THE FACTS

I. Description of the applicants and presentation of their applications

1. The seven applicants are: Gerard Donnelly, age 29 years (No.

5577/72), Gerard Bradley, age 20 years (No. 5578/72), Edward Duffy, age

17 years (No 5579/72), all resident in Belfast; John Carlin, age 24

years, resident in Londonderry (No 5580/72); Francis McBride, age 26

years, of Rasharkin, County Antrim (No 5581/72); Anthony Kelly, age 20

years (No 5582/72); and Thomas Kearns, age 29 years (No 5583/72); both

resident in Newry, County Down, in Northern Ireland. All seven

applicants are citizens of the United Kingdom. When lodging their

applications all applicants were held in custody. The applicants

Donnelly, Bradley and Duffy were subsequently released, but the

applicant Duffy is at present again in custody. The applicants have

made their applications jointly through their legal representatives Mr

C. Kevin Boyle, Barrister-at-law and a lecturer at Queen's University,

Belfast and Mr Hurst Hannum, A.B., J.D. of Belfast.

II. Summary of the applicants' original complaint and claim

2. The applicants stated that on various days during April and May 1972

they were taken into custody by members of the British Army or the

Royal Ulster constabulary (RUC), security forces responsible to the

respondent Government, and subjected to interrogation, during which

time they were the victims of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment

contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

3. The following allegations were made with regard to the particular

applicants:

(a) Applicants Donnelly, Bradley and Duffy stated that they had been

arrested together about midnight on 20 April 1972 by soldiers of the

British Army. They had been held at a military post for eighteen hours

during which time they had been separately interrogated and had been

the victims of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment at the hands

of Special Branch Officers of the RUC and the British soldiers. Each

of them had signed statements which each alleged had been made under

duress. The applicants had been charged with various offenses the

following day, 21 April 1972, on the basis of these statements. Each

of them had been remanded to a military hospital for medical treatment

for the injuries inflicted on him during interrogation.

Each applicant submitted to the Commission a signed statement giving

a detailed description of the ill-treatment to which he alleged that

he had been subjected. All of them claimed that they had been

repeatedly beaten on the head and body and kicked in the genitals.

Applicant Donnelly also alleged that he had been given electric shocks

in the genitals.

Medical reports were submitted in respect of each applicant indicating

the injuries which had been found at an examination on 22 April 1972.

The reports were accompanied by photographs.

(b) Applicant McBride stated that he had been arrested on the afternoon

of 13 April 1972 by members of the RUC. He had been taken to various

places while in custody for a period of two days, during which time he

had been interrogated and had been the victim of torture, inhuman and

degrading treatment at the hands of officers of the RUC. The applicant

had signed a statement which he alleged he made under duress and had

been charged with an offence on the basis of this statement on 13 April

1972.The applicant submitted to the Commission a signed statement describing

how he had been repeatedly beaten. He also stated that he had been

given tea to drink which made him feel dizzy.

(c) Applicant Carlin stated that he had been arrested on the evening

of 25 April 1972 by members of the RUC. He had been taken to various

places while in custody for a period of three days and during this time

he had been interrogated and had been the victim of torture, inhuman

and degrading treatment at the hands of members of the RUC. This

applicant alleged that he had been made to sign a statement under

duress that he had not been ill-treated by the police. He had refused

to sign other statements implicating him in offenses.

In a statement the applicant described the alleged ill-treatment which

included beatings and kicking. He also submitted a report on a medical

examination carried out on 2 May 1972.

(d) Applicant Kelly stated that he had been arrested on the evening of

29 April 1972 by soldiers of the British Army. He had been beaten by

the soldiers, then taken to a police station and had been in custody

for a period of two days, during which time he had been interrogated

and had been the victim of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment at

the hands of officers of the RUC. This applicant reported suffering

hallucinations while in custody and submitted medical evidence in

support which indicated that drugs had been administered to him with

the purpose of having him admit to offenses. He had signed a statement

which he alleged had been made under duress. The applicant had been

charged with an offence on the basis of this statement on 1 May 1972.

This applicant submitted a signed statement describing the alleged

ill-treatment and a report of medical examinations carried out on 1 and

4 May 1972.

(e) The allegations in respect of the applicant Kearns were made in

similar terms to those used with regard to Kelly.

No personal statement was submitted in respect of this applicant. A

medical report was filed concerning the results of a medical

examination carried out on 1 May 1972. The report concluded that the

applicant had been given amphetamines deliberately to cause an anxiety

state.

4. The seven applicants jointly submitted that the "practices and

procedures to which they and each of them were subjected are in

flagrant breach of Article 1 and Article 3 of the said Convention and

constitute part of a systematic administrative pattern which permits

and encourages brutality and is incompatible with the said Convention".

5. In support of their allegations the applicants submitted a number

of documents including copies of the Compton and Parker Reports and a

report published in March 1972 by Amnesty International. In particular,

the applicants referred to 157 specific cases of alleged ill-treatment.

These cases wee taken from the following sources:  the Compton and

Amnesty reports, a booklet prepared by the Association for Legal

Justice in Northern Ireland entitled "The Mailed Fist", a booklet

prepared by Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray entitled

"British Army and Special Branch RUC Brutalities", statements taken by

the Association for Legal Justice and from certain newspaper reports.

The applicants also made extensive arguments intended to show that the

applications should not be rejected for failure to satisfy the rule of

exhaustion of domestic remedies in Article 26 of the Convention.

6. The applicants asked the Commission, inter alia, to "Commence as

soon as possible a full investigation of the allegations made in the

present application as well as of the system of interrogation currently

employed by security forces under the control of the United Kingdom in

Northern Ireland, with the purpose of determining whether or not such

specific acts and administrative practices are incompatible with the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms."

In addition, the applicants requested that the Convention should issue

a temporary injunction. However, in view of the Commission's decision

of 14 July 1972 to the effect that it did not have the power,

consistent with its functions under the Convention, to meet this

request, the applicants do not pursue this request and have made no

further observations in this respect.

III. Submissions of the parties

A. As to the facts and relevant provisions of United Kingdom law

7. In their written observations and oral submissions on admissibility

the respondent Government strongly denied that there had been in

Northern Ireland, at any time relevant to these applications, any

administrative practice of ill-treatment or other conduct which might

contravene Article 3 of the Convention or any official tolerance of

such conduct. The respondent Government further stated that they did

not admit that the applicants had been treated in the manner alleged

or that they had been treated in any way amounting to a violation of

Article 3 of the Convention.

8. As regards the facts which the Government considered relevant to

admissibility, it was submitted as follows:

(a) The applicants Bradley, Duffy and Donnelly were arrested on 21

April 1972; they were subsequently charged with causing an explosion

on 13 November 1971, and Duffy and Donnelly were also charged with

causing a further explosion on 30 March 1972. The three applicants

appeared at Belfast Custody Court on 22 April 1972. At Belfast

Magistrates Court, on 6 June 1972, no evidence was offered against the

applicants and they were released from custody.

On 16 May 1972 (while they were still in custody) the three applicants

commenced proceedings against the Crown, the Chief Constable and a

member of the RUC by issuing writs of summons. They claimed damages for

personal injuries and loss sustained by them by reason of assault and

battery and trespass. None of the applicants had taken any further step

to pursue these actions.

At the hearing on 22 April 1972, complaints were made that the

applicants had been subjected to ill-treatment whilst they were in

custody; these were investigated under Sec 13 of the Police Act

(Northern Ireland) 1970. As a result of these investigations, two

Detective Constables were charged with causing grievous bodily harm to

the applicants. In addition a soldier was charged with causing actual

bodily harm to Duffy. The case against them was tried before the Lord

Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and a jury. On 16 March 1973 the jury

returned verdicts of not guilty and all three defendants were

acquitted.

(b) The applicant McBride was arrested on 13 April 1972 and was

subsequently charged with murder. He was remanded in custody and

returned for trial in October 1972 on charges of the murder of a woman,

the attempted murder of a police constable and offenses under the

Explosive Substances Act. At the trial the applicant pleaded guilty to

manslaughter and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On 28 April 1972 complaints were received concerning allegations of

ill-treatment whilst he was in custody. These complaints were currently

under investigation.

(c) The applicants Kelly and Kearns were arrested on 29 April 1972 and

were both charged with conspiracy to murder and illegal possession of

firearms. Both were remanded in custody, and were returned for trial

for the October assizes. At their first trial the jury failed to reach

an agreement. When they were again put on trial, the applicants pleaded

guilty to certain offenses. On 8 May 1972 complaints were received

concerning allegations by them of ill-treatment while they were in

custody. These complaints were currently under investigation.

9. As regards the relevant provisions of United Kingdom law the

respondent Government first submitted that a person who claimed that

he had been ill-treated while in custody might, under the common law,

bring an action for damages, which, as a general rule, would be an

action for assault (this expression being used here to include

battery), against the person or persons allegedly responsible for the

assault. In certain circumstances an action for negligence might be

available where an action for assault would not lie.

The Crown was vicariously liable, by virtue of the Crown Proceedings

Act 1947, in respect of tortious acts of its servants committed in the

course of their duties. Thus, if a person was ill-treated by a Crown

servant (including a soldier), he had a right of action either against

the soldier allegedly responsible or against the Crown. A right of

action lay against the Crown even where it was not possible to identify

an individual soldier with sufficient precision to enable proceedings

to be instituted against him. When it was alleged that ill-treatment

or injury had been caused by a police officer (ie a member of the RUC),

the Chief Constable of the RUC might be sued under Section 14 of the

Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970, which provided that proceedings

might be brought against the Chief Constable in respect of torts

committed by members of the police force in the exercise, or purported

exercise, of their functions.

An assault might also constitute a criminal offence for which an

alleged wrongdoer might be prosecuted either at the instance of the

Crown or at that of an injured party, for a variety of offenses

depending on the seriousness of the assault. Moreover, a person who

sustained an injury which was directly attributable to a criminal

offence, might bring an action in a county court for compensation under

the Criminal Injuries to Persons (Compensation) Act (Northern Ireland)

1968. It was not necessary to identify the wrongdoer provided it

appeared on the balance of probabilities that the injury resulted from

a criminal act, nor was it necessary for the persons responsible for

the injury to have been prosecuted for a criminal offence in respect

of it. The court had jurisdiction to award compensation whatever the

amount claimed.

10. Where a complaint was made by a member of the public against a

member of the police force, the Chief Constable of the RUC was

required, by Section 13 of the Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970,

forthwith to record the complaint and cause it to be investigated.

Where a complaint was made against a member of the armed forces (which

amounted to an allegation of a criminal offence) involving a civilian,

it was the responsibility of the civil authorities, not the army

authorities, to investigate the complaint and the Director of Public

Prosecutions decided what legal action, if any, was required. But a

Commanding Officer might impose a disciplinary penalty, should he

consider that a soldier's misbehaviour, although not amounting to a

criminal offence, had been a breach of army discipline.

11. By virtue of the rules made under the Prison Act (Northern Ireland)

1953, an untried prisoner (by which term was meant a person detained

pending trial) should, at his request, be allowed to see his legal

adviser. Such visits should not be in the hearing of any officer or

other person nor, so far as was consistent with security and the

interests of justice, in the sight of any such person, unless the

prisoner or his legal adviser so desired. Untried prisoners might

commence legal proceedings after obtaining the permission of the

Governor of the prison; such permission was invariably given if the

reasons for commencing legal proceedings were themselves given. Similar

arrangements applied in the case of internees and detainees.

12. In their submissions the applicants did not dispute the

Government's above submissions. They pointed out, however, that, while

certain members of the security forces had been prosecuted as a result

of complaints made by the applicants Bradley, Duffy and Donnelly,

complaints of the other applicants were described as being merely under

investigation. The applicants also emphasised that the question whether

any particular applicant was charged or convicted of any particular

offence had no bearing on the substantive allegations in a complaint

under Article 3 of the Convention.

B. As to the admissibility of the applications

- Questions under Article 27 (1) and (2)

13. In their written observations the respondent Government referred

to the statement in the original application that the applicants were

bringing the applications "on behalf of themselves and all other

persons similarly situated". Furthermore, the Government stated that

the application was directed exclusively to questions of compatibility

with the Convention of an alleged administrative practice. The

respondent Government submitted that an application under Article 25

of such a nature and with such an object was inadmissible under Article

27. In particular, they submitted that, insofar as the application

purported to be made in respect of persons other than the seven named

applicants, it was incompatible with the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27 (2); it was also anonymous within the meaning of Article

27 (1) (a) as it was made otherwise than by or on behalf of a person

claiming to be a victim of a violation of the Convention. In addition,

since the application apparently complained exclusively of alleged

general practices and sought an investigation to the compatibility of

such practices, the application, being an individual application, was

as a whole incompatible with the Convention within the meaning of

Article 27, paragraph (2). In support of this submission the Government

referred to the Commission's case-law according to which the Commission

was not competent to examine in abstracto the question whether domestic

legislation was incompatible with the Convention, but could only

examine the compatibility of such legislation as it affected the

applicant. Reference was also made to the judgment of the European

Court of Human Rights in the De Becker Case. The Government argued that

this case-law was equally applicable to an application which sought to

obtain a determination of the compatibility of certain alleged

practices.

14. At the hearing these submissions were developed further on behalf

of the Government. It was then submitted that the applicants were, in

fact, putting two separate claims before the Commission. The first

claim was for a determination whether their individual rights under

Article 3 of the Convention had been separately violated. Subject to

the conditions in Article 26, such a claim was compatible with the

Convention. The second claim was a request for a determination whether

there had been a series of acts allegedly forming an administrative

practice. In the Government's submission, the latter claim was

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention in an application

under Article 25. The Commission had no competence to examine such a

claim regardless of the question whether it was made alone or together

with a claim that individual rights had been violated.

The Government submitted that it was clear, both from the text of the

Convention itself and from the Commission's and the Court's case-law,

that an individual could not raise before the Commission the question

of the compatibility with the Convention of legislation or an

administrative practice in general. Such a general claim could only be

considered in an application under Article 24 of the Convention. In an

application under Article 25 the Commission was only competent to

examine the compatibility of legislation insofar as it had actually

impinged on the applicant. If no application of a statute was involved,

an individual could only complain of a particular action which affected

him and the Commission had no power to consider whether there were

other actions which might form an administrative practice.

15. If, notwithstanding the above submissions, consideration were to

be given to the issue of compatibility raised in the application, the

Government submitted in their written observations that this

application was in terms and essence the same as a matter which was

already under examination by the Commission in application No 5310/71

(the Government of Ireland v. the Government of the United Kingdom).

This followed from the fact that application No 5310/71 had been

declared admissible on 1 October 1972, inter alia, insofar as it

related to "the allegation that the treatment of persons in custody,

in particular the methods of interrogation of such persons constitutes

an administrative practice in breach of Article 3 of the Convention"

(Collection of Decisions, Vol. 41, pp. 3, 91).

Having regard to the applicants' observations at the hearing the

Government in their final submissions on this point asked the

Commission to reject the application in accordance with Article 27 (1)

(b) of the Convention insofar as the applicants were claiming that the

methods of interrogation presently used in Northern Ireland, since the

abandonment of the five interrogation techniques referred to in the

Compton Report, constituted an administrative practice which was

incompatible with the Convention.

16. As regards the applicants' reference to Article 1 of the

Convention, the Government submitted in their written observations that

no question on the merits could arise in respect of an allegation of

a contravention of Article 1 separate from an allegation of a

contravention of one of the rights and freedoms defined in Section I

in the Convention. The Commission should therefore reject any such

complaint on the grounds that it was incompatible with the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2). At the hearing the

Government's representative took note of the fact that the applicants

had renounced their intention to make a separate claim under Article

1 of the Convention.

17. In their written observations, the applicants denied that their

application was anonymous and thus inadmissible under Article 27 (1)

(a). It had been brought under Article 25 of the Convention by seven

named individuals and evidence had been submitted on behalf of each of

them that he was a victim of a violation of Article 3. The references

to "persons similarly situated" in the original application primarily

concerned the request for a temporary injunction pending a full hearing

of the allegations.

18. The applicants also denied that they were requesting the Commission

to examine in abstracto an administrative practice alleged to be

incompatible with the Convention. Their claim was based on personal

experiences and they had requested a decision that they had been

subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In

addition to such a determination of a violation the applicants sought

to have the Commission protect them from further abuse of their rights

by requiring that such practices in breach of the Convention be

stopped. In order to ensure this protection the Commission should

require the respondent Government to satisfy it that domestic law no

longer facilitated or permitted such practices. The applicants

envisaged particularly powers under the Civil Authorities (Special

Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 which allowed for arrest and

detention for interrogation in depth for indefinite periods. The

applicants argued that they were fully entitled to request from the

Commission the relief set forth in paragraph 6 above.

19. The applicants further denied that their application was in terms

and essence the same as a matter before the Commission. In particular,

their application was submitted under Article 25 whereas application

No 5310/71 was submitted under Article 24. The applicants had no

connection, for the purpose of these proceedings, with the Government

which had initiated the inter-State application, nor did they have any

control in respect of that application which might be abandoned or

settled pursuant to Article 28 of the Convention. The applicants were

seeking individual remedies in their respective cases of their claim

that they had been victims of a violation of Article 3 of the

Convention. Furthermore, the applicants argued that the present

application was not the same as a matter "which has already been

examined" by the Commission, neither at the date of the introduction

of the application, nor at the date of the submission of their

observations. The applicants also pointed out that it was clear from

the applicant Government's submissions in the inter-State case that

they were not seeking relief in the name of any individual whereas the

present application was seeking such relief.

20. The applicants accepted that, under the Commission's case-law,

Article 1 did not create a separate enforceable right, but they argued

that it did reinforce the observations of the respondent Government

under Article 3 and that it underlined the competence of the Commission

to receive complaints of denials or violations of rights under Article

3.

21. In their submissions at the hearing the applicants' representatives

maintained the above submissions. They denied that they were raising,

as had been submitted by the respondent Government, two separate and

distinct issues before the Commission, namely the question of violation

of the applicants' individual rights and an in abstracto or general

claim. The applicants agreed that an individual was not competent to

raise in abstracto a general issue before the Commission. However, the

applicants sought to put in issue the existence of an administrative

practice of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment only in relation

to their claim that the direct application to each of them of this

practice had violated their rights under Article 3 of the Convention.

In this connection the applicants also referred to the Commission's

decision on admissibility of 16 December 1972 of application No 5155/71

(Kjeldsen v. Denmark) where a complaint concerning legislation on

compulsory sex education had been declared admissible although the

legislation had not yet been applied to the particular applicants or

their daughter. In the applicants' view this was, in a technical sense,

a complaint about a future violation, and they argued that in this

respect no distinction should be made between legislation and

administrative practices.

The applicants further argued that the competence of a State Party to

the Convention to raise an issue of the compatibility of legislative

measures and administrative practices could not detract from the power

of an individual applicant under Article 25 to raise the issue of an

administrative practice which directly affected him as a victim. The

distinction under the Convention between the powers of a State and an

individual would still be maintained because an individual application

was subject to the requirements under Article 25 and Article 27.

- Questions under Article 26

Submissions of the respondent Government

22. If the application were considered as a claim of a violation of the

Convention by each of the seven individual applicants in respect of

treatment he allegedly suffered himself, the respondent Government

submitted in their written and oral observations that the application

was inadmissible because each of the applicants had failed to exhaust

the remedies available to him under domestic law. It was further

submitted that the remedies described under Section IV A above were

adequate and sufficient remedies in respect of the treatment of which

the applicants complained and that these remedies were freely available

to each applicant. Reference was made to the Commission's case-law

according to which proceedings for damages for assault had been

considered an effective and sufficient remedy in respect of allegations

under Article 3 regarding ill-treatment by the police (eg application

No 4225/69, Collection of Decisions, Vol.33, p. 34).

23. Moreover, such remedies had been and were being pursued against the

Crown, the RUC and other authorities in Northern Ireland, including

claims of the kind made by the applicants. In particular, Bradley,

Duffy and Donnelly had commenced such proceedings and three persons had

been prosecuted for criminal offenses arising out of the complaints by

these three applicants.

24. The main written submissions by the respondent Government in reply

to the applicants' arguments that domestic remedies were not effective

or adequate may be summarised as follows:

- remedies were available against the Crown and the Chief Constable of

the RUC, even if the actual assailants were unknown to the applicant,

and the position was therefore different from the one referred to in

the Second Cyprus Case which had been invoked by the applicants

(Yearbook, Vol. 2, p. 186);

- the argument that any remedy for damages would not have any

preventive effect and could not protect individuals from future

ill-treatment was not relevant in an application under Article 25 of

the Convention as an applicant was required to exhaust the remedies

available to him in respect of the precise violation alleged;

- the argument that, because of the alleged lack of interrogation

guidelines, the respondent Government's practices could not be

adequately questioned or examined was equally irrelevant in a claim

under Article 25.

25. The Government maintained that the findings of the Commission in

the decisions on admissibility in the First Cyprus Case (Yearbook, Vol.

2, pp. 182, 284) and the First Greek Case that "the rule requiring the

exhaustion of domestic remedies does not apply where an application

raises, as a general issue, the compatibility with the Convention of

'legislative measures and administrative practices'" (Yearbook, Vol.

11, pp. 730, 770) was inapplicable to an application under Article 25.

This rule was only excluded in an application raising a general issue

which the Commission examined distinct from its effect on individuals.

It was not open to an applicant under Article 25 to prefer a claim of

such a nature and with such an object.

26. The Government accepted that an alleged administrative practice

could be considered by the Commission in relation to the effectiveness

of domestic remedies. However, such a practice could only be relevant

to the extent it was established that the particular practice impeded

the effectiveness of the particular remedy open to the applicant. In

the Government's view none of the applicants had shown that, as a

result of any practice as to the conduct of interrogation, he had been

impeded in his access to the domestic remedies available. The

applicant's contention that Article 26 did not apply to this

application was therefore misconceived and ill-founded.

27. If the Commission nonetheless were to consider the allegations of

an administrative practice, the Government submitted that the

applicants had not discharged the burden of proving the existence, at

any time relevant to the application, of any such practice. The

Government denied that there was or had been at any relevant time such

a practice of ill-treatment or other conduct which might contravene

Article 3 or, in particular, that there was any official tolerance of

any ill-treatment or conduct. Furthermore:

- as announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 2 March

1972, the five techniques used as an aid to interrogation examined by

the Compton and Parker Committees had been discontinued. It was denied

that any of these techniques violated Article 3. No other techniques

had been authorised. The applicants' suggestion that "beating, torture,

humiliation" had been or were authorised was untrue. Interrogation in

depth without the use of the abandoned techniques continued but meant

only extensive and searching questioning of suspects;

- to guard against ill-treatment during interrogation the Attorney

General had issued instructions that interrogation must only be

conducted in accordance with the law and he had warned the security

forces that, if there was evidence of assault or intimidation, those

responsible would be prosecuted;

- whenever complaints had been made that the security forces had acted

in a way which might be said to contravene Article 3 of the Convention,

the Government had acted promptly to investigate the complaints.

28. At the hearing the respondent Government developed these arguments

in greater detail in the light of the applicants' written and oral

submissions.

As regards the applicants' argument that Article 26 of the Convention

did not apply to the present applications because they raised an issue

of an administrative practice, the Government now also referred to the

Commission's decisions on the admissibility of the Second Greek Case

(Yearbook, Vol. 3, pp. 122, 132) and the Ireland v. the United Kingdom

Case (Collection of Decisions, Vol. 41, pp. 3, 84). In the Government's

view it was clear from these decisions that the exception to Article

26 of the Convention invoked by the applicants could not be applied to

an application under Article 25, in which no general issue of

compatibility could be raised. Moreover, the Commission had held in the

latter decision that, even in an application under Article 24 where

such a general issue could be raised, the domestic remedies' rule

applied where the State also complained of the violation of the rights

of individuals. It must follow a fortiori that, in an Article 25

application, in which an applicant was only entitled to complain of a

violation of his individual rights, his complaint could only be

admitted if he had exhausted domestic remedies.

29. The Government maintained that adequate and effective remedies were

available and had not been exhausted by any of the applicants. The

Government then replied to the various arguments made by the applicants

to show that there were no such remedies. It was first recalled that

remedies were available against the Crown or the Chief Constable of the

RUC even if the individual assailant could not be identified. Moreover,

the Commission had previously held that in general an action for

damages was a sufficient remedy for physical assault. The Government

then referred to the applicants' argument that an award for

compensation was not a remedy as they were not seeking compensation but

protection for themselves and others from brutality which they thought

they might suffer in the future. The answer to this argument was that

Article 25 only entitled an applicant to complain of violations of

which he was a victim and gave him no right to be protected from

something which had not yet happened.

The Government further maintained that the absence of interrogation

guidelines to which the applicants had referred was irrelevant to the

question of remedies. Such guidelines could only direct soldiers or

policemen to interrogate people in accordance with the law and could

not affect the right of action for assault or battery.

It was true that, as stated by the applicants, "a person's

international human rights were not justiciable under internal British

law". However, although the acts of which the applicants complained

might well infringe international human rights, they would also

constitute an infringement of rights under domestic law for which there

was a domestic remedy. It could not affect the effectiveness of the

remedy if the domestic law placed the act in the category of acts

infringing domestic law rather than acts infringing international law.

It was also true that the existence of legislation or administrative

practice incompatible with the Convention could not be raised before

a Court in the United Kingdom. This did not, however, mean that no

effective remedy was available for a violation of rights of which the

applicants were entitled to complain to the Commission, since under

Article 25 individuals could not complain of the compatibility of an

administrative practice in general. Their right under Article 3 of the

Convention was a right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or

degrading treatment and the Government repeated that, if there was a

violation of this right, a domestic remedy was available.

30. The Government also denied that there was any evidence of an

administrative practice in Northern Ireland which would prevent the

effective pursuit of domestic remedies. In this connection, the

Government recalled that the Commission had held in the Ireland v. the

United Kingdom case that an applicant who sought to exclude the

application of the domestic remedies' rule on the ground of the

existence of an administrative practice was required to establish the

existence of such practice by means of substantial evidence.

(Collection of Decisions, Vol. 41, pp. 3, 85). In the Government's

submission the applicants had produced no substantial evidence to show

that they were being deterred from pursuing the remedies available to

them by reason of harassment by the security forces or of fear of

continuing incarceration. In fact such remedies were being pursued by

individuals against agents of the respondent Government. In this

connection, the Government submitted information as to proceedings

taken during the period between 9 August 1971 (when internment was

introduced) and the present day.

The figure submitted showed, inter alia that civil actions for

maltreatment and false arrest and imprisonment and been brought by 152

persons. Of these cases 31 had already been settled or decided and 40

cases had been commenced while the plaintiff was in custody. Legal aid

had been granted in 16 cases. There had also been 83 actions alleging

false arrest and imprisonment. Of these seven had been settled or

decided and seven commenced while the plaintiff was in custody. As

regards prosecutions against members of the security forces for assault

or other offenses of a similar nature, 30 cases had been decided. Of

these eight had resulted in convictions:  four on indictment (ie tried

before a judge and jury) and four in the magistrate's court (sitting

without a jury). In 12 cases the defendants had pleaded guilty and in

10 cases the defendants had been acquitted. There were 17 further cases

pending. In 49 cases (and possibly in a few more recent cases) the

Director of Public Prosecutions had directed that no prosecutions

should be brought. In this context the Government also gave information

as to the sentences imposed.

31. The Government rejected the applicants' suggestion that there had

been any official tolerance of maltreatment such as alleged and they

again referred to the instructions issued by the Attorney General as

to the way persons in custody should be treated. Moreover, the

above-mentioned prosecutions against members of the security forces

showed that there was no such tolerance on the part of the United

Kingdom authorities. The Government also rejected the suggestions that

the prosecution against the three members of the security forces

suspected of assault upon the applicants Donnelly, Bradley and Duffy

had not been pressed with due vigour. The fact was that these persons

had been properly tried according to the regular course of criminal

procedure and acquitted by the jury. It was true that Mr Duffy had been

arrested in the course of the trial after he had given his

evidence-in-chief. The reason was, however, that Mr Duffy was suspected

of having abducted two men at gunpoint in February 1973. At the time

of the trial, the police had been unable to find Mr Duffy and they were

afraid that he would not return the next day to complete his evidence.

32. The Government also commented on the particular details given by

the applicants in support of their allegations that they were harassed

or had been frightened of what would happen to them if they pursued any

remedies. In fact, MM. Donnelly, Bradley and Duffy had commenced

proceedings which they, in their own submission, had not yet pursued

only because they were awaiting the outcome of the trial. Particulars

of alleged harassment had only been given with regard to these three

applicants. The Government were unable to agree with certain of these

allegations. In particular as regards Mr Duffy, the Government pointed

out that he had been arrested and convicted of certain offenses in

August 1972 and that he was now awaiting trial on more serious charges.

33. In reply to the applicants' suggestions that the Commission should,

if necessary, join the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies to

the merits of the application, the respondent Government submitted that

the situation in the present case was unlike the situation in previous

cases where the Commission had adopted such a course. In the previous

cases the issue under Article 26 of the Convention had been practically

identical with one of the substantive issued raised by the applicants.

The Government claimed that there was no such connection in the present

case and that, if the case were to proceed to an examination of the

merits, there would no longer be any issue of an administrative

practice. Moreover, the Government asked the Commission, bearing in

mind the circumstances out of which this case arose, to hesitate before

taking a course which might involve the parties in an investigation of

the merits which in the ultimate issue would prove to be unwarranted.

Submissions of the applicants

34. In their written observations the applicants denied that their

application was inadmissible on the ground that they had failed to

exhaust the domestic remedies available to them.

In the first place, the applicants argued that the exception to the

domestic remedies's rule relating to administrative practices in the

context of Article 3, elaborated by the Commission in the First Cyprus

and First Greek Cases, was not limited to applications under Article

24. The Commission might, in an application by an individual, examine

the existence of "administrative practices" as part of the

determination of whether the applicant's rights had been denied him.

In its discretion, the Commission might choose to postpone a decision

on this point until the merits.

35. The applicants submitted that, provided they were victims of

violations of Article 3 and claimed that the violation resulted

directly from the administrative practice complained of, there was no

barrier to prevent them putting in issue the existence of an

administrative pattern as part of their application. The applicants

therefore asserted that, given the existence of an administrative

pattern of torture and brutality which allegedly existed in Northern

Ireland and under the jurisprudence of the Cyprus and Greek cases,

Article 26 was inapplicable and thus no barrier to their application.

36. In the alternative, should the Commission take the view that the

decision in the Cyprus and Greek cases was not applicable to the

applications under Article 25 of the Convention, the applicants urged

that the arguments which led to the creation of the exception were

equally valid in an application under Article 25. It was clear that,

whether the complaint was an individual or a State, no adequate and

effective domestic remedy could exist where there was a continuing

administrative pattern of violation of the Convention. The situation

complained of remained the same, whether the complainant was an

individual or a State Party to the Convention and whether or not an

individual complainant might later be financially compensated for his

physical injuries. The emphasis given to the inviolability of Article

3 rights in the Convention lead to the conclusion that the broadest

possible scope must be given to the Commission to examine alleged

violations of these fundamental rights.

37. In the further alternative, should the Commission accept the

respondent Government's argument that an administrative pattern must

be shown to affect the obligation regarding domestic remedies open to

the individual applicants, the applicants submitted that such had in

fact been the case.

According to the respondent Government's own figures in their written

observations, half of the formal complaints alleging physical

ill-treatment by security forces had not been pursued. It was evident

that the existence of a widespread pattern of torture and brutality

would necessarily intimidate those who might wish to complain about the

treatment they had received. The situation in Northern Ireland at the

time of this application, and at present, remained one where emergency

measures had been invoked, where over 20,000 members of the British

Army were present, and where powers of detention without trial or under

special trial procedures were still operative. All of the circumstances

created an atmosphere where complainants must be assumed to have

serious hesitation in pursuing any action against the Government.

In the context of the present application, four of the applicants had

been in continuous custody throughout all the stages of the

application. The three applicants not in such custody, particularly Mr

Duffy, had complained of continuing harassment by the security forces.

In the applicants' submission it was very possible that this harassment

and the continuing incarceration of the other four applicants was

intended as a warning to others who might wish to pursue legal remedies

against agents of the respondent Government.

38. In the future alternative, the applicants submitted that, in the

light of the remedy which they sought of the Commission, no adequate

or effective domestic relief existed.

39. The applicants submitted that Article 3 of the Convention was by

its nature of special concern to the Commission. Its prohibition was

absolute and it could not be derogated from in any circumstances. The

physical and psychological scars of torture, brutality, and humiliation

were not easily erased, nor were they confined only to those who had

themselves undergone physical mistreatment. Where torture was

widespread, it would have a chilling effect on all members of society,

and it would inhibit the full exercise of political rights as well as

violate the rights of those actually brutalised. If the applicants'

experiences had been isolated cases of security forces' brutality

without the tacit approval of higher officials, the applicants might

be prepared to accept the argument that the existence of domestic

legislation would be adequate to protect their rights. Where it was

alleged, however, that the experiences of the applicants were merely

one part of a larger pattern of brutality and torture directed against

a political minority, the Government responsible for such activities

should not be allowed to continue to violate Article 3 of the

Convention and at the same time argue that, as long as compensation was

available, such violations could not be examined by the Commission.

While three prosecutions had been initiated by the respondent

Government this did not touch the question of the encouragement or

toleration of brutality that must have existed at higher levels in the

chain of command.

40. Specific acts of torture might be illegal under the domestic law

of assault, for example, but the question of whether or not a person's

international human rights had been violated was not justiciable under

internal British law. The existence of legislation or an administrative

practice incompatible with the Convention could not be raised in the

courts of the United Kingdom.

41. While it was true that such a situation might be the subject of

complaint and referred to the Commission through an inter-State

application, the rights of an individual and the protection provided

by the Convention could not be made to depend solely on the good

offices of another nation.

The applicants were themselves victims of the administrative pattern

or brutality and torture about which they were complaining. Due to the

special status of Article 3 in the scheme of the Convention and due to

the difficulties referred to above in obtaining adequate relief for a

widespread pattern of violation, they submitted that it was proper, and

entirely compatible with the provisions of the Convention, for them to

seek a determination by the Commission of the question whether or not

such acts and administrative practices violated Article 3 of the

Convention, as well as a determination of the question whether their

individual rights were violated as a result of treatment meted out to

them in furtherance of such administrative practice. In their view only

such relief would provide the applicants with an adequate and effective

remedy.

42. At the hearing the applicants' representatives maintained these

submissions. The applicants claimed that, because they were victims of

violations of Article 3 of the Convention and because the injuries

inflicted on them in breach of that Article took place within a system

of interrogation and officially tolerated torture, inhuman and

degrading treatment or punishment, they were not bound to exhaust

domestic remedies before seeking relief before the Commission. The

applicants argued that they suffered their injuries as part of a

systematic, repeated and official interrogation procedure known as

interrogation in depth, whereby acts of physical beatings,

psychological intimidation and sensory deprivation through the

administration of drugs were either officially authorised, condoned or

tolerated at various levels in the chain of command.

43. The applicants admitted that, in normal circumstances, an isolated

incident of police brutality could only be brought before the

Commission where the domestic remedies had been exhausted. However, the

situation was entirely different where, as in the present case, police

officers and security forces were guilty of systematic brutality as

part of a policy of extracting information or obtaining confessions in

order to achieve convictions; furthermore, this had to be seen against

the background of an official policy which included the mass arrest of

political suspects and the exercise of emergency powers of arrest

allowing unlimited detention and interrogation. The applicants alleged

that the circumstances of their arrest and interrogation showed several

common features. In particular, they claimed that the purpose of their

interrogation and treatment was to obtain a confession. With the

exception of Mr Carlin, they all signed statements which they later

repudiated as having been obtained as a result of physical or

psychological pressure.

In support of their allegation that their ill-treatment formed part of

an administrative pattern the applicants referred to the statements and

other evidence filed with their application. In their view this

evidence established the existence of an administrative pattern by

showing both a repetition of acts and official tolerance of such acts.

44. The applicants maintained that the exception to the domestic

remedies' rule in applications in respect of legislative measures and

administrative practices applied to applications under Article 25 of

the Convention as well as to those under Article 24 of the Convention.

In the applicants' opinion there was no support in the Commission's

case-law for the contention that this exception should be confined to

applications under Article 24, although it was true that the Commission

had not previously held that it applied also to an Article 25

application.

45. In terms of relief the applicants sought from the Commission that

it both enquired into the administrative practice alleged and declared

that their experiences were violations of Article 3. Further, they

sought from the Commission such protection as would ensure that their

rights could be protected in the future from violation which would in

fact continue if the administrative practice alleged did not cease. The

process of providing such relief made it necessary for the Commission

to consider the compatibility with the Convention of the administrative

practices relating to interrogation in Northern Ireland.

It might be objected that, to hold that Article 26 did not apply to an

application under Article 25 where the individual alleged that he was

the victim of an administrative practice, would render Article 26 an

ineffective first barrier to the Commission's jurisdiction and expose

it to a flood of claims from people who had not exhausted domestic

remedies. However, the combined effect of the normal application of

Article 26, of the requirements of Article 25 and the powers given to

the Commission to reject applications under Article 27 were powerful

controls available to the Commission on claims brought under Article

25. To hold that the exception to Article 26 developed in inter-State

cases also applied to applications under Article 25 would not in any

way affect the intent and purposes of the limitations and conditions

with regard to the right of individual petition. Moreover, to hold that

the exception did not apply would run counter to the purpose of the

Convention which was to provide full protection not to States but to

individuals. In the applicants' submission, to hold that Article 26

applied differently to States and individuals would be contrary to

normal rules of interpretation of treaties generally and found no

support in the decisions of the Convention, the language of the

Convention or the travaux préparatoires to it.

46. In this connection, the applicants also referred to the decision

on admissibility in the Ireland v United Kingdom case (Collection of

Decisions, Vol. 41, pp. 3, 86) where the existence of an administrative

practice with regard to the interrogation techniques practised by the

security forces in Northern Ireland had been considered. In that case

the Commission held that the so-called Compton techniques amounted to

an administrative practice. In the applicants' submission it would be

unreasonable if such an administrative pattern could not be questioned

by an individual applicant.

47. As regards the burden of proof, the applicants submitted that no

such burden rested on them at the admissibility stage with respect to

their claim that they personally were victims of violations of the

Convention. It was true, however, that the Commission's case-law

required, in relation to Article 26, the existence of legislative

measures or an administrative practice to be shown by substantial

evidence. The applicants argued that, where under Article 25 such a

measure or practice was alleged by an individual, the burden of proof

ought more properly to be on a lower level, namely, in the presentation

of a prima facie case. However, the applicants claimed that they had,

in any event, produced such substantial evidence as was required.

48. In their oral submissions the applicants' representatives also

developed the applicants' arguments that, even if Article 26 could not

be excluded on the above ground, domestic remedies were not adequate

and effective in the circumstances of this case.

It was submitted that the concept of adequacy meant that there must not

only be some remedy available to the applicants, but also an

appropriate remedy which was capable of redressing their specific

grievances. In order to judge the appropriateness it was necessary to

examine the nature of the applicants' claim and whether the relief

requested was available to them. The applicants argued that they were

entitled to seek relief by way of declaration that they had been

subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 as part of and

administrative practice. However, the only remedies indicated by the

respondent Government were directed either to compensation to the

victims for their injuries or to the prosecution of those responsible

for causing the injuries. The applicants submitted that criminal

prosecution could not provide an adequate remedy because the applicants

had no control over the initiation of such proceedings and any private

prosecution might be quashed by the Public Prosecutor. Moreover, the

inherent difficulties of identification and proof in such criminal

prosecutions would render them a rather haphazard method at best. In

this connection, the applicants also referred to the alleged official

toleration of violations of Article 3 of the Convention at a relatively

high level of administration and to the collaboration in concealment

of such violations at a lower level in the security forces.

49. As regards compensation, the applicants conceded that the civil

actions referred to by the respondent Government would constitute

adequate remedies for isolated cases of police brutality. However, in

the present case there were consistent, widespread acts of brutality

and torture, and merely awarding damages to a few individuals would

have no ameliorative effect on the practice itself.

50. With regard to the effectiveness of the remedies concerned, the

applicants claimed that the existence of the administrative practice

of which they had offered substantial evidence was the primary factor

in rendering any theoretically available remedy ineffective in Northern

Ireland. In the prevailing circumstances many individuals did not have

the courage to pursue legal remedies when they knew that they were

liable to be harassed, probably arrested, and possibly beaten as a

result. In this context the applicants described what they considered

to be the pattern of intimidation followed by the security forces. They

also referred to the 157 cases of alleged ill-treatment dealt with in

the statements and other evidence filed with their application. The

applicants also referred to certain more recent incidents, one of which

involved the arrest by the army of Mr Hannum and an English journalist

on the totally unfounded suspicion of being members of the IRA. Further

reference was made to incidents, subsequent to the introduction of

these applications, concerning the applicants Donnelly, Bradley and

Duffy, ie the only applicants not to have been in continuous custody

during this period. In particular, Mr Bradley's home has been raided

on numerous occasions and finally rendered uninhabitable by the army

in November 1972. All three applicants had been arrested at least once

during the period June 1972 - March 1973. Mr Duffy had been arrested

four times and Mr Donnelly had been photographed constantly by the

security forces and forced to move to the Republic of Ireland. The

applicants claimed that their experiences were typical of those

suffered by many who made allegations of ill-treatment against the

security forces.

51. The applicants also stressed that the lack of co-operation by

members of the security forces in civil or criminal proceedings had

been judicially noted. While it was true that a few soldiers had been

prosecuted for assault in Northern Ireland, there had been a lack of

enthusiasm in convicting and imposing realistic sentences on those who

participated in the continuing violations of Article 3. With regard to

the figures regarding legal proceedings presented at the hearing by the

respondent Government, the applicants observed that the number of

prosecutions had been extremely small in relation to the number of

allegations made. As to the civil actions only 31 cases out of 152 had

been decided. Of these 31 cases 29 had been settled out of court and

this again raised the question whether it was possible for the

Government to escape examination of its practices by simply paying

those whom they had ill-treated. Moreover, the number of actions filed

seemed in itself to indicate the existence of a pattern. According to

the applicants there was no let-up in complaints being filed and this

showed that these figures were irrelevant as regards the stopping of

the administrative practice alleged.

52. The applicants commented in detail on the proceedings brought

against three members of the security forces on charges of having

assaulted the applicants Donnelly, Bradley and Duffy. The applicants

maintained that this trial could not be cited as an example of vigorous

prosecution or the efficiency of judicial remedies generally. It also

evidenced the conspiracy of silence or concealment that existed among

the security forces when an issue of this kind was raised. Moreover,

as a result of the jury system in Northern Ireland, where only those

who own property are entitled to sit on the jury panel, the jury was

primarily, if not entirely, Loyalist or Protestant in composition. The

applicants claimed that Loyalists and Protestants tended to be

prejudiced against suspected terrorists and in favour of the security

forces. Finally, the applicants maintained that the fact that Mr Duffy

was arrested in the middle of the trial and appeared the next day in

the custody of four police officers to complete his evidence, was an

extremely prejudicial action which had no reasonable foundation.

53. The applicants stated that the civil proceedings instituted by MM

Donnelly, Bradley and Duffy had not been pursued because they wanted

to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the members

of the security forces who had been prosecuted. As regards the other

applicants it was admitted that there was no legal impediment to civil

proceedings, but these applicants had taken the view that to bring a

civil action would in fact provide a hopeless and ineffective remedy.

Moreover, MM Kelly and Kearns had stated that they did not wish to

pursue any civil proceedings until they were released from prison

because they believed that such action would prejudice their chances

for parole.

THE LAW

1. The applicants have alleged that, following their arrest by the

security forces in Northern Ireland, they were victims of violations

of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, and that the injuries so

suffered by them were part of an administrative practice authorising

or condoning torture or degrading or inhuman treatment within the

meaning of that Article.

The respondent Government have denied that there has been in Northern

Ireland, at any time relevant to the applications, any administrative

practice of ill-treatment or other conduct which might contravene

Article 3 (Art. 3). They have also denied that the applicants were

treated in the manner alleged by them, or that they were otherwise

treated in any way amounting to a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of

the Convention. The respondent Government further have submitted that

the Commission has no competence, under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention, to examine the applications insofar as the applicants are

complaining of the incompatibility with the Convention of an alleged

administrative practice. As regards treatment allegedly suffered by

each of the individual applicants, the respondent Government have

submitted that the applications are inadmissible on the ground that the

applicants have failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to

them as is required under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

If nevertheless, consideration were to be given by the Commission to

the issue of compatibility raised in the applications, the respondent

Government have then asked the Commission to reject the applications

in accordance with Article 27 (1) (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention

insofar as the applicants are claiming that the methods of

interrogation presently used in Northern Ireland, since the abandonment

of the five interrogation techniques referred to in the Compton Report,

constitute an administrative practice which is incompatible with the

Convention. Such complaints constitute the same matter as is already

before the Commission in application No 5310/71 lodged by the

Government of Ireland against the Government of the United Kingdom.

The applicants have stated in reply that they are entitled to raise the

issue of the compatibility with the Convention of an administrative

practice insofar as it relates to their claim that the application of

such practice to each of them has violated their rights under Article

3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. They have further submitted that Article

26 (Art. 26) of the Convention does not apply in the present case where

prima facie evidence of an administrative practice in violation of the

Convention had been produced. In the alternative, the applicants have

argued, that no adequate or effective remedies are available to them

under the law of Northern Ireland in view of the relief they seek from

the Commission and of the particular circumstances prevailing in

Northern Ireland.

As regards the respondent Government's submissions under Article 27 (1)

(b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention, the applicants have denied that

their applications are in either their terms or essence the same as a

matter already before the Commission, namely application No. 5310/71.

In particular, they have emphasised that their application has been

lodged under Article 25 (Art. 25) whereas application No. 5310/71 was

lodged under Article 24 (Art. 24) of the Convention and that,

furthermore, the applicants in each case are different. Moreover, the

applicants are seeking individual remedies in respect of their claim

that they have themselves been victims of violations of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention whereas the above inter-State case does not

seek relief in the name of any individual.

2. The Commission first observes that, under Article 25 (Art. 25) of

the Convention, it may only receive petitions from a person,

non-governmental organisation or group of individuals "claiming to be

the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the

rights set forth in this Convention". It follows that the Commission

can only consider the present applications insofar as they have been

brought by the seven applicants on their own behalf and the Commission

cannot, within the framework of the present case, examine whether or

not there had been a violation of the rights under the Convention of

any other individuals. However, neither Article 25 (Art. 25), nor any

other provisions in the Convention, inter alia Article 27 (1) (a)

(Art. 27-1-a), prevent an individual applicant from raising before the

Commission a complaint in respect of an alleged administrative practice

in breach of the Convention provided that he brings prima facie

evidence of such a practice and of his being a victim of it.

3. The Commission has further considered the respondent Government's

objection based on Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention to the effect

that the applicants have not exhausted the domestic remedies available

to them. The Commission here recalls that it has, in a number of

applications introduced under Article 24 (Art. 24) of the Convention,

held that the rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies does

not apply where an application raises as a general issue, inter alia,

the compatibility with Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention of an

administrative practice (see decisions on admissibility in the First

Cyprus Case, Yearbook, Vol. 2, pp. 182, 184, the First Greek Case,

Yearbook, Vol. 13, pp. 122, 132-133, and the Northern Ireland

inter-State case, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 41, pp. 3, 86-87).

Furthermore, the Commission has defined the essential characteristics

of an administrative practice as it is to be understood in relation to

the application of the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies in

its Report on the First Greek Case (Vol. II, p. 12 and Yearbook, Vol.

12 bis (The Greek Case) p. 194).

In particular, the Commission stated that where "there is a practice

of non-observance of certain Convention provisions, the remedies

prescribed will of necessity be side-stepped or rendered inadequate.

Thus, if there was an administrative practice of torture or

ill-treatment, judicial remedies prescribed would tend to be rendered

ineffective by the difficulty of securing probative evidence, and

administrative enquiries would either not be instituted, or if they

were, would be likely to be half-hearted and incomplete".

The Commission considers that, by similar reasoning, where an applicant

under Article 25 (Art. 25) submits evidence, prima facie substantiating

both the existence of an administrative practice of the nature

described above, which he alleges to be contrary to Article 3, and his

claim to be a victim of acts part of that practice, the domestic

remedies' rule in Article 26 (Art. 26) does not apply to that part of

his application.

In the present case, the Commission has examined the allegations made

by each of the applicants in the light of its previous decision of 1

October 1972 on the admissibility of application No 5310/71 introduced

by the Government of Ireland against the Government of the United

Kingdom. In that decision the Commission considered the applicant

Government's allegations that persons in custody in Northern Ireland

had been subjected to treatment which constituted torture and inhuman

and degrading treatment and punishment within the meaning of Article

3 (Art. 3) of the Convention and that such treatment constituted an

administrative practice. The Commission found first that the employment

of the five interrogation techniques referred to in the Compton Report

constituted an "administrative practice" and that consequently the rule

of exhaustion of domestic remedies did not apply to the applicant

Government's allegations under Article 3 (Art. 3) in respect of them.

Secondly, the Commission found that other forms of ill-treatment, were

alleged as forming part of the admitted administrative practice of

interrogation in depth, and that, therefore, the domestic remedies'

rule could not be properly applied to those allegations. The Commission

has also carried out a preliminary examination of the evidence

submitted jointly on behalf of each of the present applicants, in

particular the statements made by other persons in Northern Ireland

claiming to be victims of ill-treatment at the hands of the security

forces during the course of interrogation. Having in mind its decision

referred to above of 1 October 1972, and taking into account the

evidence submitted by the applicants jointly and by each of them

individually, the Commission finds that the applicants have provided

evidence which prima facie substantiates their allegations of the

existence of an administrative practice in violation of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention and of their being victims of that practice.

It therefore follows that the domestic remedies' rule does not apply

to this part of the present applications and the Commission finds that

the applicants' complaint in this respect raises issues of law and fact

whose determination should depend upon an examination of the merits of

the case.

4. The Commission has next considered the applications insofar as they

might raise the question whether each applicant was himself a victim

of specific acts, as distinct from an administrative practice, in

violation of Article 3 (Art. 3). The Commission observes that, in

principle, the applicants must be required under Article 26 (Art. 26)

of the Convention to exhaust the domestic remedies available to them

under the law of Northern Ireland with regard to such acts. However,

the Commission has frequently stated that the exhaustion of a given

remedy ceases to be necessary if the applicant can show that, in the

particular circumstances of his case, this remedy was unlikely to be

effective and adequate in regard to the grievances in question (see eg

the decision on admissibility of application No 4340/69, Simon-Herold

v. Austria, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 39, pp. 18-33).

In the present case, the question of the effectiveness of the remedies

available to the applicants is, for the reasons set out above, closely

linked with the alleged existence of an administrative practice in

breach of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. In these circumstances,

the Commission finds that the issue under Article 26 (Art. 26) cannot

be examined without an examination of questions which concern the

merits of the applicant's complaint concerning the alleged

administrative practice. The Commission has already found that the

determination of the part of the application relating to such

administrative practice should depend upon an examination of the

merits. Accordingly, the Commission finds it appropriate to join to the

merits the issue under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention relating

to the applicants' allegations that each of them was a victim of

specific acts in breach of Article 3 (Art. 3).

5. The Commission has also considered, in the light of the arguments

of the parties, the question whether any part of the present

applications should be rejected under Article 27 (1) (b) (Art. 27-1-b)

of the Convention, which provides that the Commission shall not deal

with any application submitted under Article 25 (Art. 25) which "...

is substantially the same as a matter which has already been examined

by the Commission ... and if it contains no relevant new information

...". The Commission, however, feels unable to accept the respondent

Government's submission that, in view of application No 5310/71 lodged

by the Government of Ireland against the United Kingdom, the present

applications should, in part, be declared inadmissible on this ground.

It is true that in the inter-State case similar issues under Article

3 (Art. 3) of the Convention have been raised and that the applicant

Government in that case have referred to the treatment of five of the

present applicants in support of their allegations under Article 3

(Art. 3). It is also true that an examination of the admissibility of

the inter-State case has already taken place. However, following the

Commission's decision to declare the relevant part of the inter-State

case admissible, an examination of the merits in accordance with

Article 28 (Art. 28) of the Convention still remained to be carried

out. This examination is currently being undertaken with the aim of

drawing up a report under Article 30 or Article 31 (Art. 30, 31) of the

Convention.

The relevant part of the inter-State case has therefore not yet been

"examined" within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (1), (b)