THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised

as follows:

The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in Liverpool in 1916.

When he introduced his application he was held in H.M. Prison, A. but

was released early in 1972 and now lives in F., London.

On .. June 1966, while serving a prison sentence in W., he underwent

an operation to straighten the toes of his right foot. He was released

from prison on .. September  1966.

The applicant was again sent to prison in about July 1967: this time

to P. On .. August 1969 he underwent a further operation in the prison

hospital to amputate the small toe of his right foot. Some time between

the date and .. October 1969 the applicant petitioned the Home

Secretary for compensation and for permission to seek legal advice with

a view to claiming compensation for disability in his right foot. It

appears that he complained of negligence by the prison medical

authorities. His petition was rejected as, in the view of the Home

Office, the first operation was properly successfully carried out and

the applicant had throughout received all the treatment and advice

which would have been expected from competent and conscientious

doctors; in any case, according to the Home Office, the Statute of

Limitations barred the applicant from taking legal action as the

original operation had taken place more than 3 years previously.

The applicant again petitioned the Home Secretary, apparently for the

same purpose, on .. February 1970 and .. October 1970, but his

petitions were rejected.

The applicant underwent a further operation in A. Prison hospital on

.. October 1971 to straighten the big toe of his right foot. The

operation was carried out by the P. prison surgeon and entailed a month

in P. prison hospital.

The applicant states that he did not consider making any further

petitions to the Home Office after his treatment in 1971, because he

expected that any further petitions would be rejected like the earlier

ones.

In March 1972 the applicant was discharged from A. prison and went to

live in Southampton. It seems that he then underwent yet another

operation to shorten the bone in his big toe. He is still receiving

out-patient hospital treatment. He moved to F. in July 1972.

Complaints

The applicant complains that he entered prison a fit man and was

discharged a cripple. He now walks with a limp. He can no longer take

work as a labourer and is obliged to live on Social Security.

He complains of the fact that while he was in prison his petitions from

compensation were rejected and that he was not granted facilities to

seek legal advice.

He does not allege the violation of any particular Article of the

Convention but requests the Commission to grant him compensation.

THE LAW

The applicant has complained that he entered prison a fit man and was

discharged a cripple. He states that he now walks with a limp, can no

longer take work as a labourer and is obliged to live on Social

Security. He further complains of the fact that while he was in prison

he petitioned for compensation and for permission to see a lawyer and

that his petitions were rejected.

It is not clear from the way in which the applicant has presented the

facts of his case to the Commission how he considers that they

constitute a violation of the Convention. He has not specified the

violation of any particular Article of the Convention but has asked the

Commission to grant him compensation.

It appears that the applicant's main object has at all times been to

obtain the payment of a sum of money as compensation. He has applied

on several occasions to the United Kingdom authorities for payment and

this has been refused. Such refusal in no way constitutes a violation

of the Convention which does not provide, as such, for payment of

social and medical benefits. But on one occasion the applicant also

applied for permission to seek legal advice and it seems that this

application was also refused. The Commission has examined this aspect

of the case in the light of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

which provides that "in the determination of his civil rights and

obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal ...".

If the applicant applied for leave to see a solicitor with a view to

the eventual "determination of his civil rights" and such leave was

refused, this might appear, prima facie, to raise an issue under

Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It would not be relevant

that the authorities themselves considered that he had no civil right

or that they considered that such right had been barred by the passing

of time. This was something which should have been decided by the

"independent and impartial tribunal" unless, for example, he abandoned

his action because a lawyer, acting on the applicant's behalf,

intervened to inform him that the matter was not worth taking before

a tribunal.

In this respect the facts of the case cause some difficulty. The

applicant originally petitioned the prison authorities for compensation

and for permission to see a lawyer. Both requests were refused. The

applicant then states that he did not consider making any further

petitions to the Home Office after his treatment in 1971, because he

expected that any further petitions would be rejected like the earlier

ones. This does not seem unreasonable. In December 1971, however, a

White Paper was laid before the United Kingdom Parliament announcing

that existing prison practice would be liberalised in such a way that

where a prisoner had suffered some physical injury or disablement and

when there was an allegation of negligence on the part of the prison

authorities or staff, that prisoner would be granted access to a

solicitor in order to obtain advice as to the possible institution of

civil proceedings. Under this new practice it seems that the applicant

was entitled to seek legal advice for that purpose. Yet he did not

attempt to take advantage of it. Nor, when he was released from prison

in March 1972, did he attempt to consult a solicitor.

Although, therefore, it appeared that the applicant was prevented from

consulting a lawyer in 1969, it seems that he took no advantage of the

opportunity to see a lawyer which was offered to him from December 1971

onwards. Neither during the last three months of his imprisonment, nor

on his release from prison, did he attempt to consult with a lawyer.

Such conduct appears to indicate that he did not wish after all to have

his "civil rights determined" within the meaning of Article 6 (1)

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Even supposing, therefore, that the refusal of the authorities in 1969

to allow the applicant to consult a solicitor was not in conformity

with Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission notes

first that such a situation will not occur again because the relevant

United Kingdom practice has been liberalised; and, secondly, that the

applicant did not consult a solicitor when he was able to do so. In

this respect the Commission refers to the legal principle of "de

minimis non curat lex". It seems improper to hold that the authorities

prevented the applicant from obtaining the "determination of his civil

rights" when his later conduct indicates that he was seeking nothing

beyond a lump sum payment of compensation directly from the Government

or the Commission.

An examination by the Commission of this complaint as it has been

submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not therefore

disclose an appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set

forth in the Convention and in particular in the above Article.

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION

INADMISSIBLE