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HEWITT AND HARMAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 12175/86 • ECHR ID: 001-45372

Document date: May 9, 1989

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HEWITT AND HARMAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 12175/86 • ECHR ID: 001-45372

Document date: May 9, 1989

Cited paragraphs only



Application No. 12175/86

Patricia Hope HEWITT and Harriet HARMAN

against

the UNITED KINGDOM

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 9 May 1989)

- i -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.      INTRODUCTION

        (paras. 1 - 13) ....................................    1 - 2

        A.      The application

                (paras. 2 - 4 ) .............................     1

        B.      The proceedings

                (paras. 5 - 8) ..............................     1

        C.      The present Report

                (paras. 9 - 13) .............................     2

II.     ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

        (paras.  14 - 22)  ..................................   3 -  7

        A.      The particular circumstances of the case

                (paras. 14 - 19 ) ...........................   3 -  5

        B.      Relevant domestic law

                (paras. 20 - 22 ) ...........................   5 -  7

III.     OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

         (paras. 23 - 60) ...................................   8 - 14

        A.      Points at issue

                (para. 23) ..................................     8

        B.      Article 8 of the Convention

                (paras. 24 - 43) ............................   8 - 11

        C.      Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention

                (paras. 44 - 49) ............................  11 - 12

        D.      Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction

                with Article 8

                (paras. 50 - 56) ............................  12 - 13

        E.      Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction

                with Articles 10 and 11 (paras. 57 - 59) ....    14

        F.      Recapitulation

                (para. 60) ..................................    14

APPENDIX I      :  HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ...............    15

APPENDIX II     :  DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............  16 - 28

I.      INTRODUCTION

1.      The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A.      The application

2.      The first applicant, Ms Patricia Hope Hewitt, is a United

Kingdom citizen, born in 1948, and resident in London.  She was

General Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL)

between September 1983 and May 1984.

        The second applicant, Ms Harriet Harman, is a citizen of the

United Kingdom, born in 1950 and resident in London.  She is a

solicitor and a Labour Member of Parliament.

        Both applicants are represented, in the proceedings before the

Commission, by Ms Madeleine Colvin, Legal Officer, NCCL, and Mr.  Geoffrey

Robertson, Q.C., of counsel.

3.      The application is directed against the United Kingdom.  The

respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr.  M. C. Wood,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

4.      The case concerns the secret surveillance of the applicants by

the Security Service and the consequent gathering and storing of

information about them.  The applicants invoke Articles 8, 10, 11 and

13 of the Convention.

B.      The proceedings

5.      The application was introduced before the Commission on

4 September 1985 and registered on 22 May 1986.  On 2 December 1986

the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its

Rules of Procedure to give notice of the application to the respondent

Government and to invite them to present before 16 March 1987 their

observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the

application insofar as it raised issues under Articles 8, 10, 11 and

13 of the Convention.  Following an extension of the time-limit, these

observations were submitted on 29 May 1987.  The applicants'

observations in reply were received on 22 December 1987.

6.      The application was again examined by the Commission on

12 May 1988 when it was declared admissible.

7.      The parties were then invited to submit further observations

on the merits by 5 August 1988.  After an extension of the time-limit

the applicants submitted further observations on 19 December 1988.  No

further observations were received from the Government.

8.      After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in

accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the

disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement

of the case.  In the light of the parties' reactions, the Commission

now finds that there is no basis upon which a friendly settlement can

be effected.

C.       The present report

9.      The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and

votes, the following members being present:

              MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President

                  F. ERMACORA

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J. C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  J. CAMPINOS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C. L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  L. LOUCAIDES

10.      The text of this Report was adopted by the Commission on

9 May 1989 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers

of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the

Convention.

11.      The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of

the Convention, is:

(i)    to establish the facts, and

(ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a

breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.

12.      A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before

the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's

Decision on the Admissibility of the Application forms Appendix II.

13.      The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the

Commission.

II.     ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A.      The particular circumstances of the case

14.     The first applicant was General Secretary of the NCCL between

September 1983 and May 1984.  The second applicant was employed as a

legal officer by the NCCL from 1978 until 1982.

15.      The NCCL is an unincorporated association which works to

monitor and defend civil and political rights in the United Kingdom.

Pursuant to its constitution, the NCCL is a non-party and non-

denominational organisation.  In order to achieve its aims to

uphold human rights the NCCL works inter alia by briefing and lobbying

Members of Parliament, submitting evidence to official enquiries,

conducting research and issuing publications, and taking test cases to

local and international courts.  It sometimes sends impartial

observers to monitor demonstrations as part of its function to defend

the right of freedom of assembly but it does not sponsor or organise

demonstrations.

        As revealed by Ms Cathy Massiter, a former intelligence officer

of one branch of the Security Service (MI5) on a television programme

broadcast on 8 March 1985, and in an affidavit dated and sworn for the

purposes of judicial review proceedings in another case, both

applicants were placed by the Security Service in the category of

"communist sympathisers" due to their prominent participation in the

activities of the NCCL.

        In her affidavit Ms.  Massiter states that the NCCL was

classified as a communist controlled subversive organisation by the

Security Service.  As regards the secret surveillance of the

applicants, she states as follows:

"...  Harriet Harman has been on record with the security

service since the period when she was an NCCL legal

officer.  She has never been the subject of a telephone or

mail intercept through the security services to my

knowledge.  However references to her on other intercepts

and contacts with individuals who were themselves the

subject of such intercepts would usually find their way on

to her file.  The file would be used as the basis for an

assessment of Ms Harman when she became a parliamentary

candidate.  Assessments of newly elected MPs are passed on

to the Cabinet Office where there is information about the

person concerned which might throw doubt upon their security

fitness for inclusion on certain parliamentary committees

requiring access to highly classified and/or sensitive

information.  I did not see any assessment of Harriet Harman

but I would think it unlikely that exclusion from any

committees would have been recommended on the basis of her

security service record.

        In order to open a file on Harriet Harman the

security service would have to find a category in which to

place her.  She was clearly not a member of the Communist

Party of Great Britain.  However she was legal officer for

NCCL which had been assessed as a subversive organisation.

The only category open in which to record her was

'Communist sympathiser'.  Although she was not a member of

the Communist Party and there was not evidence that she was

sympathetic to the Communist Party, bureaucratically this

was the only appropriate category into which she could be

placed.

        Patricia Hewitt was recorded on the same basis as

Harriet Harman.  As well as her NCCL connections she was

also known to be living with a member of the Communist Party

of Great Britain although he later left the party.  As in

the case of Harriet Harman, up to the time of my leaving the

security service Patricia Hewitt had not at any time been

the subject to a security service initiated telephone or

mail intercept.  She was however subject to the same

'indirect interception'.

        If someone to whom Harriet Harman or Patricia Hewitt

was talking was subject to an intercept then the tapes of

the telephone conversation would be played to a transcriber.

The transcriber receives a brief and does not transcribe

irrelevant information.  Political information was generally

transcribed and personal information might be transcribed.

Everything which has been transcribed from an individual's

conversation is on a linked supplementary file to that

individual's file and a single copy of the entire transcript

is kept and is not destroyed.  To the best of my knowledge

and belief the transcriber would not necessarily have

directions to respect doctor patient or lawyer client

relationships or the sub judice rule.  The transcript would

be sent to the desk officer who was responsible for the

warrant.  If that officer saw the name of someone of

interest to my desk they would pass that part of the

transcript to me.  ..."

16.     Security service files were described by Ms Massiter

as including the following material:

        - fullest possible personal particulars of the

individual (name, date and place of birth, addresses,

occupation, employer and past employment);

        - a photograph, usually taken from the individual's

passport application;

        - data from surveillance by local police special

branch in the area where he or she lives;

        - press reports relating to the individual's

activities and political views;

        - references to the subjects in telephone or mail

intercepts operating against other individuals or

organisations;

        - references to the subject in agents' reports.

17.     The applicants allege that surveillance of both applicants was

continued after they had left the NCCL on the basis that they were

candidates for elected office.

18.     The above allegations are neither confirmed nor denied by the

respondent Government.  They point out that the policy of successive

governments of the United Kingdom is not to disclose information about

the operations of the security service or to comment on particular

allegations.

19.     By a letter dated 21 February 1985 the second applicant wrote

to the Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher) seeking confirmation

that she had been subject to surveillance and also seeking access to

her file.  Her request was rejected in a letter dated 11 March 1985.

By a letter dated 29 March 1985, addressed to the General Secretary of

the NCCL, the Home Secretary declined to order an enquiry into the

matters of which the applicants complain and failed to provide an

assurance that they are, or the NCCL is, not a target of secret

surveillance.

B.      Relevant domestic "law" and practice

20.     The Security Service was established and exists for the

exclusive purpose of the defence of the Realm.  The activities of the

Security Service are governed by the published Directive of the Home

Secretary to the Director-General of the Service, a Crown Servant,

dated 24 September 1952 ("the Directive") as follows:

"1.  In your appointment as Director-General of the Security

Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary

personally.  The Security Service is not, however, a part of

the Home Office.  On appropriate occasion you will have

right of direct access to the Prime Minister.

2.  The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of

the country.   Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a

whole, from external and internal dangers arising from

attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of

persons and organisations whether directed from within or

without the country, which may be judged to be subversive to

the State.

3.  You will take special care to see that the work of the

Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary

for the purposes of this task.

4.  It is essential that the Security Service should be kept

absolutely free from any political bias or influence and

nothing should be done that might lend colour to any

suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any

particular section of the community, or with any other

matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole.

5.  No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any

Government Department unless you are satisfied that an

important public interest bearing on the Defence of the

Realm, as defined in paragraph 2, is at stake.

6.  You and your staff will maintain the well-established

convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with

the detailed information which may be obtained by the

Security Service in particular cases, but are furnished with

such information only as may be necessary for the

determination of any issue on which guidance is sought."

21.     Members of the Security Service are public officials but

unlike, for example, police officers, immigration officers or officers

of HM Customs and Excise, they have conferred on them no special

powers whether under any law or by virtue of the Directive.  Members

of the Service are Crown Servants, subject to the disciplinary control

of the Crown but are otherwise in no position different from private

citizens.  Their activities are constrained by the criminal law and

the law of torts in the same way as the activities of citizens

generally are so constrained.  Thus, if they carry out or engage in

matters which it is unlawful for citizens generally to carry out or

engage in, it is likewise unlawful for them to do so and they would

thereby be liable to be proceeded against for any offence which was

thereby committed, or liable in any civil proceedings in respect of

any tort which had resulted.

22.     From June to September 1963 Lord Denning, one of the then

most senior Judges of the Supreme Court, at the request of the Prime

Minister, undertook an examination of the operation of the Security

Service in the light of the resignation of the then Secretary of

State for War.  At paragraph 239 of his Report dated 16 September 1963

(Cmnd. 2152), Lord Denning, after hearing a considerable body of

evidence, found general approval that the Directive embodied the

correct principles, which principles (inter alia) he summarised as

follows:

"(1) The Head of the Security Service is responsible

directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper

working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the

Prime Minister.

(2) The Security Service is, however, not a department of

the Home Office.  It operates independently under its own

Director-General, but he can and does seek direction and

guidance from the Home Secretary, subject always to the

proviso that its activities must be absolutely free from any

political bias or influence.

(3)  The function of the Security Service is to defend the

Realm as a whole from dangers which threaten it as a whole,

such as espionage on behalf of a foreign Power, or internal

organisations subversive of the State.  For this purpose, it

must collect information about individuals, and give it to

those concerned.  But it must not, even at the behest of a

Minister or Government Department, take part in

investigating the private lives of the individuals except

in a matter bearing on the Defence of the Realm as a whole.

(4)  The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime

Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and

delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has

any direct responsibility for the Security Service.  He has

certainly none in day-to-day matters.  It would be a

mistake for the Prime Minister to take such responsibility

because he cannot in practice exercise adequate supervision,

and he has not the secretariat for the purposes."

III.    OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A.      Points at issue

23.     The following are the principal points at issue in the case:

        - Whether the surveillance of the activities of the applicants

by the Security Service and the consequent compilation and retention

of information concerning their private lives constituted a violation

of their right to respect for private life contrary to Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention;

         - Whether the above actions of the Security Service

constituted a violation of the applicants' right to freedom of

expression contrary to Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention;

        -  Whether the above actions of the Security Service

constituted a violation of the applicants' right to freedom of

association contrary to Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention;

         -  Whether there exists an effective remedy under the law of

the United Kingdom in respect of the applicants' complaints under

Articles 8, 10 and 11 as required by Article 13 (Art. 8, 10, 11, 13)

of the Convention.

B.      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

24.     The applicants complain that they were the subject of secret

surveillance by the Security Service and that information concerning

their activities was compiled and retained by the Security Service.

They claim that, by reason of their association with the National

Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), they were classified as

"subversives" and "communist sympathisers" by the Security Service.

They contend that the above actions of the Security Service constitute

an unjustified interference with their right to respect for private

life as guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

25.     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:

"1.      Everyone has the right to respect for his private

and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.      There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public safety

or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

26.     The Government, in line with their policy of not disclosing

information about the operations of the Security Service, have

neither confirmed nor denied the applicants' allegations.

27.     The Commission recalls that the storing of information

concerning a person's private life in a secret police register amounts

to an interference with the right to respect for private life as

guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (see Eur.

Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 22

para. 48).  It follows that secret surveillance activities for the

purpose of gathering and storing on file information concerning a

person's private life also constitutes an interference with this right

(see, mutatis mutandis, Eur.  Court H.R., Klass judgment of 6

September 1978, Series A no. 28;  Malone judgment of 2 August 1984,

Series A no. 82).

28.     A question arises as to whether the evidence before the

Commission as to the compilation and retention of information

concerning the applicants' private lives leads to the conclusion that

there has been an interference with their right to respect for private

life.

29.     The Commission recalls that "an individual may, under certain

conditions, claim to be a victim of a violation occasioned by the mere

existence of secret measures - without having to allege that such

measures were in fact applied to him" (Eur.  Court H.R., Klass Judgment

of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 18 para. 34).

30.     The Court in the Klass case added that the relevant conditions

were "to be determined in each case according to the Convention right

or rights alleged to have been infringed, the secret character of the

measures objected to, and the connection between the applicant and

those measures" (ibid.).

31.     Similarly, in the Malone case, the Court agreed with the

Commission that the existence of laws and practices permitting and

establishing a system for effecting secret surveillance amounted in

itself to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention, apart from any measures actually taken

against him (Eur.  Court H.R., Malone judgment of 2 August 1984,

Series A no. 82, p. 31 para. 64).

32.     The Commission does not consider that this case-law can be

interpreted so broadly as to encompass every person in the United

Kingdom who fears that the security service may have compiled

information about them.  The Commission, however, considers that an

applicant cannot be reasonably expected to prove that information

concerning his private life has been compiled and retained.  It is

sufficient, in the area of secret measures, that the existence of

practices permitting secret surveillance be established and that there

is a reasonable likelihood that the security service has compiled and

retained information concerning private life (see Application No.

12015/86, Dec. 6.7.88, to be published in D.R.).

33.     In the present case the applicants have submitted a detailed

affidavit by a former intelligence officer of MI5 which indicates that

the applicants were the subjects of secret surveillance by the

Security Service because of their association with the National

Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) and that the information gathered

about them comprises inter alia information concerning their private

life and is kept in records maintained by the Security Service.

34.     The Commission notes that the applicants do not allege that

they were subjected to telephone or mail intercepts.  Nevertheless

Ms.  Massiter's evidence states that they had been subject to

"indirect interception", i.e. the recording of information about them

which appeared in the telephone or mail intercepts of others.

35.     The interception and recording of such information, even

though the applicants were not directly subject to interception,

amounts in itself to an interference with the applicants' right to

respect for private life and correspondence (see Eur.  Court H.R.,

Malone judgment, loc. cit., p.30 para. 64).

36.     Against the above background the Commission finds that the

existence of practices permitting secret surveillance has been

established and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the

applicants were the subjects of secret surveillance and that the

Security Service have compiled and retained information concerning

their private lives.  It follows that there has been an interference

inter alia with the applicants' right to respect for their private

life under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.

37.     The Commission must next examine whether this interference is

justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.  It

must first determine whether the interference is "in accordance with

the law".

38.     The Commission recalls that the phrase "in accordance with the

law" includes requirements over and above compliance with the domestic

law.  The "law" in question must be adequately accessible in the sense

that the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate

in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case.

In addition, "a norm cannot be regarded as law unless it is formulated

with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his

conduct.  He must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to

foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the

consequences which a given action may entail." (See Eur.  Court H.R.,

Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31 para.

49).

39.     The Court in the Malone case has further elucidated the

concept of foreseeability and highlighted its importance as a

safeguard against the arbitrary application of measures of secret

surveillance.  The Court stated as follows (loc. cit., p. 32, para.

67):

        "The Court would reiterate its opinion that the

phrase 'in accordance with the law' does not merely refer

back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the

law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law,

which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the

Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the [above-mentioned]

Silver and Others judgment, p. 34, para. 90, and the Golder

judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 17, para.

34).  The phrase thus implies - and this follows from the

object and purpose of Article 8 (Art. 8) - that there must be a

measure of legal protection in domestic law against

arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the

rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 (see the report of the

Commission, paragraph 121).  Especially where a power of the

executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness

are evident (see the above-mentioned Klass and Others

judgment, Series A no. 28, pp. 21 and 23, paras. 42 and

49).  Undoubtedly, as the Government rightly suggested, the

requirements of the Convention, notably in regard to

foreseeability, cannot be exactly the same in the special

context of interception of communications for the purpose of

police investigations as they are where the object of the

relevant law is to place restrictions on the conduct of

individuals.  In particular, the requirement of

foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be

enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to

intercept his communications so that he can adapt his

conduct accordingly.  Nevertheless, the law must be

sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate

indication as to the circumstances in which and the

conditions on which public authorities are empowered to

resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference

with the right to respect for private life and

correspondence."

40.     The Commission notes that the activities of the Security

Service are governed by a Directive of the Home Secretary to the

Director-General of the Security Service dated 24 September 1952.

Although the Directive is published, it is not claimed by the

Government that it has the force of law or that its contents

constitute legally enforceable rules concerning the operation of the

Security Service.  Nor does the Directive provide a framework which

indicates with the requisite degree of certainty the scope and manner

of the exercise of discretion by the authorities in the carrying out

of secret surveillance activities.

41.     The Commission finds that in these circumstances the

interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life was

not "in accordance with the law" as required by Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

42.     In view of the above finding, the Commission considers it

unnecessary to examine whether the interference in the present case

was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8

para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

        Conclusion

43.     The Commission concludes, by 13 votes to 2, that there

has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

C.      Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention

44.     The applicants have also complained of an interference with

their freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention.  They state that as a result of the secret surveillance

they and those with whom they are in communication will be deterred

from expressing their true opinions and beliefs.  In addition they

submit that their future career prospects and political ambitions may

be prejudiced by being labelled "subversive" by the Security Service.

45.     The Government submit that the applicants have at all times

been free to express their opinions and have not substantiated their

allegations.

46.     The applicants further complain of an interference with their

right to freedom of association under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention.

They allege inter alia that, as a result of being classified as

subversives, potential supporters of NCCL may have been inhibited

from associating with the applicants.

47.    The Government contend that Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) does

not guarantee a right of association in the sense described by the

applicants and that, in any event, they have not substantiated their

complaints.

48.     The Commission considers that the above complaints under

Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention are based on the

claim that the applicants were the subject of secret surveillance and

that the Security Service has compiled and retained files of

information relating to their private lives.  In the opinion of the

Commission it is not necessary to examine these complaints separately

in view of the above finding that these activities constitute a breach

of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

        Conclusion

49.     The Commission concludes, by a unanimous vote, that it is not

necessary to examine separately whether there has been a violation of

Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention.

D.      Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8

        (Art. 13+8)

50.     The applicants complain under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention that there exists no effective remedy under the law of the

United Kingdom in respect of their complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention.

51.     The Government have not commented on the applicants' complaint

of a breach of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8) .

52.     Article 13 (Art. 13) provides as follows:

     "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in

this Convention are violated shall have an effective

remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that

the violation has been committed by persons acting in an

official capacity."

53.     This provision has been interpreted in the following way by

the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Silver and Others

(Eur.  Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25 March 1983,

Series A no. 61, p. 42 para. 113):

        "(a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be

        the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the

        Convention, he should have a remedy before a national

        authority in order both to have his claim decided and,

        if appropriate, to obtain redress (see the ...  Klass and

        others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 29, para. 64);

        (b)  the authority referred to in Article 13 (Art. 13) may not

        necessarily be a judicial authority but, if it is not,

        its powers and the guarantees which it affords are

        relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is

        effective (ibid., p. 30, para. 67);

        (c)  although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy

        the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13), the aggregate of remedies

        provided for under domestic law may do so (see, mutatis

        mutandis, ...  X v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A

        no. 46, p. 26, para. 60 and the Van Droogenbroeck judgment

        of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 32, para. 56);

        (d)  neither Article 13 (Art. 13) nor the Convention in general lays

        down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring

        within their internal law the effective implementation of any

        of the provisions of the Convention - for example, by

        incorporating the Convention into domestic law (see the

        Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment of 6 February 1976,

        Series A no. 20, p. 18, para. 50).

        It follows from the last-mentioned principle that the

        application of Article 13 (Art. 13) in a given case will depend

        upon the manner in which the Contracting State concerned

        has chosen to discharge its obligation under Article 1

        (Art. 1) directly to secure to anyone within its jurisdiction the

        rights and freedoms set out in section I (see ...  Ireland

        v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 25, p. 91,

        para. 239)."

54.     The Commission recalls the above conclusion that there is a

breach of Article 8 (Art. 8) in the present case.  Article 13 (Art. 13)

is applicable in such a case.

55.     The Commission has not been informed of the existence of an

effective remedy under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of the

applicants' complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.  The

Commission therefore finds that the applicants do not have an

effective remedy as required by Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

        Conclusion

56.     The Commission concludes, by 13 votes to 2, that there has been

a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8) of the

Convention.

E.      Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 10

        and 11  (Art. 13+10+11)

57.     As regards the applicants' complaints of a violation of

Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 13+10+11), the

Commission recalls that it does not consider it necessary to examine

the complaints relating to Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) separately

in view of the finding of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.

58.     For the same reasons and in view of the above finding of a

breach of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8), the

Commission does not consider it necessary to examine separately the

complaint relating to Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 10 and

11 (Art. 13+10+11).

        Conclusion

59.     The Commission concludes, by a unanimous vote, that it is not

necessary to examine separately the applicants' complaint of a

violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11

(Art. 13+10+11) of the Convention.

F.      Recapitulation

60.     The Commission concludes

        -  by a vote of 13 votes to 2, that there has been a

           violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (para. 43

           above);

        -  by a unanimous vote that it is not necessary to examine

           separately whether there has been a violation of

           Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention

           (para. 49 above);

        -  by a vote of 13 votes to 2, that there has been

           a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with

           Article 8 (Art. 13+8) of the Convention (para. 56 above);

        -  by a unanimous vote, that it is not necessary to

           examine separately the applicants' complaint of

           a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with

           Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 13+10+11) of the Convention

           (para. 59 above).

Secretary to the Commission          Acting President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                           (J.A. FROWEIN)

APPENDIX I

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

______________________________________________________________________

Date                            Item

______________________________________________________________________

4 September 1985               Introduction of the application

22 May 1986                     Registration of the application

Examination of Admissibility

2 December 1986                Commission's decision to invite

                                the Government to submit

                                observations on the admissibility

                                and merits of the application

29 May 1987                     Government's observations

22 December 1987                Applicant's observations in reply

12 May 1988                     Commission's decision to declare

                                the application admissible.

Examination of the merits

9 June 1988                    Decision on admissibility transmitted

                                to the parties

19 December 1988                Applicant's observations on the merits

9 October 1988    )            Commission's consideration of the

11 March 1989      )            state of proceedings

5 May 1989                     Commission's deliberations on the

                                merits and final votes

9 May 1989                     Adoption of the Report

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