect of houses which

he considers are not unfit, either to exclude them from the order

absolutely or to authorise their purchase as "added lands. "Added land"

is "land which is surrounded by the clearance area ... the acquisition

of which is reasonably necessary for the purpose of securing a cleared

area of convenient shape and dimensions, and any adjoining land the

acquisition of which is reasonably necessary for the satisfactory

development or use of the cleared area"; see section 43 (2) of the 1957

Act. Compensation paid for "added land" which is compulsorily acquired

is assessed on a basis different from that applicable to unfit houses.

Compensation

Subject to certain exceptions, to which reference is made below,

compensation is paid for land compulsorily acquired under Part III of

the 1957 Act on the basis of site value.

Exceptions to the provision that payment of compensation is to be on

the basis of site value, when property is compulsorily acquired under

Part III of the 1957 Act, are made in the following cases:

-  "added land" (see above), where compensation is paid on the basis

of the market value of the land and buildings;

-  where inspection has shown a house to have been "well maintained",

a supplementary grant is paid to the person responsible for such

maintenance;

-  when the slum clearance drive was resumed in 1956, temporary

provision (intended to expire in 1965, but subsequently extended) was

made for supplementary payments to owner-occupiers who had bought their

houses between 1939 and 1955, while slum clearance was in abeyance, to

bring their compensation up to the market value of their houses as if

they had not been found unfit.

Judicial review

Paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule to the 1957 Act provides that any

person aggrieved by a clearance order or a compulsory purchase order

may question its validity, on the ground that it is not within the

powers of the Act or that any requirement of the act has not been

complied with, by making an application for the purpose to the High

Court, which has power to quash the order, either generally or in so

far as it affects any property of the applicant, if satisfied that the

order is ultra vires the Actor that the interests of the applicant have

been substantially prejudiced by non-compliance with any provision of

the Act. Paragraph 3 of that Schedule provides that such an order shall

not be questioned in any other legal proceedings.

(b)  Applicant's observations

The United Kingdom Government indicate that there would be financial

burden on local government authorities if the market value had to be

paid for houses on land deemed unfit by local government.

According to the applicant there can be no justification for

confiscation of buildings by local government.

The fallacy of the arguments used by the United Kingdom Government

seeking to support the confiscation of property as being in the public

interest is illustrated by a brief perusal of the very figures the

United Kingdom Government produces.

Reference is made to a survey carried out in 1967 which refers to an

estimate that there are still 1,800,000 houses remaining, of which

1,000,000 are in potential clearance areas. This "survey" was the basis

of a Government publication "Old Houses into New Homes", and published

in April 1968.

The full title of this survey reads "A National Sample Survey on the

Condition of Houses". Some 6,000 houses were surveyed to give a report

on the condition of 15,000,000 houses, i.e. one house in every 2,500.

With regard to the survey carried out by local authorities in 1956, and

which was mentioned by the Government, the applicant points out that

this was a very complete survey carrying no element of "sampling" and

was carried out by 1,467 local government authorities, i.e. those

actually charged with the responsibility of the classification of

unfitness. It is shown that the total number of unfit houses revealed

by this complete survey was about 850,000. The Minister's Annual Report

published in 1957 referred to this survey as "a detailed examination".

It will be seen that since 1955 some 820,000 houses have been

demolished or closed underslum clearance programmes. The year 1955

provided demolition etc. of 25,229 houses. It will be seen therefore

that the total number demolished etc. since 1956, i.e. the year of the

detailed examination, was about 800,000. According to these figures all

unfit houses had been demolished etc. by 1967.

Following the sample survey, it is alleged that there are a further

1,800,000 unfit houses. In addition between the years 1955 and 1967

some 1,174,027 Improvement Grants were made covering houses which as

a result cannot be labelled unfit.

The applicant therefore supports that these figures illustrate the

unreliability of both argument and figures submitted by the respondent

Government.

2. Government's observations on the admissibility of the application

(a)  As regards the complaints under Article 1 of the First Additional

Protocol:

The applicant alleges that he was deprived of two houses without

compensation in accordance with the provisions under Housing Act 1957,

Section 59. The applicant's silence as to the third house for which

compensation was payable on the basis of market value, taken together

with the applicant's statement concerning the alleged violation of

Article 1 of the First Protocol, make it clear that this complaint is

in substance a complaint about the basis of compensation as prescribed

by Section 59 (2) of the 1957 Act.

The first paragraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol excepts from the

right secured by that Article a deprivation of property "in the public

interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the

general principles of international law". The United Kingdom Government

submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence of the

Commission that Article 1 does not require that measures taken by a

State with respect to its own national are to be subject to the general

principles of international law and, in particular, does not require,

as a separate condition, that compensation shall be paid when the

property of a State's own nationals are acquired in the public interest

and subject to the conditions provided for by law. In this connection,

the respondent Government refer to the Commission's decision in

Application No. 1870/63, Yearbook, Vol. 8, p. 218. It follows from this

that Article 1 does not in such cases require any particular standard

of compensation.

The applicant does not raise any question in respect of the public

interest or compliance with the conditions of domestic law. It is

apparent from this statement in respect of Article 1 of the Protocol

and from the application form itself (in which the applicant explains

why he did not prefer a further appeal, a step which Article 26 of the

Convention would require if this aspect of the acquisition of the

properties were in issue) that it is not disputed that the applicant

was deprived of the properties "subject to the conditions provided for

by law". The United Kingdom Government wish to draw the Commission's

attention to the determination to that effect in the judgment of the

High Court on the applicant's motion.

With regard to the question whether the compulsory acquisition of the

applicant's property was in the public interest, it is submitted that

measures taken pursuant to the legislation evolved in the United

Kingdom to deal with the problem and social evils of slum housing

conditions, involving the clearance of areas of such housing with a

view to their redevelopment to provide housing of a satisfactory

standard, are plainly measures taken in the public interest; and that

the compulsory acquisition of this property was such a measure. In this

connection, the United Kingdom Government wish to refer the Commission

to its decision in Application No. 3039/67, Collection of Decisions,

Vol. 23, p. 66.

The United Kingdom Government therefore submit that, for these reasons

the applicant's complaint of the violation of his rights under Article

1 of the First Protocol is incompatible with the provisions of the

Convention or, in the alternative, manifestly ill-founded and should

be considered inadmissible under Article 27 (2) of the Convention.

(b)  Submissions regarding alleged violation of Article 6 of the

Convention

The applicant alleges that in the determination of his civil rights he

was not afforded a fair hearing by na independent and impartial

tribunal, and in his statement in respect of Article 6 (1) of the

Convention specifies two matters as constituting a violation of the

rights guaranteed by that paragraph, namely the action taken by the

former Q Borough Council in declaring a clearance area (which he refers

to as the "B determination") and the action taken by the Minister in

confirming the compulsory purchase order made by the Commission (which

he refers to as the "Minister's determination"). The applicant's

criticism of the latter determination also extends to the conduct of

the proceedings before the inspector appointed by the Minister to hold

the public local inquiry, and the United Kingdom Government would refer

the Commission to the High Court's findings on the inquiry which are

set out in the judgment at Annex C.

Although the applicant criticises the "B determination" and the

"Minister's determination" on the grounds that the proceedings of the

Council in the one case, and of the inspector and the Minister in the

other case, did not satisfy the requirements of paragraph (1) of

Article 6, it is by no means clear from the application what is the

nature of the civil right or rights which the applicant alleges to have

been the subject of a determination on either occasion. It is the

submission of the United Kingdom Government that no matter which fell

to be determined, or was determined, by the Council or the Minister

constituted a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 (1).

It has been, and remains, the contention of the United Kingdom

Government that on the true construction of Article 6 (1) (in both the

English and French texts), only something which is justiciable in the

courts of the State concerned can properly be regarded as a civil right

within the meaning of that Article. Paragraph (1) of Article 6 deals

with the determination of civil rights and obligations and of criminal

charges; paragraph (2) deals further with the determination of criminal

liability; and it is submitted that, when Article 6 is considered as

a whole, it is clear that the Article is intended to regulate only he

determination by courts and tribunals of such rights and liabilities

as are accorded by national law. Moreover, in the French text, the

words "cause" and "contestations" necessarily imply that the paragraph

is intended to regulate the conduct of proceedings for the

determination of issues which are justiciable in the courts or

tribunals of the country concerned. In support of this proposition, the

United Kingdom Government rely on the decision of the Commission, in

Application No. 1329/62, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 9, p. 28, that

this Article applies only to proceedings before courts of law and that

the right to have a purely administrative decision based upon

proceedings in court is not as such included among the rights and

freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.

In the submission of the United Kingdom Government, the proposition is

not inconsistent with the decision of the Commission in Application No.

1931/63, Yearbook, Vol. 7, p. 212, in which it is said that the term

"civil rights and obligations", employed in Article 6 (1) of the

Convention, cannot be construed as a mere reference to the domestic law

of the High Contracting Party concerned, but on the contrary, relates

to an autonomous concept which must be interpreted independently of the

rights existing in the law of the High Contracting Parties, even though

the general principles of the domestic law of the High Contracting

Parties must necessarily be taken into consideration in any such

interpretation. The Commission has not, to the knowledge of the United

Kingdom Government, in any of its decisions concluded that something

which is not recognised as a right or obligation in the domestic law

of the country concerned is to be regarded as a civil right or

obligations within the meaning of Article 6 (1).

The only justiciable issues in relation to actions taken under the

relevant provisions of the 1957 Act are whether a clearance order or

a compulsory order are within the powers of the Act, or whether the

interests of the applicant are substantially prejudiced by any

non-compliance with the requirements of the Act. These questions were

not in issue in, and the subject of, the "B determination" of the

"Minister's determination".

The United Kingdom Government are, however, mindful of the Commission's

decisions on Applications Nos. 3435, 3436, 3437 and 3438/67,

(Collection of Decisions, Vol. 28, P. 109); they therefore submit that

the matters which fell to be determined, and were determined, by the

Council and the Minister did not constitute a civil right within the

meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention on the following

alternative ground.

In its consideration of the "autonomous concept" of civil rights within

the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention, the

Commission has concluded, as appears from the quotation set out in

paragraph 37 above, that the issue of what is and what is not a civil

right is to be decided solely by an analysis of the claim itself. It

has also, in two lines of cases, isolated the two following criteria:

(a)  First the United Kingdom Government refer to Applications Nos.

2991 and 2992/66 (Collection of Decisions, Vol. 24, p. 116). From these

decisions, it would appear to follow that a "right" which is not a

right protected by the Convention is not a civil right within the

meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention. (The United

Kingdom Government wish to emphasise that this is a negative, not a

positive proposition).

(b)  In a second line of cases the Commission has decided that a

distinction is to be drawn between matters falling under public law and

matters falling under private law, and that Article 6 (1) does not

apply  to matters falling under the former. In this connection

reference is made to Application No. 2145/64, Yearbook, Vol. 8, p. 282.

The applicant's claim appears to be essentially a claim to be accorded

a particular standard of compensation on the acquisition of his

property. Such a claim does not, it is submitted, satisfy either of the

criteria referred to above.

As the United Kingdom Government have sought to establish in the above

paragraphs, Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention (and

there is no other relevant provision) does not accord to nationals any

right to compensation or, a fortiori, to compensation of particular

standard. Therefore, such a claim, not being a right accorded by the

Convention, is not a civil right within the meaning of Article 6,

paragraph (1), of the Convention.

Secondly, whilst rights and obligations are not formally characterised

as "public" or "private" in the domestic law of the United Kingdom,

they may be so characterised for the purposes of the Convention, and

indeed such a characterisation was made by the Commission in its

decision on a previous complaint against the United Kingdom Government

(decision in Application No. 3325/67, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 25,

p. 117).

The United Kingdom Government submit that the exercise by a local

government authority and by a Minister of the powers conferred upon

them by Part III of the 1957 Act are acts of public administration,

governed by public law and, accordingly, that the decisions complained

of by the applicant did not involve the determination of any civil

rights within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1), of the

Convention.

As a further alternative, the United Kingdom Government submit that

there can be no place for the application of an autonomous concept, so

as to require a determination in accordance with the provisions of

Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention, in a field where the

Convention or Protocol itself makes it clear that a discretion is left

to the State concerned. Article 1 of the First Protocol provides, so

far as material, that deprivation of possessions is to be regulated by

the "conditions provided for by law". There would appear to be no

justification for applying, in relation to the deprivation of

possessions, criteria external to those adopted in the law concerned.

Moreover, since the "B decision" and the "Minister's decision" were

(notwithstanding that the Minister was under a duty to exercise his

functions in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner) administrative acts,

not acts of a judicial-tribunal, the United Kingdom Government submit

that such decisions are, irrespective of the nature of the right

claimed by the applicant, not governed by the provisions of Article 6

(1). In this connection they refer again to the decision of the

Commission in Application No. 1329/62 (Collection of Decisions, Vol.

9, p. 28):

The United Kingdom Government therefore submit that for the reasons set

out above, the applicant's complaint of the violation of his rights

under Article 6 (1) of the Convention is incompatible with the

provisions of the Convention or, in the alternative, manifestly

ill-founded and should be considered inadmissible under Article 27,

paragraph (2), of the Convention.

THE LAW

Whereas the applicant complains that the proceedings under the Housing

Act 1957 concerning the expropriation of his property were carried out

in a grossly unfair manner ; whereas he alleges, in particular, that

the Council of the London Borough of B failed to act impartially and

that the Minister of Housing took his decision in an unfair and partial

manner and was biased against the applicant; whereas the applicant

alleges that he was consequently denied the right to a fair and public

hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of

Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention;

Whereas it is true that Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the

Convention, provides that "in the determination of his civil rights and

obligations .... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

established by law";

Whereas, even assuming that the decision to expropriate the applicant's

houses under the Housing Act involved the determination of such civil

right and that consequently the above-mentioned provision was

applicable in the proceedings concerning that decision, it must first

be examined whether the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies

available to him under English law, and thus satisfied the conditions

of Articles 26 and 27 (Art. 26, 27) of the Convention; whereas the

Commission notes in this respect that the 4th Schedule of the Housing

Act, paragraph 2, provides as follows:

"If any person aggrieved by such an order as aforesaid, or by the

Minister's approval of a redevelopment plan or of a new plan, desires

to question the validity thereof on the ground that it is not within

the powers of this Act or that any requirement of this Act has not been

complied with, he may, within six weeks after the publication of the

notice of confirmation of the order, or of the approval of the plan,

make an application for the purpose to the High Court, and where any

such application is duly made the court

(i)  may by interim order suspend the operation of the order, or the

approval of the plan, either generally or insofar as it affects any

property of the applicant until the final determination of the

proceedings; and

(ii)  If satisfied upon hearing of the application that the order, or

the approval of the plan is not within the powers of this Act, or that

the requirement of this Act not having been complied with, may quash

the order or the approval of the plan, either generally or insofar as

it affects any property of the applicant".

Whereas, paragraph 4 of the said Schedule implies that an appeal could

be made to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court;

and whereas it follows that the Court of Appeal was, in general,

competent to give judgment on the question whether or not the

procedural provisions of the Housing Act were duly observed in these

proceedings and was thus competent to deal with exactly those issues

of which the applicant complained in his application; whereas the

Judges' Chamber in its judgment of 25th October, 1967, stated that its

powers on the applicant's motion were extremely limited and that it had

no possibility to consider whether the Inspector or the Minister was

right or wrong on questions of fact of opinion falling within their

powers; and whereas the Court further held, with respect to the

applicant's allegations concerning the shortcomings of the inquiry,

that it could only interfere on these grounds if the defects in the way

this inquiry was conducted were so fundamental that there was really

nothing t hat could fairly be called an inquiry at all; whereas the

Commission consequently admits that there might arise doubts as regards

the effectiveness of an appeal to the Court of Appeal because of the

restricted powers of that Court;

Whereas the Commission in an number of decisions [see 3.g. decision as

to the admissibility of Application No. 788/60 (Austria v. Italy),

Yearbook, Vol. IV, p. 168] has decided that "the exhaustion of a given

domestic remedy does not normally cease to be necessary, according to

the generally recognised rules of international law, unless the

applicant can show that, in these particular circumstances, this remedy

was unlikely to be effective"; whereas, furthermore, it is established

under international law that "if there is any doubt as to whether a

given remedy is or is not intrinsically able to offer a real chance of

success, that is a point which must be submitted to the domestic courts

themselves before any appeal can be made to the international court"

(Panevezys Saldutiskis Railways Case P.C.I.J. Series A/B No. 76);

whereas the Commission refers to its previous jurisprudence concerning

this question (see decision of Applications No.s 712/60, Yearbook, Vol.

IV, p. 400 and 1661/62, Yearbook, Vol. VI, p. 365):

Whereas the applicant does not deny that he failed to appeal against

the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of 25th

October, 1967, but alleges that an appeal to the Court of Appeal would

have been ineffective because of its limited powers; whereas, however,

the applicant has not shown that having regard to the generally

recognised rules of international law and the Commission's

jurisprudence relating thereto, such appeal to the Court of Appeal was

an ineffective remedy which might absolve him from the obligation to

exhaust the remedy concerned;

Whereas, therefore, the condition as to the  exhaustion of domestic

remedies laid down in Article 26 and 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3),

of the Convention, has not been complied with by the applicant;

Whereas the applicant further complains that his property was

expropriated without adequate compensation since he was paid only site

value for those of his houses which had been declared unfit for human

habitation;

Whereas he alleges that this constitutes a violation of the right to

the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as guaranteed under Article

1 of the Protocol (P1-1); whereas the Commission is of the opinion that

a basis of site value in respect of compensation for houses found unfit

for human habitation constitutes an adequate compensation, since such

houses have no value for their proper purpose as dwelling-houses;

Whereas the compensation paid to the applicant on this basis was in the

circumstances adequate; whereas it follows that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE