THE FACTS

Whereas the facts originally presented by the applicant may be

summarised as follows:

The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1937 and resident in L..

On 6 May 1968, the applicant submitted a letter to the Ministry of

Education (utbildningsdepartementet) in which he requested that the

Minister should exempt him from the obligation to repay a State

guaranteed loan of 7,000 Swedish Crowns to a certain bank. He stated

that the bank belonged to the capitalist camp in Sweden  and that the

capitalists were working against the interests of the working class and

conducting a terrible war in Vietnam. For this reason he did not wish

to support a capitalist enterprise. The letter ended with the words:

"Victory to FNL".

According to the applicant, this letter was copied by the Ministry and

sent to the Göta Court of Appeal (hovrätt) in J. to which he was

attached as an assistant judge (hovrättsfiskal).

On .. June 1968, the Court of Appeal decided that the applicant should

be dismissed from his post by the end of the year on the ground that

he was not suitable for the post.

His subsequent application for re-employment was refused by the Court

in October 1968. The applicant lodged several unsuccessful appeals

against his dismissal and the refusal to re-employ him.

The applicant alleged that the forwarding of his letter of 6 May 1968,

by the Ministry of Education to the Court of Appeal, which had nothing

to do with his letter, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the

Convention.

He submitted that he was subsequently dismissed from his position as

a judge because of the political views expressed in the letter, and

claimed that his dismissal violated Articles 9 and 10 of the

Convention.

The applicant maintained that he was a victim of constant

discrimination because of his political opinions and for this reason

he had not been accepted for any of the positions in public service for

which he had applied. In this respect, he referred to a number of

decisions by the King-in-Council whereby his appeals against such

refusals had been rejected.

He further complained that he had been refused a student grant for

studying medicine abroad and that his family had been denied social

security benefits for the same reason.

The applicant also maintained that the Ministry of Justice was

attempting to have him committed to a mental hospital and that

consequently his home had been visited by police officers who broke

some of his ribs.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The Commission examined the application on 15 December 1969, and

decided, in accordance with Rule 45 (3) (b), of its Rules of Procedure,

to give notice thereof to the respondent Government and to invite the

Government to submit its written observations on the question of

admissibility.

The respondent Government submitted its observations on 2 February

1970. The letter whereby the applicant was invited to submit his

observations in reply was, however, returned by the Post Office on the

ground that the post office box number indicated as his last address

had been cancelled and that his present address was unknown.

Having been informed of the applicant's address by the Swedish

authorities, the Secretary to the Commission wrote, on 4 March 1970,

to the applicant who had not been heard from since 8 November 1969, and

asked him to confirm that he wished to maintain his application. The

applicant then confirmed his wish to pursue the case. His observations

in reply were received on 13 May 1970, i.e. 9 days after the time-limit

fixed for the submission had expired although he had already been

granted a two week extension of the time-limit.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

1. As to the general background

The respondent Government has made the following submissions in this

respect:

"The applicant was born on .. August 1937. After completing his

university studies, he obtained his law degree in 1960. Subsequently

he worked as an apprentice (tingsnotarie) at a district court. From ..

October 1964, he worked at the Göta Court of Appeal at J. where he was

accepted as an assistant judge as from .. October 1965. In the

following year, he worked partly at the Court of Appeal and partly at

District Courts falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

On .. June 1968, the Court of Appeal, acting as an administrative body,

decided to dismiss the applicant from his employment at the Court. It

was indicated that the dismissal should take effect at the end of the

year 1968. The decision was taken on the ground of the applicant's"lack

of aptitude" for his work.

The applicant subsequently applied for re-employment at the Court of

Appeal, but this was refused by the Court's decision of .. October

1968.At the applicant's request, the Court of Appeal issued, on .. November

1968, a testimonial regarding his work. In this testimonial, it was

expressly stated that the applicant had been dismissed on account of

his "lack of aptitude".

The applicant lodged appeals from the Court of Appeal's decisions of

.. June and .. October 1968. The decision taken in regard to these

appeals will be dealt with below.

In 1968 and 1969, the applicant submitted to various public authorities

appeals, complaints and applications regarding a great variety of

matters. The register of the Minister of Justice alone contains 12

entries in 1968 and 33 entries in 1969 which all relate to requests

submitted by the applicant. Some of them concern, directly or

indirectly, the applicant's dismissal from the Court of Appeal. Several

complaints concern the fact that the applicant had not been appointed

to various posts at the Ministries or otherwise in public service.

The applicant had also addressed a considerable number of complaints

to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (justitieombudsmannen) and the Attorney

General (justitiekanslern), both of whom are competent to examine

complaints against civil servants. In the years 1968 and 1969, 39 such

complaints were entered in the register of the Parliamentary Ombudsman,

and during the same period the applicant submitted 13 complaints to the

Attorney General. In particular, it should be mentioned that the

Parliamentary Ombudsman made a thorough investigation of the

circumstances in connection with the applicant's dismissal and also

dealt at length with a complaint by the applicant regarding the way in

which his testimonial had been drafted. The conclusions of the

Parliamentary Ombudsman are laid down in an decision of .. June 1969.

In this decision, the Parliamentary Ombudsman pointed out that,

according to the legal provisions in force, the applicant could be

dismissed from his employment if he had shown "lack of aptitude" for

his work. There was no reason to believe that, in reaching its

decision, the Court of Appeal had been influenced by any irrelevant

circumstances or to question the Court's finding that the applicant was

not well suited for his work. On the other hand, the Parliamentary

Ombudsman criticised the Court for not having taken a decision earlier

in regard to the applicant's further employment or dismissal from the

Court, and he also found that the testimonial had not been drafted in

a satisfactory manner.

The applicant has not commented on this part of the Government's

observations.

2. The forwarding of a letter by the Ministry of Education to the Court

of Appeal

(a)  Before commenting on the facts relating to this part of the

application, the respondent Government has made the following general

remarks:

"The applicant invokes Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms which protects everyone's 'right to respect for

his private and family life, his home and his correspondence'. Although

the applicant does not indicate in what way he fins this provision to

be violated, it may be assumed that he considers the alleged action of

the Ministry of Education to constitute a violation of his right to

respect for his correspondence. The Swedish Government is unable to

share this opinion of the interpretation of Article 8.

It is clear that the right to respect for correspondence implies that

any person shall have the right freely to correspond with any other

person and that censorship or control shall be prohibited. Another

aspect of the right to respect for correspondence in that aspect of the

right to respect for correspondence is that neither the person who

sends a letter nor the person who receives it shall be forced to

disclose the contents of that letter. On the other hand, the right to

respect for correspondence cannot be so construed as to imply that the

person who sends a letter or the person who receives it should be bound

by the Convention not to disclose the contents of that letter.

Consequently, the act complained of by the applicant cannot, in the

opinion of the Swedish Government, amount to a violation of his right

of respect for his correspondence as guaranteed by Article 8 of the

Convention.

The Swedish Government also wishes to draw the attention of the

Commission to the fact that, under Swedish law, everyone shall have

free access to public documents, i.e. documents in the custody of

public authorities. In accordance with this Rule, the applicant's

letter was a public document as soon as it had been received by the

Ministry of Education, and no one could be denied the right to take

cognizance of the letter. Consequently, if the letter had been

communicated to the Court of Appeal, this would not have constituted

a breach of professional secrecy, since the letter was in fact

available to any person who wished to see it.

As a matter of principle, it is therefore irrelevant whether the

Ministry of Education forwarded the letter to the Court of Appeal, as

alleged by the applicant, since in any event such a measure could not

be contrary to the Convention. It is a different question whether the

Court of Appeal, when deciding to dismiss the applicant, was influenced

by the contents of the letter, and this question will be examined below

under 3.

The Swedish Government therefore submits that the applicant's complaint

regarding the forwarding of his letter is manifestly ill-founded and

should be inadmissible in accordance with Article 27, paragraph (2),

of the Convention.

(b)  As stated above, the Swedish Government finds the applicant's

complaint on this point inadmissible, even if the facts alleged by him

were true. Nevertheless, in order to provide the Commission  with a

complete picture of the situation, the Swedish Government has also

tried to establish the facts relating to the applicant's complaint.

From the files of the Ministry of Education, it appears that the

applicant's letter of 6 May 1968 arrived at the Ministry on 7 May 1968.

The contents of the letter are, on the whole, correctly set out in the

statement of facts prepared by the Commission's Secretariat. It further

appears that, by letter of 8 May 1968, the applicant withdrew the

application contained in his previous letter. The letter of withdrawal

arrived at the Ministry on 9 May 1968.

There is no indication in the file that the letter of 6 May 1968 was

communicated to the Court of Appeal. Nor do the files of the Court of

Appeal show that a copy of the letter had been received by the Court

or its President. The enquiries which have been conducted by the

Government seem to confirm the impression that the letter was never

forwarded by the Ministry of Education to the Court.

In these circumstances, the Swedish Government feels justified in

contesting the accuracy of the facts on which the applicant has based

his present complaint. This is, in the Government's opinion, an

additional reason for declaring this complaint inadmissible as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2),

of the Convention."

In reply to the Government's statement that there is no indication in

the files to show that the applicant's letter was brought to the

attention of the Court, the applicant has stated that only a few formal

letters would be found in the file. His letter, on the other hand, was

transmitted to the Court in secret and in such circumstances the

receipt of the letter would not be recorded in the file. Although the

contents of his letter had been reported in the newspapers, the press

had only referred to the letter as having been written by a student in

Lund without indication of the applicant's professional status and

domicile. The applicant contends that he can produce evidence to show

that copies of his letter were distributed to the judges at the Court.

3. The applicant' dismissal from the Court of Appeal

(a)  As regards the applicant's dismissal from the Court of Appeal, the

respondent Government has first discussed the question of whether the

applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies at his disposal and, in

this connection, has made the following submissions:

"According to the general rules of Swedish administrative law, the

applicant was allowed to appeal from the decision regarding his

dismissal, and the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) was

competent to examine such appeal. The time-limit for appealing was

three weeks from the day on which the applicant was notified of the

decision regarding his dismissal.

The decision of the Court of Appeal to dismiss the applicant was taken

on .. June 1968 and the applicant was officially notified on .. July

1968. Consequently, the time-limit for lodging an appeal expired on 25

July 1968. The applicant did not lodge an appeal within the time-limit.

After the expiry of the time-limit, the applicant took certain action

in order to have the decision of his dismissal reversed.

By a letter which bears no date but arrived at the Minister of Justice

on 29 August 1968, the applicant "protested" against his dismissal from

the Court of Appeal and against the refusal to give him new employment.

This letter, however, was not drafted as an appeal and no formal

decision was taken on it.

By a letter of 29 September 1968, which arrived at the Minister of

Justice on 1 October 1968, the applicant lodged a formal appeal against

his dismissal. On .. January 1969, the Supreme Administrative Court

declared this appeal inadmissible as being lodged out of time.

The applicant also asked the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), by a

letter which was dated 28 July 1968 but arrived on 3 September 1968,

to quash the decision regarding his dismissal on account of a

procedural defect. The Supreme Court declared, on .. October 1968, that

it had no competence in the matter and decided to transfer the file to

the competent authority. By its above-mentioned decision of .. January

1969, the Supreme Administrative Court also dealt with this request and

decided not accept it.

By a further letter which arrived at the Minister of Justice on 6

February 1969, the applicant requested that the decision given on ..

January 1969 by the Supreme Administrative Court should be reviewed by

the King-in-Council. This application was rejected on .. February 1969

by the King-in-Council, the ground obviously being that the

King-in-Council is not competent to review the decisions of the courts.

Further requests were submitted to the Minister of Justice by letters

which arrived on 12 and 14 February and 13 March 1969. In these

letters, the applicant again asked for a review of his dismissal.

Alternatively, he submitted that there were reasons to grant him a

restitutio in integrum, since he had been prevented by illness from

lodging an appeal in time. These requests were rejected by the Supreme

Administrative Court on .. April 1969. In its decision, the Court

pointed out, inter alia, that the applicant had adduced no evidence to

show that he had in fact, at the time concerned, been prevented by

illness from appealing.

As stated above, the applicant also raised the question of his

dismissal in a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman who dealt with

this question at length in his decision of .. June 1969.

Article 26 of the Convention provides that the Commission may only deal

with a matter "after all domestic remedies have been exhausted,

according to the generally recognised rules of international law". In

the Commission's jurisprudence, this has been held to imply that all

"effective and sufficient" remedies must be exhausted (see, inter alia,

Application Nos. 343/57 Yearbook, Vol. II, p. 438 and 712/60, Yearbook,

Vol. IV, p. 400).

In the present case, there was only one remedy which could be described

as "effective and sufficient", namely the appeal from the decision

regarding the dismissal to the Supreme Administrative Court. The

applicant failed to avail himself of this remedy within the time-limit

applicable to such appeals.

It should be added that there are not, in the present case, any special

circumstances which might have absolved the applicant from exhausting

the remedy which was available to him. As regards his statement to the

effect that he had been prevented by illness from appealing in time,

the Swedish Government first refers to the observation of the Supreme

Administrative Court that the applicant had in no was proved that he

had been prevented by illness from appealing during the relevant time.

Secondly, the Swedish Government refers to the Commission's

jurisprudence according to which illness cannot in itself excuse from

compliance with the rules of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see, for

instance, Application No. 289/57, Yearbook, Vol. I, p. 149).

Consequently, the Swedish Government is of the opinion that the

applicant has failed to comply with Article 26 of the Convention and

that this present complaint is inadmissible according to Article 27,

paragraph (3), of the Convention."

The applicant has submitted in reply that he has not been "in default"

with his appeals to the "Swedish King". According to him such "appeals

will be sent to the Swedish Government's Council" and it results from

the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court that no

time-limit has to be observed. The Court's decision of .. January 1969,

is therefore contrary to its usual practice. Moreover, in July 1969,

the applicant consulted a psychiatrist in order to overcome the shock

his dismissal had caused him (1). The psychiatrist allegedly prescribed

very strong drugs which affected the function of the applicant's brain

until he, on his own initiative, stopped taking the drugs in August,

1969.(b)  Although maintaining that the applicant's complaint regarding his

dismissal is inadmissible on the formal ground of non-exhaustion of

domestic remedies, the respondent Government has submitted the

following additional information, regarding the circumstances in

connection with the applicant's dismissal;

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

----

(1)  The applicant has indicated, in this connection, that the drugs

were prescribed in July "1969". It should be noted, however,  that he

has stated elsewhere in his observations that he consulted a

psychiatrist in July 1968 and he also invoked bad health in support of

his application to the Supreme Administrative Court for a restitutio

in integrum in February/March 1969.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

----

"During the investigation carried out by the Parliamentary Ombudsman,

the President of the Court of Appeal submitted a detailed memorandum

on the facts leading up to the applicant's dismissal.

It appears from this memorandum that in 1965 the Court of Appeal had

only very hesitantly decided to accept the applicant as an assistant

judge at the Court. The main reason why he was accepted was that

several judges at the Court believed that he would develop favourably

during the following years. After working for some months at the Court

of Appeal, the applicant was in March 1966 transferred to the Vadsbo

District Court at M.. While the applicant's task at the Court of Appeal

had been to assist the judges, his work at the District Court consisted

in the exercise of independent judicial functions. In July 1966, the

Chief Judge at the District Court informed the President of the Court

of Appeal that the applicant's work at the District Court had been far

from satisfactory. In view of these critical remarks, the President of

the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to return to the Court of

Appeal where he would again assist the appeal judges in their work. In

October 1966, the applicant returned to the Court of Appeal. Although

his subsequent work at the Court of Appeal was not wholly satisfactory,

he was again, in March  1967 entrusted with judicial functions at the

District Court of N.. In February 1968, the President of the Court of

Appeal received further information about the applicant from the Chief

Judge and one other senior judge at the N. District Court. It then

appeared that the applicant's work at the District Court had not been

up to the standard that must be required of a person exercising

judicial functions. It was agreed that, for the time being, the

applicant should be given a warning and that he should be asked to

improve his work considerably. In May 1968, the President was informed

that no improvement had been noticed, and at this stage the President

found it necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the Court

of Appeal at a plenary session so as to permit the Court to consider

the proper action to be taken in regard to the applicant. The matter

was discussed at a plenary session of the Court on 29 May 1968. At the

following plenary session on .. June 1968, the Court of Appeal decided

to dismiss the applicant.

In his memorandum, the President of the Court of Appeal also dealt with

the applicant's allegation that the Court's decision had been

influenced by the contents of the applicant's letter of 6 May 1968 to

the Ministry of Education. In this regard the President stated that,

at the end of the discussion during the Court's plenary session on 29

May 1968, one of the participants had referred to a letter which the

applicant was reported to have sent, earlier in May, presumably to the

Ministry of Education and in which FNL had been mentioned. Information

about this letter had appeared in the press. The President had then

given an account of the contents of this letter, as he remembered it

from the newspaper reports. He and other members of the Court had

emphasised that this letter was obviously quite irrelevant for the

decision which the Court should take in regard to the applicant. At the

same time, it had also been pointed out that the Court could not avoid

that the applicant or other persons might wrongly interpret the

applicant's dismissal as being occasioned by his letter to the Ministry

of Education but that this should obviously not prevent the Court from

taking such action as was justified for other reasons. The President's

memorandum finally contains an express statement to the effect that the

applicant's letter had not been distributed to the members of the

Court, nor was the President aware that the text of the letter had in

any other way been available to the members of the Court.

In the opinion of the Swedish Government, the memorandum of the

President of the Court of Appeal gives a very clear picture of the fact

on which the Court based its decision to dismiss the applicant from his

functions at the Court. It appears that, for a long time, the

applicant's work had not been found satisfactory and that the decision

to dismiss him was only taken after the Court had given him every

possible chance to improve his work. It is clear that the Court was

well aware of the serious effects which a dismissal would have on the

applicant's personal situation, but that, on the other hand, the Court

had to take into account the interests of justice which require that

persons exercising judicial functions must have sufficient

qualifications to perform their important duties. It is significant

that the Parliamentary Ombudsman found no reason to criticise the

decision to dismiss the applicant as such, but merely the fact that the

Court had waited so long before deciding whether or not the applicant

should be allowed to remain in the judicial career.

In any event, the Swedish Government finds it established that the

decision to dismiss the applicant was exclusively based on

considerations concerning his professional qualifications. The

applicant's letter to the Ministry of Education - which was apparently

known to the Court only through reports in the press - did not in any

way influence the position taken by the Court. Consequently, there is

no appearance of a violation of the applicant's right of freedom of

thought (Article 9 of the Convention) or freedom of expression (Article

10 of the Convention) or of any other right guaranteed by the

Convention,  and the applicant's complaint regarding his dismissal is

therefore also inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2), of the Convention.

(c)  The Swedish Government wishes to add that the applicant, at the

time of his dismissal, was not a holder of a judgeship. His functions

were of a less independent character and the fundamental principle of

the irremovability of judges did not apply to him. Consequently, his

dismissal does not give rise to any question of an interference with

the independence of the judiciary, which is one important aspect of the

protection afforded by Article 6 of the Convention.

In order to elucidate this point further, the Swedish Government finds

it essential to give the Commission some general information on the

Swedish judicial career.

The principle of the irremovability of judges is laid down in Section

36 of the Swedish Constitution. This principle applies to all holders

of judgeship. In addition to permanent judges, there are, however,

civil servants who belong to the judicial career. This training extends

over very long periods, during which the person concerned usually works

at many different courts or different levels. During some periods, his

main task is to prepare cases for the courts and to assist judges in

their work. During other periods, he is himself given assignments as

a judge, but not on a permanent basis. Insofar as he exercises judicial

functions, he acts in full independence, but at the same time the

permanent judges are expected to observe the way in which he performs

this work so as to make sure that he is not later appointed a judge

without having the necessary personal and professional qualifications.

The terms of his employment are similar to those of an ordinary civil

servant, which means that he may, in exceptional cases, be dismissed

from his employment.

In the present case, the applicant was still, at the time of his

dismissal, in the beginning of his judicial career. The account given

in the President's memorandum shows that in the years preceding his

dismissal he worked partly at the Court of Appeal, where his task was

merely to assist the judges, and partly at two different District

Courts, where he performed the functions of a judge. This was part of

his training, and it was found that he did not have sufficient

qualifications for such judicial work. According to the rules

applicable to his employment, he could be dismissed, inter alia, on the

ground of "lack of aptitude" for his work and these rules constituted

the legal basis for the decision of the Court of Appeal."

The applicant's observations in reply may be summarised as follows:

The applicant maintains that his dismissal was entirely due to his

political views and constitutes a violation of his right to freedom of

expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. According to

him, he had repeatedly criticised the Government and his letter of 6

May 1968 was only one of his actions in this respect. He claims that

he has never acted "politically illegally" or neglected his judicial

duties. The applicant states that he had in April 1968 been warned by

a counsellor at the Minister of Justice that he would be dismissed

unless he discontinued his political activities.

The applicant refers to the statements made by the President of the

Court of Appeal in his memorandum as being false and wrong. He contends

that no complaints were ever made regarding the way he carried out his

work. This is borne out by a part of the President's memorandum which

the respondent Government has not mentioned and where it is stated that

the applicant had never committed any breach of duty, nor could any

specific action on his part be relied on in order to prove his "lack

of aptitude". In this connection, the applicant refers to the case of

another assistant judge, Mr. B.., who had been active in the public

discussion on the Vietnam question and who allegedly also had to leave

the Göta Court of Appeal.

The applicant requests that the judges of the Court and Mr. B. should

be heard as witnesses by the Commission.

4. The refusal to give the applicant re-employment at the Court of

Appeal and to give him other employment in public service, the refusal

to give the applicant a student grant for studies abroad and to give

his family social security benefits

In regard to the facts relating to the present complaints, the

respondent Government has made the following observations:

"(a)  From the files available to the Government, it appears that by

letter of 18 September 1968, the applicant applied for re-employment

at the Court of Appeal. This was refused by the Court on .. October

1968. The applicant appealed from this decision and his appeal was

rejected by the King-in-Council on .. February 1969.

It further appears that the applicant has repeatedly applied for

employment at different Government departments or otherwise in public

service. He has, on many occasions, sent in his name as a candidate for

specific posts, and he has often appealed from decisions to appoint

other candidates. In some cases, he has also submitted complaints to

the Parliamentary Ombudsman.

In August 1968, the applicant applied for a student grant for studying

theology at the University of Lund. His letter indicated that, in the

first place, he wished his application to concern studies of medicine

in France. His application, insofar as it concerned studies in France,

was rejected by two decisions of the Central Student Grant Committee

(Centrala Studiehjälpsnämnden) in December 1968 and January 1969. In

March 1969 a student grant was given to him by the Student Grant

Committee (Studiehjälpsnämnden) of Lund for studies of theology at the

University of Lund. The applicant complained of the decision of the

Central Student Grant Committee to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, but

this complaint was unsuccessful. The Ombudsman stated, in his decision

of 9 June 1969 that he found no circumstances which might corroborate

the applicant's statement according to which the Committee, when

refusing him a student grant for studies abroad, had been influenced

by irrelevant motives.

As regards the applicant's complaint that his family had been denied

social security benefits, the substance of the applicant's complaint

cannot be determined on the basis of the very scarce information

contained in the statement of facts. The Swedish Government can confirm

however, that the applicant had apparently, in some cases, applied to

local authorities for social relief and that such applications had been

rejected.

(b)  The question arises in what way the present complaint could

involve any of the provisions of the Convention. The applicant himself

does not seem to invoke, on this point, any specific articles of the

Convention. Moreover, it is obvious that the rights involved, i.e. the

right to employment in public service, the right to receive a student

grant or social security benefits, are not covered by any provision of

the Convention.

According to the statement of facts, however, the applicant complains

that he is a victim of constant discrimination because of his political

opinions and that this was the reason why he had not been accepted for

any of the positions for which he had applied. It was possible that he

maintains that, for the same reason, he was denied a student grant for

studies in France and social security benefits. The Swedish Government

therefore wishes to make some comments on the compatibility of the

present complaints with Article 14 of the Convention which deals with

discrimination.

In this respect, it must be remembered that Article 14 only affords

protection against discrimination in regard to the rights and freedoms

guaranteed by the Convention. The Swedish Government has already

pointed out that the right to employment in public service and the

right to receive student grants or social security benefits are not

covered by any provision insofar as they concern discrimination in

respect of these rights, fall entirely outside the scope of Article 14.

These complaints are therefore incompatible with the Convention and

inadmissible according to Article 27, paragraph (2), of the Convention.

(c)  It may be added that the Swedish Government has found no

appearance of any discrimination against the applicant in any of the

files relating to the present complaints of the applicant. Insofar as

the application for re-employment at the Court of Appeal is concerned,

it is obvious that the decision of the Court was based on the same

considerations as were behind the decision regarding his dismissal,

namely that the applicant did not have sufficient qualifications for

a post in the judicial career. As regards the other unsuccessful

applications for employment in public service, the Government has found

no indication of any decision of a discriminatory nature. In some of

the files concerned, there are in fact statements by the public

authorities concerned which set out the reasons for the appointment of

another candidate and clearly show that the choice was made on entirely

objective and non-discriminatory grounds. In respect of the student

grant, the Central Student Grant Committee has quite satisfactorily

explained why the applicant was not given such a grant for medical

studies in France. The main reason was that the applicant had already

a university education for which he had been given a student grant by

the State. As regards social security benefits, the Swedish Government

is uncertain about the facts which the applicant complains of.

Nevertheless, it can be stated that certain applications for social

relief which the applicant submitted to local authorities were rejected

on grounds which could in no way be considered discriminatory.

In reply, the applicant has repeated his allegations that he has been

refused employment on account of his political views. He refers to a

number of further occasions on which he did not obtain positions for

which he had applied although he was, in his own opinion, the most

qualified candidate. He also maintains that he has been denied social

security benefits as a result of intervention by the Government. The

refusal of a student grant has furthermore been upheld by the Ministry

of Education.

5. The attempts to have the applicant committed to a mental hospital

and the visit to his home by police officers

On this point, the respondent Government has first stated that the

applicant's allegation that the Minister of Justice is attempting to

have him committed to a mental hospital is completely untrue and

without foundation. This part of the application should therefore be

declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2), of the Convention.

In the absence of any indications of date, place and circumstances in

general, the Government has found itself unable to make a statement as

to the applicant's reference to a visit to his home by police officers.

It is not clear whether the applicant has exhausted the domestic

remedies available to him, and it is not clear in what way the alleged

visit by police officers could be considered a violation of the

Convention. The Government therefore concludes that, in the present

state of the file, this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and

inadmissible according to Article 27, paragraph (2), of the Convention.

The applicant has only stated in reply that his home at V. was visited

in his absence by police officers in September 1968, although, in his

opinion, there was no "legal reason" for such a visit.

According to him, the Central Student Grant Committee asked, in August

1968 for the medical case sheet concerning the applicant's recent

consultation of a psychiatrist. The applicant submits that the

Committee on which the Government is represented had no reason to see

this case sheet.

6. The applicant's arrest by the police at H. and the "torture" to

which he was subjected after his arrest

The respondent Government points out in its observations that there is

no indication of the date of the applicant's arrest and "torture".

Nevertheless, the Government has made certain enquiries about this

complaint and, in particular, attempts have been made to obtain

information from the records of the police at H..

On the basis of these investigations, the Government has submitted that

the records of the H. police prior to 8 November 1969 contain no entry

about any arrest of the applicant and the local police authorities are

unaware of the events referred to by the applicant.

The Government submits that it is clearly the task of the applicant to

set out the relevant facts pertaining to his complaint and, if the

Commission wishes to examine this complaint further, the Government

would suggest that the applicant be requested to provide further

information about the incident concerned (date and place of arrest and

"torture", names of police officers involved, etc.). On the basis of

such further information, the Government is prepared to present its

final view on the admissibility of this complaint.

The applicant has stated in reply that, at the end of September 1969

he was kidnapped by a police car in H. and brought to the police

station where he was kicked and beaten. When he was subsequently thrown

out, one policeman told the applicant to withdraw any complaints he had

made to an international institution. The applicant contends that it

is obvious that the records of the H. police will not give any

information in this respect. He claims that he had pains for several

months and offers to submit X-ray pictures taken in January 1970 as

evidence.

THE LAW

Whereas the applicant first complains that the Ministry of Education

forwarded to the Court of Appeal a letter sent by him to the Ministry

and he alleges thereby a violation generally of Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention;

Whereas the said Article guarantees to everyone the right to respect

for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence;

Whereas it is assumed that the applicant considers that the alleged

forwarding of the letter constituted an interference with his right to

respect for his correspondence;

Whereas the respondent Government has submitted in its observations

that there is no evidence in the records of the Ministry of Education

or of the Court of Appeal of the letter ever having been transmitted

by the Ministry or received by the Court or its President and that

enquiries carried out by the Government seem to confirm that the letter

was never forwarded by the Ministry; whereas in his observations in

reply the applicant has merely repeated his contention that the letter

was transmitted without in any way substantiating his allegation;

Whereas, however, the provisions of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention as to respect for correspondence cannot be taken to imply

that a public authority to which a letter has been submitted should be

prevented from communicating this letter, or disclosing its contents,

to another authority;

Whereas it follows that, even assuming that the letter had in fact been

forwarded by the Ministry as alleged by the applicant, this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of his dismissal from his

position as an assistant judge at the Court of Appeal, it is first to

be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1 (Art. 1),

guaranteed only the rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of the

Convention; and whereas, under Article 25 (1) (Art. 25-1) only the

alleged violation of one of those rights and freedoms by a Contracting

Party can be the subject of an application presented by a person,

non-governmental organisation or group of individuals; whereas

otherwise its examination is outside the competence of the Commission

ratione materiae;

Whereas the Commission has repeatedly held that no right to hold a

position in public service is as such included among the rights and

freedoms guaranteed in the Convention (see. e.g. applications Nos.

273/57, X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook, Vol. I p. 207 and

1103/61, X. v. Belgium, Yearbook, Vol. V, p. 168); whereas it follows

that the application is in this respect incompatible with the

provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof;

Whereas, however, the applicant further alleges that he was dismissed

because of the political opinions expressed by him in his above letter

the contents of which were indisputedly known to the Court when it

considered the question of his dismissal, and that, in these

circumstances, his dismissal constituted a violation of Articles 9 and

10 (Art. 9, 10) of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with

a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to

the generally recognised rules of international law;

Whereas the respondent Government has submitted that, in order to

comply with Article 26 (Art. 26), the applicant was obliged to lodge

an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court within a period of

three weeks from the date on which he was notified of the decision of

28 June 1968 whereby his dismissal was ordered;

Whereas it is clear that the applicant did not avail himself of this

possibility within the time-limit provided by the relevant provisions

of Swedish law; whereas the Commission has frequently held that an

applicant's failure to observe the time-limits imposed on proceedings

under national law means that he had not satisfied the obligation to

exhaust the domestic remedies laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention;

Whereas in this respect the Commission refers to its previous decisions

on the admissibility of applications Nos. 352/58, X. v. Federal

Republic of Germany, Yearbook, Vol. II, p. 342, and No. 2366/64 X. v.

Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook, Vol. X, p. 208;

Whereas, moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted,

including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose the

existence of any special circumstances which might have absolved the

applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international

law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal;

Whereas, in particular, the Commission has considered the applicant's

statement that he was prevented for a certain period from appealing

against his dismissal on the ground that he was under the influence of

drugs prescribed on account of the shock caused by that dismissal;

Whereas the Commission observes that the applicant has offered no

evidence to support his contentions in this respect; whereas it should

furthermore be noted that, in its decision of .. January 1969 on the

applicant's request for a restitutio in integrum, the Supreme

Administrative Court found that the applicant had failed to establish

that he had been unable to make an appeal in time for reasons of bad

health; whereas the Commission does not find therefore that the

applicant has established his contention in this respect;

Whereas, the Commission has next considered the applicant's subsequent

attempts to obtain a review of his dismissal, either by challenging

before the Supreme Administrative Court the Court of Appeal's initial

decision of .. June 1968 or by his appeals and complaints to the

King-in-Council and Supreme Court respectively; whereas such

proceedings could not have rectified the wrong of which he now

complains and therefore cannot be considered as in any way being

equivalent remedies to a duly lodged appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court such as would under international law, relieve him

from the obligations of making such appeal; whereas, in particular, as

regards the applicant's application to the Supreme Administrative Court

for a re-opening (resting) of the proceedings or a restitutio in

integrum, the Commission refers mutatis mutandis to its decision on the

admissibility of application No. 1739/62 (X. v. Sweden, Collection of

Decisions, Vol. 13, p. 99), where it held that the extraordinary

remedies (särskilda rättsmedel) mentioned in Chapter 58 of the Swedish

Code of Procedure (rättegångsbalken) could not be regarded as effective

and sufficient remedies as the proceedings relating to these remedies

do not, until successful, affect the validity of the final decision

impugned;

Whereas, therefore, the condition as to exhaustion of domestic remedies

laid down in Articles 26 and 27 (3) (Art. 26, 27-3) of the Convention

has not been complied with by the applicant as regards this part of the

application;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of the refusal of the

authorities concerned to re-employ him at the Court of Appeal, to give

him other employment in the civil service, to give him a student grant

for studies abroad or to grant his family certain social security

benefits, it is re-called that the Commission is only competent ratione

materiae to examine an application under Article 25 (Art. 25) if the

applicant alleges a violation of one of the rights and freedoms set

forth in the Convention; whereas, in addition to what has been said

above concerning the right to hold a position in the public service,

no right to obtain such a position or to be given a student grant or

social security benefits is as such guaranteed by the Convention;

Whereas it follows that the application is also in this respect

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2) thereof;

Whereas the applicant also alleges that he is a victim of constant

discrimination on political grounds and that this is the reason why he

had not been accepted for any of the posts for which he had applied or

been given a student grant or social security benefits;

Whereas, however, Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention only prohibits

any discrimination on the grounds mentioned therein "of the rights and

freedoms set forth in the Convention"; whereas, the Commission has

already found that no right to obtain a post in public service or to

receive a student grant or social security benefits is as such

guaranteed by any of the provisions of the Convention;

Whereas it follows that, in this respect the application is again

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected

in accordance with Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2) thereof;

Whereas, the applicant further complains that the Minister of Justice

is attempting to have him committed to a mental hospital and complains

of the alleged visit to his home by police officers; whereas the

respondent Government has submitted that the allegation that the

Ministry has made any attempt to have him committed to a mental

hospital is completely untrue and without foundation; whereas the

Government has also pointed out that the applicant has failed to submit

any particulars regarding the alleged visit to his home or to explain

in what way this visit could be considered a violation of the

Convention;

Whereas the Commission finds that the applicant has in no way

substantiated his allegations and it fully respects the Government's

submissions in this respect; whereas, consequently the Commission does

not find that there is any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set forth in the Convention; whereas if follows that this part

of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of having been arrested by

the police and ill-treated at the H. police station, it is again to be

observed that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the

Commission may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have

been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of

international law; and whereas the applicant has failed to show that

he has taken any steps to raise this complaint before the competent

courts and authorities in Sweden; whereas, therefore, he has not

exhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law; whereas,

moreover, an examination made ex officio, does not disclose the

existence of any special circumstances which might have absolved the

applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international

law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal; whereas,

therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid

down in Articles 26 and 27 (3) (Art. 26, 27-3), of the Convention has

again not been complied with by the applicant.

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE