THE FACTS

A. Whereas the basic facts originally presented by the applicant

may be summarised as follows:

The applicant who is a stateless person holding a Swedish alien's

passport, was born in 1925 and is at present detained in Portlaoise

Prison.

On 6th November, 1966, the applicant was arrested in Scotland on

suspicion of having murdered in Ireland in October, 1965, one James

MacPartland. The applicant was then delivered into the custody of the

Gárda Síochána and taken to Ireland. He complained that being a

stateless person he could not lawfully be "extradited" from Scotland

to Ireland.

On 21st April, 1967 the applicant was convicted of murder at the

Central Criminal Court in Dublin and sentenced to penal servitude for

life. The applicant claimed that his trial was "rigged and fixed" as

a result of a conspiracy between the judge, Mr. Justice K, his own

counsel and the prosecution counsel, in order to obtain a conviction

although the applicant was innocent. He accused the judge of bias and

of having gravely misconducted the proceedings and alleged that his

conviction was based on insufficient and perjured evidence.

His application for leave to appeal was refused by the Court of

Criminal Appeal on 26th July, 1967. On 25th October, 1967, the Court

of Criminal Appeal considered an application from the applicant for a

certificate pursuant to Section 9 (29) of the Courts of Justice Act,

1924, to enable the applicant to take an appeal to the Supreme Court

on the grounds that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of

26th July, 1967, involved a point of law of exceptional public

importance and that it was desirable in the public interest that an

appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court. The point of law concerned

was that the cause of death had not been proven at the trial and that

the trial judge had misdirected the jury on one part of his charge. The

Court of Criminal Appeal refused, however, to grant the certificate.

On 24th November, 1967, the applicant appeared before the Supreme Court

claiming a right of appeal against the decision of the Court of

Criminal Appeal, but was informed by the Supreme Court that no such

right of appeal existed in the absence of a certificate.

On the same date the applicant appeared in the High Court seeking an

order of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 40, Section 4, sub-section

(2), of the Constitution. This application was refused by the High

Court and later on the same day the applicant appealed to the Supreme

Court against this refusal on the grounds that he had not been properly

brought before the trial court which therefore had not jurisdiction to

try him and that he had not been tried in due course of law because of

the alleged conspiracy. On 11th November, 1968 the Supreme Court held

that the applicant was being detained in accordance with the law and

dismissed his appeal.

The applicant submitted that when he tried to raise arguments before

the Supreme Court relating to his trial, he was informed that the Court

was only interested in hearing arguments concerning the lawfulness of

his detention. Nevertheless, the Court in its judgment discussed his

complaints regarding the trial but found that the applicant had not

produced any evidence to support his allegations though he had in fact

been prevented from producing such evidence.

In May, 1968, the applicant applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal to

re-hear his application for leave to appeal on the ground of new

evidence. On  26th May, 1968 the Court held that it had no jurisdiction

to re-open these proceedings. The applicant contended that the Court,

in fact, was competent to do so, and he referred in that respect to an

English precedent.

On 26th March, 1968, the applicant handed to the prison authorities an

appeal addressed to the President of the Republic. When it had been

photocopied by the Prison Governor, the petition was according to the

applicant transmitted to the "Prison Secretary". When the applicant

asked to see the registration slip to ascertain that the appeal had

been properly dispatched, he was informed on 5th April, 1968, by the

Governor that his appeal had been returned and permission to have it

transmitted to the President's Office refused by the Prison Secretary.

The applicant complained that he had a right under Article 13 of the

Constitution to appeal to the President and that the Prison Secretary

had no authority to interfere with this right.

In April, 1968, the applicant applied to the High Court for a writ of

certiorari and an order of mandamus against the Prison Governor and the

Prison Secretary for stopping his letter to the President. He submitted

that he then wrote two further letters requesting the result of his

previous complaints without receiving any reply.

The applicant  complained that numerous submissions by him, inter alia,

to the High Court or the Supreme Court had remained without reply. By

way of example, he maintains that between 10th September, 1967 and 27th

July, 1968, he wrote 17 times to the High Court without his letters

being answered. In this connection, the applicant made a number of

allegations concerning the President of the High Court who also acted

as trial judge in his case.

It appeared that most of these submissions concerned proceedings

relating to the applicant's attempts to obtain by way of writs for

habeas corpus, certiorari or mandamus, a finding that he was being

unlawfully detained. According to the applicant most of these

applications had simply remained unanswered or refused without the

applicant having been allowed to appear before Court. However, one

application seeking an order of habeas corpus was heard by the Supreme

Court on 31st January, 1969. The applicant complained that the judgment

was not delivered until July, 1969.

The applicant also complained that his repeated attempts to have one

of the trial witnesses summoned to a District Court to answer charges

for perjury had been unsuccessful.

The applicant complained of the conduct of certain proceedings

concerning his request that certain property retained by the police

should be returned to him. On 21st May, 1968, the Circuit Court

dismissed the applicant's appeal against an order issued by the

Middleton District Court in this respect. The applicant alleged that

the courts were unduly influenced by the prosecution during these

proceedings.

The applicant also complained of his treatment in the Portlaoise Prison

and, in particular, that he did not receive food in accordance with the

requirements of the Buddhist faith. When he protested he was subjected

to disciplinary punishment.

Before these measures were imposed the applicant had hunger strike for

three days, to protest against the prison food and the prison doctor's

behaviour towards him. The doctor declared him, however, fit to undergo

the punishment imposed. The applicant alleged that he was punished as

a reprisal for having attempted to complain about the conditions at the

prison. He further complained that certain letters of complaint, inter

alia, to the Irish Medical Association had been suppressed and this

decision had been upheld by the Ministry of Justice. According to the

applicant he suffered from a skin disease (psoriasis) but his requests

for treatment had been unsuccessful. In this respect the applicant

submitted that eight months after he applied to the Minister of Justice

for such treatment his letter had remained without reply.

The applicant alleged violation of Articles 6, paragraphs (1) and (3)

(b) and (c), and 14 of the Convention.

B. Proceedings before the Commission

The Commission examined the application on 1st October, 1969, and by

partial decision declared the application inadmissible insofar as the

applicant's complaints related to:

- his arrest in Scotland and his subsequent detention and delivery into

  the custody of the Irish authorities;

- his conviction and sentence at the Central Criminal Court and the

  court proceedings concerned;

- applications for an order to habeas corpus and for rehearing of his

  appeal;

- attempts to have a witness prosecuted for perjury;

- proceedings relating to the restitution of certain property;

- his treatment in prison and, in particular, alleged denial of food

  in conformity with his Buddhist faith.

In regard to the applicant's complaints concerning the refusal to

transmit his petition to the President of Ireland, the Commission found

that this complaint gave rise to a question as to whether there had

been an interference with the right to respect for correspondence

guaranteed under Article 8, paragraph (1), of the Convention, and that

an examination of the file did not give the information required for

determining the question of admissibility. It therefore decided, in

accordance with Rule 45, paragraph (3) (b), of the Rules of Procedure

to give notice thereof to the respondent Government and to invite the

Government to submit its observations in writing on the question of

admissibility. The Commission also decided, in the meanwhile, to

adjourn its examination of that part of the application.

The respondent Government submitted its observations on 11th December,

1969. These were communicated to the applicant who submitted his

observations in reply on 12th January, 1970.

C. Submissions of the parties

It is first to be noted that the applicant's observations of 12th

January, 1970, which comprise 18 handwritten foolscap sheets, are not

limited to the only issue on the applicant of which the respondent

Government was invited to submit written observations. In his

observations and in several letters to the Commission received

subsequently to the partial decision on admissibility of 1st October,

1969, he has made further complaints, reverted to previous complaints

and raised various questions of procedure.

I. Arguments of the parties as to the stopping of the petition to the

President

1. Restrictions on a prisoner's correspondence

The respondent Government submits that, in accordance with the

recognised principles of international law, the provisions of Article

8 of the Convention, insofar as they relate to the rights of prisoners

and detained persons, should not be interpreted in isolation but in

conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention which foresees that in

certain circumstances there may be interference by the State with "the

right to liberty and security of person". In particular, the exceptions

set out in paragraph (2), of Article 8 should not be considered as

exhaustive insofar as they relate to prisoners and detained persons.

To put the case another way, the Government would view Article 8 as

intending to relate to the rights to respect for private life and

family life, home and correspondence of persons living in ordinary

circumstances but should not be regarded as absolute in its application

to persons subject to the various forms of detention recognised as

lawful by Article 5. Otherwise, for example, the normal restrictions

on non-essential or social letters of prisoners would not seem to be

permitted by Article 8.

The Government does not consider, therefore, that the right to respect

of correspondence in Article 8 is interfered with by the State when

prison regulations provide in a reasonable manner for security of

correspondence, limitation of the number of letters, non-transmission

of letters in certain necessary circumstances, etc. The applicant was

given considerable facilities for correspondence, both outgoing and

incoming. In this connection the Government refers to a list according

to which the applicant submitted, between 24th May, 1967 and 25th

November, 1969, 46 applications to the Department of Justice, and

between 24th April, 1967 and 18th December, 1969, sent more than 400

letters to various courts, authorities and private individuals. In

addition, he was said to have received 283 letters while in Portlaoise

Prison, non of which had, according to the records, been withheld from

him.

The applicant argues that Article 5 has no application to his complaint

which should only be considered under Article 8. He describes the

Government's arguments in this respect as being neither proper nor

lawful. The applicant calls the Government's reference to the prison

rules a "downright lie" as, in his opinion, the right of the prison

authorities to withhold a letter which is "objectionable" should only

apply to letters "which bear abuse or has any dirty words as remarks".

2. Purpose of the letter concerned

The Government submits that it appeared from the applicant's letter to

the President, copy of which was enclosed with the Government's

observations, that the purpose of the letter was to ask for a "retrial"

and not to "petition for pardon". In fact the applicant was at some

pains in his letter to emphasise that his purpose was to look for a

retrial. He says in line six:  "I am not asking to be set free, all I

am asking is a retrial". The President of Ireland has no powers or

functions under the Irish Constitution or law to arrange for a retrial

in these circumstances or, indeed, in any circumstances. Irish law and

procedure relating to appeals in criminal cases, including requests for

retrials, had already been exhausted by the applicant as appears both

from the letter in question and from the various letters which he has

transmitted to the Commission. The applicant had made several

applications both to the Court of Criminal Appeal and to the Supreme

Court and was given every assistance by these bodies to enable him to

pursue any valid complaint which he might have. Accordingly, no purpose

could have been served by transmitting to the President of Ireland a

letter requesting a retrial since the President could not have taken

any action on the matter. As the Commission is aware, the applicant has

also appeared before the Irish Supreme Court since the date of the

letter in question.

The applicant submits that whether or not his letter contained a

petition for pardon or a request for retrial, it was addressed to the

President. Accordingly, the only person entitled to reply would be the

President's Secretary. Under the Irish Constitution the prison

authorities or the Department of Justice have no right to stop or

refuse an appeal either for pardon or retrial.

As regards the Government's statement that he had exhausted all

remedies in respect of his conviction and sentence, the applicant

submits that it is true that he had made many applications to the

Supreme Court. He alleges, however, that he has not been granted the

rights of an accused person. In this connection he complains of the

proceedings relating to his application for leave to appeal on 26th

July, 1967. He agrees that the Supreme Court has heard his case but

complains that it has not been willing to see the evidence and that its

judgment is contrary to the arguments presented to it.

The applicant also alleges that he is illegally detained and complains

of the handling of his various applications for an order of habeas

corpus, an order of certiorari and his challenge of the Middleton

District Court.

3. The abusive character of the letter

The Government draws the attention of the Commission to the fact that

the letter in question contained most serious and offensive allegations

against Mr. Justice K, President of the C Court, as well as against

prosecution and defence counsel and witnesses involved in the

applicant's trial. Indeed, most of the letter is taken up with

accusations against Mr. Justice K rather than with the purported object

of the letter, namely a request for a retrial.

In these circumstances, taking into account the purpose of the letter

and having particular regard to the allegations against Mr. Justice K,

the Department of Justice, to whom the letter was referred for

consideration by the Prison Governor, decided that it should not be

transmitted.

In this connection the Government refers to the Commission's decision

on the admissibility of Application No. 1628/62 (X. v. Federal Republic

of Germany, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 12, page 61). From this case

it appears that the Commission considers that where letters of

prisoners contain statements and accusations against third persons

which, after careful enquiry, prove groundless, violation of the

applicant's right to freedom of correspondence does not occur since the

interference exercised is related to "the protection of the rights and

freedom of others" authorised by paragraph (2) of Article 8 of the

Convention. This case also refers to the constant view of the

Commission as to the rights of Governments to have "a certain margin

of appreciation in determining the limits that may be placed on the

exercise of the rights in question". It was clear that the gross

accusations against Mr. Justice K. were groundless. It was clear also

that the rights of a number of persons, and in particular Mr. Justice

K., not to be subjected to attacks upon their honour or reputation, as

described in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

would have been infringed in the transmission of this communication to

the President of Ireland.

The applicant has submitted in reply:

"I agree that I did accuse D.K. in my appeal to the President of

Ireland. I have gone indeed further than that. I have in fact accused

K. in the Supreme Court. I have challenged the Supreme Court to bring

Mr. K. to the Supreme Court and to allow me the Court's permission to

challenge the C. Court's President in person and openly in the Supreme

Court. The results were the excuse that Mr. X. was not available as he

was on some other case right then. The Government states that I had

accused the prosecution and defence counsel, also prosecution

witnesses. I in fact, from the start of my trial, openly accused the

State's number one witness, a prisoner, F."

The applicant then makes further submissions regarding the court

proceedings concerned and argues that, if his allegations were not

true, the Government should not be afraid to investigate them.

II. Other complaints made by the applicant

The submission of the applicant on issues other than the one on which

the respondent Government has been invited to submit observations on

admissibility can be summarised as follows:

(a)  The applicant complains that a number of letters written by him

have been improperly stopped, including the following letters:

- a letter written to the Irish Medical Association in order to

  complain about the prison doctor;

- a letter of 24th May, 1967, addressed to the Glasgow Corporation

  Office, asking for a change of his name by deed poll;

- letters addressed to the British Home Secretary concerning the

  applicant's alien's papers and other personal matters;

- a letter of 18th August, 1969, addressed to Mr. B. of the United

  Nations Social Defence Section;

- a letter asking a Scottish Member of Parliament to assist him;

- a letter written to the newspaper "News of the World".

The applicant further complains that a number of applications to the

prison authorities listed in the Appendix to the Government's

observations have not been replied to, whereas three other applications

allegedly submitted in August and September, 1969 are missing in the

list.

(b)  The applicant has also in this connection complained that a letter

to the Commission of 25th September, 1969, was not received by the

Commission's Secretary until 13th October, 1969, and accordingly too

late to be considered when the Commission took its partial decision on

1st October. The applicant considers that this proves that even letters

and documents sent to the Commission are being interfered with.

(c)  The applicant complains generally of the conditions in the

Portlaoise Prison which he describes as "Belsen Camp No. 2" and refers

to the restrictions imposed on alleged misconduct. He complains of the

hostile attitude of the newly-appointed Prison Governor who only allows

him to appear before him once a week.

He also complains of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient writing

paper in order to continue his correspondence and that he has been

refused air letters without having seen the Prison Governor first.

THE LAW

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains that the refusal of the

Department of Justice to allow transmission of his petition of 26th

March, 1968, to the President of Ireland constituted a violation of his

right to respect for his correspondence under Article 8, paragraph (1)

(Art. 8-1), of the Convention, it is to be observed that paragraph (2)

of the said Article (Art. 8-2) permits interference with a person's

correspondence by a public authority where such interference is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a domestic society, inter

alia, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

Whereas, in cases in which the rights guaranteed in Article 8 (Art. 8)

are at issue, the Commission has the competence and indeed the duty to

appreciate whether or not interference by a public authority is

justified in accordance with the provisions mentioned in paragraph (2)

of the Article (Art. 8-2);

Whereas the respondent Government has referred to the relevant prison

regulation which provides that letters from a prisoner may be stopped

if the contents are objectionable and it has submitted that the

applicant's letter contained most serious and offensive allegations

against the judge as well as against prosecution and defence counsel

and witnesses involved in the applicant's trial; whereas the Government

has further stated that the transmission of this letter to the

President would have infringed the right of the judge and the other

persons concerned not to be subjected to attacks upon their honour or

reputation;

Whereas an examination of the letter in question confirms the serious

nature of a number of allegations made in it by the applicant;  whereas

it is clear that the decision of the Department of Justice not to

forward the letter concerned was an interference with the applicant's

right to respect for his correspondence which is clearly permitted

under paragraph (2) of Article 8 (Art. 8-2), in particular, for the

protection of the rights of others; whereas, therefore, this part of

the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, under Article 27, paragraph (1) (b) (Art. 27-1-b), of the

Convention, the Commission may not deal with any application submitted

under Article 25 (Art. 25), if it is substantially the same as a

matter, which has already been examined by the Commission and contains

no relevant new information;

Whereas a number of the issues raised by the applicant in his

submissions subsequent to the partial decision of 1st October, 1969,

as to the admissibility of the application, merely repeat complaints

which were declared inadmissible by the said decision and to not

contain or add any relevant new information;  whereas it follows that

these complaints are, within the meaning of Articles 4, paragraph (3)

(Art. 4-3), of the Convention, 27, paragraph (1) (b) (Art. 27-1-b),

substantially the same as a matter previously examined and rejected by

the Commission;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant makes new complaints concerning

further restrictions on his correspondence and the manner in which he

is being treated by the prison authorities, an examination of the case

as it has been submitted, including an examination made ex officio,

does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set forth in the Convention; whereas, in particular, the

Commission has frequently held that the normal control, including in

certain circumstances a restriction of correspondence is an inherent

feature of imprisonment and does not constitute a violation of

paragraph (1) of Article 8 (Art. 8-1); whereas if follows that also

this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, the Commission has also considered the applicant's complaint

that the transmission of letters and documents sent by him to the

Commission have been interfered with by the prison authorities and, in

particular, that one letter was not received by the Commission's

Secretary until two weeks and four days after it had been handed by the

applicant to the prison authorities for transmission;

Whereas the Commission observes in this respect that the applicant has,

in fact, made a large number of substantial submissions and presented

his case in completely adequate manner; whereas there is no evidence

that letters sent by the applicant to the Commission have been

improperly delayed by the Irish authorities; whereas, therefore, it is

clear that the applicant has not been hindered in the effective

exercise of the right to lodge an application as guaranteed in Article

25, paragraph (1) (Art. 25-1), in fine, of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission

1. DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE;

2. DECIDES TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION IN RESPECT OF THE ALLEGED

INTERFERENCE WITH THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL

PETITION.