THE FACTS

The facts of the case may be summarised as follows:

A.1. General Background

The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1914 and resident in

Vienna. He has lodged with the Commission a previous application (No.

4517/70) (See Collection of Decisions, Vol. No. 38, pp. 90 and 99)

relating to criminal proceedings against him. These proceedings

concerned a number of charges brought in 1959 against the applicant and

several other persons, for having defrauded the exchequer by

fraudulently obtaining reimbursement of turnover tax to the extent of

several million schillings. The indictment was filed with the Regional

Criminal Court in Vienna on 17 March 1964. It contained altogether ten

charges against the applicant who was accused of

a) fraud by improperly obtaining turnover tax refunds for the sham

   export of various goods (points I/6, I/7, I/8a, I/8b and I/9 of the

   indictment);

b) attempted fraud, by attempting improperly to obtain turnover tax

   refunds for the sham export of various goods (points II/1, II/2a,

   II/2b and II/3 of the indictment);

c) attempt to aid and abet defamation (Article 9 and 209 StG) (point

   V of the indictment).

2. Proceedings on two further charges which were not included in the

indictment but were the subject matter of investigations were

discontinued in August and September 1964; viz a) the charge of having

been an accomplice in an offence of misuse of official powers within

the meaning of Articles 5 and 101 of the Criminal Code and b) the

charge of having made defamatory remarks about a lawyer and the

Vice-Chancellor of Austria.

On 16 September 1964, the Vienna Court decided, upon an application by

the Public Prosecutor's Office to discontinue, in accordance with

Article 109 StPO, the proceedings against the applicant as regards the

first-mentioned charges. The discontinuance was made subject to the

reservation of the Public Prosecutor's Office under Article 34 (2) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure to prosecute at a later date. The two

accused in this case, Fuchshuber and Rafael, were later acquitted for

lack of evidence against them. The second charge was similarly

discontinued on 28 September 1964 in accordance with Articles 34 (2)

and 363 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3. The main trial against the applicant started before the Vienna Court

in November 1964 but the proceedings were adjourned in June 1965 and

the case was referred back to the Investigating Judge. On 8 March 1966

the Regional Criminal Court of Vienna decided that the proceedings

against the applicant for fraud and attempted fraud as set out under

points I/6, II/1, 2a, 2b and 3 of the indictment should be

provisionally discontinued in accordance with Articles 109 and 34 (2)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The charge under point V of the

indictment was made the subject of separate proceedings. On 26 April

1967 the applicant and his co-accused were acquitted from this charge

for lack of evidence against them. As regards the applicant this

judgment became final.

4. The trial concerning the remaining charges (see points I/7, I/8a and

b and I/9 of the indictment) opened on 4 December 1967 and continued

until 2 July 1968. However, on 10 June 1968, at the Public Prosecutor's

request, the charges set out under points I/8b and I/9 of the

indictment were severed from the remainder.

5. On 2 July 1968, the Regional Criminal Court also severed the charge

under point I/8a and convicted the applicant of fraud with regard to

the improper obtaining of turnover tax refunds for the sham export of

running gears, as set out under point I/7 of the indictment of 17 March

1964. He was sentenced to three years' severe imprisonment. The written

judgment comprising 80 pages, the applicant first criticised generally

the terms of the judgment and the manner in which it had been drafted,

as well as the fact that, under the relevant provision of the Austrian

Code of Criminal Procedure, he had only had two weeks to submit his

plea whereas it had taken the Court more than eight months to prepare

the judgment. In this connection the applicant also invoked Article 6

(3) (b) of the Convention.

The applicant then stated his grounds of nullity and, first, relied on

Article 281 (1) Nos. 3 and 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging

that the Court should not have taken certain evidence under oath. He

next challenged the Court's findings of fact invoking Article 281 (1),

No. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pointing to many passages in

the judgment where the Court's findings, in his opinion, were either

unclear or incomplete, or contradictory in themselves, or based on

insufficient reasoning, or contrary to the contents of the case-file.

Finally, relying on Article 281 (1), No. 4 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure and Article 6 (2) and (3) (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention,

the applicant criticised the Court's refusal to hear certain evidence

offered by him. He further alleged that this inter alia deprived him

of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.

On 16 June 1971 the Supreme Court rejected the plea of nullity insofar

as the applicant had alleged violations of procedural law, and, on 4

November 1971 it rejected the appeal and the plea of nullity concerning

the alleged violations of substantive law.

6. The Commission considered the admissibility of the previous

application (No. 4517/70) on 19 December 1970. At that time the

applicant's appeal and plea of nullity to the Supreme Court were still

pending. By partial decision, it rejected all the applicant's

complaints except that under Article 6 (1) of the Convention, relating

to the length of the criminal proceedings. In particular, it found that

with regard to the complaints concerning the alleged deprival of his

right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in

accordance with Article 6 (6.1, 6.2, 6.3, b, c, d) of the Convention,

an alleged breach of his right to respect for private and family life

and his correspondence, or an alleged inhuman treatment, domestic

remedies had not been exhausted (Article 27 (3), of the Convention).

On 14 July 1971, the Commission declared admissible the applicant's

only remaining complaint, namely that Article 6 (1) of the Convention

had been violated by reason of the length of the criminal proceedings

against him.

7. After unsuccessful attempts to reach a friendly settlement, the

Commission adopted its report (Article 31) on 8 February 1973.

B.   Complaints included in the present application

In the present application, the applicant again submits complaints

relating to the above proceedings.

1. The applicant complains once more of the length of the criminal

proceedings instituted against him. Referring to the statement made on

14 July 1971 at the hearing on admissibility by the representative of

the Austrian Government (1), the applicant alleges that the authorities

have failed to discontinue certain proceedings with regard to which

preliminary investigations had been opened against him.

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(1) "I should inform the Commission that in respect of all the offenses

involving the applicant in which severance occurred the Public

Prosecutor's Office intends to discontinue (...) all further legal

proceedings against the applicant when the proceedings now pending in

the Supreme Court are concluded and its decision becomes final. I have

been authorised by the Public Prosecutor's Office to make this

announcement here."

--------------------------------

1.1  The applicant stresses that he had originally been charged in the

indictment on ten counts. He was later (2 July 1968) convicted on one

charge of fraud (point I/7 of the indictment) and (26 April 1967)

acquitted on another point (point V). The proceedings against him on

charges of fraud as set under points I/8a, I/8b and I/9 have been

formally discontinued on 26 May 1972 by decision of the Regional Court.

The applicant indicates however that the prosecution on charges of

fraud and attempted fraud as set out under points I/6, II/1, 2a , 2b

and 3 of the indictment, have only been provisionally discontinued on

8 March 1966 in accordance with Article 109 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, subject to a reservation of the Public Prosecutor's Office

under Article 34 (2) of the same Code to prosecute at a later date (see

A.3 above). The applicant submits that prosecution could be reopened

at any time on these charges, since the proceedings have not been

formally discontinued.

1.2  The applicant also complains that the proceedings have not been

expressly terminated with regard to the separate charge brought against

him of having been an accomplice in an offence of misuse of official

powers. As stated above (see A.2.) the prosecution against him had only

been provisionally discontinued (Article 109 and 34 (2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure). The applicant submits in this respect that his

situation is not affected by the fact that his co-accused and, in

particular, the civil servant Fuchshuber, had been acquitted on this

charge of misuse of official powers by judgment of the Regional Court

on 26 April 1967.

1.3  The applicant finally complains that, as a result and evidence

of these pending proceedings, he is still subject to travel

restrictions and his sister would still be bound, as a surety, by a

recognisance she entered into in 1965, to pay 50,000 schillings in the

event that the applicant, released on bail, would fail to appear in

court. By decision of the Regional Court of 4 July 1968, the applicant

has been given complete freedom to travel in Austria and abroad,

provided that he would report to the judge when summoned within 8 days

if in Austria, 30 days abroad.

The applicant indicated that on 23 June 1972 he orally asked Judge

Koubek to be freed from these restrictions (bail and travel

restrictions) but that the judge rejected this.

2. The applicant again submits various complaints under Article 6,

which had been rejected by the Commission on 19 December 1970 for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

2.1  The Vienna Regional Criminal Court has not been an independent

and impartial tribunal (Article 6 (1)) of the Convention for the

following reasons:

2.1.1 Under Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court

should not have taken certain evidence under oath, especially from

persons the applicant had requested to be prosecuted for having

allegedly committed "investigation crimes" and misuse of official

powers.

2.1.2 In many passages, the Court's findings are either unclear or

incomplete, or contradictory in themselves, or based on insufficient

reasoning, or contrary to the contents of the case-file.

2.2.1 The Regional Court has violated the principle of presumption of

innocence (Article 6 (2) of the Convention) when stating in its

reasoning that the applicant was not reliable (glaubwürdig). He submits

that the Court has considered his guilt as a "thesis" and rejected all

counter-submissions ("antitheses").

2.2.2 Furthermore, the applicant complains that his guilt was not only

presumed but alleged in the various warrants of arrest, letters

rogatory, and statements made before by Austrian officials in

Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. These documents

contained false information designed for the misleading of the foreign

authorities. In this respect, he specially refers to the warrant of

arrest in view of the extradition issued on 21 February 1961 which

reads, inter alia:  ".... in order to avoid an examination by the

fiscal authorities, the various co-accused decided to bribe the

accountant of the Tax Office. This bribery has been successful ...".

The applicant submits that his guilt was put forward in a very

affirmative way, although proceedings on this charge were lasted

discontinued.

2.3  The Regional Court has refused to hear certain evidence offered

by the applicant who alleges a violation of Article 6, paragraph (3)

(d) in this respect. On 17 and 18 June 1968, being the 78th and 79th

day of the trial, counsel for the applicant's defence made substantial

application for the taking of further evidence in connection with the

only remaining charges at that time, namely those under points I/7 and

I/8a of the indictment. However, on 2 July 1968 the Court also severed

the charge under point I/8a, rejected the 34 applications to take

evidence as being irrelevant, and convicted the applicant of fraud with

regard to the remaining point (I/7) of the indictment.

The applicant complained of this Court's refusal to hear further

evidence, in the introductory part of his plea of nullity. He referred

to Article 281, paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

After the Regional Court, the Supreme Court repeated that the

obligation to hear evidence was in no way unlimited and that a Court

may refuse to summon witnesses whose statements could not be of any

relevance in the case. The Supreme Court shared the views of the

Regional Court in finding that the application for the taking of

further evidence was dilatory.

2.4  The applicant complains that he did not "have adequate time and

facilities to prepare his defence" and alleges a violation of Article

6 (3) (b) of the Convention. He points out that under the relevant

provision of Austrian law (Article 285 StPO) he had only two weeks to

submit his plea of nullity whereas it had taken the Court more than

eight months to prepare the judgment comprising 367 pages and based on

30 volumes of evidence.

He adds that his lawyer was prevented from examining all necessary

documents at the same time in order to compare them. He submits that

his lawyer should have been given opportunities to make himself

acquainted with the reasoning of the Regional Court before the judgment

was served.

The applicant raised this complaint in his plea of nullity, alleging

a breach of Article 6 (3) (b) of the Convention. The Supreme Court

rejected it as follows:

Article 6, paragraph 3 (b) is not a "self-executing provision". The 14

days' period running from the service of the judgment is a preclusion

period; the courts are not competent to prorogate it in any way. The

law does not provide a right to enquire into the Court's reasoning

before the service of the judgment.

3. The applicant heavily criticises the judgment of the Supreme Court.

He submits that this Court does not constitute an independent and

impartial tribunal, since it appears to be bound by the Attorney

General's (Generalprokurator) submissions. In this respect the

applicant stresses that on 5 May 1971, when drafting his submissions

concerning the applicant's appeal and plea of nullity based on alleged

violations of substantive law, the Attorney General mentioned that the

plea of nullity had "already been rejected on..." insofar as violation

of the procedural law was at issue. The application points out that the

Supreme Court rejected his plea of nullity based on alleged violations

of procedural law only on 16 June 1971. He therefore comes to the

conclusion that the Supreme Court is bound by the Attorney General's

instructions"  since he knows in advance which judgment the court will

pronounce.

The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention

in this respect.

4. The applicant complains that his right for private and family life

and his correspondence has been violated by reason of the fact that,

during his detention on remand, the Investigating Judge had

communicated the contents of his correspondence to his co-accused and

thus caused him damage. The applicant alleges in this respect

violations of Article 8 (1).

5. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the length of the

proceedings, of the partiality of the judges, of the prosecuting

authorities' refusal to institute criminal proceedings against a judge

and governmental official.

6. The applicant finally complains under Article 13 that he had no

effective remedy against violations committed by the judges of the

Vienna Regional Criminal Court. An appeal to the Supreme Court could

not have been such remedy, since this tribunal appears to be bound by

the Public Prosecutor's conclusions.

THE LAW

1. The applicant again complains of the length of criminal proceedings

instituted against him.

He submits that he is still subject to criminal prosecution because the

authorities and courts had failed to discontinue certain proceedings

with regard to which preliminary investigations had been opened against

him, but no decision had been taken at a later stage.

a) It is indeed true that proceedings against the applicant on various

charges of fraud and attempted fraud (points I/6, 1, 2a, 2b and 3 in

the indictment of 17 March 1964) had only been provisionally

discontinued on 8 March 1966, subject to a reservation by the Public

Prosecutor's Office to prosecute at a later date (case number 6 bvr

573/62). Further prosecution on all such charges have, however, been

barred by operation of Article 363 (1) Section 3 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, three months after the final decision of the

Supreme Court on 4 November 1971.

b) Proceedings against the applicant on the charge of having been an

accomplice in an offence of misuse of official powers had likewise been

provisionally discontinued on 16 September 1964 (case number 26 DVR

2287/64). According to a letter from the Public Prosecutor to the

Regional Court, dated 17 October 1972, further proceedings on this

charge have also been discontinued by operation of Article 363 (1)

Section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

c) With regard to the so-called "travel restrictions", the applicant

who is very often abroad, failed to show that the last court's decision

in this respect - that of 4 July 1968 - is still valid. In particular,

his alleged talk with Judge Koubek on 23 June 1972 took place prior to

the Public Prosecutor's letter of 17 October 1972 in which it was

stated that further proceedings against the applicant in the above

charges (case numbers 6 bVR 5730/62 and dVR 2287/64) had been

discontinued.

d) With regard to the surety by his sister to an amount of 50,000

schillings for his not absconding, Article 195, paragraph 2 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure provides that the surety's recognisance expires

as soon as the criminal proceedings are closed by a final decision or

a decision to discontinue criminal prosecution.

The applicant failed to indicate that, in contravention of this

provision, the surety's undertaking had not expired.

The Commission concludes that the applicant's situation is not

adversely affected as no criminal charges are pending against him since

4 November 1971, when the Supreme Court confirmed his conviction and

sentence.

On this point the application thus contains no relevant new element and

is therefore essentially the same as a previous application (No.

4517/70) within the meaning of Article 27 paragraph (1) (b)

(Art. 27-1-b), of the Convention.

2. The applicant first complains that the Court refused to hear certain

evidence offered by him.

a) According to the Commission's constant jurisprudence, Article 6 (3)

(d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention is intended to place the accused on

an equal footing with the prosecutor as regards the hearing of

witnesses but not to give him a right to call witnesses without

restriction.

The competent judicial authorities accordingly remain free, provided

that they comply with the provisions of the Convention, to establish

whether the hearing of witnesses can contribute to the finding of the

truth and, if not, to decide against calling such witnesses.

In the present case the Regional Court, in refusing to hear the

witnesses and experts in question, and the Supreme Court in confirming

this decision, found that some evidence proposed did not concern the

facts of the case, some had already been heard, some referred to counts

of the indictment which had already been separated, some was "hearsay"

evidence and some concentrated on facts which, even if proved true,

would not establish the applicant's innocence. Most of this evidence,

at any rate, could, and should, have been proposed in the course of the

proceedings two or three years earlier.

The Commission recalls that extensive measures had been taken at an

earlier stage of the proceedings in order to summon and hear witnesses

proposed by the applicant both in Austria and abroad.

It notes that the Court made a very detailed analysis of the

applicant's proposals for new evidence and is satisfied with the above

reasons put forward by the judge when refusing to hear this new

evidence. The Commission therefore finds that the applicant's complaint

under Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) is manifestly ill-founded under

Article 27 paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

b) The applicant complains that Article 6 (2) (Art. 6-2) of the

Convention has been violated two different ways, in the course of the

preliminary investigations and before the Regional Court:

(i) in that the warrants of arrest against him presented the charges

as if they were proved.

In this respect, according to the Commission's previous findings (see

report of the Commission in application No. 788/63, Austria against

Italy, Vol. VI, p. 782), Article 6, paragraph 2 (Art. 6-2) is primarily

concerned with the spirit in which the judges carry out their task. It

may be asked however whether the authorities' behaviour, during the

preliminary investigations could not, in certain circumstances, amount

to a violation of this provision, namely if the Court subsequently

accept as conclusive evidence, without further evaluation, any

admission unlawfully obtained.

The problem does not arise in this case; even if one could sustain that

various warrants of arrest did present the charges as if they were

proved, this does not affect the applicant's position before the

courts, since proceedings on these charges were discontinued or

culminated in his acquittal.

This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded under Article 27

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

(ii) in that the Regional Court stated in its reasoning that he was

not reliable.

Article 6 (2) (Art. 6-2) of the Convention requires basically that

court judges in fulfilling their duties should not start with the

assumption that the accused committed the act with which he is charged.

A careful examination of the Regional Court's decision does not

disclose any violation of this principle. In particular, the fact that

the Court did not follow the applicant's submissions, after having

found that they were in contradiction with statements made by both the

fiscal authorities and co-accused, does not as such indicate any

appearance of a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence.

This complaint is also manifestly ill-founded under Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

c) The applicant complains that he has not been given adequate time and

facilities to prepare his defence, and that this constituted a

violation of Article 6 (3) (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention.

In accordance with Article 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the

applicant had to submit the full text of his plea of nullity within

fourteen days after service of the judgment.

This period is under Austrian law a time-limit which cannot be extended

by courts. Moreover, the plea of nullity must comprise the detailed

grounds underlying the motions for revision; no other ground, no

substantial information would be taken into consideration by the court

after that period has elapsed (see O.G.H. 11.9.64, OZ 165 Evidenzblatt

121).

The task of the Commission is to find whether this period did

constitute an "adequate time" according to the kind of proceedings

involved and the facts of the particular case.

The time necessary to prepare a defence must indeed be estimated on a

different basis at the various stages of the proceedings. When lodging

an appeal or a plea of nullity, a defendant is already familiar with

the contents of the file, and in particular the nature of the charges

and the evidence on which they rely. It must be stressed, in this

respect, that the lawyer who had represented Huber before the Regional

Court, drafted the plea of nullity.

The facts of the case were obviously complex since they included

export-import transactions through middlemen, transfer of foreign

currencies through various banking channels in order to maintain the

appearance of genuine business transactions and so on. All these

aspects of the facts had however been examined at length in the course

of the trial which has lasted for some 90 days.

Turning to the applicant's plea of nullity the Commission notes that

it contained 80 pages of well-argued detailed material. The basic

ground of nullity invoked was that the court's findings were unclear,

contradictory in themselves, based on insufficient reasoning, or

contrary to the contents of the case-file. In support of this

allegation the applicant made altogether 173 detailed comments

concerning the 150 pages of the judgment in his case.

The Commission considers that the 14 days time-limit is rather short,

particularly as it cannot be extended and no submissions are admissible

after it has passed.

The Commission comes, however, to the conclusion that, even if Article

285 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure could in some

circumstances raise a problem under Article 6 (3) (b) (Art. 6-3-b), a

careful examination of the circumstances of this case does not disclose

any appearance of a violation of the Convention.

This complaint is thus manifestly ill-founded under Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

d) The applicant also challenges the Court's findings and reasoning.

With regard to the judicial decisions of which the applicant complains,

the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19)

of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the

obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular,

it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors

of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it

considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of

any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The

Commission refers, on this point, to its constant jurisprudence (see

e.g. decisions on the admissibility of applications No. 458/59,

Yearbook, Vol. 3, pp. 222, 236 and No. 1140/61, Collection of

Decisions, Vol. 8, pp. 57, 62).

It is true that in this case the applicant also complains that he was

not given all the procedural guarantees of an accused before the Court.

In this connection he alleges a violation of Article 6 (2), 3 (b) and

(d) (Art. 6-2, 6-3-b, 6-3-d) of the Convention.

However, as explained above, the Commission has found that there is no

appearance of a violation of these provisions in the proceedings

complained of.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention.

e) The same ground of inadmissibility applies to his further submission

that the Court did not correctly apply Article 170 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure in that it had certain evidence under oath.

3. The applicant alleges that the Supreme Court was bound by the

Attorney General's "instructions" and this did not constitute an

independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 (1)

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. He points out that, on 5 May 1971, when

drafting his submissions concerning the applicant's substantial" plea

of nullity, the Attorney General mentioned that the "formal" plea of

nullity had already been rejected. A blank space was left for the date

of this decision which, in fact, was only given on 16 June 1971.

The Commission has previously studied the position and functions of the

Attorney General under Austrian law, in particular in proceedings on

a plea of nullity alleging violations of procedural law (Applications

Nos. 524/59 and 617/59, Ofner and Hopfinger against Austria). It might

be generally recalled that, although the Attorney General belongs to

the prosecuting authorities, his functions are different from those of

a public prosecutor. "His task is in a more objective way to ensure

respect of the law in criminal proceedings and he does not, like a

prosecutor, have the additional task to see that reasonably suspected

persons are convicted and adequately punished" (Report of the

Commission in the case of Ofner and Hopfinger v. Austria , p. 79). In

respect of cases where such a plea of nullity has been raised by the

accused, "the Attorney General is not a party to the proceedings, but

is required to examine the plea of nullity independently of the Judge

Rapporteur" (ibid. p. 80) in the interest of the law. Therefore, the

case-file, generally including a draft decision by the Judge Rapporteur

is submitted to the Attorney General for his observations. If he

expresses his agreement with the report the Supreme Court usually

adopts the draft decision in a non-public sitting in the absence of

both the applicant and the Attorney General. If, on the other hand, he

disagrees with the report, to the disadvantage of the appealing party,

the plea of nullity must be examined by the Court in an oral hearing.

In this context, the facts of the present case are that the Attorney

General, having read the draft decision submitted by the Judge

Rapporteur, anticipated its adoption by the Supreme Court. This

circumstance is certainly not of itself even prima facie evidence that

the court sitting in private was subject to any discretion by the

Attorney General, and thus not an independent or impartial tribunal

within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Furthermore, a careful examination of the proceedings before the

Supreme Court, in the light of the above findings of the Commission,

does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 (1)

(Art. 6-1) as a whole.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention.

4. The applicant complains that, during his detention on remand, his

right to respect of his correspondence has been violated.

However, such complaint constitutes the same matter as was already

before the Commission in Application No. 4517/70. The applicant having

failed to introduce any new remedy in this respect, the present

application contains no relevant new information of this point and is

therefore essentially the same as a previous application within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (1) (b) (Art. 27-1-b).

5. The Commission has also examined the applicant's other complaints.

However, a careful examination of these complaints does not disclose

any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention, in particular in its Articles 3 and 13 (Art. 3, 13).

It follows that this last part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION

INADMISSIBLE