McCALLUM v. UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 9511/81 • ECHR ID: 001-45383
Document date: May 4, 1989
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Application No. 9511/81
Michael McCALLUM
against
the UNITED KINGDOM
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 4 May 1989)
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9511/81
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
I. INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-18) ............................ 1-3
A. The application (paras. 2-4) ...................... 1
B. The proceedings (paras. 5-13) ..................... 1-2
C. The present Report (paras. 14-18) ................. 2-3
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 19-26) ............. 4-6
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 19-23) .................................... 4-5
B. The relevant domestic law and practice
(paras. 24-26) .................................... 5-6
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES (paras. 27-41) ............. 7-9
A. The applicant (paras. 27-30) ...................... 7
B. The Government (paras. 31-41) ..................... 7-9
IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 42-85) .............. 10-20
A. Points at issue (para. 42) ........................ 10
B. Article 8 of the Convention
(paras. 43-62) .................................... 10-14
General considerations (paras. 43-48) ............. 10-12
The present case (paras. 49-61) ................... 12-14
i) Letter of 5 October 1981
(paras. 52-53) ............................ 12
ii) Letter of 18 December 1981
(paras. 54-56) ............................ 12-13
iii) Letters of 20 February and 23 February 1982
(paras. 57-59) ............................ 13
iv) Letters of 4 June and 22 June 1982
(paras. 60-61) ............................ 13-14
Conclusion (para. 62) ............................. 14
C. Article 10 of the Convention
(para. 63) ........................................ 14
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9511/81
page
D. Article 13 of the Convention (paras. 64-84) ....... 15-19
General considerations (paras. 64-66) ............. 15-16
The present case (paras. 67-83) ................... 16-19
Conclusion (para. 84) ............................. 19
E. Recapitulation (para. 85) ......................... 19-20
Dissenting opinion of Mr. Danelius joined by MM. Jörundsson,
Vandenberghe, Sir Basil Hall and Mr. Martinez ................. 21
APPENDIX I History of the proceedings
before the Commission ......................... 22
APPENDIX II Partial Decision on the admissibility
of the application ............................ 23-39
APPENDIX III Final Decision on the admissibility
of the application ............................ 40-50
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant is Michael McCallum, a British citizen, born in
1950 and resident in Helensburgh.
3. The applicant is represented before the Commission by McCann
Fordyce, solicitors practising in Helensburgh. The Government are
represented by their Agent, Mr. Michael Wood of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, London.
4. The case concerns the stopping by the prison authorities of
various letters written by the applicant when he was in prison and the
disciplinary award imposed on the applicant which included a 28 day
restriction of his right to correspond. The case also concerns the
applicant's complaints that he has no effective remedy in respect of
these matters or in respect of his complaints under Article 3 of the
Convention concerning conditions of detention in the Inverness
Segregation Unit. Issues accordingly arise under Articles 8 and 13 of
the Convention.
B. The proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 31 August 1981 and registered
on 16 September 1981.
6. On 4 October 1983, the Commission decided that notice of the
application should be given to the respondent Government, pursuant to
Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, and that
they should be invited to submit before 16 December 1983 their written
observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's
complaints under Articles 3 and 13.
7. The Government sent their written observations on 24 January
1984 after an extension in the time-limit and the applicant's
observations in reply were received on 24 April 1984 also after an
extension in the time-limit.
8. On 16 March 1984, the applicant was granted legal aid under
the Addendum to the Commission's Rules of Procedure.
9. The Commission considered the application again on 9 July 1984
and decided to adjourn its consideration of the applicant's complaints
under Articles 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention relating to interference
with his correspondence and remedies therefor, as well as the
complaint under Article 13 insofar as it related to his complaint
under Article 3 of the Convention. It declared the remainder of the
application inadmissible.
10. The Commission also requested supplementary observations on
the admissibility and merits of the adjourned complaints. The
observations of the respondent Government were submitted on 3 December
1984 and the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on
2 April 1985.
11. On 10 July 1985, the Commission declared the application
admissible as regards the applicant's complaints under Articles 8,
10 and 13 of the Convention and decided to adjourn the further
examination of the application pending its decision in the cases of
Boyle and Rice.
12. On 14 July 1986, the Commission decided to adjourn further
consideration of the merits pending the outcome of Boyle and Rice v.
the United Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights.
13. Following the decision of the Court in Boyle and Rice on 27
April 1988 (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988,
Series A no. 131), the parties were invited to submit any additional
observations on the merits of the application. The parties made no
further observations. The Commission, acting in accordance with
Article 28 para. b of the Convention, also placed itself at the
disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement
of the case. In the light of the parties' reactions, the Commission
now finds that there is no basis on which a friendly settlement can be
effected.
C. The present Report
14. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and
votes in plenary session, the following members being present:
MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President
S. TRECHSEL
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. L. LOUCAIDES
15. The text of this Report was adopted by the Commission on
4 May 1989 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in
accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
16. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of
the Convention, is
1) to establish the facts, and
2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found
disclose a breach by the State concerned of its
obligations under the Convention.
17. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before
the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I. The Commission's
partial decision on the admissibility of the application is attached
as Appendix II, the Commission's final decision on the admissibility
of the application as Appendix III.
18. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the
Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case
19. On 11 March 1980, the applicant was convicted of assault and
robbery and sentenced to six years' imprisonment to run from 26 November
1979.
20. During two periods, from 22 November 1980 to 27 January 1981
and from 30 June 1981 to 15 October 1981, the applicant was detained
in solitary confinement in the Inverness Segregation Unit, a special
"control unit" introduced in 1965-1966 for the accommodation of
troublesome prisoners.
21. During 1981-1982, the applicant's correspondence was subject
to the following restrictions:
- Two letters dated 24 June 1981 to the applicant's solicitor
and to a Member of Parliament were stopped. The letter to
the solicitor was stopped in accordance with Standing Order
Ic 1(3)d which prohibits complaints concerning prison
treatment. The letter to the Member of Parliament was stopped
in accordance with Standing Order Ic 3(6)a on the ground that
it contained complaints about prison treatment which had not
been channelled through the appropriate procedure, namely a
petition to the Secretary of State or other official means.
- A letter of 5 October 1981 to the editor of the Daily Record
was stopped. It was considered by the prison authorities
not to conform to Standing Orders but there is no record of
the grounds for this view. In this letter, the applicant
requested that a copy of an article in the newspaper
concerning himself ("Cage Man Euro Court Plea") be sent to
him and also asked to be informed if two previous letters
had been received.
- A letter dated 18 December 1981 to the Procurator Fiscal was
stopped because it contained allegations of assault on other
prisoners. The letter was considered objectionable in terms
of Standing Order Ic 1(3)d as containing complaints of
prison treatment. Those prisoners had not themselves made
complaints through any channel, internal or external. It was
also considered that to allow letters complaining on behalf of
other prisoners would be contrary to good order and
discipline. The applicant was allowed to write another letter
containing allegations of assault concerning himself alone.
- A letter dated 19 January 1982 to Miss Hampson of Dundee
University was stopped on the grounds that she was not a
previous correspondent of the applicant, nor a legal adviser
for purposes of his petition to the Commission. Under
Standing Order Ic 4(12) correspondence with persons other
than existing friends and relations was at the discretion
of the Governor.
- Letters dated 20 and 23 February 1982 to the applicant's
representative Mr Godwin were delayed and eventually posted
on 18 March 1982. It was agreed that the applicant could
correspond with Mr Godwin in relation to his application to
the Commission pursuant to Standing Order Ic 3(10)(g)i, which
entitles prisoners to correspond with their legal advisers and
other persons in relation to the preparation of an application
to the Commission. This was done on the understanding that Mr
Godwin would abide by the Commission's rules of
confidentiality concerning applications. Some particulars of
the applicant's complaints had been published in the press and
the Scottish Home and Health Department had sought an
assurance from him that he would abide by the rules of
confidentiality.
- Copies of letters that had been written by Mr Godwin to
the Secretary of State (22 June 1982) and Mr Allan at the
Prison Service Headquaters (4 June 1982) were stopped from
being issued to the applicant under Standing Order Ic 4(12)b,
which gives the Governor a discretion to forbid letters on the
grounds of security or good order and discipline or in the
interests of the prevention or discouragement of crime. These
letters suggested that there had been a breakdown of
discipline on the part of the staff at Peterhead prison and
predicted there would be disturbances among prisoners. The
letter of 22 June 1982 implied that staff might have been
responsible for causing a fire in the applicant's cell. The
prison Governor considered these letters objectionable on the
grounds of good order and discipline in the prison. In
particular, it was feared that if they got into the hands of
prisoners they might be encouraged to make the disturbances
predicted in the letters.
22. On 22 December 1982, a disciplinary award was imposed on the
applicant by the Visiting Committee of Barlinnie Prison, which
included a 28 day restriction on the applicant's correspondence,
pursuant to Rule 74(2) of the Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952 which
provides that the intervals at which prisoners are allowed to write
and receive letters may be extended as punishment for misconduct. The
applicant complains that during this period he was refused permission
to write to the Commission, his Member of Parliament, a solicitor, the
Procurator Fiscal, the Scottish Council for Civil Liberties and the
Howard League for Penal Reform.
23. The applicant was released from prison on a date unspecified
in 1985.
B. The relevant domestic law
a) Prison rules
24. Rule 74(1)-(5) of the Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952 regulates
the right of prisoners to correspond with others and the censorship or
stoppage of such correspondence. The discretion of prison governors to
stop letters under this Rule was, at the material time, exercised in
accordance with administrative instructions of the Secretary of State
for Scotland contained in Standing Orders Ic 1 to Ic 4 of the Prisons
(Scotland) Standing Orders. Since 1 August 1983 the Standing Orders
have changed to take account of the Commission's Report and the
judgment of the Court in the case of Silver and Others. The new
regulations are now found in Section Ma of the Prison (Scotland)
Standing Orders.
25. The Prison (Scotland) Act 1952 and the Prison Rules apply to
the Inverness Unit as they apply to other prisons. Most provisions of
the Standing Orders also apply. Administrative instructions
particular to the unit are, however, set out in the Inverness Prison
Unit Regulations.
b) Channels of complaint
26. The following channels of complaint exist:
- The principal internal channel of complaint is to petition the
Secretary of State for Scotland in accordance with Rule 50(4) of the
Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952.
- A visiting committee set up by virtue of Section 7 of the 1952
Act is empowered to hear and investigate any application or complaint
made by prisoners.
- Section 15 of the 1952 Act provides that a Sheriff or Justice
of the Peace may visit any prison and may examine the condition of the
prison and of the prisoners. This means of complaint is seldom, if
ever, used.
- The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration is empowered
to investigate complaints of maladministration made by prisoners.
- A prisoner detained in the Inverness Unit would have the
additional possibility of complaining to the Inverness Unit Review
Board. The purpose of the Board is to review the case of each
prisoner detained in the Unit and, if appropriate, to make
recommendations to the Secretary of State for the return of a prisoner
to a normal prison location.
- It would also have been open to a prisoner to direct a
complaint to the Standing Committee on Difficult Prisoners whose
purpose is to advise the Secretary of State for Scotland on the
allocation and management of difficult prisoners.
- The exercise by public authorities of statutory powers and
duties are reviewable in the courts. The operation of a statutory
power would be open to challenge on the grounds that it had been
exercised arbitrarily, unreasonably or for an improper purpose.
Insofar as the 1952 Act and the Rules made under it confer rights
on prisoners, such rights would be enforceable by an action for
Declarator.
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The applicant
27. The applicant complains that the restrictions on his
correspondence and the stopping of his letters constitute an
unjustified interference with his right to respect for his
correspondence contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
28. While the relevant rules have since been changed, the
applicant submits that the new Standing Orders contain restrictions
and limitations on prisoners' rights which are not necessary in a
democratic society for the prevention of disorder and constitute a
clear breach of the provisions of the Convention. He considers that
the new rules confer excessive discretion on the Governor in stopping
communications. For example, while Order 2.1(d) states that "no
prisoner may be deprived by disciplinary award or otherwise of writing
a statutory letter", the Governor of the Visiting Committee could, as
a disciplinary punishment, impose restrictions on a prisoner's
entitlement to additional letters. Such a restriction constitutes an
excessive use of power by a prison governor and is incompatible with
the Convention. Similarly, if a prisoner has no funds of his own
available to meet the cost of posting, the governor under Order 2.1(g)
may refuse to allow the letter to be sent at public expense. He
provides further examples of Standing Orders which grant wide
discretion on the governor to impose restrictions on a prisoner's
correspondence. He considers these restrictions to constitute
breaches of the Convention.
29. Accordingly, he submits that the changes that have occurred
in the Standing Orders since the bringing of his application do not
satisfy the complaints which are at the basis of his application.
30. He further contends that he did not have an effective remedy
as required by Article 13 of the Convention in respect of his
correspondence complaints or his complaints under Article 3 concerning
the conditions of his detention in the Inverness Segregation Unit.
B. The Government
Article 8 of the Convention
Letters dated 24 June 1981 to the applicant's
solicitor and a Member of Parliament
following the case of Silver and Others
31. The Government concede that the stopping of the two letters
was contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
Letter dated 5 October 1981 to the Daily Record
32. Since the Government do not have the necessary information
regarding the grounds for stopping this letter, they are unable to say
whether the stopping was justifiable under Article 8.
Letter dated 18 December 1981 to the Procurator Fiscal
33. It is submitted that the stopping of the letter was justified
under Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention. It would be contrary to
the maintenance of prison order if a prisoner were allowed to raise
with the prosecuting authorities allegations of assault by prison
staff on behalf of other prisoners who have not raised any such
complaint themselves.
Letter dated 19 January 1982 to Miss Hampson
34. It is conceded that the stopping of this letter was contrary
to Article 8 of the Convention.
Letters dated 20 and 23 February 1982 to Mr Godwin
35. The Government had agreed that the applicant could correspond
with Mr. Godwin, in relation to his application to the Commission,
without censorship, on the understanding that Mr. Godwin would abide
by the Commission's rule of confidentiality. Some particulars of the
applicant's complaints had appeared in the press and the Government
were unwilling to allow further letters under the arrangement without
an assurance from Mr. Godwin that he would abide by the Commission's
rules in the future. Following Mr. Godwin's reply of 5 March 1982 to
their letter of 24 February 1982 seeking such an assurance, the
letters which had been stopped were then posted.
Stopping of copies of letters dated 4 and 22 June 1982
36. The stopping of these letters is justified under Article 8
para. 2 of the Convention. It would be contrary to the maintenance of
prison order to permit prisoners to obtain letters which alleged a
breakdown of discipline among prison staff and which, in the present
case, suggested that there might have been criminal conduct by prison
staff, and predicted consequent disorder by prisoners.
37. Finally, as regards the disciplinary award of 22 December 1982
the Government concede that this award was contrary to Article 8,
having regard to the case of Silver and Others.
Article 13 of the Convention
38. As regards the complaint under Article 13 relating to
correspondence, it is submitted that where there has been no violation
of Article 8, there has been no violation of Article 13 either.
39. As regards the applicant's complaint under Article 13 in
relation to Article 3, the aggregate of domestic remedies as
summarised above is adequate to comply with Article 13. The case of
Raymond v. Honde (1982) 2 WLR 465 shows that the courts may adjudicate
on the lawfulness of a prisoner's treatment in the light of the
statutory powers and duties of the prison authorities.
40. The applicant might also complain of the decision to transfer
him to the Inverness Unit to the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration. He would examine whether or not such a decision
involved maladministration. However, Article 13 does not require a
remedy in respect of the decision to transfer. What matters is the
existence of remedies in respect of treatment while a prisoner is in
the Unit.
41. If a prisoner were detained in the Unit for an excessive period
of time, the case could be reviewed by the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration or the prisoner could petition the Secretary of
State. Since the Secretary of State has recommended specified periods
for detention in the Unit, such a complaint would be likely to be
upheld.
IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Points at issue
42. The principal issues to be determined are:
Article 8 (Art. 8)
a) Whether there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention as a result of:
- the stopping of the two letters of 24 June 1981 from the
applicant to the applicant's lawyer and a Member of Parliament;
- the stopping of the applicant's letter of 5 October 1981 to
the Daily Record;
- the stopping of the applicant's letter of 18 December 1981
to the Procurator Fiscal ;
- the stopping of the applicant's letter of 19 January 1982
to Miss Hampson of Dundee University ;
- the delaying of the letters of 20 February and 23 February
1982 to the applicant's representative ;
- the stopping of the issue to the applicant of copies of
letters written by the applicant's representative to the Secretary of
State and Prison Service Headquarters (dated 4 June 1982 and 22 June
1982) ;
- the 28 day restriction on the applicant's correspondence
imposed by a disciplinary award on 22 December 1982.
Article 10 (Art. 10)
b) Whether the above matters also constituted a violation of
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
Article 13 (Art. 13)
c) Whether the applicant had an effective remedy within the
meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention as regards his
complaints concerning his correspondence.
d) Whether the applicant had an effective remedy within the
meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention as regards his
complaints under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention concerning the
conditions of his detention.
B. Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
General considerations
43. The relevant part of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as
follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for ... his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
44. In the Commission's opinion in the case of Silver and Others
v. the United Kingdom (Comm. Report 11.10.80) it held as follows:
"... a prisoner has the same right as a person at liberty
to respect for his correspondence, the ordinary and reasonable
requirements of imprisonment being of relevance in assessing
the justification for any interference with that right under
the exceptions permitted by Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) ...
The Commission considers, therefore, that the right under
Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) to respect for correspondence envisages
a free flow of such communications, subject only to the
limitations prescribed by Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).
The Commission concludes that the censorship of prisoners'
correspondence by prison authorities, in principle,
constitutes an interference with the right of prisoners to
respect for their correspondence under Article 8 para. 1."
(Art. 8-1) (paras. 269-271)
"Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention requires that any
interference with a person's right to respect for
correspondence be firstly in accordance with the law ...
The Commission considers that phrase ... is not
merely a reference to the State's domestic law, but also
a reference to the rule of law, or the principle of legal
certainty, which is common to democratic societies and
the heritage of member States of the Council of Europe."
(paras. 277 and 281)
45. The Commission noted that this entailed two requirements -
that the law must be adequately accessible and foreseeable (Eur. Court
H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A No. 30, p. 29
para. 49). Whilst the Prison Rules 1964, as amended, satisfied the
requirement of accessibility, the same could not be said of the
management guidelines unless they could be reasonably deduced from the
Rules.
46. As regards the second element of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2),
"necessary in a democratic society", the Commission found that
restrictions imposed on a prisoner's right to respect for
correspondence must be necessary and proportionate to meet a
legitimate governmental aim. Thus a balance must be struck, for
example, between the need to rehabilitate a prisoner and the interests
of public order and security (paras. 286-290).
47. As regards the substantive issues, the principal justification
that could be put forward for the censorship of prisoners'
correspondence was the need to prevent disorder. However, the
Commission noted that many of the management guidelines concerning
the contents and addressee of prisoners' letters were overbroad
restrictions, which were not "necessary in a democratic society ...
for the prevention of disorder", within the meaning of Article 8 para.
2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (paras. 294-426).
48. This opinion of the Commission was not substantially contested
by the respondent Government before the European Court of Human
Rights, which confirmed most of the Commission's conclusions (Eur.
Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25.3.83, Series A No. 61,
pp. 32-41, paras. 83-105).
The present case
49. As regards the facts of the present case, the Commission first
notes that the Government do not contest that, in light of the Silver
case, the stopping of the two letters of 24 June 1981 and the letter
of 19 January 1982 and the imposition of the 28 day restriction on
correspondence were not "necessary in a democratic society for the
prevention of disorder" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2
(Art. 8-2) and accordingly admit that these actions were contrary to
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. In view of these circumstances,
the Commission finds that these restrictions constituted violations of
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
50. Since August 1983 there has been a substantial reform of the
relevant management guidelines. The applicant complains that these
changes however still impose excessive restrictions. These new
regulations were not in force at the material time and it is not the
Commission's task to examine the compatibility with the Convention of
the new regulations in the present case.
51. The Commission will however deal in turn with each of the
applicant's remaining correspondence complaints in light of the
principles and case-law outlined above.
i) Letter of 5 October 1981 to the Daily Record
52. The Government have confirmed that this letter was stopped on
the grounds that it did not conform to Standing Orders but have no
record of the grounds for this view. The Commission recalls that in
this letter the applicant requested the newspaper to send a copy of an
article concerning the applicant and to acknowledge receipt of
previous correspondence.
53. The Commission is unable to discern any relevant or sufficient
reason which might have justified the stopping of the applicant's
letter as being "necessary in a democratic society" for any of the
purposes provided for in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
ii) Letter of 18 December 1981 to the Procurator Fiscal
54. The Government have submitted that this letter to the
Procurator Fiscal was stopped since it contained allegations of
assault on other prisoners. It is stated that the letter was
objectionable in terms of the Standing Orders as containing complaints
of prison treatment and that it was considered that to allow letters
complaining on behalf of other prisoners would be contrary to good
order and discipline.
55. In the Silver case (loc. cit., paras. 385-389), the Commission
considered that an imprecise and overbroad restriction was not
justified in terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
Similarly the Commission found that a prohibition which takes no
account of the addressee or the likely effect of the material in
question constituted an overbroad and unjustifiable restriction
(paras. 357-358).
56. In the present case, the Commission notes that the letter was
addressed to the Procurator Fiscal and is unable to discern how such a
letter could have adverse effects on prison order and discipline. The
Commission finds therefore no sufficient reason which might have
justified the stopping of the letter as being "necessary in a
democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder" within the
meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
iii) Letters of 20 February and 23 February 1982
57. The Commission recalls that these two letters from the
applicant to his representative Mr. Godwin were delayed and not
posted until 18 March 1982.
58. The Commission refers to its previous case-law to the effect
that the supervision of prisoners' correspondence, while an
interference with their right to respect for correspondence, is in
general justified under the provisions of Article 8 para. 2 (Art.
8-2). Such supervision may reasonably extend, in difficult cases, to
the referral by a prison governor of a prisoner's correspondence to
the Secretary of State for further consideration (e.g. Silver case,
loc. cit. paras. 423-426). In the Silver case for example, the
Commission found that a three weeks delay in the posting of a letter
did not constitute a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
for this reason.
59. The Commission recalls that in the present case the letters
were delayed while the Scottish Home and Health Department contacted
Mr. Godwin seeking an assurance that he would comply, as he had
agreed, with rules of confidentiality attaching to applications to the
Commission. The Commission finds that the delay in the posting of the
letters interfered with the applicant's right to respect for his
correspondence but also finds, in the circumstances of the present
case, that the interference was justified under Article 8 para. 2
(Art. 8-2) of the Convention as necessary for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
iv) Copies of letters of 4 June and 22 June 1982
written by the applicant's representative
60. The Commission recalls that these letters, copies of letters
from Mr. Godwin to the Secretary of State and Mr. R. Allan of the
Scottish Prison Service, were stopped from being issued to the
applicant on the grounds of security and good order and the prevention
and discouragement of crime.
61. The Commission notes that the letters had been sent by
Mr. Godwin to the Secretary of State and Mr. R. Allan making
representations on the applicant's behalf and that accordingly the
applicant had a legitimate interest in receiving copies of these
letters. While the Commission notes that the letters referred to
alleged provocative acts by prison officers and the state of tension
in the prison, these matters, which included the incident of an
outbreak of fire in the applicant's cell, must already have been known
to the applicant and many other of the prisoners. The Commission
therefore cannot discern how these letters, if issued to the
applicant, could have adverse effects on prison order and discipline
or be construed as encouraging disturbances. The Commission
consequently finds no sufficient reason justifying the stopping of
these letters as being "necessary in a democratic society ... for the
prevention of disorder or crime" within the meaning of Article 8 para.
2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
Conclusion
62. The Commission concludes unanimously :
a) that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the stopping of the two letters of 24 June
1981 (para. 49) ;
b) that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the stopping of the letter of 5 October 1981
(paras. 52-53) ;
c) that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the stopping of the letter of 18 December
1981 (paras. 54-56) ;
d) that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the stopping of the letter of 19 January 1982
(para. 49) ;
e) that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the stopping of the issue of the copies of
the letters dated 4 and 22 June 1982 to the applicant (paras. 60-61) ;
f) that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the disciplinary award of a 28 day
restriction on the applicant's correspondence (para. 49) ;
g) that there has been no violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in respect of the delaying of the letters of 20 and
23 February 1982 (paras. 57-59).
C. Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention
63. The applicant has also complained that the stopping and
delaying of his correspondence constituted a violation of Article 10
(Art. 10) of the Convention. The Commission considers however that
where interference is alleged in the communication of information by
correspondence, Article 8 (Art. 8) is the lex specialis and no
separate issues arise under Article 10 (Art. 10). The Commission
therefore finds it unnecessary to pursue a further examination of the
matter in light of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
D. Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
General considerations
64. Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in
this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity."
65. Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not, however, require a
remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation of the
Convention. It only applies if an individual can be said to have an
"arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R.,
Klass and Others judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 29
para. 64 and Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April
1988, Series A no. 131, para. 52). The scope of the notion of
"arguable claim" was considered by the European Court of Human Rights
in the case of Boyle and Rice (loc. cit.), in particular, its
relationship with a complaint which is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. The Court
stated:
"As the Court pointed out in its Airey judgment of
9 October 1979, rejection of a complaint as 'manifestly
ill-founded' amounts to a decision that 'there is not
even a prima facie case against the respondent State'
(Series A no. 32, p. 10, para. 18). On the ordinary
meaning of the words, it is difficult to conceive how
a claim that is 'manifestly ill-founded' can
nevertheless be 'arguable', and vice versa.
This does not mean, however, that the Court must hold
a claim to be excluded from the operation of Article
13 (Art. 13) if the Commission has previously declared it
manifestly ill-founded under the substantive Article.
The Commission's decision declaring an application
admissible determines the scope of the case brought
before the Court (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 63
para. 157). The Court is precluded from reviewing on
their merits under the relevant Article the complaints
rejected as manifestly ill-founded, but empowered to
entertain those complaints which the Commission has
declared admissible and which have been duly referred
to it. The Court is thus competent to take cognisance
of all questions of fact and of law arising in the context
of the complaints before it under Article 13 (Art. 13) (ibid.),
including the arguability or not of the claims of violation
of the substantive provisions. In this connection, the
Commission's decision on the admissibility of the underlying
claims and the reasoning therein, whilst not being decisive,
provide significant pointers as to the arguable character of
the claims for the purposes of Article 13 (Art. 13).
The Court does not think that it should give an abstract
definition of the notion of arguability. Rather it must
be determined, in the light of the particular facts and the
nature of the legal issue or issues raised, whether each
individual claim of violation forming the basis of a complaint
under Article 13 (Art. 13) was arguable and, if so, whether the
requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) were met in relation thereto"
(Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988,
paras. 52-55).
Availability of remedies for prisoners' correspondence
complaints
66. As regards the availability of effective remedies in respect
of complaints concerning prisoners' correspondence, the Commission
recalls that in the case of Silver (loc. cit.) the Commission and the
Court were of the opinion that the applicants did not have access to
effective domestic remedies, as envisaged by Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention, for the alleged breaches of their right to respect for
correspondence ensured by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
Moreover, the Commission and the Court considered that the possible
channels for prisoners' complaints, i.e. the English courts, the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, the Board of Visitors
and the Home Secretary, were inadequate for the purposes of Article 13
(Art. 13). In particular, while a petition to the Secretary of State
might be effective when a complaint was directed against the
misapplication of one of his directives, it would not be so when the
complaint concerned the validity of the directive itself (Comm.
Report paras. 435-453; Eur. Court H.R., Silver judgment of 25 March
1983, Series A No. 61, pp. 42-44, paras. 111-119).
The present case
Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8) of the
Convention
67. The Commission recalls that it has declared admissible all the
applicant's complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) and found a violation in
respect of the stopping of the letters of 24 June 1981, 5 October
1981, 18 December 1981, 19 January 1982 and the copies of letters of 4
and 22 June 1982 and in respect of the disciplinary award. The
Commission considers that in respect of all his complaints under
Article 8 (Art. 8) the applicant has an arguable claim for the purposes of
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
68. The Commission must therefore examine the effectiveness of the
remedies available in respect of these complaints. As in the Silver
case (loc. cit.), the remedies advanced by the respondent Government
are the Parliamentary Commissioner, the Board of Visitors, the Courts
and the Secretary of State. As found by both the Commission and the
Court in the Silver case, the first three do not constitute an
effective remedy in respect of this type of correspondence complaints.
Whether the Secretary of State could do so depends on the nature of
the complaint. If it concerns the application or implementation of the
prison norm, the Secretary of State provides an effective remedy. If,
on the other hand, it concerns the validity of the norm itself the
Secretary of State cannot be considered a sufficient remedy as
required by Article 13 (Art. 13).
69. As regards the applicant's complaints of the stopping of the
letters of 24 June 1981 and 18 December 1981, the Commission recalls
that these letters were stopped, under Standing Orders Ic 1(3)d and
Ic 3(6)a which prohibited as objectionable complaints of prison
treatment. The Commission finds that these complaints are directed
against the compatibility of the directives themselves with the
Convention rather than their implementation. Accordingly there was no
effective remedy available.
70. As regards the letters of 19 January 1982 and the copies of
letters dated 4 and 22 June 1982, the Commission recalls that the
first was stopped under Standing Order Ic 4(12) which gives the
Governor a discretion to stop letters to persons who are not friends
or relatives of the prisoner and the second under Standing Order Ic
4(12)b which gives the Governor a discretion to stop letters on the
ground of security, good order and discipline and the interests of the
prevention and discouragement of crime. The Commission finds that
these complaints are directed towards the exercise of the Government's
discretion in these cases and therefore concern the implementation and
application of these prison norms. In respect of these letters the
Commission finds that there was a remedy available.
71. The Government have not given any reason for the stopping of
the letter of 5 October 1981 to the Daily Record. Against this
background the Commission finds that the decision to stop this letter
would not appear to fall under the Standing Orders. The Commission
takes the view, in these circumstances, that it would have been
possible for the applicant to challenge the decision on the grounds
that it was not covered by any of the Standing Orders. Similarly, as
regards the delay in the sending of the letters of 20 and 23 February
1982 the applicant was entitled under the Standing Orders 3(10)(g)i to
correspond with his legal adviser and other persons in connection with
the preparation of his petition to the Commission. The Commission
therefore finds that the delaying of these letters raised issues of
the application of this provision which could have been referred to
the Secretary of State, who would have constituted an effective remedy
in this respect.
72. Lastly, as concerns the disciplinary award of 28 days
restriction on correspondence which was imposed by the Board of
Visitors on 22 December 1982 the Commission recalls that this
punishment was imposed under Rule 74(2) of the Prison (Scotland) Rules
1952. The Commission considers that this matter concerns the norm
itself rather than its application and that accordingly recourse to
the Secretary of State would not have constituted an effective remedy.
Conclusion
73. The Commission concludes unanimously that there has been a
violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) in relation to the applicant's
complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention concerning the
stopping of the letters of 24 June 1981 and 18 December 1981 and the
disciplinary award of 22 December 1982 of a 28 day restriction on the
applicant's correspondence.
74. The Commission concludes unanimously that there has been no
violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) in relation to the applicant's complaints
under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention concerning the letters of 5
October 1981, 19 January 1982, 20 and 23 February 1982 and the copies
of letters dated 4 and 22 June 1982.
Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 (Art. 13+3)
75. The Commission recalls that the applicant complains that he
has no effective remedy in relation to his complaints under Article 3
(Art. 3) of the Convention of the conditions of his detention in the
Inverness Segregation Unit. The Commission must first consider
whether the applicant has an arguable claim of a violation of a breach
of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.
76. The Commission notes that according to the Government the
Inverness Unit was set up to provide a secure place of segregation for
those prisoners, who through violent, subversive or recalcitrant
behaviour were seriously disrupting order in the institutions in which
they were detained, who had not responded to the treatment provided in
those establishments and had refused to cooperate with normal prison
routine. The applicant complained inter alia of this unit that it was
"soul destroying" and oppressive. While letters and visits were
allowed on a regular basis, the Commission recalls that prisoners in
the unit were kept in single cells which had a barred security grill
separating the entrance lobby of the cell from the area in which the
prisoner was confined, that they were not permitted to associate with
other prisoners and kept locked up except for exercise periods and
going to the toilet. While the Commission found in its Partial
Decision on Admissibility that the actual conditions and treatment
complained of did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment within
the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, it did consider
that the regime was exceedingly rigorous in nature.
77. Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention provides for no legitimate
exception to its requirements. As the Commission and the Court have
held in other cases, the borderline between harsh treatment on the one
hand and a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) on the other is sometimes
difficult to establish (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp.
65-72, paras. 162-187 and Application No. 8463/78, Comm. Rep.
16.12.82, D.R. 34, p. 24). It is especially in these situations that
the guarantee of Article 13 (Art. 13) becomes important to ensure on a
national level that violations of Article 3 (Art. 3) can be examined.
78. In light of the particular circumstances of this case and the
serious nature of the issues raised, the Commission finds that the
applicant's complaints must be considered to raise an arguable claim
for the purposes of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
79. The Commission must next determine whether the applicant had
an effective remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in
respect of these complaints. The applicant submits that he has not,
whereas the Government contend that there is an aggregate of
satisfactory remedies available for the applicant's complaints against
the regime in the Inverness Unit: petition to the Secretary of State
for Scotland, complaints to the Visiting Committee, to the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and civil action in the
courts. The Government also refer to the possibility of complaint to
a Sheriff or Justice of the Peace, the Inverness Unit Review Board and
the Standing Committee on Difficult Prisoners.
80. The Commission notes however of the latter possibilities that
while the Inverness Unit Review Board and the Standing Committee on
Difficult Prisoners may entertain complaints, their function is only
to give advice to the Secretary of State: they do not have any power
to make any binding recommendations. As regards the possibility of
complaining to a Sheriff or Justice of the Peace, it appears that this
means of complaint is seldom, if ever, used.
81. The Commission has examined the remaining channels of
complaint open to the applicant. As found in the Silver case (loc.
cit.) however, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and
the Visiting Committee do not constitute an "effective remedy",
neither being able to enforce their decisions. As regards the
efficacy of petitioning the Secretary of State, the Commission recalls
that the applicant's complaints are directed against the conditions
in the Inverness Unit which are regulated by the administrative
instructions (e.g. Inverness Prison Unit Regulations) issued by the
Secretary of State. Since his complaints concern the compatibility of
these regulations with the Convention rather than the manner of their
implementation the Commission finds that the Secretary of State cannot
be considered an effective remedy.
82. The Government have submitted that the applicant would have
the possibility of bringing an action before the courts on the basis
that the exercise by public authorities of statutory powers and duties
is reviewable in the courts. The Commission notes however that the
scope of review is limited to determining whether the power or duty
has been exercised arbitrarily, unreasonably or for an improper
purpose. The Government have cited no previous cases in which a
prisoner has been able to secure a remedy in the courts in respect of
the conditions of detention imposed by the Secretary of State in
exercise of his statutory powers.
83. The Commission accordingly finds that none of the above
remedies could provide adequate redress for the applicant's complaints
under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The lack of effectiveness
of each remedy, considered in isolation, is not cured by considering
the aggregate of remedies as a whole, since the imperfections which
taint each single remedy remain. The Commission finds therefore that
the applicant did not have an effective remedy within the meaning of
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
Conclusion
84. The Commission concludes, by nine votes to six, that there has
been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with
Article 3 (Art. 13+3).
E. Recapitulation
85. The Commission concludes :
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the stopping of the two
letters of 24 June 1981 (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the stopping of the letter of
5 October 1981 (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the stopping of the letter of
18 December 1981 (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the stopping of the letter of
19 January 1982 (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the stopping of the copies of
the letters dated 4 and 22 June 1982 to the applicant (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the disciplinary award of a
28 day restriction on the applicant's correspondence (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention in respect of the delaying of the letters
of 20 and 23 February 1982 (para. 62) ;
- unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 13
(Art. 13) in relation to the applicant's complaints under Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention concerning the stopping of the letters of
24 June 1981 and 18 December 1981 and the disciplinary award of a 28
day restriction on the applicant's correspondence (para. 73) ;
- unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 13
(Art. 13) in relation to the applicant's complaints under Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention concerning the letters of 5 October 1981,
19 January 1982, 20 and 23 February 1982 and the copies of letters
dated 4 and 22 June 1982 (para. 74) ;
- by nine votes to six that there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 (Art. 13+3)
(para. 84).
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (J.A. FROWEIN)
&-Dissenting opinion of Mr. Danelius joined by&S
&-MM. Jörundsson, Vandenberghe, Sir Basil Hall and Mr. Martinez&S
(in regard to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 (Art. 13+3)
of the Convention)
According to the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights, which has been followed by the Commission on many occasions,
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention shall be so interpreted as to
require a domestic remedy only when there is an "arguable claim" that
a substantive provision of the Convention has been violated (see,
e.g., the Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, para.
77). In two recent judgments, the Court has further developed this
case-law by referring to the link that exists between an "arguable
claim" and the concept of "manifestly ill-founded" in Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. In the case of Boyle and Rice, the
Court stated that, "On the ordinary meaning of the words, it is
difficult to conceive how a claim that is 'manifestly ill-founded' can
nevertheless be 'arguable', and vice versa" (judgment of 27 April
1988, Series A no. 131, para. 54). In the case of Plattform 'Ärzte
für das Leben', the Court proceeded to an examination of whether a
claim that the requirements of a substantive Article of the Convention
had not been complied with was arguable "notwithstanding that the
Commission dismissed it as manifestly ill-founded" (judgment of 21
June 1988, Series A no. 139, para. 27).
In the Boyle and Rice judgment, the Court further stated that
it did not follow from the relationship between the two concepts
"arguable claim" and "manifestly ill-founded" that "the Court must
hold a claim to be excluded from the operation of Article 13 (Art. 13)
if the Commission has previously declared it manifestly ill-founded
under the substantive Article" (judgment, para. 54). This must be so,
because the Court might well disagree with the Commission as to
whether the claim was in fact manifestly ill-founded.
On the other hand, it would seem to follow from the Court's
reasoning that in cases where the Commission finds a claim that one of
the substantive Articles of the Convention has been violated to be
manifestly ill-founded, the Commission should, at least as a rule,
also find the claim not to be arguable and thus not to require a
remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13).
In the present case, the Commission has found the applicant's
complaint under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention to be manifestly
ill-founded. There seems to be no special reason why the Commission
should nevertheless consider the applicant's claim relating to Article
3 (Art. 3) to be arguable when considered on the basis of Article 13
(Art. 13) of the Convention. In particular, I do not find it
logically convincing that the absolute character of the prohibition in
Article 3 (Art. 3) and the fact that Article 3 (Art. 3) only applies
to acts which reach a high degree of severity are elements which could
make a claim arguable under Article 13 (Art. 13) even where the main
complaint under Article 3 (Art. 3) has been found to be manifestly
ill-founded.
For these reasons, I have reached the conclusion that there
has been no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3
(Art. 13+3) of the Convention.
APPENDIX I
History of the proceedings before the Commission
Date Item
----------------------------------------------------------------
31 August 1981 Introduction of the application
16 September 1981 Registration of the application
Examination of admissibility
4 October 1983 Commission's deliberations and decision to
invite the Government to submit observations
in writing
24 January 1984 Government's observations
24 April 1984 Applicant's reply
9 July 1984 Commission's further deliberations and
partial decision on the admissibility of the
application
Parties invited to submit further observations
on the admissibility and merits
3 December 1984 Government's further observations
2 April 1985 Applicant's reply
10 July 1985 Commission's deliberations and decision to
declare the remainder of the application
admissible
Examination of the merits
10 July 1985 Commission's deliberations and decision to
adjourn consideration on the merits pending
its decision in the case of Boyle and Rice
14 July 1986 Commission's deliberations and decision to
adjourn further examination pending the
decision of the European Court of Human Rights
in the case of Boyle and Rice
11 April 1989 Commission's deliberations on the merits, final
votes and consideration of the draft Article
31 Report
4 May 1989 Commission's adoption of the Report