Lexploria

Application No. 11224/84

Terence EWING

against

the UNITED KINGDOM

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 6 October 1987)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION

(paras. 1 - 19) ...................................... 1 - 3

A. The application (paras. 2 - 6) ............... 1

B. The proceedings (paras. 7 - 14) .............. 1 - 2

C. The present Report (paras. 15 - 19) .......... 3

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

(paras. 20 - 94) ..................................... 4 - 13

A. Relevant domestic law and practice

(paras. 20 - 36) ............................. 4 - 7

a. The charge (para. 21) .................... 4

b. The committal for trial

(paras. 22 - 23) ......................... 4

c. The bill of indictment

(paras. 24 - 26) ......................... 5

d. The trial (paras. 27 - 29) ............... 5

e. Appeal to the Court of Appeal

(paras. 30 - 34) ......................... 6

f. Appeal to the House of Lords

(paras. 35 - 36) ......................... 6 - 7

B. The particular circumstances of the case

(paras. 37 - 94) ............................. 7 - 13

III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

(paras. 95 - 138) ..................................... 14 - 21

A. The applicant (paras. 95 - 116) .............. 14 - 17

a. Relevant domestic law and practice

(paras. 95 - 97) ......................... 14

b. The merits of the case

(paras. 98 - 116) ........................ 14 - 17

aa. General

(paras. 98 - 100) ................... 14 - 15

bb. The complexity of the case

(paras. 101 - 102) .................. 15

cc. The conduct of the applicant

(paras. 103 - 108) .................. 15 - 16

dd. The conduct of the judicial

authorities (paras. 109 - 116) ...... 16 - 17

B. The Government

(paras. 117 - 138) ........................... 17 - 21

a. General

(paras. 117 - 119) ....................... 17 - 18

b. The pre-trial period

(paras. 120 - 127) ....................... 18 - 19

c. The appeal period before the Court of Appeal

(paras. 128 - 134) ....................... 19 - 20

d. The appeal period before the House of Lords

(paras. 135 - 136) ....................... 21

e. The length of the proceedings as a whole

(paras. 137 - 138) ....................... 21

IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

(paras. 139 - 160) ................................... 22 - 26

A. Point at issue

(para. 139) .................................. 22

B. Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

(paras. 140 - 141) ........................... 22

C. The length of the proceedings and the relevant

periods to be taken into account

(paras. 142 - 145) ........................... 22 - 23

D. The reasonableness of the length of

proceedings (paras. 146 - 159) ............... 23 - 26

a. The complexity of the case

(paras. 146 - 149) ....................... 23 - 24

b. The conduct of the parties

(paras. 150 - 159) ....................... 24 - 26

aa. The pre-trial period

(paras. 150 - 152) .............. 24 - 25

bb. The appeal period

(paras. 153 - 157) .............. 25 - 26

cc. The length of the proceedings as a

whole (paras. 158 - 159) ........ 26

E. Conclusion (para. 160) ....................... 26

APPENDIX I - History of the proceedings before the

Commission .................................... 27 - 28

APPENDIX II - Second decision on the admissibility of the

application ................................... 29 - 41

APPENDIX III - First decision on the admissibility of the

application ................................... 42 - 43

APPENDIX IV - Decision to re-open the examination of part of the

application ................................... 44 - 46

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A. The application

2. The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1952 and

living in London.

3. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. David M.

Greene, Solicitor, Messrs. Edwin Coe and Calder Woods, Solicitors,

London.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom are represented by their

Agents MM. Ian D. Hendry and Michael C. Wood, both of the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office.

5. The applicant was arrested on 3 December 1979 and charged with

criminal offences on 5 December 1979. He was remanded in custody for

two weeks and then released on bail. He was finally arrested on 13

March 1980 and remanded in custody until his trial. He faced charges

for offences committed before 5 December 1979 and charges for offences

committed during the bail period. His trial lasted over a month and

resulted in his conviction on 20 May 1981 for 24 offences and a total

sentence of seven years' imprisonment. Appeal proceedings up to the

House of Lords terminated on 24 October 1983 with the dismissal of his

petition for leave to appeal, although in the meantime the Court of

Appeal had reduced the applicant's sentence to a total of 5 years'

imprisonment. The applicant was therefore released from prison on 12

August 1983, before the House of Lords' decision.

6. The applicant complains to the Commission of the length of the

proceedings as a whole (5 December 1979 to 24 October 1983), as well

as the length of proceedings prior to his trial and on appeal. He

claims to be a victim of a breach of the reasonable time requirement

laid down in Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

B. The proceedings

7. The application was introduced on 9 September 1983 and

registered on 26 October 1984. It concerned various complaints about

the criminal proceedings described above, including the complaint

relating to the length of criminal proceedings, both as a whole and at

each jurisdictional stage.

8. On 15 March 1985 the Commission declared the whole application

inadmissible. By letter of 12 June 1985 the applicant drew the

Commission's attention to the fact that the Commission's rejection of

the length complaint for non-observance of the six months' rule was

based on facts which were shown to be untrue. Therefore, on

18 October 1985 the Commission decided to re-open its proceedings

concerning that part of the application relating to the length of the

criminal proceedings in question. It also decided to invite the

applicant to re-submit an application form and certain essential

documents.

9. On 12 December 1985 the Commission decided to give notice of

the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 42

para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure and to invite them to present

before 27 March 1986 their observations in writing on the admissibility

and merits of the application. These observations were submitted on

24 March 1986, to which the applicant replied on 9 April 1986 in

person, and on 2 July 1986 through his legal representative. The

applicant had been granted legal aid by the Commission on 16 May 1986.

10. On 3 December 1986 the Commission declared the application

admissible, limited to the issue of length of proceedings under

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

11. On 7 March 1987 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of

the parties on the merits of the case. This hearing was held on

6 May 1987. The applicant attended, represented by Mr. D.M. Greene,

Solicitor, and Ms. J. Eales, Adviser. The Government were represented

by Mr. M.C. Wood, Agent, the Rt. Hon. Sir Patrick Mayhew QC, MP, then

Solicitor General, Counsel, Mr. T.F.H. Cassel, Counsel, Miss E.S.

Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department, Adviser, Mr. C.M.L. Osborne,

Home Office, Adviser, and Mr. M. McKenzie, Criminal Appeal Office,

Adviser.

12. On 26 June 1987 the applicant submitted supplementary written

observations on the merits of the case, upon which the Government made

no written comments in reply.

13. On 6 October 1987 the Commission considered the merits of the

application and took their final votes on the case. On the same date

the Commission adopted the text of the Report.

14. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in

accordance with Article 28 para. b of the Convention, placed itself

at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly

settlement of the case. In the light of the parties' reaction, the

Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a settlement

can be reached.

C. The present Report

15. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and

votes in plenary session, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD

J.A. FROWEIN

E. BUSUTTIL

B. KIERNAN

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Sir Basil HALL

16. The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on

6 October 1987 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers

in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.

17. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of

the Convention, is

1) to establish the facts, and

2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found

disclose a breach by the State concerned of its

obligations under the Convention.

18. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before

the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's

second decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.

The Commission's first decision on admissibility forms Appendix III,

and its decision to re-open its examination of part of the application

forms Appendix IV.

19. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the

Commission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A. Relevant domestic law and practice

20. In criminal proceedings for serious offences there may be up

to six procedural stages:

a. charging of the suspect by the police with an offence;

b. examination of the evidence by a magistrate and

committal for trial;

c. signing of the bill of indictment;

d. trial;

e. appeal against conviction or sentence, or both,

to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division);

f. appeal to the House of Lords on a certified point of

law of public importance.

a. The charge

----------

21. The investigation of a criminal case is ordinarily conducted by

the police in the United Kingdom, either on their own initiative or at

the instance of the prosecuting authorities. The charging of the

suspect with an offence is done by the police in culmination of the

investigatory process if they consider that sufficient evidence exists

to commence a prosecution.

b. The committal for trial

-----------------------

22. An examining magistrate considers the sufficiency of the

evidence before committing the suspect to the Crown Court for trial.

23. These proceedings are not part of the investigation. The

purpose of committal proceedings is to decide whether a prima facie

case has been made out against the accused. Committal proceedings are

a safeguard against the improper or unjustifiable committal of an

accused person to stand trial. The magistrate will examine the

evidence presented to him, will listen to any argument and will then

decide whether there is enough evidence on which a reasonable jury if

properly directed could find him guilty. If the magistrate finds the

evidence insufficient, he will discharge the accused person. (See also

point d., para. 27 below.)

c. The bill of indictment

----------------------

24. The bill of indictment (the formal document embodying the

charge or charges brought by the Crown against the accused person) is

drawn up from the committal papers by the Crown Court authorities.

25. Several charges may be joined in one indictment (Section 4

Indictments Act 1915), particularly where they concern the same facts

or a series of similar offences (Rule 9 Indictment Rules 1971). Where

the Crown Court judge orders, inter alia, that two or more offences

charged against that person be tried together, a voluntary bill of

indictment is made.

26. Where it is considered desirable to have separate trials for

any one or more offences charged in an indictment, the Crown Court may

so order (Section 5(3) Indictments Act 1915).

d. The trial

---------

27. It is an important discretionary judicial function of both

magistrates and trial judges to fix the respective dates of committal

proceedings and of the trial, and to deal with the parties'

applications for directions. In fixing dates the judicial authorities

are required to consider the representations made to them by both the

prosecution and the defence. A balance has to be struck between the

interests of the accused, whose liberty may be at stake, and that of

the efficient administration of justice and the avoidance of

unreasonable delays. All courts, including the Central Criminal Court

by which the applicant was tried, regularly review cases which are

awaiting trial in order to reduce protracted delays. If the judicial

authorities have doubts as to the merits of an application for an

adjournment it is proper for them to give the accused the benefit of

the doubt and ensure that sufficient time is allowed for the

preparation of the defence.

28. The prosecution or the defence may concede certain facts,

which admission will be taken as conclusive evidence of the point

(Section 10 (1) Criminal Justice Act 1967). The prosecution is

obliged to prove every material allegation beyond reasonable doubt.

The defence are entitled to put the prosecution to strict proof of

purported evidence and to object to the admissibility of evidence.

However, it is common for facts which cannot be seriously disputed to

be conceded by the defence, thus avoiding the necessity of oral

evidence on them. Use of this procedure results in considerable

savings in both time and money.

29. Proceedings before the Central Criminal Court, where the

applicant was tried, are marginally longer than elsewhere, because it

hears the more serious, complex cases. In 1980/81 the period from

remand to trial was normally about a year.

e. Appeal to the Court of Appeal

-----------------------------

30. Appeal against conviction or sentence, or both, lies to the

Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The accused may appeal as of

right on a point of law, but only with the leave of the Court of

Appeal on other matters. Whether to grant leave to appeal is usually

decided by a single judge where any element of fact is involved. He

considers the grounds of appeal drafted by Counsel for the appellant,

together with any transcript from the shorthand notes of relevant parts

of the trial that may be put before him.

31. As to this, Counsel for the appellant has the responsibility

of informing the Criminal Appeal Office as to which parts of the trial

proceedings he wants transcribed for the purposes of the appeal. In

order to reduce time and cost, particularly in a case like the

applicant's where the trial lasted some 22 working days, only those

parts of the trial shorthand notes which are relevant to the grounds

of appeal will be ordered to be transcribed by the Criminal Appeal

Office. Counsel will then be supplied with the transcript and be given

an opportunity to finalise the appellant's grounds of appeal. Until

Counsel does this, the papers cannot be placed before the single judge

for his decision and the case cannot proceed to a hearing before the

Full Court of Appeal. The single judge's decision whether to grant

leave or not is usually made without hearing oral argument. An

appellant may apply to the Full Court against any decision of the

single judge.

32. The appeal courts perform the same discretionary judicial

function as the lower courts in fixing hearing dates (see point d,

para. 27 above).

33. If the Full Court of Appeal, made up of three judges,

dismisses an appeal, the appellant (or the prosecution) may request

the court to certify that the case involves a point of law of general

public importance and to grant leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

If this question cannot be decided immediately the matter must be

adjourned until it is possible to reassemble the same judges. The

Court of Appeal may issue such a certificate, but nevertheless refuse

leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

34. Proceedings before the Court of Appeal in 1980/81 normally

took about a year, the Court of Appeal having received 6097 leave to

appeal applications in 1981. Appeals may be expedited if the prisoner

would complete his sentence before the appeal hearing.

f. Appeal to the House of Lords

----------------------------

35. An appeal lies to the House of Lords against certain decisions

of the Court of Appeal. The appeal is available to both parties to

the proceedings provided that the Court of Appeal has certified that

the case involves a point of law of public importance and either the

leave of the Court of Appeal has been given or the House of Lords

itself grants leave.

36. Applications for leave to appeal to the House of Lords are

made by way of a petition, which must be lodged within 14 days of the

refusal of leave by the court below, although an application may be

made by a defendant to extend that time limit when the petition is

lodged out of time. The petition is then referred to an Appeal

Committee, which will consider whether it is fit for an oral hearing.

Where a petition is not considered fit, the Clerk of the Parliaments

will notify the parties of its dismissal.

B. The particular circumstances of the case

37. On 3 December 1979¹ the applicant was arrested and two days

later was charged with procuring the execution of a valuable security

by deception and with obtaining property by deception (hereafter

referred to as Case A). These offences had allegedly been committed

in October 1979. He was remanded in custody by a magistrate and

released on bail on 19 December.

38. On 13 March 1980 the applicant was again arrested and charged

on 19 March with five counts of forgery, five counts of uttering a

forged document and five counts of theft (hereafter referred to as

Case B). These offences were allegedly committed during the bail

period. He was remanded in custody on 20 March until his trial.

39. The applicant was subsequently charged with three counts of

forgery, two counts of uttering a forged document and three counts of

theft, offences allegedly committed between June 1979 and January 1980

(hereafter referred to as Case C).

40. The offences charged arose out of separate incidents involving

the theft and forgery of cheques and investigations by two police

forces.

41. On 10 April 1980 the applicant was committed for trial by the

Mansion House Justices to the Central Criminal Court in respect of

Case A. On 13 June 1980 he was committed for trial by the Highbury

Corner Magistrates' Court to the Inner London Crown Court in respect

of Case B.

42. On 7 July 1980 the indictment in Case A was preferred. On

6 August and 9 September 1980 the applicant made successful

applications to change his solicitors in this case.

43. On 19 September 1980 the Inner London Crown Court ordered the

hearing in Case B to be listed for the week commencing 24 November

1980.________________

¹ Since the Commission's decision on admissibility (Appendix II hereto,

p. 39), the parties have now agreed that the applicant was arrested on

3 December 1979 and not 5 December 1979, as stated in the decision.

In his supplementary written observations on the merits (26.6.87) the

applicant included a chronology of events with which the Government

had no disagreement, and which gave 3 December 1979 as the arrest date.

44. On 5 November 1980 the applicant instructed his solicitors to

delay the hearing of Case A at their discretion.

45. The next day the defence applied to the Inner London Crown

Court for an adjournment of the proposed hearing in Case B fixed for

24 November 1980, as more time was required to obtain handwriting

evidence. The application was granted and the prison authorities were

instructed to prepare a medical report on the applicant. The hearing

date was fixed for 5 January 1981 after the judge had expressed his

concern about the adjournment because of the applicant's remand in

custody.

46. On 10 November 1980 the defence requested an independent

psychiatric report in the context of Case A. On 25 November the trial

date in this case was fixed for 9 February 1981.

47. On 28 November 1980 Case B was transferred to the Central

Criminal Court.

48. The applicant was committed for trial by the Highbury Corner

Magistrates' Court to the Central Criminal Court in respect of Case C

on 4 December 1980.

49. On 17 December 1980 the Central Criminal Court contacted the

parties by telephone to confirm the hearing date in Case B for

5 January 1981. Two days later the prosecution successfully applied

for an adjournment and the hearing date was then fixed for 6 April

1981. The defence also made an application for second Counsel to hold

a "noting brief". On 29 December 1980 the defence applied for the

appointment of a handwriting expert in this case.

50. On 5 January 1981 the Central Criminal Court confirmed with

both parties that Case C would be listed for hearing with Case B on

6 April 1981.

51. On 9 January 1981 the defence applied for the appointment of a

handwriting expert in Case A also.

52. On 19 January 1981 the defence requested medical reports on

the applicant in respect of Case B.

53. On 2 February 1981 the Central Criminal Court fixed the

hearing date in Case A for 6 April 1981 (along with Cases B and C).

All parties agreed on the change of fixture and that the Metropolitan

Police solicitor should take over the whole prosecution.

54. On 10 February 1981 Mr. Justice Russell gave the prosecution

leave to prefer a voluntary bill of indictment to amalgamate the three

indictments into one, because the offences charged were of a similar

kind and criminal pattern, and it was deemed desirable in the interests

of justice, and the economy of time and expense, to hold a joint trial

before the same court. The resultant indictment contained 25 counts,

relating to eleven different sets of circumstances, but only three

criminal offences, namely theft, forgery and uttering a forged

document. The applicant was given notice of the voluntary bill of

indictment on 19 February.

55. On 13 March 1981 the defence applied for legal aid for second

Counsel to hold a full brief, the prosecution having instructed a

Leading Junior Counsel. The application was granted on 27 March 1981.

56. The applicant's trial opened on 6 April 1981 and closed on

20 May 1981 with his conviction on 24 out of the 25 counts. It lasted

22 working days. The first eight days of the trial were occupied with

legal submissions (voir dire). The Court adjourned for Easter on

15 April, the trial resuming on 22 April when the jury was sworn. The

prosecution case lasted 14 working days and finished on 13 May. During

that time the jury went out on 27 occasions whilst submissions in law

were made to the judge. The applicant had instructed his solicitors

that no admissions whatsoever were to be made under Section 10 of the

Criminal Justice Act 1967 and that the prosecution were to be put to

strict proof of every ingredient of every single count. For Case A

there were 12 witnesses and 17 exhibits; for Case B, 31 witneses and

50 exhibits; for Case C, 21 witnesses and 21 exhibits.

57. On 22 April 1981, 16 days after the opening of the case, on

the day the jury was empanelled, the applicant's Counsel applied to

the trial judge to release the case for trial by another judge, on the

ground that he was prejudiced. The applicant also applied for

severance of the indictment with an order for five separate trials.

These applications were refused.

58. After the normal submissions at the end of the prosecution

case, the applicant did not give evidence, but made a statement from

the dock. The judge's summing up lasted just over a day. The jury

took 4 hours and 15 minutes to reach their verdict as to the

applicant's guilt.

59. On conviction, the applicant was sentenced to a total of seven

years' imprisonment, and ordered to pay compensation of £11,701.85p

and to make a contribution of up to £5,000 towards prosecution costs.

60. The applicant lodged his Notice of Appeal against conviction

and sentence with the Criminal Appeal Office on 17 June 1981. The

grounds of appeal against conviction, settled by Counsel, contained

29 separate allegations of errors of law made by the trial judge.

61. On 18 June 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office requested the trial

documents from the Central Criminal Court.

62. On 24 June 1981 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal,

inter alia, to deal with his appeal urgently.

63. On 30 June 1981 the trial documents were received from the

Central Criminal Court, but found to be incomplete.

64. On 1 July 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office replied to the

applicant's request of 24 June 1981 that his appeal had to await the

transcription of the relevant parts of the trial. The Criminal Appeal

Office also requested the missing documents from the Central Criminal

Court.

65. On 7 July 1981 the applicant wrote to the Criminal Appeal

Office drawing their attention to relevant parts of the Criminal

Appeal Act 1968 in respect of his appeal.

66. On 23 July 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office received the

documents requested from the Central Criminal Court. The next day the

Assistant Registrar of the Criminal Appeal Office wrote to Defence

Counsel asking him to specify which parts of the trial proceedings he

wished to have transcribed. The Office also replied to the

applicant's letter of 7 July 1981.

67. On 30 July 1981 Defence Counsel replied to the Assistant

Registrar's inquiry, but his letter was not received by the lawyer

dealing with the case in the Criminal Appeal Office until early

September because the letter omitted the case reference number.

68. On 5 August 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office requested a reply

from Counsel to their letter of 24 July. The next day they received

an inquiry from the applicant as to whether the relevant transcript

had been ordered and whether it was to include the judge's summing up,

to which inquiry the Office replied that the transcript had not yet

been ordered because Defence Counsel's reply was awaited.

69. On 12 August 1981 the applicant's solicitors requested that

the single judge grant legal aid for two Counsel.

70. On or about 10 September 1981 Defence Counsel's letter of

30 July 1981 was received by the case lawyer in the Criminal Appeal

Office, which on 24 September wrote to Counsel asking him to

reconsider his transcript requirements.

71. On 6 October 1981 the Assistant Registrar ordered part of the

transcript from the shorthand writers, i.e. the list of witnesses, the

judge's summing up and the proceedings after the verdict had been

given.

72. On 18 October 1981 Counsel sent a holding reply (an

acknowledgement) to the Criminal Appeal Office's letter of

24 September.

73. On 27 October 1981 the Assistant Registrar wrote to Defence

Counsel expressing concern over the fact that the applicant had been

convicted 5 months before and the need to submit the applicant's leave

to appeal application to a single judge of the Court of Appeal as soon

as possible. He requested Counsel to deal urgently with the question

of his transcript requirements and informed him of the partial

transcript already ordered on 6 October.

74. On 31 October 1981 Defence Counsel replied about the

transcript.

75. On 3 November 1981 the applicant wrote to the Criminal Appeal

Office about the progress of his case and the question of legal aid.

76. On 12 November 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office received

Prosecuting Counsel's transcript requirements.

77. On 1 December 1981 the applicant again wrote to the Criminal

Appeal Office asking, inter alia, if the appeal would now proceed.

78. On 9 December 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office wrote to

Defence Counsel enclosing a copy of Prosecuting Counsel's letter of

12 November. In the former letter, Defence Counsel was informed of

the Office's several unsuccessful attempts to contact him and he was

asked to contact the Office as soon as possible. A further pressing

reminder was sent to Defence Counsel on 15 December, followed by a

letter dated 8 January 1982 warning that, unless he clarified his

transcript requirements before 15 January, the case would go before

the Court in its present state. Counsel replied on 12 January 1982.

79. In the meantime the applicant had again written to the

Criminal Appeal Office on 22 December 1981 asking about the progress

of the transcript and for information concerning his Counsel.

80. On 15 January 1982 the Criminal Appeal Office ordered a

further transcript. However, as it later transpired, the order was

partly defective because the principal evidence of two witnesses was

requested, whereas what was required was a transcript of those

witnesses' evidence during the preliminary voir dire proceedings.

81. On 5 March 1982 the Criminal Appeal Office forwarded the

transcript to Defence Counsel, to which he replied on 16 March that it

was partly defective. The next day the Criminal Appeal Office ordered

the correct transcript to be provided no later than 7 April. In fact

it was received on 29 March 1982 and forwarded on 30 March to Defence

Counsel with the request that he finalise his grounds of appeal.

82. On 6 April 1982 the Criminal Appeal Office contacted Defence

Counsel as to when the finalised grounds of appeal might be expected,

and were told to expect them by 27 April. Defence Counsel was

reminded by the Office on 28 April 1982 and he sent the perfected

grounds of appeal on 4 May 1982.

83. On 5 May 1982 the Assistant Registrar granted legal aid for

one Defence Counsel for the submission of the applicant's case

directly to the Full Court, thus avoiding the single judge stage. The

case papers were then referred to the case lawyer in the Criminal

Appeal Office for a summary of them to be made for the members of the

Court.

84. On 11 May 1982 the applicant wrote to the Criminal Appeal

Office about the progress of his case and followed this with a letter

dated 21 June 1982 about the legal aid order and asking the Registrar

to instruct Counsel.

85. On 7 July 1982 the Assistant Registrar signed the legal aid

order.

86. On 30 July 1982 the applicant was informed by the Criminal

Appeal Office that his appeal would be heard on 21 October 1982 and

Defence Counsel was asked to provide his estimate of the length of the

appeal hearing.

87. On 24 September 1982 Defence Counsel's estimate that the

case would take one-and-a-half to two days was received by the

Criminal Appeal Office. The case had, however, been listed on the

basis that it would only take one day and, as the Court was to be

differently constituted on 22 October, the case could not be allowed

to overrun. Lord Justice Lawton directed that a new hearing date be

fixed. This was done on 1 October 1982, with the hearing date fixed for

16 and 17 December 1982.

88. The applicant's appeal was heard during four whole days,

between 16 and 21 December 1982. The Court allowed the appeal against

conviction on three counts in the indictment and quashed those

convictions. The total sentence of imprisonment was reduced from

seven to five years. Judgment was reserved until a later date.

89. On 29 and 30 December 1982 the applicant wrote to the Criminal

Appeal Office requesting information and leave to appeal to the House

of Lords respectively. He sent a reminder on 10 January 1983 and

received a reply dated 20 January. He again wrote on 7 February 1983

enquiring about the progress in his case, to which the Criminal

Appeal Office replied on 17 February that the Court of Appeal would

deliver its judgment on 11 March 1983.

90. When judgment (consisting of 41 pages) was given on 11 March

1983 Defence Counsel reserved his position in relation to the

possibility of applying to the Court of Appeal to certify that a point

of law of general public importance was raised by the case. As Mr.

Justice Staughton had only returned to London to give the Court's

reasons and was not further available, the certificate question was

adjourned "to a date to be fixed some time at the beginning of next

term".

91. On 15 June 1983 the Criminal Appeal Office informed the

applicant that his application to certify a point of law would be

heard on 29 June, on which day the Court of Appeal issued such a

certificate, but refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The

point of law certified by the Court of Appeal concerned the

admissibility, under the Criminal Evidence Act 1965, of bank

statements prepared by a computer.

92. The applicant then lodged a direct petition for leave to

appeal in the Judicial Office of the House of Lords on 13 July 1983.

The petition was presented to the House on 18 July after the expiry of

the two clear days required by the relevant Practice Directions. The

petition was in fact lodged out of time, but the House extended the

time limit. Having been presented to the House, the petition was

referred to an Appeal Committee for a decision as to whether it should

receive an oral hearing.

93. On 10 October 1983 the Committee reported to the House that

the petition was fit for an oral hearing; and on 24 October the

petition was heard and dismissed. The report of the Appeal Committee

was agreed to by the House on the same day. The delay between the

date of presentation and the date of determination was largely caused

by the summer recess: the House rose on 28 July 1983 and judicial

business was resumed on 4 October 1983. During the recess the

applicant could have requested the matter to be expedited. However, he

did not do this for, having just been released from prison on

12 August 1983, he was then in the process of re-organising his life.

94. On 16 February 1984 the applicant requested the Home Office to

pay him compensation for the time taken to dispose of his criminal

case. This was refused on 31 August 1984.

III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. The applicant

a. Relevant domestic law and practice

----------------------------------

95. As regards his appeal to the Court of Appeal, the applicant

contends that, as his appeal related to points of law alone, it should

have been dealt with immediately by the Full Court of Appeal. However,

despite the consistent efforts of Defence Counsel to point this out to

the Criminal Appeal Office the latter continued to treat the appeal as

if it required the leave of the single judge.

96. The Registrar of Criminal Appeals and his Office have the

statutory obligation to deal with the administration of appeals and

the Registrar is empowered to make certain decisions of a judicial

nature including decisions as to whether legal aid should be granted

to appellants or not. Legal aid is available to appellants but it is

limited in its nature to accord with the limited work to be done for

an appeal. Accordingly legal aid is granted for Counsel only. By

Section 21 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 the Registrar has the

statutory duty to take all necessary steps for obtaining a hearing of

any appeal or application. The Registrar has the duty to ensure that

matters proceed as quickly as possible. In the case of the applicant

he remained in prison throughout the proceedings before the Court of

Appeal and therefore his ability to communicate was limited. The

Registrar and Defence Counsel are intended to be in constant contact

about various aspects arising during the course of the proceedings,

including the settlement of the transcript for the Court of Appeal

and, for instance, questions of whether a conference with Counsel is

necessary. The Registrar is the only person in direct contact with

Counsel and able to ensure that Counsel deals with matters

expeditiously. To this extent the Registrar acts as a solicitor would

do were legal aid extended for such representation.

97. The applicant contends that the Criminal Appeal Office failed

in its duties in his case.

b. The merits of the case

----------------------

aa. General

98. The applicant submits that the length of the criminal

proceedings against him from 5 December 1979 until 24 October 1983 (a

total of 3 years, 10 months and 19 days) contravened the reasonable

time requirement of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

99. In criminal cases the test of reasonable time should be

strict, particularly when the accused person is imprisoned. It is

widely accepted that there is an unacceptable delay in criminal

proceedings in England and Wales, compared with other jurisidictions,

such as that of Scotland which requires that the trials of persons

remanded in custody must come on within 110 days of committal.

100. The applicant points out that he had already been released

from prison, having served his sentence, by the time the final

decision of the House of Lords was given on 24 October 1983.

bb. The complexity of the case

101. As to the complexity of the case, the applicant relies on the

assessment of Lord Justice O'Connor in the Court of Appeal who said:

"The nature of the offences was very simple".

102. The 24 counts of which the applicant was convicted related to

only 11 different sets of circumstances and only three offences:

theft, forgery and uttering a forged document. It would have been

appropriate to have taken up specimen charges. As to the 29 grounds

of appeal, they related only to seven general areas of appeal.

cc. The conduct of the applicant

103. The applicant submits that his various applications in no way

delayed the proceedings, for there is no reason to assume that the

Central Criminal Court would have fixed earlier hearing dates if such

applications had not been made. In particular, the changes of

solicitors did not delay the hearing date in Case A and the authority

given on 5 November 1980 to the applicant's solicitors to delay Case A

if necessary was merely standard practice and did not in fact lead to

any prolongation of the proceedings.

104. The only conduct of the applicant which should be considered

is in relation to Case B where the defence applied for an adjournment

on 6 November 1980 to collect handwriting evidence. This caused a

delay of six weeks in Case B which should then have been heard on

5 January 1981. However the prosecution then applied for an

adjournment and the trial was postponed until April 1981. The

applicant, therefore, submits that in relation to Cases A and C his

conduct did not in any way interfere with the length of the period up

to the trial. In relation to Case B his conduct induced a six week

delay only.

105. During the whole appeal period the applicant was imprisoned

and it is alleged that his communications with his representatives

were restricted. With the legal aid limitations for Counsel only,

communications between the appellant in prison and Counsel tend

largely, as in this case, to go through the Criminal Appeal Office.

The appellant, as in this case, is able to exert only very limited

pressure on Counsel. His main method of trying to accelerate matters

is to pressure the Criminal Appeal Office, who in turn may pressure

Counsel by, for instance, fixing the hearing date. Counsel's delays

can only therefore be attributed to the failure of the Criminal Appeal

Office in its duties and not to the applicant. The applicant's

correspondence with the Criminal Appeal Office indicates his concern

that the appeal should be heard as soon as possible.

106. Defence Counsel cannot be held responsible for the six week

delay of the Criminal Appeal Office to ensure that the case lawyer

received his letter of 30 July 1981, merely because he had omitted an

appropriate reference. Defence counsel also denies responsibility for

the ordering of the wrong transcript in January 1982, and claims that

his requirements were clearly specified. The applicant concludes that

this latter delay, from 15 January 1982 until 29 March 1982, was

caused by the Criminal Appeal Office.

107. The applicant also criticises the practice of the Criminal

Appeal Office in fixing the appeal hearing date: The Registrar first

estimates how long the hearing will take and fixes a date. He then

asks Counsel to estimate the length of the hearing, and if Counsel

considers that it will take longer than the Registrar has estimated

the hearing is fixed for a later date. It is submitted that the time

wasted with this procedure cannot be deemed to be Counsel's

responsibility.

108. As regards the proceedings before the House of Lords the

applicant did not apply for an expedited hearing during the summer

vacation for he had just been released from prison in August 1983 and

was re-organising his life. However, the applicant challenges the

availability of such an application, for their Lordships sit in only

the very rarest of cases during the summer recess, at their

discretion. The Judicial Office apparently have confirmed to the

applicant that there has been no such sitting in the last four years.

dd. The conduct of the judicial authorities

109. The applicant contends that the conduct of the judicial

authorities in his case caused unreasonable delay in the proceedings.

110. As regards the period up to trial, the applicant submits that

the offences against him were not of such a serious nature as to

require a trial before the Central Criminal Court. Putting cases like

his before this Court only contributes to further delays in the

handling of the most serious trials.

111. The joining of the charges provoked unnecessary delays. In

particular, the adjournment of the hearing in Case B, fixed for

5 January 1981, was crucial in inducing the further delay until

6 April 1981, for all the charges were then held back until that

date. However, the three cases against him were entirely separate and

there was no reason why events in one case should have delayed the

others.

112. The applicant claims that the authorities took no action to

ensure a trial within a reasonable period even though the applicant

had been remanded in custody.

113. As regards the appeal proceedings, the applicant contends that

the Criminal Appeal Office mishandled them by failing, inter alia, to

put the appropriate pressure on Defence Counsel, by ordering the wrong

transcript, by refusing to accept at the outset the appellant's

contention that leave to appeal did not have to be obtained from the

single judge (because the appeal was on points of law only) and by

operating an inefficient method of estimating and fixing appeal

hearing dates.

114. He concludes that the delays in the appeal proceedings arose

only from the conduct of the judicial authorities and were wholly

unreasonable.

115. As to the House of Lords proceedings, the applicant points out

that his petition for leave was lodged only two days outside the

14 day time limit. It was then heard some three-and-a-half months

later, some two-and-a-half months after his release. This

three-and-a-half months' delay was unreasonable.

116. To sum up, the applicant submits that the length of the

proceedings as a whole, 3 years, 10 months and 19 days, was

unreasonable, particularly for someone in custody. Of that period the

only "contribution" the applicant made to the delay was a six week

adjournment prior to the trial, leaving a delay of 3 years and 9

months because of the Government's inaction for which no satisfactory

reasons have been given. Accordingly the applicant claims to have

suffered a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

B. The Government

a. General

-------

117. The Government submit, for the reasons given by the Commission

in its decision on admissibility of 3 December 1986 (Appendix II,

pp. 39 - 40 below) that the period to be taken into consideration

began on 5 December 1979, when the applicant was first charged, and

ended on 24 October 1983, when the House of Lords refused his petition

for leave to appeal.

118. Pursuant to the approach adopted by the Court in the Eckle

judgment, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings for the

purposes of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention must be assessed in

the light of the particular circumstances of the individual case. In

particular, three factors must be taken into account: the complexity

of the case as a whole, the manner in which the case has been handled

by the national judicial authorities and the courts and the

applicant's own conduct (Eur. Court H.R., Eckle judgment of 15 July

1982, Series A No. 51, para. 80).

119. The Government contend that in the present case the total

period under consideration was reasonable. Such delays as occurred

were in large part caused by the conduct of the applicant himself or

of those representing him, and not by the conduct of the national

authorities. Indeed the judicial authorities were at pains to

curtail the delays which arose. Morever such delays which may be

attributable to the authorities themselves were not sufficiently

serious to involve a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

b. The pre-trial period (5 December 1979 - 6 April 1981)

-----------------------------------------------------

120. The voluntary bill of indictment was a necessary and classic

procedural step to join three groups of charges revealing a similar

pattern of criminal activity by the applicant. The prosecution

considered, and the highly experienced judge, Mr. Justice Russell,

agreed, that it was desirable in the interests of justice that the

same tribunal should determine all the issues involved and that a

joint trial would save time and avoid unnecessary expense. It would

be improper to view the progress in each individual case on its own,

for it was apparent during the individual preparation of the three

cases that they were developing a pattern of similarity and it was

foreseeable that at a particular point it would be necessary to ask

for a voluntary bill of indictment so that they might all be brought

together under one single indictment. This was not an appropriate

case for specimen charges to be taken up, given the difficulties

juries often experience in determining the facts of the matter in

fraud cases, and the need in the applicant's case to prove that he had

a system in his criminal activities. The prosecution may prove a

system by providing the facts of other cases of a similar character

bearing the same pattern.

121. It is not contended that the nature of the offences was

complex. However, the proliferation of the applicant's criminal

activities imposed considerable demands upon the investigating and

judicial authorities and resulted in 25 charges being laid against

him. Two police forces were involved and the events under

investigation took place over a considerable period (from June 1979 to

March 1980). The trial reflects the substantial and detailed nature

of the case: it lasted 22 days, including 8 days of legal argument.

It involved numerous witnesses and exhibits, the applicant insisting

on all of them being subject to strict proof, including the proof of

the origin of documents (as was his right).

122. The causes for delay at this stage were the applicant's own

requirements for time to prepare his defence and the continued

necessity for investigations by the police and prosecuting authorities

of fresh offences committed by the applicant after his first arrest

and remand in custody in December 1979.

123. The Government contend that the applicant was not ready for

trial in Cases A and B in late 1980 and early 1981, given his

application on 6 November 1980 for a later hearing date in Case B, his

letter of authority of 5 November 1980 to his solicitors to delay

Case A, his application on 19 December 1980 for handwriting expertise

in Case B, followed by a similar application in Case A on 9 January

1981, and his application on 19 January 1981 for medical reports in

Case B. Thus on 2 February 1981, with the applicant's agreement, the

cases were ordered to be heard together on 6 April 1981, which was the

actual date on which the trial began.

124. In all these applications the applicant was, of course,

exercising his rights. However, he cannot complain about delays which

arose from his own applications.

125. Nearly the whole of the period from 13 June 1980 to

10 February 1981 was required by the applicant in order to prepare his

defence and this period was also used by the authorities to conduct

the third investigation and prosecution in Case C.

126. The period of two months which elapsed between the committal

of Case C for trial and the grant of the voluntary bill of indictment on

10 February 1981 is not unreasonable, in the Government's opinion,

particularly bearing in mind its similarity with Cases A and B, for

which a hearing day had been fixed for 6 April 1981 by consent.

127. Thus in respect of the three factors enunciated above

(para. 118), the Government submit that the pre-trial period clearly

discloses no breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

c. The appeal period before the Court of Appeal (17 June 1981 -

------------------------------------------------------------

29 June 1983)

-------------

128. The Government submit that the delays during the Court of

Appeal proceedings may be attributed to the applicant's Counsel who

was tardy in making clear which part of the transcript he wanted

transcribed and in finalising the applicant's grounds of appeal.

The facts of the case clearly show the efforts made by the Criminal

Appeal Office to accelerate matters. However, it was proper for that

Office to await the transcript requirements and the perfected grounds

of appeal rather than setting the hearing date earlier, otherwise the

applicant would have complained to the Commission of an unfair

hearing.

129. It was regrettable that it took the Court of Appeal Office six

weeks to ensure that Defence Counsel's letter of 30 July 1981 reached

the competent case lawyer, but that Office's reminder to Counsel on

5 August 1981 should have alerted him to the fact that his letter had

not been received. He did not, however, respond to the reminder.

Nevertheless, this incident involved only a six week delay in the

overall length of the proceedings. Similarly, the misunderstanding

of the Criminal Appeal Office concerning Defence Counsel's transcript

requirements, and the ordering of the wrong transcript, involved no

more than a 25 day delay in the proceedings.

130. The Criminal Appeal Office did not receive the finalised

grounds of appeal from Counsel until 4 May 1982, although the

supplementary transcript had been sent on 5 March 1982.

131. The single judge procedure was dispensed with in order to save

time in view of the delays which had occurred, although the Criminal

Appeal Office held the view that the case might well have been an

appeal in which matters of fact would fall to be considered, and

which, therefore, would normally have required leave to appeal from

the single judge first. This view is substantiated by an examination

of the perfected grounds of appeal. They confirm that the appeal

might well have related to matters of fact as well as law.

132. There were 29 grounds of appeal. Legal aid was granted on

5 May 1982, the signing of the legal aid order on 7 July 1982 being a

mere formality and having no incidence on the length of proceedings.

On 30 July 1982 Defence Counsel was informed that the hearing would be

held on 21 October 1982. However, Counsel did not indicate until

24 September 1982 that he thought the hearing would take longer than

a day. The Court of Appeal, as constituted for 21 October, could not

sit longer than one day on the case, so a new date had to be found.

133. Thus from 17 June 1981 until 5 May 1982 the facts show that

the Criminal Appeal Office was endeavouring to press Defence Counsel

to expedite matters. In the end, the authorities decided to cut short

the normal procedure (the single judge's leave) so that the case could

be brought on for hearing as soon as possible.

134. The Government submit that the next period from 5 May 1982

until 21 October 1982 did not involve an unreasonable delay, bearing

in mind, in particular, that a full summary of the case had to be

prepared for the use of the members of the Court. Nor was it

unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to delay giving its reasons for

dismissing the appeal on 21 December 1982, until 11 March 1983, in the

light of the length of the judgment (41 pages). Finally, the

Government contend that the delay until 29 June 1983 for deciding the

application to certify that the case raised a point of law of general

public importance was not unreasonable, given the fact that Counsel

had originally reserved his position on this matter, and the same

three judges had to be reassembled at a time that was consistent with

their other judicial commitments.

d. The appeal period before the House of Lords (13 July 1983 -

-----------------------------------------------------------

24 October 1983)

----------------

135. The Government state that the delay in this stage of the

proceedings was partly caused by the summer recess (cf. Eur. Court

H.R., Corigliano judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A No. 57,

para. 48). The Government also point out that the applicant himself

applied out of time and he could have also applied for an expedited

hearing during the summer recess. If such an application had been

made it would have been treated sympathetically, by the prosecution at

least. The applicant did not, however, make such an application.

136. The Government conclude, therefore, that this period also did

not amount to unreasonable delay, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

e. The length of proceedings as a whole (5 December 1979 -

-------------------------------------------------------

24 October 1983)

----------------

137. The Government concede that every extra week that an accused

is left in a state of uncertainty as to his fate is to be regretted.

However, such delays as occurred were in large part the responsibility

of the applicant or those representing him.

138. The Government contend that no particular period of the

proceedings involved undue delay for which the national authorities

were responsible. It follows that the total period did not involve

such delay and that there was no infringement of the applicant's right

to a hearing within a reasonable time, ensured by Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention.

IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A. Point at issue

139. The point at issue in the present application is whether there

has been a determination of the criminal charges against the applicant

within a reasonable time, as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

B. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

140. The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) provides as follows:

"In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

established by law ..."

141. There is no dispute between the parties as to the

applicability of this provision in the present case. The Commission

must therefore first identify the periods which are to be taken into

account, and then it must evaluate the reasonableness of the duration

of the proceedings.

C. The length of the proceedings and the relevant periods to

be taken into account

142. The Commission established in its decision on admissibility of

3 December 1986, and it was subsequently agreed by the parties at the

hearing on the merits on 6 May 1987, that the periods under

consideration in the present case are as follows:

- as regards the proceedings as a whole, from 5 December 1979

until 24 October 1983 (three years, 10 months and 19 days);

- as regards the pre-trial period, from 5 December 1979 until

the first day of the applicant's trial on 6 April 1981

(one year, four months and one day);

- as regards the appeal period, from 17 June 1981 until

24 October 1983 (two years, four months and seven days).

(See decision on admissibility, Appendix II, pp. 39 - 40.)

143. However, the Commission notes that in the proceedings on the

merits the parties have since agreed that the applicant was arrested on

3 December 1979, not 5 December 1979, as it appeared at the time when

the Commission took the admissibility decision (see footnote to para. 37

above).

144. The Commission refers to the case-law of the Court as regards

the commencement of the period to be taken into account:

"In criminal matters the 'reasonable time' referred to in

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) begins to run as soon as a person is

'charged'; this may occur on a date prior to the case coming

before the trial court ..., such as the date of arrest, the

date when the person concerned was officially notified that he

would be prosecuted or the date when preliminary investigations

were opened ... 'Charge' for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

may be defined as 'the official notification given to an

individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he

has committed a criminal offence', a definition that also

corresponds to the test whether 'the situation of the

has been substantially affected'." (Eur. Court H.R.,

Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A No. 51, para. 73).

145. Applying these considerations to the present case, the

Commission finds that the criminal proceedings against the applicant

commenced on 3 December 1979 when he was arrested and when the police

must have informed him that he was suspected of having committed fraud

offences and that he risked a criminal prosecution. He was thus

"substantially affected" by this measure, which also deprived him of

his liberty for a short period at that stage. The length of the

proceedings as a whole and that of the pre-trial period are therefore

extended by two days as follows:

- as regards the proceedings as a whole, from 3 December 1979

until 24 October 1983 (three years, 10 months and 21 days);

- as regards the pre-trial period, from 3 December 1979 until

6 April 1981 (one year, four months and three days).

The appeal period is as previously established: from 17 June 1981 until

24 October 1983 (two years, four months and seven days).

D. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings

146. The Commission refers to its constant case-law and that of the

Court, summarised in the Eckle judgment:

"The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be

assessed in each instance according to the particular

circumstances. In this exercise the

regard to, among other things, the complexity of the case,

the conduct of the applicants and the conduct of the judicial

authorities." (Eur. Court H.R., Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982,

Series A No. 51, para. 80).

a. The complexity of the case

--------------------------

147. The Commission notes the parties' agreement that the criminal

proceedings in this case did not involve complex issues of law and

fact. However, the applicant draws from that the conclusion that the

proceedings were simple, whereas the Government contend that the

proceedings were nevertheless substantial and detailed.

148. The Commission has examined the facts of the case and finds

that the proceedings were indeed substantial and detailed. They

involved, inter alia,

- 25 offences of fraud, allegedly committed over a 10 month

period (June 1979 to March 1980);

- 11 different sets of factual circumstances;

- investigations by two different police forces;

- 64 witnesses and 88 exhibits at the 22 day trial, eight days

of which were taken up by legal arguments alone;

- 29 grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal covering

seven general areas of complaint;

- a certifiable point of law of general public importance for an

appeal to the House of Lords.

149. In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the

proceedings against the applicant were complex and would have required

careful preparation by both the prosecution and the defence.

b. The conduct of the parties

--------------------------

aa. The pre-trial period

150. The applicant's principal criticism of the handling of the

proceedings by the judicial authorities at the pre-trial stage

concerns the delays caused by the amalgamation of the three different

sets of proceedings against him with one voluntary bill of indictment

and a joint trial. The Government contend that this measure was

necessary, particularly in view of the fraudulent nature of the

offences, because the prosecution wished to prove that the applicant

had established a system. To do this it was essential to group the

offences which showed a similar pattern of criminal activity by the

applicant.

151. The Commission considers that the joining of the three cases

against the applicant has not been shown to be arbitrary or

unreasonable or to have caused undue delay, account being taken of the

need to ensure the efficient administration of justice. Moreover, the

Commission notes that in late 1980 and early 1981 the applicant was

not ready to proceed with the trial of Cases A and B as is shown by

the following applications to the Court in these cases:-

i) his application on 6 November 1980 for an adjournment of Case

B to enable expert evidence as to handwriting to be obtained,

ii) his application on 29 December 1980 for the appointment in

Case B of a handwriting expert,

iii) his application in Case B on 19 January 1981 for medical reports,

iv) his application on 9 January 1981 in Case A for the

appointment of a handwriting expert.

It does not appear to the Commission that at the material time

the applicant was prejudiced by the postponement of the joint trial

until 6 April 1981, as he required time to prepare his defence fully,

as was his right.

152. In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the

pre-trial period from the applicant's arrest on 3 December 1979 until

the commencement of his trial on 6 April 1981 (one year, four months

and three days) did not amount to an unreasonable length of time.

bb. The appeal period

153. The applicant submits that the Criminal Appeal Office

mishandled his appeal to the Court of Appeal and failed in its

statutory duty to ensure that his appeal hearing was dealt with

expeditiously. The Government deny the responsibility of the Criminal

Appeal Office for the delays, which they attribute largely to the

conduct of Defence Counsel. The applicant disclaims responsibility

for Defence Counsel, because he alleges that his communications whilst

in prison were restricted, and he claims that it was not his duty but

that of the Criminal Appeal Office to put pressure on his Counsel.

154. The Commission has examined the facts of the case and finds

that there were a few mistakes made and misunderstandings between the

Criminal Appeal Office and Defence Counsel. However, although the

appeal proceedings were unusually long for such cases at the material

time, it cannot be said that the Criminal Appeal Office neglected the

applicant's appeal. It took frequent steps to ensure the progress of

the applicant's case, which involved the preparation of a transcript

from the shorthand notes of a substantial part of a long trial, 29

grounds of appeal and a certifiable point of law of general public

importance.

155. The applicant has not substantiated his claim that whilst in

prison he was prevented from writing to his Counsel. The Criminal

Appeal Office had informed him of the progress of his case and some of

its difficulties with his Counsel. It is not clear, therefore, that

the applicant is discharged of all liability for the conduct of his

appeal by Counsel. Be that as it may, the Commission finds that the

Criminal Appeal Office did press Defence Counsel to expedite matters,

but on occasions their communications went unanswered. Whilst courts may have

some responsibilities under Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) to ensure

effective legal assistance for the accused, the Commission finds that the

Criminal Appeal Office acted with the necessary diligence in the present case

(cf. Eur. Court, H.R. Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, para.

33).

156. As regards the appeal before the House of Lords, the Commission notes

that these proceedings took three months and eleven days. This period does not

seem unduly long, especially in view of the fact that it was interrupted by the

legal vacation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Corigliano judgment of 10 December 1982,

Series A no. 57, para. 48). Moreover, the applicant could have applied for an

expedited hearing of his appeal if he had considered the matter urgent at that

stage.

157. In the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the Commission

concludes that the appeal period from the lodging of the appeal before the

Court of Appeal on 17 June 1981 until the dismissal of the applicant's appeal

to the House of Lords on 24 October 1983 (two years, four months and seven

days), although long, did not amount to an unreasonble length of time.

cc. The length of the proceedings as a whole

158. It appears that the length of the criminal proceedings in the present

case (three years, 10 months and 21 days), and in particular the length of the

appeal proceedings, was unusually long, the average length of criminal

proceedings up to the Court of Appeal being about two years at the material

time (see paras. 29 and 34 above).

159. However, an examination of the facts of this complex case reveals that

at no stage did the proceedings lie dormant. In general, the judicial

authorities conducted the case diligently and the applicant fully exercised his

rights to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence

and appeals. The Commission finds, therefore, that the overall length of the

criminal proceedings against the applicant was not unreasonable.

E. Conclusion

160. The Commission concludes by a unanimous vote that there has been no

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, because the

criminal charges against the applicant were determined within a reasonable

time.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

APPENDIX I

History of the proceedings before the Commission

Date Item

--------------------------------------------------------------------

9 September 1983 Introduction of application

26 October 1984 Registration of application

Examination of admissibility

15 March 1985 Commission's decision to declare application

inadmissible

12 June 1985 Information from applicant

18 October 1985 Commission's decision to re-open its

examination concerning that part of application

relating to the length of criminal proceedings

and to invite the applicant to re-submit an

application form and certain essential

documents

24 October 1985 Receipt of documents from applicant

12 December 1985 Commission's decision to give notice to the

respondent Government of the re-opened

application and to invite them to submit

written observations on admissibility and merits

24 March 1986 Submission of Government's observations

9 April 1986 Submission of applicant's observations in person

2 July 1986 Submission of applicant's observations by his

legal representative

3 December 1986 Commission's deliberations and decision to

declare application admissible

Appendix I

Examination of the merits

7 March 1987 Commission's decision to hold a hearing of

the parties on the merits of the case

6 May 1987 Hearing on the merits of the case and

Commission's deliberations

For the applicant

-----------------

Mr. Greene

Ms. Eales

The applicant in person

For the Government

------------------

Mr. Wood

Sir Patrick Mayhew

Mr. Cassel

Miss Wilmshurst

Mr. Osborne

Mr. McKenzie

26 June 1987 Submission of applicant's supplementary

written observations on the merits

** October 1987 Commission's further deliberations on the

merits, vote and adoption of the present

Report

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EWING v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

EWING v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI