FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF HUOHVANAINEN v. FINLAND

( Application no. 57389/00 )

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

13 March 2007

FINAL

24/09/2007

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Huohvanainen v. Finland ,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) , sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mr J. Casadevall , Mr M. Pellonpää , Mr R. Maruste , Mr K. Traja , Ms L. Mijović , Mr J. Šikuta, judges , and Mr T.L. Early , Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 20 February 2007 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on th at date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in an application (no. 57389/00) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Finnish national, Mr K auko Huohvanainen (“the applicant”), on 8 May 2000 .

2 . The applicant was represented by Mr H. Salo , a lawyer practising in Helsinki . The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr A. Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs .

3 . The applicant alleged that the facts of the case disclosed a violation of his brother ' s right to life under Article 2 of the Convention.

4 . By a decision of 14 March 2006, the Court declared the application partly admissible. Judge Pellonpää, who at the time of the decision sat in respect of Finland , continued to participate in the examination of the case (Article 23 § 7 of the Convention).

5 . The applicant and the Government each filed further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine ), the parties replied in writing to each other ' s observations.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6 . The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Liperi .

A. Background

7 . On 2 December 1994 the applicant ' s 27-year-old brother J. was shot dead at six metres ' range by the police following a two-day siege. The following events led up to the shooting:

8 . On the evening of Wednesday 30 November 1994 J. threatened a taxi driver with a gun, forcing him to abandon his car. J. pointed his gun, which had a silencer on it , at the driver ' s chest and then pushed it against his abdomen with force causing los s of breath. While on the ground the driver was forced to put his hands up and his clothes w ere searched. He was then ordered to lie on the ground face down. When he tried to look up, J. held the gun to the back of his head and said “if you move, you know what this gun will do”. Finally, J. let the taxi driver go having taken a torch from the car .

9 . Later that night, J. shut himself in his rented house on the island of Ängeslandet in the municipality of Kirkkonummi . He did not take any hostages. The island was subsequently evacuated.

B. The scene of the events

10 . A ccording to the Government, the island comprises several hundred hectares of woods with several inhabited house s. It was sealed off from the mainland by the police. The area of the siege was not illuminated by lights other than th ose coming from J. ' s house . There was d aylight between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m . At night, there was no moon light due to cloud. T here was not enough snow , either, to provide enhanced visibility. In fact , the greater part of the operation was conducted in darkness. The temperature was around zero .

11 . There we re two bridges to the mainland. The island could also be left by boat or by walking in the shallow water or on the ice which covered some of the water. The house stood near the water and had doors and windows on all sides. The ground was uneven and covered with rocks, tree trunks and densely growing bushes. The surrounding area did not provide the police officers with c over. Some of the m had visual cover only .

12 . A ccording to the applicant, the Government deliberately described the scene of the events as more difficult than it actually w as . The location of the house was secluded. The trees surrounding it had been cut down by two armoured vehicles at the scene . There was no direct access to the woods from the bedroom door in the north-eastern part of the house.

13 . According to the Government, a total of 50-60 police officers took part in the police operation. According to the applicant, more than 100 police officers and other officials participated in the two-day siege.

C. The events leading up to and including the shooting of J.

1. The f irst day

14 . The house was surrounded by the police . D uring the night and in the early hours of Thursday 1 December 1994 the police gathered information from various sources. Having learnt that J. had been convicted of criminal activities, they contacted the police in hi s former home town. The police at the scene were informed that he had previously been involved in an armed siege , that he had been a dmitted to a psychiatric institution and that he was considered to be especially hostile towards the police . The police also contacted the psychiatric institution where J. had received treatment and were informed that it would be very difficult to conduct negotiations with J., who was extremely impulsive, paranoid, aggressive and incapable of co-operati ng . In order to draw up a profile of J., f urther information was received from two psychiatrists and one psychologist, from police officers who had been involved in J. ' s previous siege and from his family and acquaintances.

15 . A t the beginning of the operation the instructions regarding the use of force were first to apprehend J. by issuing instructions to him, to refrain from using weapons and to act within the limi ts of self-defence:

1. In a self-defence situation each police officer decides for him or herself on the use of force.

2. If the suspect comes out without a gun, he shall be issued with instructions and be apprehended using a police dog if necessary.

3. If the suspect comes out with a gun, he shall first be given instructions and if possible the police dog shall be used. If he approaches carrying a gun, shots may be aimed at his legs as a last resort. The suspect must not be allowed to exit the cordoned area.

16 . The b order g uard provided assistance in the form of a patrol boat and a helicopter. Units from the fire department were at the scene and an air ambulance was initially on stand - by and was moved closer at a later stage.

17 . The police acquired the construction plan of the house but as a search at night would have been too risk y it was postponed until the morning . At first light , the police started to approach the house in a line. A police dog and handler were o n duty but when J. was spotted in the woods, armed, they were too far away to act and they lost sight of him . After J. had been sighted around and in the house and the situation had escalated , the search plan was abandoned altogether.

18 . The police tried several times to contact J. by tele phone , without success . From around noon a psychologist from the Police A cademy was present t o assist in the negotiations. However, no telephone calls were successfully put through.

19 . Due to the lack of appropriate maps , the difficult surroundings and the safety hazards facing the police officers , the search was con tinued using a helicopter, which later spotted J. near the house . Following the sighting, the police move d closer to the house. Th e proper siege began at around noon. At that time there were 32 police officers present.

20 . At about 2 p.m. the officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T., requested the Ministry of the Interior to authorise the use of the Special Police Task Force . The request was granted and 23 specially trained police officers joined the police at the scene under the instruction of their commander, Superintendent H . Upon arrival, H. was informed by Superintendent T. of the instructions on the use of force.

21 . The police moved closer to the building to establish direct contact with J., whereupon he fired shots in the air. A dditional shots were fired by J. during the day some of which at the police officers at the scene . I n addition to attempts to make direct contact , t h e negotiators tried repeatedly to reach J. by tele phone, by leaving messages on his answering machine and by sending faxes . During the afternoon and early evening three short phone calls were successfully put through . However, J. ref used to negotiate . At around 4 p.m. he said “many will go with me once I come out” and “I will count to ten and there will be nobody in the bushes”, whereupon he exited the house and shot in the air repeatedly. At 4.10 p.m. he stated “I will teach [ you ] a third and final lesson”. At 4.46 p.m. J. called the negotiator to say that he had fired his gun “ because he did not know who [ they ] were”.

22 . Around that time J. ' s brother O. arrived at the scene. He informed the police that J. owned a 22 calibre small-bore rifle and a very heavy 45-70 calibre sporting gun. J. was also said to be an excellent shot, having practi s ed shooting as a hobby. J. could not however be reached by telephone at th e time.

23 . At the scene, t he police spotted J. carrying two long - barrel led weapons. The operation was scaled up, with enhanced security measures put in place to protect the police officers and any other persons in the area. At 9.15 p.m. O. called to inform that J. had called him and promised to let him into the house at dawn. During the evening and night J. was heard moving around outside in the darkness. The police had several lights trained on the house, but J. sho t them all. At around 10 p.m. J. fired several shots in the air and at the police. T he helicopter , which was training a searchlight on the house, was hit by J. ' s small-bore rifle and had to perform an emergency landing i n a nearby field . At around 11 p.m. J. shout ed something at the police about a blasting operation, which made the m suspect that he might also have explosives in his possession.

24 . The closest Special Task Force hideout was located about 15 metres from the house at the edge of the woods . The police considered it impossible to surround the house from far ther away without losing sight of it . M oving the operation further away from the house would have enabled J. to move around and pos sibly to enter other houses.

2. The s econd day

25 . In the early hours of Friday 2 December 1994 t he police used audible flares to locate J. and keep him in doors , from where he fired repeatedly through the windows and the skylight. He aimed some of the shots at the police. At 2.27 a.m. there were about 50 police officers on the island. At around 7 a.m. a police officer , S. K., from J. ' s former home town (situated over 500 kilometres from the scene of the events) telephoned to inform that J. had called him. At about that time, J. was shooting around him. At 9 a.m. the negotiators managed to make contact with J., who demand ed a written assurance that he w ould not be committed to a psychiatric institution. The request was refused . At 10 a.m. S.K. called J. At 11 a .m. the afore-mentioned psychologist arrived at the scene. At noon J. called S.K. The police ' s subsequent attempts to make contact failed.

26 . The senior police officers assessed the situation in the light of the following incidents which had taken place during the pre vious nigh t and during the morning . J. had shot at the police over a hundred times, having an excellent shooting position from the roof , which was accessible to him from the skylight. After the operation 14 bu llet holes were found in a 15 x 20 cm - sized searchlight situated next to a police hideout. The rock providing cover to the command centre also had dozens of bullet marks on it. The police officers ' gear did not give them adequate protection . The police officers ' attempts to remain as invisible to J. as possible, the attempt s at negotiation and the cutting-off of the telephone lines by the police to allow a night ' s rest, did not have any effect on J. ' s behaviour. The police considered it too dangerous to allow the situation to continue another night , as J. was able to leave the house undetected when it was dark .

27 . The senior police officers had lengthy discussions on whether to abandon the siege . However, the y deci ded that public order and safety could not be guaranteed if the operation was abandon ed . The use of a police dog was rejected as too risky, since the dog c ould not operate without the handler and there was no cover for the dog handler near the house . A fter weighing up the different possibilities , the officer in overall charge obtained executive assistance from the d efence f orces in the form of two armoured personnel carriers (nos. 31 and 51) with drivers. It had also been suggested by a psychologist at the aforementioned psychiatric institution that “a show of strength in the form of military force and vehicles might allow J. to retreat honourably ” . The a rmoured vehicles also allow ed closer monitoring of the house and ma d e possible the use of tear gas and, if necessary, the evacuation of injured persons .

28 . A round noon , w hen repeated negotiation attempts had failed, the officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T., ordered the use of tear gas to break J. ' s resistance . The order was carried out from armoured vehicle no. 51. The gas had no visible effect on J. As his whereabouts in the house were un known, Superintendent T. ordered the window panes and curtains to be removed some two hours later in order to prevent surprise attacks. Armoured vehicle no. 51 remained at the corner of the green and yellow sides, 5.8 metres from the bedroom door, with a view to observing and effecting an arrest. Shortly after the removal of the window panes J. was spotted on the roof .

29 . During the day the police tried repeatedly to reach J. by telephone. However, he did not answer their calls. When it got dark, the searchlights were switched on, whereupon J. fired his gun. At around 4 p.m. J. ' s brother O. arrived at the scene but i t was considered too dangerous to let him approach the house. The same considerations applied to having the afore-mentioned police officer S. K., who arrived at the scene at 6.20 p.m., approach the house. Meanwhile, a t around 5 p.m. the police used a megaphone to make contact with J., without success.

30 . At about 6 p.m. J. fired shots towards the armoured vehicles and the b order g uard boat apparently with a view to shooting the searchlights. In addition , he thr e w a gas canister and at least two “ Molotov cocktails ” . A t the same time it appears that J. set the house on fire. J. was seen walking around inside carrying a rucksack and breaking glass and furniture in an uncontrolled manner . The police estimated that the situation had become more dangerous and more difficult as i t seemed that J. was planning an escape . His conduct was becoming increasingly hostile and self-destructive. H is life was deemed to be in danger from the fire .

31 . A t that point , abandoning the operation was not an option owing to the serious threat posed by J. The us e of a dog was impossible under the circumstances , as was the sending of an action team into the burning house. I t was decided that the only possible way to stop and apprehend J. in the dark and smoke-filled conditions before he could escape was to order a police officer to shoot with a shotgun aim ed at J. ' s leg, although shooting was considered extreme and a last resort.

32 . At 6.26 p.m. flares were used to have the scene lit. T he Special Task Force commander, Superintendent H., and the officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T., decided that J. should be shot at, on the firm understanding that he be hit only in the leg. The goal of the shooting operation was to rescue J. from the burning building without endangering the other persons at the scene. Senior Constable T.L. was assigned the task of firing the shot. The manner in which he carried out the order was left to his discretion. He chose a shotgun in order to cause as little injury as possible . According to the Government, the shotgun was chosen also in order to minimise the danger to the police officers and rescue personnel on the opposite side of the house . The officer in overall charge, Provincial Chief Inspector K.A., authorised the change of instructions on the use of force at 6.31 p.m. , whereupon T.L. fired one 9 x 9 millimetre lead shot through the porthole of armoured vehicle no. 31 at 18 metres ' range. J. was hit in the right hand and the upper part of the right thigh. J. was issued with instructions to surrender.

33 . The shot had no visible effect on J., who continued to throw objects into the fire and to move around in side the house . No further shooting was authorised since it had prove d ineffective . According to the subsequent indictment, J. did not fire his gun after he had been hit.

34 . By 6.56 p.m. the house was ablaze. Thirty seconds later the Special Task Force commander, Superintendent H., estimated that J. would exit the house within two minutes if he intended to come out at all before its expected collapse . Due to the noise of the fire no further contact with J. was possible. The police expected him to leave the house either through the bedroom window from which the glass had been removed or through the bedroom door. According to the subsequent indictment, the only way out had been the lower part of the door on the so-called green side of the house.

35 . At about 7 p.m. J. broke the glass on the lower part of the bedroom door and cleared the frame of shattered g lass with his weapon. He started to crawl out through the opening, which was about 80 centimetres high. He was carrying two weapons. At that point he was hit by two shots fired simultaneously by Senior Constables A. and L., from armoured vehicle no. 51 at six metres ' range . B oth shots were aimed at J. ' s shoulder and arm, but owing to his position , the firing angle through the porthole of the armoured vehicle and the short time available , he was hit in the head.

36 . According to the Government, in the final stage of the siege there had been a total of 19 police officers surrounding the building. Out of these, seven officers were inside the armoured vehicles . Acco rding to the applicant, the total number had been greater.

37 . The prompt resuscitation efforts at the scene were unsuccessful and J. died at 7.35 p.m. The site was sealed off and an investigation was started immediately.

D. The investigation

38 . During the siege a log was kept of the decisions made and actions taken. Due to the geographical conditions not all the radio conversations were recorded on tape, but the later part of the siege was recorded on audio tape and the us e of tear gas was also recorded on video tape . Although the area was sealed off for the crime - scene investigation , s ome evidence may have been destroyed when the fire was extinguish ed. Despite th is, it was possible to collect details of the bullet holes in and around the building. The investigation , which started immediately , was carried out by the National Bureau of Investigation ( keskusrikospoliisi , centralkriminalpolisen ) , which is one of the national units of the Finnish Police. The National Bureau of Investigation specialise s in investigating and preventing serious, organised and international crime. A t the national level, it is responsible for criminal intelligence and identification of new types of crime. The National Bureau of Investigation also develops criminal - investigation techniques and provides training in the afore mentioned subjects. On 2 December 1994 the investigation into the cause of J. ' s death began.

39 . At the particular request of J. ' s family , certain additional lines of inquiry were followed during the pre-trial investigation. The autopsy report and the results of all the forensic and other investigations , as well as the reports on the siege , were included in the pre-trial documentation , together with a large number of witness statements.

40 . Having received the investigation report concerning the cause of death, the National Bureau of Investigation , on 8 February 1995, began to investigate whether anyone involved in the siege had acted in an unlawful manner.

41 . In 1995 the decisions made and the actions taken during the operation were studied by a permanent investigation team set up by the Ministry of the Interior. The tasks of the team include investigation of the tactics, plans and actions of particularly dangerous police operations. O ccupational safety requirements are considered and improvements suggested whe re necessary. In addition , the team has an educational role , creating educational material for police forces and giving advice on future operations where appropriate.

42 . The investigation team studied the operation in question hour by hour, dr e w conclusions and made recommendations on the basis of the investigation. The team dr e w attention in particular to the inadequacies of the police officers ' protective equipment and stressed the importance of improving their occupational safety in future operations . The report was finalised within one year of the operation in question.

E. Press releases

43 . Meanwhile, on the evening of 2 December 1994 the local police issued a press release stating that the situation at the scene had become extremely serious as the suspect had been firing at the police with the apparent intention of breaking through the cordon in order to escape. The police had made tactical use of gas, but the suspect had continued to direct heavy fire at the police and had thrown fire bombs both outside and inside the house, causing the house to catch fire. Finally, the armed suspect had run out of the building. The situation had become so serious that the police had been forced to act. There had been an exchange of fire as a result of which the suspect had been hit and had died.

44 . On 2 February 1995 the National Bureau of Investigation issued a press release stating that according to the investigations so far three police officers had each fired once at J. It also stated that there were grounds for investigating whether J. had committed suicide in an unusual manner.

F. The consideration of the charges

1. The District Prosecutor ' s decision to prosecute

45 . At the District P rosecutor ' s request , the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an additional investigation during the consideration of the charges.

46 . On 26 September 1995 the District Prosecutor decided to charge the commander of the Special Task Force , Superintendent H., with negligent homicide and negligent breach of official duty. The indictment was to the following effect.

Upon his arrival at the scene, H. had received the afore-mentioned instructions on the use of force (see paragraph 15 above ). It was H. ' s responsibility to inform his subordinates of the instructions on the use of force. H. duly informed his men, but added the following:

“If, despite everything, [the suspect] tries to break through the cordon of police officers, he must be stopped. In the last resort, this may be done by shooting at him in the upper body.”

The District Prosecutor considered that H. ' s own adaptation of the instructions on the use of force, according to which his men had the right under certain conditions to shoot J. in the upper body, was a fundamental change in orders which H. did not have the right to give without the explicit approval of the officer in charge at the scene or the officer in overall charge. H. must therefore be considered to have breached his official duties on account of his negligence in relaying the instructions to his men. Having regard to the fact that H. was to be considered as having sought to clarify the instructions for his men rather than to deliberately alter them, the District Prosecutor took the view that his conduct, although reprehensible, should be considered only as negligence in the performance of duty.

Towards the end of the chain of events of 2 December 1994, just before 7 p.m., J. broke the glass on the lower part of the bedroom door and was about to exit the building with no apparent intention of surrendering to the police, apparently intent on escaping, armed, through the police cordon. At that moment he was hit by two shots fired simultaneously from armoured vehicle no. 51 at six metres ' range by two police officers, Senior Constables A. and L. They considered, as did their superior officer, that there was no other way of stopping J., who received a fatal shot to the head. A. and L. were acting on the orders of their superior officer, Sergeant R. Accordingly, the District Prosecutor considered that H. had negligently caused J. ' s death, having provided his men with an arbitrary interpretation of the instructions on the use of force, which A. and L. had tried to act upon.

2. The District Prosecutor ' s decisions not to prosecute

47 . On 15 November 1995 the District Prosecutor decided not to bring charges against the officer in overall charge, Provincial Chief Inspector K.A., and the officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T., for negligent breach of official duty, finding that the shooting of J. in the legs had been justifiable under Chapter 3, Article 8 of the Criminal Code. He also decided not to prefer charges for negligent breach of official duty against A. and L., who had both fired shots at six metres ' range. He found that the decision to stop J. by using a gun had been in line with the instructions on the use of force, and justified in the circumstances. While it could be argued that the shots had been fired too early, it was unreasonable in the circumstances to direct criticism at A. and L.

48 . Lastly, he decided against bringing charges of manslaughter against Sergeant R., finding that he had given an order to take lawful action against J. There was no evidence that he had ordered A. and L. to shoot to kill.

49 . The District Prosecutor therefore concluded that the evidence did not warrant the prosecution of any of the persons involved in the siege, with the exception of the commander of the Special Task Force, Superintendent H., whom he had decided to prosecute by his decision of 26 September 1995 .

50 . On 22 February 1997 the District Prosecutor also decided against bringing charges of endangering others and committing an offence in the performance of duty against Sergeant R. in his capacity as the superior of the police officer who had fired tear gas into the house.

3. The private prosecutio n

51 . Following the District P rosecutor ' s decision not to bring charges, J. ' s family brought a private prosecution. It appears that some of them were granted free legal assistance . In April 1996 they brought charges against Senior Constable T.L. for aggravated assault and abuse of office, on the ground that he had shot at J. at 18 metres ' range, inflicting bodily harm. They also preferred charges against Senior Constables A. and L. for manslaughter and aggravated abuse of office, on the ground that they had shot J. in the head at six metres ' range with a 9 x 9 millimetre lead shot, in a situation where he had manoeuvred only his upper body through the door opening. Lastly, Sergeant R. was charged with manslaughter in his capacity as A. and L. ' s superior officer, who had ordered them to shoot. The complainants also claimed damages from the State.

G. The court proceedings against Superintendent H.

52 . In the proceedings against the commander of the Special Task Force, Superintendent H., J. ' s family did not submit any claims.

53 . The District Court held two hearings in November 1995 and took forensic and oral evidence. The members of the Special Task Force involved in the siege appeared before the court and gave evidence to the effect that they had understood their commander, Superintendent H. ' s , orders as relating to a self-defence situation in the strict sense. The officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T., testified that at 6.37 p.m. he had heard Superintendent H. say on the police radio that J. could be shot in the legs when he appeared and that if his gun was pointed towards the police he should be shot dead. T. had been about to correct the order but he had then heard Superintendent H. correct it himself by saying that J. should not be shot dead but shot in the upper body. T. had accepted the change of order and perceived it as an operational tactic in a genuine self-defence situation. He had therefore not intervened. T. considered that H. ' s order was in line with the instructions on the use of force.

54 . A. gave evidence to the effect that, had J. managed to get up on his feet, he would have posed an immediate threat to the life or health of the police officers in the cordon. A. had perceived the situation as requiring self-defence and had therefore fired his gun. He had done so independently and irrespective of H. ' s amendment to the instructions on the use of force.

55 . L. gave evidence to the effect that the sector of fire had been too narrow to await a possibility to shoot at J. ' s legs. When exiting the house J. had posed a threat to the police officers in the cordon. Due to J. ' s position it had not been possible to aim at his legs. L. had perceived the situation as requiring self-defence. H ' s amendment to the instructions on the use of force had not influenced his judgment.

56 . On 18 December 1995 the District Court ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) of Raasepori dismissed the charges. It observed that the forensic reports revealed that J. ' s death had been caused by a shot fired at six metres ' range. It was not known which of the shots fired by Senior Constables A. and L. had brought about his death. The court observed that the instruction had been given to a trained team of specialist s used to working closely together. A. and L. had shot at J. independently of their commander Superintendent H. ' s amendment to the instructions on the use of force, because they had perceived the situation as requiring self-defence.

57 . The District Prosecutor appealed. On 21 August 1997 the Helsinki Court of Appeal ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) upheld the lower court ' s judgment. The acquittal appears to have become final.

H. The court proceedings against Senior Constables T.L., A. and L. and Sergeant R.

58 . The District Court of Raasepori conducted an inspection in an armoured vehicle and heard evidence from about thirty witnesses, including four doctors on the subject of the autopsy, J. ' s mental health prior to a nd during the siege and his treatment in a psychiatric institution; six persons responsible for the forensic investigation ; the senior police officers; 11 police officers and other police personnel who had been at the scene or working with the remote units; the drivers of and police officers in the armoured vehicles; a negotiator and a firefighter ; three experts o n ammunition, weapons and tear gas; and two other persons on the nature of the information provided by the police after the operation . The court also had before it the pre-trial investigation records, the medical reports on J. and the reports and opinions concerning the forensic investigation. It also had audio and video tapes of the siege.

59 . The doctors testified that J. had been suffering from a serious personality disorder and paranoia, had had a grandiose perception of himself and had been aggressive and violent. They considered that he had been in need of compulsory care at the time of the events. All these factors had made the situation dangerous and urgent.

60 . In his testimony, a forensic medical expert, T., expressed the view that firing a shotgun with lead shots, with a scatter of over 30 centimetres, at six metres ' range could be considered tantamount to executing the target. The weapon in question was not a precision weapon.

61 . Sergeant R. gave evidence to the effect that J. ' s behaviour and the way he had exited the house had made clear his intention not to surrender but to break through the cordon while armed. J. had had to be stopped by having shots fired at him from the armoured vehicle, as the lives of the police officers outside would have been endangered by any cross-fire. Several police officers gave evidence to the effect that J. had come out crouching. He had also been carrying the guns, which were pointing outwards. Senior Constables L. and A had aimed at J. ' s shoulder, but had hit him in the head.

62 . In its judgment of 22 August 1997 the District Court observed that the scope of the case was not to assess whether the actions of the police taken as a whole had been appropriate to the purpose of the siege. The scope was confined to the examination of the charges.

63 . The court dismissed the charges against Senior Constable T.L., finding that he had not exceeded his powers.

64 . As to the charges against Senior Constables A. and L., the court noted the following. Several witnesses had given evidence to the effect that the shotguns had been pointing outwards when J. had made his way out of the building, whereas the forensic report had stated that the guns had been found pointing inwards after the fire had been extinguished. A firefighter had testified that the power of the fire brigade ' s hoses might possibly have altered the shotguns ' position. In any event, the court found that the position of the shotguns was not decisive. What was decisive was the fact that J. had brought the guns when making his way out and that A. and L. had been convinced that the guns were pointing towards them. The court also attributed importance to the fact that J. had crawled out through the door although he could have opened it and walked out. The manner of exit strongly suggested that he had not planned on surrendering. On the contrary, the court drew the conclusion that J. had tried to exit the building undetected with a view to breaking through the cordon and escaping into the dark woods. As to whether any blame could be attributed to A. and L. for not waiting one or two seconds before shooting in order to be able to target the lower part of his body, the court observed that the forensic examination and a reconstruction of the events had disclosed that A. ' s sector of fire had ended one metre to the left of the doorway and the sector available to L. had ended 0.2 metres to the left of the doorway. Having regard to the narrowness of the sectors of fire and the inside of the armoured vehicle and the fact that J. could have disappeared from their sectors of fire at any moment, the court concluded that A. and L. had fired their guns in self-defence.

65 . As to their superior officer, Sergeant R., the court found that A. and L. had acted independently and in self-defence, and that his order to shoot had therefore not caused J. ' s death.

66 . Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the charges and the other claims.

67 . The applicant and his co-complainants appealed, requesting a hearing. On 16 and 17 September 1998 the Helsinki Court of A ppeal held an oral hearing during which the defendants and five witnesses were re-examined. In addition, it heard evidence from one new witness proposed by the complainants, making a total of ten witnesses. The court refused the complainants ' request to re-examine ten other witnesses as being manifestly unnecessary, since their statements either concerned circumstances that had already been clarified during the proceedings in the lower court or were irrelevant. It appears that the defendants did not adduce any oral evidence and that the Court of Appeal, of its own motion, called three of the witnesses who had been examined before the District Court.

68 . By a judgment of 23 March 1999 the Helsinki Court of Appeal upheld the lower court ' s judgment. With regard to the charges against Senior Constable T.L., it found that he had acted in order to effect J. ' s arrest under Chapter 3, Article 8(2) of the Criminal Code, which justified the use of force. As to Senior Constables A. and L. and Sergeant R., it found that, following J. ' s appearance, armed, in the doorway the arrest situation had turned into a situation requiring self-defence under Chapter 3, Article 6 of the Criminal Code. Making an assessment based on the circumstances at the scene, the court considered that the shooting had been justified and necessary in order to repel an imminent attack and had fulfilled the requirements of the principle of proportionality.

69 . On 8 November 1999 the Supreme Court ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused the complainants leave to appeal by a majority (two votes to one).

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Homicide and bodily harm

70 . The right to life is guaranteed under the Constitution of Finland ( Suomen perustuslaki , Finlands grundlag ; Act no. 731/ 1999 , section 7). At the material time, it was guaranteed under the then Constitution Act ( Suomen hallitusmuoto , R egeringsform för Finland ; Act no. 94/191, section 6).

M anslaughter carried a minimum sentence of eight years ' imprisonment or , under mitigating circumstances, four years (C hapter 21, Article 1 (as amended by Act no. 491/1969 ) of the Criminal Code ( rikoslaki , strafflagen ) as in force at the relevant time) .

A person who cause d the death of another through negligence could be sentenced to a fine or to imprisonment for a maximum period of two years for negligent homicide ( Chapter 21, A rticle 8 (as amended by Act no. 578/1995) as in force at the time of the criminal proceedings).

Aggravated assault carried a maximum penalty of ten years ' imprisonment (Chapter 21, Article 6 (as amended by Act no. 491/69) as in force at the relevant time).

In matters other than breaches of official secrecy, public servants acting in an official capacity who, as a result of carelessness or inattention , were in breach of or neglect ed to fulfil their official dut ies as set out in the relevant provisions or regulations , were liable to a reprimand or a fine for negligent breach of official duty, unless the act viewed overall, in the light of any harmful effects and of other circumstances, was of minor importance (Chapter 40, Article 11 (as amended by Act no. 792/1989) as in force at the relevant time).

Persons committing an act which, though otherwise punishable, was necessary in order to repel a present or imminent unlawful attack against themselves or others, or against their property or that of others, were deemed to have acted in self-defence and were therefore not liable to punishment (Chapter 3, Article 6 (as amended by Act no. 621/1967 ) as in force at the relevant time).

A person committing an act not necessary to repel an attack, protect the sanctity of the home or retrieve his or her pro perty, was liable to either a full or a reduced sentence, at the discretion of the court, for overstepping the bounds of self-defence. If the circumstances were such that the person could not reasonably have been expected to retain hi s or her self -control, no punishment was imposed (Chapter 3, Article 9 , paragraphs 1 (as amended by Act no. 621/1967 ) and 2 (as amended by Act no. 321/1983 ). That provision was amended with effect from 1 January 2004 . It now provides that a n act which is necessary in order to repel a present or imminent unlawful attack constitutes legitimate self-defence, unless it manifestly exceeds what , on the basis of an overall assessment , may be deemed justifiable, taking into account the nature and force of the attack, the identity of the defender and the attacker and the other circumstances. However, if the act oversteps the bounds of self-defence (excessive self-defence), the offender is exempt from criminal liability if the circumstances were such that he or she could not reasonably have been expected to act otherwise, taking into account the danger and the sudden nature of the attack and the situation in general (Chapter 4 , Article 4 ( as amended by Act no. 515/2003) .

B. Duties of the police

71 . The Police Act in force at the material time (Act no. 84/1966) provided that t he duty of the police was to maintain public order and security (section 1 ). A police officer ha d the right to remove or apprehend a person and temporarily keep the person in custody if he or she was causing a disturbance or was posing an immediate danger to public order or security. A police officer ha d the right to apprehend and temporarily keep in custody a person who , on the basis of his or her threats or other behaviour , w as likely to commit an offence. A person could also be taken into custody to protect him or her from imminen t danger to his or her life or health (section 19).

Where a police officer met resistance in the performance of his or her duty, he or she was entitled to use such force as c ould be deemed justified in view of the nature of the duty, the seriousness of the resistance and the other circumstances prevailing in the situation (Chapter 3, Article 8 , paragraph 1 ( as amended by Act no. 621/1967) of the Criminal Code as in force at the relevant time). When a person being apprehended, arrested or detained attempts to avoid capture by resisting or escaping, the use of forc e is allowed in order to capture him or her, to prevent his or her escap ing , or keep order, when such measures can be justified in view of the circumstances (Chapter 3, Article 8 , paragraph 2 ( as amended by Act no. 621/1967) . In a situation where greater force ha s been used than can be deemed justified, the sentence may be reduced on grounds of mitigating circumstances or, if there are very persuasive reasons for so doing , a decision may be taken not to impose any punishment ( Chapter 3, Article 9, paragraph 2, as amended by Act no. 321/1983).

The Supreme Court has established precedents concerning the right of self-defence in cases relating to police actions in siege situations ( nos. KKO 1988:49 , 1993:50 and 2004:75).

C. The right to compensation

72 . A public corporation is vicariously liable in damages for injury or damage caused through error or negligence in the exercise of public authority. The same liability also appl ies to other corporations that perform public duties on the basis of an A ct, a Decree or an authorisation given in an A ct. However, liability is incurred in the exercise of public authority only if the performance of the activity or task, in view of its nature and purpose, has not met the reasonable requirements laid down for it (Chapter 3, s ection 2 of the Tort L iability A ct ( Act no. 412/1974) .

Damages shall constitute compensation for personal injury and damage to property. Where the injury or damage has been caused by an act punishable by law or in the exercise of public authority, or in other cases where there are especially compelling reasons, damages shall also constitute compensation for economic loss that is not connected to personal injury or damage to property (Chapter 5, s ection 1) .

A person who has suffered a bodily harm or other personal injury shall be entitled to damages to cover medical costs and the other costs arising from the injury and to compensate for loss of income and maintenance, pain and suffering, invalidity and other permanent disability (Chapter 5, section 2 ) .

The provisions on personal injury apply also to damages for the distress caused by an offence against individual liberty, honour or domestic peace or by another comparable offence (Chapter 5, s ection 6) .

D. Evaluation of evidence

73 . T he court shall decide what is to be regarded as the truth in the case a fter having carefully evaluated all the facts submitted to it (Chapter 17, Article 2 , paragraph 1 (as amended by Act no. 571/1948 ) of the Code of J udicial Procedure ) .

E. Organisation of the police

74 . The p olice force operates under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. It is a three-tier organi s ation. A t the top is the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior or the Supreme Police Command . Below are the Provincial Police Commands, the national police units, the police training establishments, the Police Technical Centre and , f or operational purposes, the Helsinki Police Department. The third level is the local police, wh o operate under the relevant Provincial Police Command.

The Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior also comprises the Police A dvisory Board set up by the Government . E ach d istrict p olice force has its own police advisory committee , appointed by the local council.

Provisions on the organi s ation of the police and the duties of the different police units and advisory committees are laid down by the Police A dministration Act ( laki poliisin hallinnosta , polisförvaltningslag en ; Act no. 110/1992).

T he national police units also come under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. However, the N ational B ureau of Investigation is separate from the provincial and local police forces.

A Special Task Force is maintained by Helsinki Police Department , answerable to the Ministry of the Interior. It has no special privileges and must comply with the legal, operational and ethical standards laid down for the police. It is a part of the police structure and always operates under the command of the unit whose operation it is participating in. The lines of action are decided by the officer in overall charge and , on the ground, the Special Task Force is subordinated to the officer in charge at the scene .

The duty of the Special Task Force is to be prepared and equipped for situations where normal police operations fail to produce the desired outcome. Its members are trained to act as a specialis t team, and have more elaborate protective equipment than the local police . They receive regular train ing in special operations such as siege and hostage situations. The y are members of the police patrol force. In 1994 special operations and training accounted for approximately twenty per cent of their work time.

At the material time, the Special Task F orce ' s equipment did not include protective gear against rifle - calibre weapons . T he amount of night-vision equipment which they had was not adequate and the ir clothing was unsuitable for prolonged operations in winter conditions.

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

75 . The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by L aw Enforcement Officials (UN Force and Firearms Principles) were adopted on 7 September 1990 by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.

Paragraph 9 of the UN Force and Firearms Principles provides, inter alia , that “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life”.

Other relevant provisions read as follows:

Paragraph 10

“... law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and shall give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warnings to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of the incident.”

Paragraph 22

“... Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that an effective review process is available and that independent administrative or prosecutorial authorities are in a position to exercise jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. In cases of death and serious injury or other grave consequences, a detailed report shall be sent promptly to the competent authorities responsible for administrative review and judicial control.”

Paragraph 23

“Persons affected by the use of force and firearms or their legal representatives shall have access to an independent process, including a judicial process. In the event of the death of such persons, this provision shall apply to their dependants accordingly.”

THE LAW

I . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

76 . The applicant complained that the facts of the case disclosed a violation of J. ' s right to life, as the use of lethal force had not been absolutely necessary.

Article 2 reads:

“1. Everyone ' s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

77 . The Government contested the allegation, arguing that it was undisputed that J. had been suspected of a criminal offence and, after a siege lasting more than two days, had been shot and fatally wounded in an operation to effect his lawful arrest.

A. Arguments of the parties

1. Whether the use of force was absolutely necessary

78 . The applicant maintained that the use of force had not been absolutely necessary. The operation had been aimed at arresting J. and taking him to hospital but he had been shot dead intentionally, or executed as Dr T. had put it when examined as a witness during the criminal proceedings. Shooting someone at six metres ' range with nine millimetre lead shots could not be justified on any grounds, as there had been no indication that J. posed a threat to anyone. Senior Constables A. and L. had been safe inside the armoured vehicle. Neither had any evidence been produced during the court proceedings to the effect that anyone else at the scene had been in danger. J., already injured, had been in the process of crawling out of the house when he had been shot in the head. At that time he had not posed a danger to anyone and had not been about to exit the cordoned area. The barrels of his shotguns had been pointing inwards. The guns had not even been cocked . J. had been making his way out of a burning house, blinded by the sudden change from intense light to darkness. His mobility had been reduced as a result of the injuries to his leg and hand. The shooting had been in violation of the principle of proportionality.

79 . The applicant emphasised that the police had failed to draw proper conclusions from the information they had received on J. ' s mental illness. They had treated an ill person like a dangerous professional criminal although he had done no harm to anyone.

80 . The Government pointed out that J. had been shown to pose a serious threat to th ose present at the scene . He had previously been involved in a siege situation and in other violent crimes . He was known to have act ed violently towards the police and even towards members of his own family, having sho t at his own brother previously, and was also known to have had mental health problems . In addition, the circumstances at the scene were extremely difficult due to the weather and other conditions. The applicable law was in conformity with A rticle 2 of the Convention. The police c ould interfere with a person ' s constitutional rights only if it was permitted by law. In the present case, as noted by the domestic courts, the police officers in question had had justifiable reason s for believ ing that J. had made an illegal threat and committed an assault and possibly a robbery. In addition , J. had been proven to be dangerous to the public at large and especially to th ose present at the scene . This entitled the police to apprehend him and take him into custody . The Government made reference to A ndronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus ( judgment of 9 October 1997, R eports of J udgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ VI, p. 2107 , § 192) and McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom ( judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, p. 58 , § 200), in which the Court had stated that the use of force may be justified where it is based on an honest belief which i s perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turn s out to be mistaken . In the present case the situation during the operation fulfilled the requirements of A rticle 2 § 2 (a) and (b). The police officers had been trying to effect a lawful arrest while protecting themselves, the other persons at the scene and the residents of the island. A s concluded during the pre-trial investigation and the consideration of the charges and also during the proceedings before the domestic courts, had J. been allowed to escape armed , the lives of even more people would have been in danger. Therefore , the perception of the situation and the actions taken in the present case had not been proved to be mi staken.

2 . Supervision and organisation of the operation

81 . The applicant submitted that the killing had not been based on any plan and had been in flagrant violation of the instructions on the use of force. In fact, the decision to shoot had been taken by the individual police officers of the Special Task Force without weighing up the alternatives. They had subsequently explained that the shooting had been an act of self-defence. It was clear from the audio tape that seven seconds had passed from the moment that J. appeared in the doorway until the firing of the fatal shots. Further, the recording also revealed that when the commander of the Special Task Force, Superintendent H., had ordered that J. be shot immediately in the legs, Senior Constables A. and L. had just fired their shotguns, hitting J. in the head with 9 x 9 millimetre lead shots. The order to shoot him in the legs had been valid only in the event of his trying to break through the cordon situated fifteen metres from the house. The visibility from the armoured vehicle had been completely clear.

82 . The applicant submitted that the police ' s subsequent diverging explanations showed that there had been a lack of proper planning and direction of the police forces. The police operation had been limited to the siege, the use of gas and the demonstration of the police ' s superiority in terms of equipment and numbers . Apart from the instructions regarding the use of force, there had been no other plans to apprehend J. The negotiator could hardly be called a professional and J. ' s brother and police officer S.K. , who were familiar to J. , had been denied the chance to speak to him when they arrived at the scene . The police had failed to search the house and to use the police dog. The closing of the telephone lines c ould hardly be characterised as giving J. a night ' s rest. Public order and safety had not been jeopardised because all the residents of the island and other people on the island apart from the authorities had been evacuated. Using gas, breaking windows and bringing in armoured vehicles cannot be characterised as a peaceful means of trying to apprehend a psychologically disturbed person and hospitalising him. The police had no other plans to rescu e J. from the burning house.

83 . A ccording to the applicant, the orders and the permission to shoot had been violated on both occasions when J. had been shot. Initially, the police had had permission to shoot J. in the foot , but had hit him in his upper body. Subsequently, J. had been shot twice in the head from an armoured vehicle , although no permission had been given to shoot him .

84 . The applicant challenged the Government ' s contention that J. had crawled out holding two weapons aimed towards the police officers. In fact, the forensic investigation and the photographic evidence had shown that the barrels of the shotguns had been pointing inwards. In addition, the police officers who had shot J. at six metres ' range had been inside the armoured vehicle and had thus not been visible to the applicant. J. ' s guns had not been in working order. J. , already injured, had been crawling out of the burning house in order to save himself at the last minute . He could easily have been apprehended if that was what the police had wanted to do. In shooting J., police officers A., L. , and R., who gave the order, intentionally took his life whereas they should have apprehended him. The blood stains demonstrated that J. had been shot dead right in the doorway, in other words, that his head had not been far outside the doorway.

85 . The G overnment emphasise d that the entire operation had been initiated and prolonged as a result of J. ' s own actions and his violent resistance to the police officers performing their duty to protect and maintain public order and security. The operation had begun following a n emergency call and when more details about the situation had emerged, it had been scaled up into a major operation. It had been planned and directed by high - rank ing and experienced police officers who had been at the scene from an early stage. Th ose in charge at the scene had kept the line of action under constant review in the light of the changes in the situation and circumstances. A ll the action had been based on official action plans and guidelines prepared for special operations such as the one in question. Practical training based on those action plans had been carried out on several occasions, the most recent night - time practice operation having taken place only two months prior to the operation in question . At the scene there had been several highly experienced specialists in different fields, including specially trained police personnel and negotia tors . The S upreme and P rovincial P olice C ommand s had been kept constantly i nformed of the details of the situation and its seriousness. A fter the second night of the siege the P rovincial P olice C ommand had been present and monitored the operation at the scene . Further assistance had been requested and received from the c oast g uard, the b order g uard and the d efence f orces , in the form of vehicles and other equipment . The Government made reference to A ndronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus (cited above, § 183 ) , in which the Court had found no violation although the operation had displayed some shortcomings, such as lack of crowd control and lack of a dedicated tele phone line between the negotiator and the perpetrator.

86 . The Government also referred to McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (cited above), in which the Court had found a violation based, inter alia , on the fact that the authorities had not take n into account that the information gathered might have been erroneous ; nor had they ha d an alternative plan of action if the intelligence had proved to be false. In the present case, the re existed pre-approved plans o f action for the operation, regulations on the use of firearms, an established chain of command and a clear operation al structure. A ll the actions had been authorised by senior officers. No rank-and-file police officers had acted on their own , nor had any unnecessary force been used despite J. ' s continuous actions and threats aimed at th ose present at the scene . Over a period of two nights and two days, the use of force by the police had been limited to three shots aimed at J., all of which had been fired during the last hour of the siege. One shot had been aimed at J. ' s foot and the other two shots had been fired in the final moment s of the siege when he had been leaving the building with two long - barrel led guns in his hands. In addition, the police had thrown several can isters of tear gas into the house before J. had s et it on fire.

87 . The Government emphasised that the measures taken during the operation had been the result of a careful weighing-up of the situation and the various options for ending the siege as peacefully as possible without causing unnecessary harm to anyone. Several alternative actions, such as a house search and the use of a dog for the arrest, had been abandoned for appropriate and thoroughly considered reasons. The use of force had been proportionate and absolutely necessary taking into account J. ' s actions, the fact that he had tried to leave the house with loaded guns pointing towards those present at the scene, giving no grounds for believ ing that he would surrender , and the other relevant facts.

3. Whether there was an effective investigation

88 . The applicant pointed out that in their press releases the police had given out wholly inaccurate information about the killing of J. in the doorway.

89 . The applicant considered that the investigation had been faulty, which in turn had resulted in an erroneous consideration of the charges by the District Prosecutor. The investigation had taken as its starting-point the idea that J. had committed suicide and the police had sought to obtain information from J. ' s family suggesting that he had committed suicide by having the police shoot him. Both the investigation and the consideration of the charges had displayed an aspiration to look into the possibility that J. had committed suicide. The charges brought against the commander of the Special Task Force had nothing to do with the facts of the case and it was no surprise that they had been dismissed. The corollary to that was that all the others involved had been discharged from liability, to the extent that Senior Constables A. and L. and their superior officer, Sergeant R., had never been suspects in the killing of J. This was emblematic of the official investigation and the consideration of the charges . At the same time, the bringing of charges against the commander had resulted in the police officers who had fired the shots and their superior officer being absolved of responsibility.

90 . The Government submitted that, in the present case, unlike the case of Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom ( no. 30054/96, 4 May 2001 ) the National Bureau of Investigation had conducted a t horough pre-trial investigation of its own motion immediately after the siege and two additional pre-trial investigations at the request of J. ' s family and the District Prosecutor. The National Bureau of Investigation had no hierarchical, institutional or practical connection with the Provincial Police Command or the local police. Various records regarding the autopsy, J. ' s mental health, the weapon s used, the plans made and the actions taken during the operation had been included in the pre-trial documents . A ll the police officers responsible for firing the shots had been questioned , along with other eyewitnesses and persons involved in the operation , whose identities had been made public . No unnecessary delays had occurred during the investigation . The re had been am p le public scrutiny and information, since J. ' s family had participated in the pre-trial investigation, had been informed of the state of the investigation and had also successfully request ed an additional investigation. Furthermore , the trial had been open to the public and the case had been widely publi cised in the media .

91 . The Government submitted that, i n addition to the investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation , the District P rosecutor had also considered the documentation and the entire operation . He had made decision s not to prosecute the three police officers who had fired shots during the operation, the officer in charge at the scene and the officer in overall charge . The commander of the Special Task Force had been prosecuted , but the charges had been dismissed by the court. The decision s not to prosecute together with reason s and the pre-trial investigation material gathered had been made available to J. ' s family. The y had therefore been able to acquaint themselves with all the details of the case. They had proceeded with a private prosecution with free legal assistance, had invited witnesses and had provided the court with all the material they deemed necessary. In the Government ' s view, there had been an effective official i nvestigation .

B . The Court ' s assessment

1. General principles

93 . In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under consideration. Any use of force must be no more than “absolutely necessary” for the achievement of one or more of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c). This term indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims ( McCann and Others , cited above, p. 46, §§ 148-149).

94 . In determining whether the force used is compatible with Article 2, it may therefore be relevant whether a law enforcement operation has been planned and controlled so as to minimise to the greatest extent possible recourse to lethal force or incidental loss of life ( McCann and Others , cited above, p. 57, § 194, and Ergı v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp. 1776-77, § 79).

2. Application to the present case

(a) The actions of the police officers

(b) The planning and control of the operation

99 . In carrying out its assessment of the planning and control phase of the operation from the standpoint of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court must have particular regard to the context in which the incident occurred as well as to the way in which the situation developed. Its sole concern must be to evaluate whether in the circumstances the planning and control of the operation outside J. ' s house showed that the authorities had taken appropriate care to ensure that any risk to his life had been minimised and that they were not negligent in their choice of action (see Andronicou and Constantinou , cited above, §§ 181-182).

100 . The Court notes that the background to the police intervention was a report to the effect that J. had threatened a tax i driver with a gun (see paragraph 8 above) . The police operation was mounted with the sole aim of arresting him. The police officers who arrived at the scene learn ed that there was a heavily armed man inside the house and that he was an excellent shot . That information triggered a major police operation, including the summoning of armed officers and their subsequent position ing a round the house. It is to be observed that the conduct of that operation remained at all times under the control of senior officers and that the deployment of the armed officers was reviewed and approved by the officer in charge .

101 . It cannot be disputed that the police considered that they were involved in a tense situation with an armed man and that measures had to be taken to protect the public by preventing him from escaping . They cordoned off the area in order to avert any threat to the lives of others and they had the area around the house lit so as to prevent J. from leaving the premises undetected .

102 . It is to be observed that it was of primary concern to the police to break the deadlock by persuasion. Numerous warnings were shouted and ample opportunities were afforded to him to give himself up. These warnings were ignored. N or did J. answer the phone in the later stages of the siege although the police tried to reach him repeatedly .

103 . A trained negotiator was available at the scene of the incident to broker an end to the siege . Those attempts however proved unsuccessful.

104 . The Court must be cautious about revisiting the events with the wisdom of hindsight. It would observe that, having regard to the information according to which J. was unpredictable , there is no guarantee that the presence of his brother O. and police officer S. K. at the scene at an earlier stage woul d have been any more successful than the efforts of the police negotiator assisted by the psychologist in bringing the matter to a peaceful close. J. was at all times aware of the fact that there was a police presence outside his house , and yet persisted in firing his gun. It is further to be noted that J. continued not to answer the telephone in the closing stages of the siege, which indicated his unwillingness to co-operate.

105 . In the circumstances, the Court does not consider that th ose in charge can be faulted for not having withdrawn the armed police officers from around the house . Even though the applicant argued that the presence of police officers close to the house would have been provocative to J., this course of action was not lightly undertaken. The advisability of positioning them there was considered , approved and reviewed by experienced officers, and there was a t all times a chain of command. Following the order ing of the use of tear gas to break J. ' s resistance on the second day and the remov al of the window s and the curtains , it would appear that later in the afternoon the police were unwilling to take any further action, but tried to defuse the situation without recourse to lethal force or to tactics which might provoke a violent response from J . The fact that J. set the house on fire exacerbated the situation. This could not have been foreseen. He was seen walking around inside the house carrying a rucksack and breaking furniture in an uncontrolled manner. While it is true that the police shot at J. inside the house with the intention of injur ing him, they did so in order to induce him to exit the burning house and surrender so that he could be apprehended .

106 . The Court cannot agree with the applicant ' s submission that the manner in which the operation was planned and conducted inevitably led to the fatal shooting of J . While it is true that t he police had ample time, between the arrival at the scene of the first policemen during the night and early hours of 1 December 1994 , and the culmination of events at around 7 p.m. on 2 December 1994 , i t must be recalled that the actual incident ended abruptly and was fraught with risk for J. and the unprotected police officers in the cordon .

107 . It would further observe that the use of firearms by the police as well as the conduct of police operations of the kind in issue were regulated by domestic law and that a system of adequate and effective safeguards exist ed to prevent arbitrary use of lethal force. In the instant case, none of the key officers concerned operated in a vacuum. They were all trained in the use of firearms and their movements and actions were subject to the control and supervision of experienced senior officers (compare and contrast, Makarat z is v. Greece , [GC], no. 50385/99, § 70, ECHR 2004- XI ).

108 . Having regard to the above considerations, the Court is of the view that it has no t been shown that the operation in issue was not planned and organised in a way which minimised to the greatest extent possible any risk to the life of the applicant ' s brother J .

(c) Conclusion concerning the substantive limb of Article 2

109 . To recapitulate, the Court considers that, having regard to the actions of the police officers who opened fire and to the planning and control of the operation in issue, the killing of J. resulted from the use of force which was no more than was absolutely necessary in defence of the lives of the personnel outside the armoured vehicles , in conformity with Article 2.

There has, accordingly, been no violation of that Article under its substantive limb.

( d ) The procedural requirement in Article 2

110 . The Court notes that d uring the siege a log was kept of the decisions made and actions taken , that the later part of the siege was recorded on audio tape and that the us e of tear gas was also recorded on video tape . Although the area was sealed off for the crime - scene investigation , s ome evidence may have been destroyed when the fire was being extinguish ed. Despite th is, it was possible to collect details of the bullet holes in and around the building. The investigation , which started immediately after the siege, was carried out by the National Bureau of Investigation which specialise s in the investigati on of serious crime . There is no indication that the investigators were not independent from those taking part in the police operation. While it is true that o n 2 February 1995 the National Bureau of Investigation issued a press release stating that there were grounds for investigating whether the suspect had committed suicide , the Court notes that a bout a week later, o n 8 February 1995 , the National Bureau of Investigation , having received the report concerning the cause of death, began to investigate whether anyone involved in the siege had acted in an unlawful manner. The decisions made and the actions taken during the operation were also studied by a permanent investigation team set up by the Ministry of the Interior , wh ich reviewed the operation in question hour by hour . The report was finalised within one year of the operation.

111 . The autopsy report and the results of all the forensic and other investigations , as well as the reports on the siege , were included in the pre-trial documentation , together with a large number of witness statements. At the particular request of J. ' s family and the public prosecutor , certain additional lines of inquiry were followed up during the pre-trial investigation. As for the complainants ' investigation requests which were turned down and their criticism of the conduct of the investigation , the Court would note that whilst it is of the utmost importance that a complete and accurate picture emerges of the events leading up to a killing by State agents, the evidence to be gathered to that end must be filtered in accordance with its relevance. What is important for the Court is the fact that the family had at its disposal as much information as was commensurate with the defence of its interests in the national proceedings, namely clarifying the facts surrounding the death of J. and securing the accountability of the police officers involved for any alleged acts and omissions.

112 . Less than a year after the incident, t he public prosecutor brought charges against the commander of the Special Task Force, Superintendent H. He decided however to waive charges against the officer in overall charge, Provincial Chief Inspector K.A., the officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T., Senior Const ables A. and L. and Sergeant R. J. ' s family could, and did, bring a private prosecution against the three last-mentioned police officers plus Senior Constable T.L.

113 . In the court proceedings against Superintendent H. the District Court took forensic and oral evidence. The defendant, the members of the Special Task Force involved in the siege and the officer in charge at the scene, Superintendent T. plus Senior Constables A. and L. appeared before the court and gave evidence. Having received the District Court ' s judgment acquitting the defendant, the public prosecutor lodged an appeal. The family was legally represented throughout the proceedings by experienced counsel. The lawyer acting on behalf of the applicant was able to examine key-witnesses, including the police officers who had fired their guns and those who had been in charge of the operation, and to make the submissions he wished to make in the course of the proc eedings.

114 . Having regard to the considerable number of witnesses who gave evidence at the pre-trial investigation , that the investigation included the appropriate forensic examinations, that the representative of the applicant was able to request additional investigations and that the essential witnesses who could help shed light on the events testified in the first set of criminal proceedings , the Court finds that the investigation complied with Article 2 requirements .

115 . Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been no vi olation of the respondent State ' s procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

Holds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention .

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 March 2007 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza Registrar President