THE FACTS

The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised

as follows:

The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1924 and resident in V.

or K. near S.

From the statements and from documents submitted by him it appears that

he was arrested on .. November 1968 and remanded in custody. At the

same time preliminary investigations were instituted against him on the

suspicion of having misused official powers (Missbrauch der

Amtsgewalt).

On .. May 1969, the applicant was convicted by the Regional Criminal

Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) in V. of having committed this

offense and sentenced to three years' severe imprisonment with the

additional penalty of "sleeping hard" (hartes Lager) and fasting once

every three months.

From the judgment it appears that the applicant, who was between ...

and ... 1968, the personal assistance in charge of public relations

(Pressereferent) to the Austrian Minister of the Interior, had made

available to the secret organisation of a foreign country certain

secret information concerning the 9th World Youth Festivals and had

photocopied certain secret documents concerning the events in

Czechoslovakia in 1968, with the intention of passing them on to the

secret service organisation of that foreign country. The Court found

that, by reason of these acts he had misused the official powers vested

in him by to the detriment of the Republic of Austria.

The applicant lodged with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) in

Vienna a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) against his

conviction and an appeal (Berufung) against his sentence. In his plea

of nullity he apparently alleged that various provisions of Article 281

of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) had been

violated by reason of the fact that the public had been excluded during

certain parts of the trial, that certain expert opinions had not been

obtained and that the Regional Criminal Court had wrongly assessed the

evidence before it.

He apparently also alleged that procedural law had been violated in

that his conviction was based on certain information given by a former

Czech diplomat, Dr. B., and a member of the German secret service which

information had been introduced in the proceedings by means of hearsay

evidence. In fact, the Court had heard as witnesses two officials of

the Austrian Security Service, Drs. H. and P., who had given evidence

as to certain information received from Dr. B. and an unidentified

official who was employed with a secret service organisation in Munich.

H. and P. had received permission from their superiors to give evidence

as to certain facts, but no permission had been given to reveal the

identity of the foreign official, and this had been assured by the

Austrian authorities. Before the trial the applicant has requested to

summon an informed representative of the Federal Information Service

(Bundesnachrichtendienst) at Munich-Pullach and such summons had been

issued by the Court. However, the Court established during the third

day of the trial, namely on .. May 1969, that the witness so summoned

had failed to appear. The applicant alleged in this respect that such

witness should have been heard by rogatory commission in Munich and

that it had been unlawful to obtain the hearsay evidence of Drs. H. and

P.

On .. February 1970, the Supreme Court partly allowed the plea of

nullity and the appeal. It confirmed the applicant's conviction having

misused his official powers by passing on secret information concerning

the 9th World Youth Festivals, and of having attempted this offence by

photocopying certain documents, but acquitted him of the charges of

having attempted to misuse the official powers by photocopying certain

other documents. At the same time the Supreme Court reduced the

sentence to two years' and nine months' severe imprisonment with the

additional penalty of fasting once every three months.

The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's allegations that procedural

law had been violated by reason of the fact that the public had been

excluded during part of the trial and that certain expert witnesses had

not been examined by the Regional Court. It also considered that the

failure to obtain the evidence of a German secret service man by means

of a rogatory commission did not constitute any violation of the law

since the applicant had not made any application in this regard during

the trial and, in any event, any such request to a German Court would

have had no prospects of success in view of the relevant provisions of

the German Code of Criminal Procedure and international custom in this

respect.

The Supreme Court then dealt with the question of the alleged hearsay

evidence given by Drs. H. and P. during the trial. It found that it

was, in principle, not permissible, both under the relevant provisions

of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and under Article 6 (3) (d)

of the Convention on Human Rights to obtain hearsay evidence where it

is possible to obtain direct evidence on the subject matter concerned.

Interpreting Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention, the Supreme Court said:

"Under Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention, the accused person has the

right - already emerging from Article 249 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure - 'to examine or have examined witnesses against him'.

However, 'witnesses against him' within the meaning of the Convention

are only such persons who have directly observed the burdening facts,

as otherwise the right to examine them would have no meaning. Neither

the accused nor his counsel would be in a position to ask significant

questions or make relevant allegations with regard to the evidence

given by an official whose licence to testify in court has been

restricted to the effect that he may not disclose the source of his

information. The right to examine witnesses about evidence submitted

by such organs whose identity must be concealed by means of an official

restriction on the authorization to testify is therefore as such

excluded from the prohibition expressly contained in Article 6 3 (d)

of the Convention,, namely to stop witnesses from being questioned by

the defendant."

The Supreme Court continued to say that, only where a witness was

otherwise unattainable was it possible to introduce in the proceedings

the evidence to be given by that person by examining a third person.

However, a witness whose identity may not be disclosed was not for that

reason an unattainable witness. Thus it was not possible to examine

witnesses who are allowed only to give fragmentary evidence as to facts

reported to them by third persons but must conceal the source of their

information.

However, the Supreme Court found that those general considerations were

not directly applicable in the present case. The unidentified informer

was not a secret service agent but a high official employed with the

Federal Information Service in Munich, being an organisation whose

identity was sufficiently clear. Moreover, an informed representative

of that service had been summoned to appear at the trial but had failed

to come. Having regard to this situation it was clear that, even if the

name of the official concerned had been revealed, he would have

similarly failed to appear at the trial and the Austrian authorities

had no power to ensure the appearance of a foreign government official.

Consequently, the witness was not unavailable by reason of the refusal

of permission to give evidence, but he was, in fact, unattainable which

justified the hearing of hearsay evidence.

Apart from this it was for the Court to assess the facts and appreciate

the evidence before it and the court's findings in this respect were

not subject to review on appeal. On the other hand, where the Court

wrongly assessed the law in regard to the facts established, the

judgment must be set aside. This was required in respect of certain

documents which, according to the facts established, were no longer

secret at the time when they were photocopied. Consequently, the

conviction had been quashed in these regards.

Complaints

The applicant now complained that his right to examine or have examined

witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of

witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against

him, had been violated in his case.

He explained that before the trial started he had made and application

to the Regional Criminal Court to summon an informed representative of

the Munich Federal Information Service. However, the fact that Drs. H.

and P. had not been granted permission to disclose in court the

identity of the person from whom they had received their information,

prevented him from examining these witnesses in this respect and also

from obtaining the attendance and examination of the person concerned.

Moreover, the Court had failed to obtain the evidence of that person

by means of a rogatory commission.

The applicant further explained that his conviction was based primarily

on information given by Dr. B. and a member of the German secret

service. However, these persons had not been examined by the Court.

Instead the evidence of Drs. H. and P. was obtained who reported that

Dr. B. and the German secret service agent had told them, namely that

the applicant had worked for the Czech secret service and had passed

information to the German secret service. According to the applicant,

these allegations were not true and he had wished to put precise

questions to the persons concerned thus proving his innocence.

He alleged violations of Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention.

Proceedings before the Commission

The application was lodged with the Commission on 16 February 1970 and

was registered on 20 March 1970. However, on 2 April 1971 the

Commission decided to strike the application off the list on the ground

that the applicant had shown no interest in its maintenance. In fact,

there had been no communication from the applicant during a certain

period and efforts on the part of the Commission's Secretary to get in

touch with him had failed.

By letter of 25 April 1971 the applicant enquired about his application

and, after the text of the Commission's decision of 2 April 1971 had

been communicated to him the requested at once that his application

should be restored to the list of cases before the Commission. He

confirmed that he had, in fact, not lost interest in having his case

examined and gave explanations as to the reasons for his failure to

keep the Commission informed about his whereabouts. He stated that he

had been released from prison on 16 October 1970 but that he had left

forwarding addresses with the prison authorities and had also notified

the judicial authorities and the police of his whereabouts. It was true

that he had failed at once to inform the Commission of his change of

address, for which he offered his apologies, but he had assumed that

the prison authorities would forward any correspondence addressed to

him in prison or that the postal authorities would have delivered the

Secretary's letters addressed to him at his new address at K. near S.

In any event, it would have been easy for the Ministry of Justice to

ascertain his correct address.

On 23 July 1971 the Commission, in accordance with its usual practice

in such cases, considered these explanations with a view to deciding

whether the circumstances of the case as a whole justified its

restoration to the list of cases. In this connection it had special

regard to the relatively short period during which contact with the

applicant had been interrupted and found that a misunderstanding could

not be excluded. Consequently, the circumstances of this case did so

justify its restoration to the list of cases.

The Commission examined the applicant's complaint on 17 December 1971

and decided, in accordance with Rule 45, 3 (b) of the Commission's

Rules of Procedure, that notice thereof should be given to the Austrian

Government and that the parties should be invited to submit

observations in writing on the admissibility of the application.

The respondent Government submitted their observations on 18 March

1972. The applicant replied on 2 April 1972.

Submissions of the parties

1.   The respondent Government first referred to the procedure of the

Commission to restore to its list cases which have previously been

struck out. They considered that such procedure was not envisaged under

the Convention and appeared to circumvent the provisions of Article 26

of the Convention.

The Government then made submissions regarding the substance of the

applicant's complaint. They explained that the judgment of the Vienna

Regional Criminal Court, by which the applicant had been convicted and

sentenced, had been based on the evidence of numerous witnesses, of

experts, as well as on documentary evidence, including official files

and the applicant's passport.

The applicant now complained under Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention,

that certain witnesses, who were members of a German secret service

organisation and whose evidence had been introduced at the trial by

means of hearsay evidence, had not been examined either at the trial

itself or by means of rogatory commissions in the Federal Republic of

Germany. However, under Article 2 of the Treaty of 22 September 1958

between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany

regarding mutual assistance in legal matters, such assistance was not

granted where the proceedings concerned relate to political matters or

are connected therewith. It was true that the Court had, in fact,

summoned witnesses in the Federal Republic of Germany to appear and

give evidence at the trial but these summonses had only been

transmitted by the German authorities to the witnesses concerned

because the authorities did not know that the proceedings concerned

related to a political matter. Otherwise, they would certainly have

refused to communicate the summonses and this would have been in

accordance with both the above Treaty and with the general rules of

international law as stated in Article 2 of the European Convention on

Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Austria herself had made a

reservation, inter alia, in respect of political cases and it could

therefore not expect any different treatment from other countries. It

was thus clear that the law did not permit the summoning of witnesses

or their examination by rogatory commission and where the Vienna

Regional Court had nevertheless issued such summonses it had obviously

attempted to safeguard, as much as possible, the procedural rights of

the accused.

Apart from this, the applicant had failed during the trial itself to

make applications for the examination of witnesses abroad and had

therefore not exhausted the domestic remedies in this respect.

As regards the examination by the Court of Drs. H. and P. it was not

true that they had simply given hearsay evidence. Insofar as these

witnesses had reported their contacts with foreign informers they had

clearly given direct evidence. But, insofar as they had reported what

these foreign informers had told them, the Court had fully appreciated

this element in their testimony and the Government quoted a passage in

the judgment of the V. Regional Criminal Court in support of this

allegation.

The Government submitted that it had been necessary to hear the

evidence of Drs. H. and P. because it had not been possible, in fact

and in law, to obtain the direct evidence in Court. In this respect the

Government referred to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the

present case and also a similar decision by the Federal Court of the

Federal Republic of Germany, dated 1 August 1962.

Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of discovering the actual

truth (Prinzip der materiellen Wahrheit), the Court was bound to

examine with care the allegations made on behalf of an accused

person in the same way as those made against him. But it was not

obliged to summon all the witnesses nominated by an accused person, and

particularly not those witnesses whose evidence it considered to be

irrelevant. In this connection the Government referred to a decision

of the Netherlands Supreme Court regarding Article 6 of the Convention

and to the Commission's Report of 11 July 1960 on the case of Austria

against Italy. In the Government's submission, the applicant in the

present case would, in any event, not have gained anything by the

disclosure of the name and the official position of the foreign

informer, or by his being summoned as a witness, as he would not have

appeared at the trial, and his examination by means of a rogatory

commission in the Federal Republic of Germany was inadmissible under

the law.

The Government next referred to the principle of the free appreciation

of evidence (Grundsatz der freien Beweisführung) and submitted that

hearsay evidence was not as such excluded under Article 6 3 (d) of the

Convention as long as the Court took into consideration the particular

nature of such evidence. It was clear from the judgment in the present

case that the V. Regional Criminal Court had been clearly cognisant of

the manifold objections against hearsay evidence. Moreover, it should

be stressed that the applicant's conviction had by no means been based

only on such evidence but had been supported by a multitude of other

evidence.

In the Government's submission, the applicant was in fact challenging

in his application to the Commission the findings of fact made by the

Regional Criminal Court. However, the Commission had constantly held

that it had no competence to examine allegations that errors of law or

fact had been committed by the domestic courts and, in this connection,

had always confirmed that it was not a "court of fourth instance".

The Government submitted that, for these reasons, the application

should be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 27 (2) and

(3) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant, in his written reply of 2 April 1972, first made

submissions explaining that he had never lost interest in his

application to the Commission. In fact it had been the Government's

fault that the Commission had been unable to contact him after his

release from prison in October 1970 and had struck his case off its

list.

The applicant then dealt with the Government's submission that the

judgment of the Vienna Regional Court had been based on the evidence

of numerous witnesses, of experts, and on an examination of his

passport and contended that this submission was wrong. In fact, as

regards experts, his counsel had requested the Court to hear expert

witnesses with regard to questions of the methods and practices

employed by intelligence services as well as questions of

constitutional law. However, the Court had refused these applications

on the ground that the evidence offered by these experts was neither

relevant or admissible. Furthermore, concerning the examination of his

passport, the applicant submitted that this evidence was not designed

to prove charges relating to espionage. Finally, as regards certain

witnesses whose evidence had been used against him, the applicant

contended that their testimony had either been contradictory in itself

or had been insufficient to prove the charges against him. In this

connection the applicant referred to the evidence of three witnesses

in particular and quoted their statements at the trial or during the

preliminary investigations.

In the applicant's submission, the two officials Drs. P. and H., on the

other hand, played a decisive part in the criminal proceedings against

him. He contended that they were regarded by the trial court as being

both experts in secret service matters and witnesses to the facts and

that it was inadmissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure to give

evidence in this double capacity. Apart from this, Dr. P. had himself

been the subject of judicial investigations in his then capacity as

Head of the State Police.

Moreover, the Court had contained itself in obtaining hearsay evidence

instead of using all possibilities which were at its disposal to arrive

at the whole truth. It was perhaps true that in the strict sense of the

law it would not have been possible to obtain evidence abroad by means

of rogatory commissions, but in practice this was nevertheless

successfully accomplished. In fact, in a case relating to espionage in

the Federal Republic of Germany (The Porst Case) the German courts had

obtained in the United States of America the evidence of a witness who

had testified against the accused.

A further contradiction emerged clearly from the Government's own

submissions when they explained, on the one hand that, contrary to the

provisions of the law, witnesses in the Federal Republic of Germany had

in fact been summoned by the Regional Court and alleged, on the other

hand, that the applicant had failed to make applications during the

trial for the summons of witnesses abroad and had therefore not

exhausted the domestic remedies. In the applicant's submission, it was

either possible or it was not possible in political cases to obtain

evidence from abroad. If it was possible, the prosecution authority

should have obtained such evidence even before the trial, but if it was

not possible the Court should not have transmitted such summonses as

requested by him. To do favours to an accused person as suggested by

the Government was neither envisaged by the law nor was it normal

procedural practice.

Moreover, through the evidence given by Drs. P. and H., the Court had

obtained the remote evidence of third persons (informers) who had

informed the undisclosed sources of information of Drs. H. and P. and

who equally remained anonymous. It was in the applicant's submission,

clear that the Court had made no attempt at obtaining the evidence of

the immediate witnesses against him and it was not true that his

conviction was based on a multitude of other evidence, as the

Government had contended. He therefore maintained that Article 6 (3)

(d) of the Convention had been disregarded and he requested the

Commission to admit his application.

THE LAW

The applicant has complained of his conviction and sentence by the

Regional Criminal Court of Vienna and of the court proceedings

concerned. However, in regard to the judicial decisions of which the

applicant complains, the Commission has frequently stated that, in

accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task

is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the

Parties in the Convention. In particular, the Commission is not

competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or

fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers

that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the

rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. In this respect, the

Commission refers to its established case-law (see e.g. decisions on

the admissibility of applications No. 458/59, Yearbook, Vol. 3, pp.222,

232 and No. 1140/61, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, pp. 57, 62).

In the present case the applicant has complained that Article 6 (3) (d)

(Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention has been violated by reason of the fact

that the Regional Criminal Court in V. failed to obtain the attendance

in court of the persons who could have given direct evidence in his

case. Instead, the Court obtained the hearsay evidence of two high

officials of the Austrian security services whose authorization to

testify in court had been limited to the extent that they were not

allowed to disclose the names of the persons who had given them

information and he had thus been prevented from examining these

witnesses in this respect or from obtaining the attendance in court and

the examination of the direct witnesses concerned. Moreover, his

conviction had been based primarily on hearsay evidence.

Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention provides that everyone

charged with a criminal offense has the right "to examine or have

examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and

examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as

witnesses against him". Interpreting this provision, the Commission has

consistently held that Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention

is aimed at ensuring in criminal proceedings equality between the

defence and the public prosecutor's office as regards the calling and

interrogation of witnesses, but does not give an accused person an

unlimited right to obtain the attendance of witnesses in court. The

domestic law of the High Contracting Parties could thus lay down

conditions for the admission and examination of witnesses provided that

such conditions were identical for witnesses on both sides. Similarly,

the competent court was free, subject to respect for the terms of the

Convention and particularly for the principle of equality established

by Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention to refuse calling

witnesses nominated by the defence for instance on the ground that the

court considered their evidence as being unlikely to assist in

ascertaining the truth (see, for example, opinion of the Commission in

its report of 31 March 1963 on application No. 788/60, Austria against

Italy, paras. 112, 115).

The Commission finds that the same considerations are applicable in

respect of an applicant's right under Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d)

of the Convention to examine or have examined witnesses against him as

both part of this provisions are closely interrelated. Thus, as accused

person does not have an unrestricted right under this provision to put

questions to witnesses testifying against him in court, but the

exercise of this right must be governed by the Court's appreciation

whether or not such questions are likely to assist in, and thus

necessary for, ascertaining the truth.

Two questions arise under Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the

Convention as to the conduct by the Regional Court of the proceedings

in the present case:  first, whether or not the applicant's right to

"obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under

the same conditions as witnesses against him" has been violated by

reason of the fact that the informer himself has not appeared to give

evidence at the trial.

In this respect the Commission observes that the Regional Criminal

Court in Vienna acting in accordance with the applicant's request, had,

in fact, tried to obtain the attendance in court of any informed member

of the German Secret Service Organisation which had transmitted

information about the applicant to the Austrian authorities. However,

this attempt had failed as the witness summoned had not appeared and,

given the reservations as to political offenses in the Austro-German

Agreement relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters as well as

to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,

it could not have been possible for the Austrian courts to compel such

witness to appear or to obtain his evidence by means of rogatory

commissions in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that, apart from the fact

that the applicant has not made any submissions as to the nature of the

evidence of the witness whom he wished to call and whose attendance the

court failed to obtain, there were factual obstacles resulting from the

character of the charges against the applicant which prevented such

attendance rather than any deliberate act or omission on the part of

the Court for which the Austrian Government would be responsible under

the Convention.

The second question  that arises in this context is whether or not the

applicant's right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him"

has been violated by reason of the fact that the two members of the

Austrian security services who gave evidence against him, namely Drs.

H. and P. were not allowed, under an official limitation of their

authorization to testify, to disclose the names of the persons who had

supplied them with information about the applicant.

In this respect the Commission observes that it emerges clearly both

from the judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 February 1970 and from the

applicant's submissions to the Commission that, in spite of the above

limitation on their testimony, the applicant knew that the source of

the information of Drs. H. and P. was a high official of the Federal

Information Service in Munich, being an organisation whose identity was

sufficiently clear to him. He further knew that Dr. B., a former Czech

diplomat, had given information about him to the Federal Information

Service which had passed such information on to Dr. H. in Vienna. The

only element, therefore, which by reason of the official limitation to

testify, remained undisclosed and thus unknown to the applicant was the

name of the German official at the Federal Information Service with

whom Dr. H. had been in contact.

The Commission finds, however, that the applicant has not shown that

the revealing of the name of that official was, in the circumstances,

necessary as such for the Court's ascertainment of the truth of the

criminal charges against him. Indeed, the applicant himself does not

allege that he suffered any prejudice in this respect other than that

he was thus prevented from summoning this German official and from

obtaining his evidence in court. However, with regard to this

allegation, the Commission has already established that it was

impossible as a matter of fact to obtain the attendance in court of any

member of the German Secret Service Organisation concerned or otherwise

to obtain evidence directly from this organisation.

It follows that in the circumstances, there was no appearance of a

breach of the applicant's rights guaranteed under either of the

provisions of Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention.

On the other hand, there is another aspect of this situation in that

the question should be considered whether, as a result of the

applicant's right to a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 (1)

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention has been violated by reason of the fact

that the Regional Criminal Court in Vienna obtained, and based its

judgment on, evidence which may be described as "hearsay" evidence and

which the applicant was, by the virtue of such evidence, unable to

challenge with regard to its substance.

The Commission has examined this question ex officio and it finds that

an issue under the general provisions of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention may arise even where it has previously established that

there is no appearance of a breach of any of the specific "minimum"

rights mentioned in para. (3) of Article 6 (Art. 6-3) including, as in

the present case, Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d). In this respect the

Commission refers to its opinion in the report of 15 March 1961 on

application No. 343/57, Nielsen against Denmark, para. 52.

The Commission first points out that it is a principle of law in many

countries, including Austria, that the court is free to assess the

value of whatever evidence is put before it and the Commission, as has

already been stated, has no competence to deal with allegations that

errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts except

where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.

The right to which reference could be made in the present case, is the

general right set forth in Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,

that in "the determination .... of any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable

time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law".

However, under this provision the Commission is again not called upon

to decide whether or not the domestic courts have correctly assessed

the evidence before them, but only "whether evidence for and against

the accused has been presented in such a manner, and the proceedings

in general have been conducted in such a way, that he has had a fair

trial" (see the Commission's conclusion in its report on the Nielsen

Case, supra, para. 52).

In the present case the Commission observes that the applicant's

conviction by the Regional Criminal Court in Vienna has by no means

been based solely on the hearsay evidence given by Drs. H. and P., but

that there was other evidence weighing against him. Indeed, the

judgment of 23 July 1969 of the V. Regional Criminal Court shows that

the evidence on which the Court relied was of a variety of sources and

quality, including several witnesses whose evidence could not be

qualified as "hearsay" evidence, as well as documentary evidence and

a factual element which could be interpreted as amounting to a

confession.

Apart from this, it further emerges clearly from the above judgment

that the Regional Criminal Court in V. has been fully aware of the

nature of "hearsay" evidence and of the objections that might be raised

against it. It has therefore given a particularly careful and critical

attention to the examination and evaluation of this evidence.

Finally, there is nothing in the applicant's submissions to suggest

that he has been prevented in any way from challenging the veracity of

the statements made by Drs. H. and P. or from adducing evidence on his

behalf, or otherwise from putting his defence before the Court.

The Commission finds therefore that in the present case there has

equally been no appearance of a breach of the applicant's right to a

fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

An examination by the Commission of the applicant's complaints as they

have been submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does

therefore not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Article 6

(Art. 6).

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be

rejected in accordance with Article 27 (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention .

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION

INADMISSIBLE