THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1936 and at

present detained at Parkhurst Prison. The applicant's case has been

presented to the Commission by a Mrs Y, allegedly his fiancée acting

under a "power of attorney" dated .. January 1969.

From statements and numerous documents submitted it appears that the

applicant was charged together with his friend, a, with having on ..

January 1968, committed robbery with violence and having murdered a

jeweller, B. They were convicted on .. May 1968 by the Central Criminal

Court in London and sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for robbery with

violence and to life imprisonment for murder with a recommendation that

they should serve a minimum sentence of 20 years.

The applicant and his co-accused applied for leave to appeal to the

Court of Appeal, Criminal Division which, in a judgment of .. April

1969, granted them leave to appeal only as regards their conviction for

murder. On .. May 1969, the same Court of Appeal quashed the conviction

on that ground and set aside the sentence of life imprisonment.

Consequently, they now only have to serve a sentence of seven years'

imprisonment for robbery with violence.

The applicant states that an important piece of evidence - a part of

an envelope bearing the name of the victim and allegedly found on him

five days after the murder - had in fact been "planted" on him by

police officers. He alleges that the detective sergeants who carried

out the investigations totally disregarded the Police Regulations for

Suspects Search Procedure. The applicant points out that the trial

judge in his summing-up to the jury drew their attention to this

possibility. According to the applicant this was also an issue in the

Court of Appeal when the court considered it most likely that parts of

the envelope had been planted by the police on the property of the

accused.

The applicant further maintains that the trial judge at the Central

Criminal Court failed to give correct directions to the jury regarding

to reliability of the evidence of certain witnesses had allegedly

committed perjury and others were brought before the court at a very

late stage of the proceedings. He also maintains that the judge spoke

in favour of the prosecution. From the judgment of the Court of Appeal

it appears that misdirection on a point of law only, namely when the

judge stated that the charges of robbery and murder against the

applicant and his co-accused should stand or fall together. Further the

Court of Appeal is examining the applicant's allegation that the trial

judge spoke in favour of the prosecution, found that the trial judge

at one point was "going slightly more in favour of the defence".

The applicant further maintains that his counsel was suddenly unable

to appear in court and that his new counsel whom he met for only 45

minutes before the trial did not follow his instructions and showed

incompetence in putting his case to the court. For this reason he had

another counsel representing him before the Court of Appeal.

Finally, the applicant alleges that because of his conviction for

murder he was classified as a category "A" prisoner and for one year

he was treated as such. This, in view of his innocence, he alleges,

amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment.

The applicant alleges violations of Articles 2, paragraph (1), 3, 5,

paragraphs (1), (2) and (5), 6, paragraphs (2), (3) (a), (b) and (d),

and 13 of the Convention, and requests the Commission to establish his

innocence so that he can be pardoned and released from imprisonment.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaints concerning his

conviction and sentence and the proceedings relating thereto, an

examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any

appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the

Convention and especially in the Articles invoked by the applicant;

Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, the

Commission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance of

the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention; whereas,

in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or the Commission considers that such errors might

have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms

limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, the

Commission refers to its decisions No.s 458/59 (X. v. Belgium -

Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X. v. Austria - Collection of

Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57); and whereas there is no appearance of a

violation in the proceedings complained of;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's specific complaints of the

alleged partiality of the trial judge, the Commission had regard to

Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas the

said Article provides that, in the determination of any criminal charge

against him everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an impartial

tribunal;

Whereas the Commission considered the summing up of the trial judge and

the very detailed judgment of the Court of Appeal of .. April 1969;

whereas it appears from the latter decision that these allegations made

in the applicant's appeal were carefully examined by the Court of

Appeal and rejected on reasonable grounds; whereas, indeed the

Commission finds no reason to depart from the opinion of the Court of

Appeal on this point (see for instance Applications Nos. 2038/63, X.

v. Federal Republic of Germany, and 2758/66, X. v. Belgium);

Whereas, therefore, no violation of the rights and freedoms set forth

in the Convention, and in particular in Article 6, paragraph (1)

(Art. 6-1), of the Convention has been established; whereas it follows

that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 27-3), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant's complaints are directed against his

lawyer, it results from Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention that the

sole task of the Commission is to ensure the observance of the

engagements undertaken in the Convention by the High Contracting

Parties, being those Members of the Council of Europe which have signed

the Convention and deposited their instruments of ratification;

Whereas, moreover, it appears from Article 25, paragraph (1)

(Art. 25-1), of the Convention that the Commission can properly admit

an application from a individual only if that individual claims to be

the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the

rights set forth in the Convention provided that the Party in question

has accepted this competence of the Commission; whereas it results

clearly from these Articles that the Commission refers to its previous

decisions Nos. 172/56 (S. v. Sweden - Yearbook, Vol. I, p. 211) and

852/60 (S. v. Federal Republic of Germany - ibid. IV, p. 346); whereas

it follows that this part of the application is incompatible within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, in regard to the applicant's complaint that his

classification as a category "A" prisoner on the basis of his

conviction for murder constituted in view of his subsequent acquittal,

inhuman and degrading treatment, and examination of the case as it has

been submitted, does not disclose any appearance of a violation of

rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in

Article 3 (Art. 3); whereas it follows that his part of the application

is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph

(2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE