THE FACTS

I. The basic facts which appear to be undisputed by the Parties may be

summarised as follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1948 and a

Member of the United Kingdom Parliament for the constituency of Mid

Ulster in Northern Ireland. When lodging her application, she was

detained in Armagh prison. She is represented by Messrs. S. & L.,

solicitors practising in London.

Following serious disturbances which occurred in the City of

Londonderry in Northern Ireland in August  1969 certain charges were

preferred against the applicant in respect of her conduct during the

disturbances. Some of these summonses were withdrawn or eventually

dismissed by the magistrates' court in Londonderry which heard them but

on 22 December 1969 the Resident Magistrate convicted her on three

charges of inciting persons unknown to commit the offenses of riotous

behaviour in a street and one charge of being guilty of riotous

behaviour. She was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, the maximum

prison sentence, on each of these charges, the sentences to run

concurrently.

The applicant's conviction on these charges was based on the finding

by the Resident Magistrate that, on the occasions in question, she had

exhorted the crowd to man the barricades, to attack the police and to

throw petrol bombs and that she actually organised the throwing of

petrol bombs at the police, although she had not thrown any bombs

herself.

The applicant's defence was that she was justified in what she did

because she reasonably feared that the police were about to carry out

illegal attacks on persons and property and that the only reasonable

way of preventing them was the method she in fact adopted. As evidence

to support this view she relied on a radio communication between a

police officer and police headquarters she claimed to have overheard.

In this connection she also sought to call about 50 witnesses to give

evidence as to the past behaviour of the police in the Bogside area in

Londonderry. The prosecution objected to the calling of these witnesses

on the ground that their evidence was irrelevant and could afford no

defence to the offenses charged. The Resident Magistrate upheld the

objection and held that this evidence was inadmissible.

The applicant first served notice of appeal to the County Court and

entered into bail for the presentation of her appeal. However, she

abandoned this appeal and applied instead for a case to be stated to

the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland.

In the course of the argument in the Court of Appeal, the applicant's

principal contention was that the Resident Magistrate had been wrong

in refusing to allow her to call the witnesses concerned and she again

submitted that assuming that they had been called and had proved the

facts that she hoped they would prove, she would have been able to

sustain the defence that her acts were justified or otherwise not

illegal.

In a judgment delivered by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord McDermott, on

22 June 1970, the applicant's appeal was dismissed.

The Court found that, even assuming that the applicant did honestly and

reasonably believe that the police were about to behave unlawfully in

the manner claimed, the applicant's plea of justification did not

afford a defence. In these circumstances, the evidence concerned was

not relevant. It was stated, however, that if there was a defence, then

such evidence would in principle be relevant.

The Court further held as regards the sentence imposed that no point

of law was raised which would leave it open to review on an appeal by

way of case stated.

The applicant then applied to the Court of Appeal for the grant of a

certificate under Section 1 (2) of the Administration of Justice Act

1960 that a point of law of general public importance was involved in

the decision of 22 June 1970, and for leave to appeal to the House of

Lords (1). Having heard the submissions of counsel for the applicant,

the Court of Appeal declared, on 26 June 1970, that no such point of

law was involved in the decision and accordingly refused leave to

appeal to the House of Lords.

-------------------------------

(1) Section 1 (2) of the Act provides:

"No appeal shall be under this section except with the leave of the

Court below or of the House of Lords; and such leave shall not be

granted unless it is certified by the Court below that a point of law

of general public importance is involved in the decision and it appears

to that Court or to the House of Lords, as the case may be that the

point is one which ought to be considered by that House".

--------------------------------

II. THE APPLICANT'S COMPLAINT

1. Summary of alleged violations of the Convention

(a)  The refusal to allow her to call witnesses to the past behaviour

of the police that gave rise to her fears (which she alleged justified

her conduct along with the overheard radio conversation) constituted

a breach of Article 6 (3) (d) of the Convention, which requires that

an accused person shall be allowed to "... obtain the attendance and

examination of witnesses on his behalf ...".

(b)  The principal ground for her subsequent appeal to the Court of

Appeal was the refusal to allow her to call this relevant evidence. She

conceded that the evidence was relevant only if, assuming it proved all

she claimed, she would then have a defence. The argument on appeal

largely turned on whether this evidence would have afforded her a

defence if it had been admitted. She claims that the judgment of the

Court of Appeal seems to reach no conclusion on this point. It was

conceded that the evidence was admissible if a defence of justification

such as the one she sought to put forward was available. The Court of

Appeal denied, however, that this was the case. The reasoning is,

according to the applicant, "so slipshod and faulty that no judge

acting in good faith, applying the laws of the United Kingdom

applicable in Northern Ireland could have come to such conclusions".

She maintains that this is a breach of Article 6 (1) of the Convention

which requires "a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by

an independent and impartial tribunal established by law".

The applicant assumes that "hearing" here means the whole procedural

process from the original hearing and all stages of appeal until final

conclusion of the case.

Referring to the rules governing appeals to the House of Lords, the

applicant states that it is clear from the act itself and the

authorities that the only consideration that the Court (in this case

the Court of Appeal) shall exercise in considering whether to grant a

certificate is whether or not there is a point of law of general public

importance in its decision. The word "involved" emphasises that the

point of law need not have been the reason (ratio decidendi) for the

Court's decision:  it is sufficient that the point of law of general

public importance has been touched upon and discussed. When the Court

comes to consider granting leave, then many other matters can be

considered, e.g. what is to be gained by an appeal to the House of

Lords. If the Court of Appeal refused leave then the House of Lords can

be requested to grant leave.

The applicant contends that in the present case many points of law of

general public importance were involved in the decision of the Court

of Appeal and that, therefore, the refusal to certify any was

deliberately unjust. She claims that on the face of it, the decision

implies beyond reasonable doubt that this was not a "fair hearing" and

that the tribunal did not act "impartially" as bona fide judges

applying, without fear or favour, the laws applicable in Northern

Ireland; a clear breach of Article 6.

(c)  The applicant finally alleges a violation of Article 13 of the

Convention in that there is no effective remedy before a national

authority for the alleged violations referred to above.

2. Arguments to support the contention that the Court of Appeal did not

act bona fide or impartially

Having summarised her complaint as set out above, the applicant

examined in her original application in greater detail the judgment of

the Court of Appeal in order to establish that, in considering her

appeal, the Court was not acting bona fide. In this connection, she

contends that the Court was so wrong as to impose the conclusion that

it had made up its mind in advance and was seeking specious reasons for

its prior decision.

The applicant first recalls that her defence was that she had been

entitled to do what she did, because she reasonably believed that the

police were about to act not as a legal police force, but in an

unlawful manner, beating up and assaulting the inhabitants of the

Bogside area and doing damage to their property. All her actions were

designed to prevent this and were no more than reasonably necessary to

that end. In support of this contention she relied on the radio

conversation mentioned earlier and the witnesses she was not allowed

to call. Their evidence was designed to show that the police on at

least four previous occasions had gone into the Bogside area and

carried out the sort of assault with damage to persons and property the

applicant alleged she feared on the occasion giving rise to the

summonses.

The Court of Appeal expressly ruled that if there was a defence of

justification then the Magistrate ought to have let the evidence in.

According to the applicant, the question then would seem to be this:

assuming that she honestly and reasonably believed that the police were

to attack people and damage property, was she then entitled to

encourage those who, she feared, were the likely victims and help to

organise them in their defence. The applicant claims that it is clear

from the judgment that the Court of Appeal assumed and expressly stated

that they were assuming that the evidence excluded, had it been

submitted, would have proved all the applicant claimed for it; that she

did honestly and reasonably believe attacks by the police were

imminent. However, she contends that by implication the Court admitted

a further point; namely that since it had not heard the excluded

evidence, it could not know precisely the scope or degree of the

previous attacks, that therefore it could not discuss the degree of her

fears or her response to those, but must assume that the attacks feared

by her were of the gravity alleged by her and of sufficient gravity to

justify in terms of "common-sense" the actions taken by her. The Court

seemed to have been unaware of this implication and indeed in some

instances based part of their judgment on the presumption that this

implication did not arise.

If the applicant was justified to do what she did from a common-sense

point of view, only one question remains, namely whether it was

justified in law. She refers to one argument advanced by the

prosecution that whatever else the excluded evidence might prove, it

could not prove that the police were in fact going to act unlawfully.

However, this objection is, in her opinion, rebutted by means of a

well-established legal principle known as "mistake of fact" according

to which an honest and reasonable mistake of fact will afford a defence

if what were believed to be the facts would have afforded a defence.

The question if justification is to be decided not on the facts as they

were, but on what she honestly and reasonably believed to be the facts.

The Court of Appeal appears to the applicant to have accepted this

principle at the outset, but in giving reasons why her appeal was to

fail, the principle was ignored several times.

If the excluded evidence had been admitted before the Magistrate, he

would then have had to decide whether this would give rise to the

applicant's honest and reasonable belief, how grave were her fears, and

whether the steps she did take could be considered merely defensive

(reasonable) or went further and amounted to aggression (unreasonable)

without knowing the degree of attack feared, it is impossible to say

whether what she was known to have done amounted to aggression or

merely defence.

The applicant states that on behalf of herself her defence was argued

in four ways:

(a)  that the justification robbed the crimes of their mens rea;

(b)  that the doctrine of self-defence was applicable or some analogous

defence was available;

(c)  that the doctrine of prevention of crime was applicable so that

if the police were about to carry out the feared aggression, they were

of course about to commit crimes and what she did was in prevention of

crime;

(d)  necessity, i.e. that there is a general defence of necessity which

can be roughly formulated thus:  acts that would otherwise be crimes

will not be crimes where the person committing them did so in order to

prevent anticipated greater evil.

In her petition the applicant summarises in respect of each method of

argument what she considers to be the legal situation according to the

law of Northern Ireland. She then relates the seven grounds for denying

justification indicated by the Court to the four methods that had been

argued by the defence. She considered that the Court has failed to deal

with some of the issues raised by her, committed repeated errors in

their reasoning. In particular, she claims that the Court should not

have made certain assumptions of fact for which there was no evidence

before the Court, since the calling of this evidence has been refused.

As to the refusal of the certificate, the only thing the Court should

be considering, according to the applicant, was whether any points of

law of general public importance were discussed. She lists eight points

which she claims warranted the granting of a certificate. These points,

except one, relate to the issues raised by the applicant's defence in

order to establish the justification of her conduct.

The last point, however, deals with the Court of Appeal's discretion

as to sentence. The applicant submits that the act entitling the

defendant to appeal from the Magistrate's Court to the Court of Appeal

by way of case stated specifically provides that the Court of Appeal

in considering the case should have all the powers of the Magistrate

in relation to sentence. Without citing any authority, the Court held

in the applicant's case that they did not have this unfettered

discretion. Thus any one who appeals to the Court of Appeal by way of

case stated incurs the penalty of not being entitled to have his

sentence considered again from the beginning.

III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

1. As to the refusal to call certain witnesses

The respondent Government submits in its observations on the

admissibility that it understands the applicant's complaints in this

connection to be directed against the decision of the Resident

Magistrate to exclude the evidence of the witnesses concerned and the

refusal of the Court of Appeal to hold that decision to be incorrect.

The established jurisprudence of the Commission is, in the Government's

submission, that the Convention, and, in particular Article 6 (3) (d),

does not afford to a defendant the unfettered right to call any

witnesses he pleases irrespective of whether or not their evidence will

be relevant to the issues before the Court. Reference is made by way

of example, to the decisions on applications Nos. 1138/61 (Collection

of Decisions, Vol. 11, pp.9, 13) and 2384/64 (Collection of Decisions,

Vol. 23, p. 26). Accordingly, the Government submits that if, in the

present case, the evidence of the witnesses whom the applicant sought

to call was, under the law of Northern Ireland relating to the offenses

in question, irrelevant to any defence that might be available in

respect of those offenses, the Resident Magistrate's refusal to admit

it was a proper refusal within the principles previously laid down by

the Commission. The decision of the Resident Magistrate on this point

was taken to the Court of Appeal, the body (save in the exceptional

case of an appeal to the House of Lords) which has the supreme

authority to determine in proceedings of this kind the law of Northern

Ireland with regard to questions of criminal law. The Resident

Magistrate's decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on the specific

ground that, under the law of Northern Ireland, no such defence was

available to the applicant as she sought to rely on and the evidence

would therefore have been irrelevant. It is therefore submitted that

the Resident Magistrate's decision on this issue and also the decision

of the Court of Appeal upholding it cannot in themselves constitute

violations of the Convention. The application is accordingly in that

respect incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.

In her observations in reply, the applicant emphasises that, whereas

the decision of the Resident Magistrate to exclude the evidence

concerned is indeed one of her complaints, she does not make the

refusal of the Court of Appeal to hold that this decision was incorrect

a separate complaint in itself. In her submission, the Court did not

in fact hold that the decision was incorrect. The Court held that,

insofar as some defence of justification was available to her, those

witnesses should have been called, but in view of other circumstances,

it would have made no difference whatever their evidence would have

been. According to her this is further evidence of the lack of

competence and bona fides of the judges of the Court of Appeal.

The applicant concedes that the Convention does not give an accused

person an unfettered right to call any witnesses as the witnesses must

be relevant to the issues involved. However, the Commission should not

be bound by the decision of the national courts as to whether these

witnesses are relevant. Otherwise Article 6 (3) (d) of the Convention

would be a dead letter because the only way to challenge the court's

ruling that a witness should not be heard would be to challenge the

bona fides of the court which in itself would be an allegation of a

violation of Article 6 (1).

The fact that the Court of Appeal assumed that the witnesses would be

relevant to her defence and the Magistrate forbade her to call them was

already a breach of Article 6 (3) (d). The decision that the witnesses

were relevant to her in the circumstances without having heard the

evidence further underlines the lack of bona fides and the lack of

competence.

2. As to the refusal of the Court of Appeal to review the sentence

As regards the refusal by the Court of Appeal to review the sentence

imposed on the applicant, the Government submits that it is the settled

jurisprudence of the Commission that the Convention is not to be

construed as obliging Contracting States to confer on a convicted

person a specific right to municipal law to appeal against his

conviction; a fortiori the Convention entails no right to appeal

against sentence or to have it reviewed.

Even where municipal law confers a right of appeal against sentence or

the right to have a sentence reviewed, it is submitted that the

provisions of Article 6 do not apply to the determination of any such

appeal or application for a review, at any rate where (as in the

present case) there is no possibility of the appellant's sentence being

increased. However, no right to appeal against sentence or to have it

reviewed was available in the proceedings which the applicant had

instituted in the present case and the applicant's request to the Court

of Appeal on that behalf was therefore misconceived. The question

whether such a right exists is, of course, a question of the domestic

law of the country concerned. The Court of Appeal in the present case

expressly considered the question whether any such right was available

to the applicant (or, more accurately, whether any such power to review

the sentence was available to the Court) in the proceedings by way of

case stated which the applicant had chosen to bring. The Court held,

as a matter of law, that except insofar as the sentence raised

questions of law (which, save in one respect which it dealt with and

which is immaterial to this application, was not so) it had no such

power. The Court's decision in this respect is, of course, an

authoritative statement of the law of Northern Ireland on this matter.

The Government also draws the attention of the Commission to the

alternative procedure for appeals that was available to her by way of

an appeal to the County Court. In the premises, the Government submits

that the refusal of the Court of Appeal to enter on a review of the

applicant's sentence in the proceedings before it cannot in itself

constitute a violation of the Convention and in that respect the

application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.

In her observations in reply the applicant states that it is not the

refusal to review her sentence itself which is her complaint but the

reasons given for this refusal which shows that the Court was either

incompetent or not acting bona fide and fairly.

In the applicant's submission, it is true that a Magistrate can only

be required to state a case on a point of law, but the wide wording of

the relevant statutory provisions makes it clear that the Court of

Appeal has all the powers of the Magistrate's Court. According to the

applicant, this plainly means that in considering the appeal the Court

of Appeal can reconsider the sentence "de novo" and that it is not

confined to considering points of law only. There are no authorities

or decisions to the contrary yet the Court of Appeal held that it had

no power to review the sentence generally. This decision constitutes

a breach of Article 6 (1) of the Convention.

3. As to the refusal to grant a certificate that points of law of

general public interest were involved.

The Government submits that the law of Northern Ireland confers no

specific right, in a case such as this, to appeal to the House of

Lords. Neither does the Convention accord to the applicant any specific

right to pursue her appeal to the House of Lords. The Government

further submits that in considering whether its decision involved

points of law of general public importance, which was of course a

necessary prelude to their embarking on the consideration of her

application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, the Court of

Appeal was not engaged in determining any civil right or obligation or

any criminal charge; it was carrying out a process analogous to that

carried out by the bench of three judges (Dreiausschuss) of the Federal

Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany and the

Government submits that the reasoning adopted by the Commission in such

cases as application No. 441/58 (Yearbook, Vol. 2, p. 391), application

No. 448/59 (Yearbook, Vol. 3, p. 254) application No. 673/59 (Yearbook,

Vol. 4, p. 286) and application No. 742/60 (Yearbook, Vol. 4, p. 296)

concerning the functions of the Dreiausschuss is applicable to the

functions of the Court of Appeal now in question. The Government

therefore submits that the functions of the Court of Appeal in deciding

whether or not to grant a certificate are not in any event within the

ambit of Article 6 of the Convention. Accordingly, for either or both

of the reasons indicated in this paragraph the Government submits that

the applicant's complaint in relation to the refusal of a certificate

is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.

The applicant stresses that again it is not the refusal of the Court

of Appeal to grant a certificate which in itself is her complaint; it

is adduced as further evidence of the lack of bona fide and lack of

competence.

She considers that the argument that the Court of Appeal, in deciding

whether to grant such a certificate is carrying out a process analogous

to the Dreiausschuss of the German Federal Constitutional Court is

false as an appeal to the latter Court is not an investigation as to

the right or wrong of the alleged criminal charge but an investigation

into whether or not a constitutional right has been breached. Quite

clearly such a process does not, in the applicant's opinion fall within

the definition of Article 6.

As appeal to the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, on the other

hand, is part of the appellate procedure available to an accused

person. Any subsidiary procedural steps in a trial (for instance

arguments as to the admissibility of evidence) must surely be regarded

as part of the trial, and therefore within the scope of Article 6. If

this were not so, High Contracting Parties could circumvent Article 6

by simply breaking up a trial into a series of procedural inaccuracies.

In the applicant's submission, the decision of the Court of Appeal as

to the granting of certificate forms part of the appellate procedure

and therefore falls within Article 6 of the Convention.

She claims that where there is a procedure for deciding whether she has

a right to pursue her appeal to the House of Lords, the Convention

requires those operating that procedure to make their decisions bona

fide. In any event, even if the Court of Appeal was not engaged in the

"determination" of a criminal charge, their manifestly wrong refusal

to certify in this case should be taken into account by the Commission

as evidence in considering the other alleged violations of Article 6

(1) of the Convention.

The applicant further submits, as regards the refusal of the Court of

Appeal to review her sentence, that this constitutes a novel

interpretation of the statute concerned which involved a point of law

of general public importance. The question of interpretation of a

statute is always a question of law even when the matter is concerned

with sentence. The applicant states that recently the same Court

granted such a certificate in respect of the question whether a statute

imposing minimum penalties during the current emergency excluded the

Magistrate's power to suspend sentence. As far as public importance

goes there is, in her opinion, no difference between these two

statutory points of interpretation, yet in her case the Court of Appeal

refused a certificate.

4. As to whether the Court of Appeal in reaching its decision was

motivated by bias and bad faith

Without prejudice to the submissions already made by the Government

that, in taking certain of the decisions in question, the Court of

Appeal was in any event not operating within the ambit of Article 6 of

the Convention, the Government makes the following submissions as to

the question whether in reaching its decisions, the Court so conducted

itself as to involve a breach of Article 6 (1) of the Convention. The

applicant's case is that at all material times the members of the Court

of Appeal acted in bad faith, were motivated by bias and deliberately

gave decisions which they knew to be wrong and unjust. The applicant

has not adduced a scintilla of factual evidence to support this

allegation. Her case for making it appears to rest solely on the basis

that the Court of Appeal did not accept the arguments that had been

submitted on her behalf, that its interpretation of the law of Northern

Ireland differs from what she contends that law is or ought to be and

that she, for her part, finds its reasoning "so slipshod and faulty

that no judge acting in good faith, applying the law of the United

Kingdom applicable to Northern Ireland could have come to such

conclusions". In the submission of the Government, this does not amount

to even the beginning of a case for considering that the judges of the

Court of Appeal were guilty of bias, bad faith and, as the applicant

in terms asserts, deliberate injustice. Accordingly the United Kingdom

Government submits that the application, insofar as it rests on this

complaint, is manifestly ill-founded.

In her reply, the applicant claims that the Government has in its

observations failed to answer her complaint and attempted to discuss

in five lines the breaches of Article 6 (1) of the Convention expounded

on over 20 pages of her original statement of facts. In her opinion she

had shown there that the judges failed to act in good faith. "Fair" in

the wording of Article 6 (1) requires not only that the judges act bona

fide and impartially but also that they are of a reasonable standard

of competence.

She argues that bad faith or incompetence can be shown in two ways. One

is by external evidence such as the proof of the taking of bribes or

expressions by the judge outside the Court which clearly indicates that

he has not acted fairly in considering the appeal. The other is by the

very nature of the judgment itself. The first type of evidence will

seldom, if ever, fall into the hands of the accused party. However, the

very words of the judgment can provide the necessary evidence if the

reasoning is so bad and the standard of legal knowledge so poor, that

no reasonable competent judge acting honestly could have delivered such

a judgment.

The applicant submits that she does not, as maintained by the

Government, rely on the fact that her interpretation of the law was not

accepted. From the beginning, she has contended that one had to go

further than merely prove that the Court of Appeal was or might be

wrong. One had actually to expose the kind of manifest errors both

legal and logical that give rise to the conclusion that the hearing was

unfair. In the applicant's opinion this was done in her original

petition. The Government has, however, not met or dealt with a single

argument advanced by the applicant but merely made a flat assertion

that it does not find her arguments convincing.

THE LAW

Whereas the applicant complains of the refusal of the Resident

Magistrate to allow her to call at the trial certain witnesses and of

the subsequent upholding of this refusal by the Court of Appeal;

whereas she alleges that these decisions were incorrect and that the

Court of Appeal's decision was, moreover, taken in bad faith; that both

decisions violated Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention

which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the

right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain

the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the

same conditions as witnesses against him"; whereas she also alleges

that these decisions violated her right under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1),

to a "fair hearing" of the charges against her; whereas, insofar as the

applicant alleges that the Court of Appeal wrongly interpreted the law

of Northern Ireland, the Commission has frequently stated that in

accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only task

is to ensure observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties

in the Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent to deal

with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been

committed by domestic courts, except where the Commission considers

that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the

rights and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions Nos.

458/59 (X. v. Belgium - Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X. v.

Austria - Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57);

Whereas the Commission has therefore only considered the decision in

regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 (3) (d) and (1)

(Art. 6-1, 6-3-d) of the Convention;

Whereas, according to the Commission's constant jurisprudence, Article

6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) does not give the accused person a right to call

witnesses without any restriction; in particular, the Commission has

repeatedly held that the competent courts of the Contracting Parties

are free, subject to respect for the terms of the Convention, to decide

whether the hearing of a witness for the defence is likely to be of

assistance in discovering the truth and, if not, to decide against

calling that witness; whereas in this respect the Commission refers to

its Report in the Austria v. Italy case (Application No. 788/60),

Yearbook, Vol. 6, pp. 740, 772 and to its decision on the admissibility

of Application No. 1134/61, X. v. Belgium, Yearbook, Vol. 4, pp. 378,

382);

Whereas, in the present case, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision

of the Resident Magistrate to exclude the evidence tendered by the

applicant on the ground that it was not relevant as her plea of

justification would under the law of Northern Ireland, offer no defence

to any of the charges; whereas the applicant herself conceded that this

evidence was only relevant provided that, once admitted, it would have

supported a valid line of defence;

Whereas the Commission considers that the Court of Appeal's decision

to uphold the Resident Magistrate's refusal for the evidence concerned

to be heard was, in view of the reasons given by the Court of Appeal

and having regard to the Commission's jurisprudence in this respect,

not inconsistent with the provisions of Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d)

of the Convention.

Whereas the Commission has also considered the applicant's allegation

that there was a violation of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) in that the

Court of Appeal, in considering her appeal, was not acting in good

faith and impartially;

Whereas she claims that this is evident from the reasons given in the

judgment of the Court for its findings that no defence of justification

was available to her and that the Court had no power to review her

sentence;

Whereas the Commission observes that the applicant's allegation of bias

on the part of the Court of Appeal is solely based on her contention

that the interpretation of domestic law expressed in the judgment of

the Court was manifestly wrong;

Whereas the Commission has already stated that it is not competent to

consider alleged errors of law or fact committed by domestic courts

unless it finds that such errors might have involved a further

violation of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the

Convention;

Whereas therefore the Commission can only consider the present

allegation to the extent that it may involve a violation of Article 6

(1) (Art. 6-1) in that the applicant, as a result of the alleged bias

of the Court, did not receive a fair hearing of the charges against

her;

Whereas, the Commission, having regard to the particular submissions

made by the Parties in this connection, does not find that their

findings of the Court of Appeal in any way violated this provision of

Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1);

Whereas, it follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, the applicant further complains of the refusal of the Court

of Appeal, after it had dismissed her appeal, to certify, in accordance

with the provisions of Section I of the Administration of Justice Act

1960, that there was a point of law of general public interest involved

in the decision of 22 June 1970; whereas the applicant was thus refused

leave to appeal to the House of Lords; whereas the applicant

specifically alleges that the refusal of the Court of Appeal to grant

the certificate concerned was deliberately unjust and constituted a

clear breach of her right under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention to a fair hearing of her case; whereas, in the applicant's

submission, the decision of the Court of Appeal as to the granting of

such certificate forms part of the appellate procedure in the United

Kingdom and therefore falls within the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention;

Whereas, the respondent Government has submitted that, neither under

the law of Northern Ireland nor under the Convention, had the applicant

a specific right to pursue her appeal to the House of Lords and that,

moreover, the functions of the Court of Appeal, in deciding whether or

not to grant a certificate, are not within the ambit of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention;

Whereas, it is first to be observed that the Convention, under the

terms of Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention, guarantees only the

rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of the Convention; and

whereas, under Article 25 (1) (Art. 25-1) only the alleged violation

of one of those rights and freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the

subject of an application presented by a person, non-governmental

organisation or group of individuals; Whereas otherwise its examination

is outside the competence of the Commission ratione materiae; whereas

he Commission has repeatedly held that no right to appeal to a higher

court is as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by

the Convention;

Whereas, having regard to the relevant provisions of the Administration

of Justice Act 1960, and the observations made by the respondent

Government in this connection, the Commission finds that, in

considering whether or not to grant a certificate, the Court of Appeal

was solely concerned with finding whether a point of law of general

interest was involved in its decision dismissing the applicant's

appeal, and was thus not concerned, as it had been when hearing the

appeal, with the determination of the charges against the applicant;

whereas the Court of Appeal was therefore at this stage clearly not

concerned with the determination of a criminal charge within the

meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission notes, in particular, that the Court, having

reached the conclusion that no point of law of general public

importance was involved, was not called upon to decide whether leave

to appeal should be granted or not; further that, although the Court

of Appeal had at the same time been requested to grant a certificate

and leave to appeal to the House of Lords, the proceedings involved

were in this respect to be clearly distinguished from the proceedings

before the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, in England on an

application for leave to appeal to that Court; whereas, the

Commission's reasons for considering such proceedings before the latter

Court as falling within the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention are set out in its decision on the admissibility of

Application No. 3075/67, X. v. United Kingdom (Yearbook, Vol. 11, p.

466); whereas it follows that this part of the application is

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, insofar as the applicant complains of a violation of

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in that there was no effective

remedy before a national authority for the alleged violations of the

Convention referred to above, the Commission observes that this

provision relates exclusively to a remedy in respect of a violation of

one of the rights and freedoms set forth in the other Articles of the

Convention;

Whereas, in the present case, not even the appearance of violation of

any of these Articles has been established; whereas therefore there is

no basis for the application of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention;

Whereas it follows that also this part of the application is

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.