THORGEIRSON v. ICELAND
Doc ref: 13778/88 • ECHR ID: 001-45487
Document date: December 11, 1990
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Application No. 13778/88
Thorgeir THORGEIRSON
against
ICELAND
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 11 December 1990)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
I. INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-17) ............................ 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-4) ...................................... 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5-12) ..................................... 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 13-17) .................................... 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 18-47) ............ 3
A. The particular facts of the case
(paras. 18-39) .................................... 3
B. Relevant domestic legislation
(paras. 40-47) .................................... 17
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 48-87) .............. 19
A. Complaints declared admissible
(para. 48) ........................................ 19
B. Points at issue
(para. 49) ........................................ 19
C. Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
(paras. 50-66) .................................... 19
D. Article 10 of the Convention
(paras. 67-85) .................................... 22
E. Recapitulation
(paras. 86-87) .................................... 25
Dissenting opinion by Sir Basil Hall ........................ 26
APPENDIX I : The applicant's article of 7 December 1983 ... 27
APPENDIX II : The applicant's article of 20 December 1983 .. 28
APPENDIX III: History of the proceedings ................... 30
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant is an Icelandic citizen, born in 1933. He is an
author and resides in Reykjavík, Iceland. Before the Commission he is
represented by his lawyer, Mr. Tómas Gunnarsson.
3. The application is directed against Iceland. The Government
are represented by Mr. Thorsteinn Geirsson, Ministry of Justice, as
Agent.
4. The case concerns freedom of expression and the alleged
partiality of the court in proceedings in the context of allegations
of police brutality in Iceland. When the applicant learned about an
incident of police brutality in 1983 he published two articles in a
daily newspaper concerning these matters. Due to the publication of
these articles, criminal proceedings were instituted against the
applicant for defamation of character and he was subsequently found
guilty in respect of the charge brought against him and sentenced to
pay a fine. The applicant considers that his case was not heard by an
impartial tribunal and that his conviction amounts to an unjustified
interference with his right to freedom of expression. He invokes
Article 6 and Article 10 of the Convention.
B. The proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 19 November 1987 and
registered on 19 April 1988. The Commission considered the case on
10 March 1989 and decided to give notice of the application to the
respondent Government in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its
Rules of Procedure and to invite them to present, before 26 May 1989,
their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the
application.
6. Having been granted an extension of the time-limit, the
Government submitted their observations on 26 June 1989. The
applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 21 August 1989.
7. Legal aid under the addendum to the Commission's Rules of
Procedure was granted to the applicant on 27 July 1989.
8. On 4 October 1989 the Commission invited the parties to
appear before it at a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the
case.
9. The hearing took place on 14 March 1990. The applicant was
present in person and was represented by Mr. Tómas Gunnarsson as
counsel. The Government were represented by their Agent Mr. Thorsteinn
Geirsson and by Mr. Gunnlaugur Claessen as counsel.
10. Following the hearing, the Commission declared the applicant's
above complaints under Article 6 and Article 10 of the Convention
admissible. Other complaints submitted under Article 6 of the
Convention were declared inadmissible.
11. The parties were then invited to submit any additional
observations on the merits of the case which they wished to make. Such
observations were submitted by the applicant on 15 May 1990. The
Government submitted further evidence on 28 June 1990 but informed the
Commission on 4 September 1990 that they did not intend to submit any
additional observations on the merits.
12. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed
itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a
friendly settlement of the case. Consultations with the parties took
place between 20 March 1990 and 4 September 1990. The Commission now
finds that there is no basis upon which such a settlement can be
effected.
C. The present Report
13. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and
votes, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, Acting President
J.A. FROWEIN
G. SPERDUTI
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
14. The text of this Report was adopted on 11 December 1990 and is
now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
15. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of
the Convention, is:
(i) to establish the facts, and
(ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose
a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the
Convention.
16. The original version of the two newspaper articles appears as
Appendices I and II to this Report. A schedule setting out the history
of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as
Appendix III and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the
application as Appendix IV.
17. The full text of the parties' submissions and the documents
concerning the case are held in the archives of the Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular facts of the case
18. From 1979 to 1983 a number of incidents occurred in Iceland
which involved allegations of police brutality. Thirteen such
incidents were reported to the police and gave rise to investigations.
In the last case, which occurred in 1983, it appeared that a journalist
had been ill-treated by the police in Reykjavík. The responsible
policemen were later prosecuted and convicted. This incident was
extensively covered in the press and it caused the applicant to
publish two articles about police brutality in the daily newspaper
Morgunbladid on 7 and 20 December 1983 respectively. The first article
(as to the original version, see Appendix I) read as follows:
(translation)
19. "LET US CONSIDER NOW!
An open letter to Minister of Justice Jón Helgason
Honourable Minister of Justice:
(1) Recently a problem that for several years had been
bothering - if not obsessing - my mind, all of a sudden came
into the spotlight of the press. A journalist of your own
very progressive party-newspaper - Tíminn - had a difficult
experience and returned with some injuries from the jungle
of the Reykjavík night-life. Often the perils of the jungle
and other alien regions can help us visualise the hardships
that missionaries have had to endure. This was the case
with Stanley and Livingstone, even if they were preaching
God's own Kingdom rather than the idea of the co-operative
Utopia.
(2) In our case one of your political missionaries,
journalist Skafti Jónsson, met hardship in the jungle of the
night and his facial injuries have clearly been exposed in
four-column pictures in the press. Of course we are
scandalised when we see this.
(3) We do not like to realise how our policemen have
treated the handsome face of this journalist who tells us
that he innocently was looking for his overcoat when the
uniformed beasts of the aforementioned jungle attacked him.
(4) In my mind Mr. Jónsson's case is of little
importance. But as it has caught much attention and been
widely discussed, I would like to use the opportunity to
point out to you that the real problem is in fact bigger and
much more horrifying.
(5) The case of Mr. Jónsson is but a top of an iceberg
that news-people have brought to our attention. Beneath, in
the dark sea of silence lurks a problem nine times bigger.
(6) That is the part I should like to make you aware of,
because you are Minister of Justice and thus in command of
those uniformed beasts that creep around, silently or not,
in the jungle of our nightly jollification.
(7) I am certainly not underestimating the hardships and
pains that this young man unnecessarily has had to endure.
But on the other hand Mr. Jónsson obviously is going to
recover. The blue spots on his face will turn violet and
then brown. In due time they finally will disappear. Mr.
Jónsson shall return to his job at your newspaper and his
case will be forgotten under the snow of future daily
scandals that incessantly will be coming down.
Unless we use this opportunity to study the real problem.
(8) Several years ago I had to spend some weeks at the
Surgery Department of our Communal Hospital. In a room of
the same corridor a boy of twenty was lying in his bed. A
promising and a charming young person. But his paralysed
condition on the other hand did not allow him to move any
part of his body, except the eyes. He was able to read with
the aid of special machinery and a helping hand which would
turn the pages for him.
I was told that his hopes for recovery were minimal.
(9) The boy's room-mates told me that his injuries had
been caused by bouncers of a restaurant and some policemen.
I refrained from believing this instantly so I inquired
among the hospital staff and - Yes, right they were; there
we had a victim of the Reykjavík night-squad.
(10) The picture of this paralysed youngster somehow
followed me out of the hospital and I couldn't help talking
about his case. Then I found out that most people knew
various stories of persons who had had a similar or even
worse experience with the uniformed beasts. Individuals had
been brought back to the intellectual capacity of a new-born
child as a result of choke-holds that policemen and bouncers
learn and use with brutal spontaneity instead of handling
people with prudence and care. Such stories are so
identical in substance and abundant that you can hardly
treat them as simple lies any more. Another thing that goes
with those stories as inevitably as brutality follows
stupidity is the statement that suing a policeman in such a
case would be hopeless. The investigation would take place
at another department of the same police and be carried out
by a troop of persons who see their duty in washing any
policeman clean of all accusations.
(11) Therefore the victims of the police brutes rest in
agony and many years can pass without an opportunity to
discuss their problems reasonably.
(12) Now there might be one of those rare occasions.
That is the reason for this letter of mine.
(13) I have little doubt that there is something
essentially wrong in a system where the persons in charge
seem to disregard all justice and misinterpret their duties
by allowing brutes and sadists to practise their perverted
mentality - no matter who is the victim. In my opinion the
Reykjavík Chief of Police shows a stubborn attitude by
refusing to release the accused policemen from their duties
while the 'Jónsson case' is being investigated. And he
seems to lose little of his self-confidence, even in a case
where he is facing one of your own partisans. But we shall
see.
(14) Even if Mr. Jónsson wins his case this will be an
exception and shall change nothing. Other victims of this
brutality would continue to pile up in silence as before.
(15) My opinion is that the real problem lies with a
system where one policeman investigates another policeman's
violations of correct professional conduct. This opinion I
share with other much more competent persons - who obviously
hesitate to pronounce their opinion on this matter fearing
the revenge and beatings that might follow.
The matter is all that serious.
(16) Two of your predecessors in office have received
letters from me regarding these problems. Neither of them
had the courtesy to answer.
(17) Recently I have had the opportunity to observe
pictures of you in the press and I have noticed their fair
expression of distinct honour. This indeed is the very kind
of facial expression that anytime could easily penetrate
into your character even if it originally had only been
meant for the photographer.
Therefore I am writing to you as well.
And proposing my idea for the third time:
(18) Please remove all cases of police brutality from
this automatic and hopeless washing-machine where they have
been treated. As long as policemen are allowed to clean up
one another's filth you will never have a possibility to
even consider most urgent things like character tests that
policemen should pass before they are taught fatal tricks to
exercise on people, or their very own responsibility in
cases where they temporarily have lost control of their
furiousness - all of which is the condition for a competent
police force worthy of the power given to them.
But how can we get rid of the old system?
(19) You have to form a committee of trustworthy people
to investigate the rumours, gradually becoming public
opinion, that brutality is growing within the Reykjavík
police force and being unfairly protected. Such a committee
could advertise for victims of police brutality and gather
their testimonies for eventual verification. Hopefully the
committee might find out that a tiny minority of policemen
are responsible. Those individuals should be advised to
look for other jobs.
(20) I assume that our police problem could be compared
with the so-called 'youth-problem' in the sense that
comparatively few individuals are responsible for this
negative public opinion. And those individuals would not
exactly be the typical or the most intelligent ones of
either group.
(21) I have seen our policemen perform many a good deed
and some of the very fine people I know are policemen. We
cannot do without them. But I owe it to the young man I met
at the Communal Hospital to gather my courage and forward
this proposal: let us do a cleaning so that the adventurers
who choose to risk their skin in the jungle of the Reykjavík
night-life in the future can at least be assured that a
policeman in uniform is not among the perils of this jungle.
The other beasts will certainly do.
(22) In court you sometimes forward a secondary claim in
case that your main demand will not be accepted. Should
you, Minister Helgason, fail to have this neutral
investigation realised I call upon journalists (Skafti
Jónsson for ex.) to start this investigation and publish the
results in a book that very probably would become a
bestseller. I would at any time be prepared to participate
in this job.
Yours sincerely with respect,
Thorgeir Thorgeirson"
20. The second article (as to the original version, see
Appendix II) read as follows (extract):
(translation)
21. "STRIKE WHILE THE FLY IS SITTING ON MY NOSE...
(1) Thorgeir Thorgeirson's statement on police captain
Einar Bjarnason's behaviour in a television
programme on the evening of last December the 13th.
...
(2) Last Tuesday, December 13th, there was a programme
about the police problem on our TV. Among the participants
were two police intellectuals who somewhat lost control of
the situation, according to the opinion of many spectators.
The single spectator I heard excusing captain Elíason and
captain Bjarnason argued that there had been only two of
them and it would exactly have been the controller who was
absent.
This might well be true.
(3) Towards the end of the programme captain Bjarnason,
who happens to be the chairman of the Reykjavík Police
Association, organised an amusing happening: after having
consulted captain Elíason with much paper rattling and
whispering, he started reading from a typed document
containing filth about my unreliable, ever-lying person
(according to this document which the police somehow had
managed to have signed by a completely irrelevant person).
(4) Bjarnason could easily have got this message of his
across without breaking the law on radio-broadcasting and
thus risking both his honour and his job. Many spectators
have been wondering about this.
Of course.
(5) This venture can hardly be explained by the lack of
control alone so I feel forced to add another article to
what I had thought to be my final word about the matter a
week ago (this is written Thursday the 15th and will be
delivered to the newspaper on 16 December).
I have to mention my experience during the last week.
(6) Wednesday last week, i.e. December 7th, Morgunbladid
published my letter to the highest authority of justice in
this country. My request was that he immediately order a
neutral investigation of the police problem instead of
having the problem control itself forever. Naturally I
never expected my text to be specially applauded at police
stations.
(7) A certain misunderstanding is always inevitable.
Misconception has bloomed around this matter; my ideas of a
writer's duty are that he should, at least sometimes, be the
conscience of his vicinity, but our police officers seem to
be of a totally different opinion, as only was to be
expected.
No harm in that.
(8) The morning my letter to Minister Helgason appeared
in the newspaper astonishingly many people phoned to me.
Among them was a certain Mr. Hermannsson who introduced
himself as police sergeant of Reykjavík. He wanted to know
what case I had been writing about in my article. I told
him that the subject had been the situation in general; no
isolated case. The cases behind this situation were several
hundreds at least. Hermannsson then inquired about the name
of the paralysed boy at the Communal Hospital, the one I had
mentioned. I told him, which was true, that I had probably
never known the boy's name. Then I asked Hermannsson if the
police actually was investigating the matter. His answer
was yes. I then pointed out to him that it would be a very
bold thing to do in the circumstances: if the police once
again was investigating a matter concerning their own
affairs. At the same time I refused to give any further
testimony by telephone, except that I told him the date of
my hospitalisation. We bade farewell.
...
(9) Time passed until Sunday. The newspapers were full
of sobbing testimonies written by policemen. Morgunbladid
of Sunday published an article by Jóhannes Jónsson, a
policeman of course, who referred to the news item from
Friday the 9th which meant that his manuscript would have
reached the editiorial office Saturday. This was peculiar
to me, knowing that the normal waiting time of an article
for Morgunbladid is something like four to six days from
presentation of the manuscript to publishing day. That is
valid for us plain-clothes citizens. In his article police
officer Jónsson had the reiterated 'police-truth' to tell
that 'the case Mr. Thorgeirson had referred to' was there on
page 13 of Friday's Morgunbladid.
...
(10) Since then something has occurred, and now I must
ask Mr. Hallsson to keep his promise and publish this
statement of mine. Even though captain Bjarnason's stroke
towards the end of the TV programme last Tuesday proved to
be so much askew that I am not the one it hurts, I must
point out how very typical and police-like his behaviour has
been.
(11) What is the core of this so called 'police problem'?
Well - many people think that our policemen already have
attacked too many a citizen, guilty or innocent. They have
been striking far too frequently.
(12) Their recent reactions in the press have been filled
with quotations from 19th century literature, which is
tremendously amusing. But older classical literature
lingers behind. They might also have been consulting the
Saga of Grettir the Strong whose principle was: The best
way to endure the Bads of Life is to suffer the Worse.
Anyway that seems to be their line.
(13) This is far too pathetic a principle for a whole
police force to follow if we really want people to
appreciate their services.
(14) Since Tuesday many people have been phoning and
expressing the opinion that the TV programme on the police
problem was a disastrous document for future generations to
study.
(15) - They should have been in uniforms, someone said.
Captain Bjarnason's behaviour was so typical of what
gradually is becoming the public opinion of our police force
in defence: bullish falsifications, illegal actions,
superstition, hasted stupidity.
And what not?
(16) The title of this article is borrowed from the
folklore everyone should know, about the couple hunting the
fly. It came to my mind when I was observing captain
Bjarnason fighting his own inventions during the TV
programme. Should our Minister of Justice not have had time
to see the programme I would like to advise him to borrow
the tape still existing at the TV station. Comical
interpretations have something pathetic about them and this
is a top one on what the general public more and more refers
to as the 'police problem'.
(17) Comic or pathetic, the programme should be an
example to show us the necessity of an impartial examination
of the problem to prevent the police from repeatedly hurting
themselves while investigating their own affairs in order to
support a completely false image of their childlike
identity.
(18) Let us stop the fight and consider the proposal I
forwarded in my letter to the Minister of Justice. We could
even consider a more sarcastic idea that a friend of mine
proposed:
(19) Thorgeir, he said. Wouldn't it be an idea to have a
really good pedagogical psychologist study this police
aggression?
Hopefully the matter is not all that complicated.
With thanks for the publication.
Thorgeir Thorgeirson"
22. Due to the contents of these articles, the Reykjavík Police
Association requested the public prosecutor to investigate the matter.
23. On 21 May 1984, the public prosecutor, TB, decided to send the
case to the State Criminal Investigation Police (SCIP) with the request
to investigate whether there might have been a violation of Section 108
of the Icelandic Penal Code (offences against state officials). The
applicant was accordingly interrogated on 18 June 1984 at the SCIP
headquarters. During this interrogation the applicant was assisted by
his lawyer.
24. On the basis of the investigation of the case, the public
prosecutor, TB, issued a bill of indictment on 13 August 1985 whereby
the applicant was charged with having published defamatory remarks
against policemen in the two articles. As regards the first article,
the following passages were considered by the public prosecutor to be
defamatory:
(translation)
"uniformed beasts" (para. 19(3) above).
"of those uniformed beasts" (para. 19(6) above).
"The boy's room-mates told me that his injuries
had been caused by bouncers of a restaurant and
some policemen. I refrained from believing this
instantly so I inquired among the hospital staff
and - Yes, right they were; there we had a victim
of the Reykjavík night-squad" (para. 19(9) above).
"Then I found out that most people knew various
stories of persons who had had a similar or even
worse experience with the uniformed beasts.
Individuals had been brought back to the intellectual
capacity of a new-born child as a result of
choke-holds that policemen and bouncers learn and
use with brutal spontaneity instead of handling people
with prudence and care. Such stories are so identical
in substance and abundant that you can hardly treat
them as simple lies any more" (para. 19(10) above).
"victims of the police brutes" (para. 19(11) above).
"allowing brutes and sadists to practise their
perverted mentality" (para. 19(13) above).
25. As regards the second article, the following passage was
considered to be defamatory:
(translation)
"Captain Bjarnason's behaviour was so typical
of what gradually is becoming the public opinion
of our police force in defence: bullish falsifications,
illegal actions, superstition, hasted stupidity"
(para. 21(15) above).
26. In the indictment it was finally stated that the afore-cited
"defamatory passages", which were "directed against unnamed and
undesignated members of the Reykjavík police force", were considered to
violate Section 108 of the Penal Code.
27. The Chief Judge of the Criminal Court of Reykjavík assigned
the applicant's case to judge PG. He decided that the case was to be
filed in the Criminal Court on 10 September 1985 and the indictment
was served on the applicant the day before, summoning him to appear.
At the applicant's request his arraignment was deferred to 17
September 1985. Accordingly nobody appeared in court on 10 September
1985.
28. The applicant's case was thus dealt with by the Criminal
Court of Reykjavík presided over by judge PG on 17 September 1985.
According to the Court transcripts the following happened during this
session:
(translation)
"At 10 a.m. the defendant, Thorgeir Thorgeirson ..., appears
in court.
He is accompanied by Tómas Gunnarsson, Supreme Court
advocate.
The provisions of Section 77 para. 2 of Law no. 74/1974 are
observed.
The defendant requests that the Supreme Court advocate be
appointed as his defence counsel; the Supreme Court advocate
accepts his appointment in court and is handed copies of all
case documents.
The defendant is asked whether he wrote the article 'Let Us
Consider Now' with the sub-title 'An Open Letter to the
Minister of Justice, Mr. Jón Helgason', published in the
Morgunbladid 7 December 1983, and the article 'Strike While
the Fly Is On My Nose', published in the same newspaper on
20 December 1983. The defendant states that he wrote the
articles.
The defendant considers that the statements described in ...
the indictment are correctly quoted, but as far as he can
see they are removed from their context with the remaining
text.
The defendant is confronted with a statement made by him
to the State Criminal Investigation Police on 18 June 1984.
He accepts having made the statement. He says it has been
correctly recorded, and accepts having signed it.
The defendant is then confronted with a letter written by
him to the State Criminal Investigation Police on 19 June
1984. He accepts having written the letter.
He is then asked whether he can substantiate the statements
which are quoted after him in the indictment.
The defendant says that in their context in the indictment,
on which he has already commented, he neither can nor is
under any obligation to substantiate the statements in
question; that this is not his literary product, it is the
product of the accuser.
Read, confirmed as correctly recorded.
The defendant, in consultation with his counsel, asks to be
granted a period of time for acquainting himself with the
case documents and for expressing further his opinion on
them and the litigation.
The judge calls the defendant and his counsel to appear in
court at a session on Tuesday the 24th of this month at
2 p.m."
29. The public prosecutor did not make an appearance during this
court session or when the case was brought up again on 24 September
1985. On the latter occasion, a record was made of counsel's statement
to the effect that, since the public prosecutor had not made an
appearance, he considered that the judge both represented the
prosecution and performed the role of judge. For this reason he
motioned that PG yield his seat as judge in the case. In a decision
rendered by PG in court the following day counsel's claims and
arguments were quoted verbatim whereupon the judge stated his opinion
as follows:
(translation)
"This case is not subject to prosecution and defence according
to Section 130 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), no. 74/1974.
(The applicant's) motion that the judge yield his seat is
unsupported by any valid arguments and totally unfounded. The
judge is neither obliged nor allowed to yield his seat."
30. The applicant requested that this decision be summarily
appealed against to the Supreme Court of Iceland, but this was denied
by the public prosecutor on 26 September 1985 on the basis of Section
171 of the CCP.
31. The applicant then complained to the Ministry of Justice which,
however, by letter of 18 October 1985, found no reason to support the
applicant's plea.
32. The applicant's case was subsequently examined in the Criminal
Court in six sessions conducted by judge PG during the period 9
October 1985 to 28 April 1986. The applicant and his counsel made an
appearance in court every time and the public prosecutor, TB, made an
appearance every time save one during which a video taped TV
programme was presented to the Court. Documents were submitted, oral
statements received and witnesses heard. On 28 April 1986 the parties
agreed that further investigation in court was not required. Counsel
was then afforded an opportunity to present a written defence and
granted a period until 3 June 1986 for this purpose. The public
prosecutor declared, however, that he would make no further
submissions.
33. On 3 June 1986 the applicant submitted his written defence. He
did not dispute the fact that he was the author of the articles in
question but maintained:
(translation)
"If public opinion turns sour, confidence in policemen is
lost, also in policemen who never have as much as hurt a
fly. In the autumn of 1983 this loss of confidence had
assumed proportions outright dangerous to public welfare.
So, when the case of Skafti Jónsson emerged, I became aware
of this danger. And my oft-mentioned article published in
Morgunbladid on 7 December 1983 was my reaction to this
dangerous situation. By writing the article I consider that
I was performing the duty of an honourable writer who studies
the spirit of the nation and reports his findings without
any evasions. This is clear to any person who is willing to
read the article in its entirety using the whole of his
mental faculties to perceive what is written there.
...
But the main purpose of the article, and its conclusion, was
the request to the Minister to have an investigation carried
out on whether public opinion is correct or incorrect. The
article was intended to raise a lawful, urgent question.
Even though my intention was to write an article completely
within the limits of the law I shall not hide the fact that
I also tried to phrase the text in such a way as to elicit
answers from the parties concerned. The question, of course,
was about the truthfulness of the menacing public opinion.
If this was incorrect the police authorities (which alone
may possess comprehensive knowledge of these matters) could
be expected to react in the composed, confident and calm
manner of respectable, honest souls. The Board of the Police
Association and the Chief of Police would simply have
recommended to the Minister that he initiate at the earliest
opportunity an impartial investigation of the matter
asked for. Such a reaction would also have calmed the public
considerably, as it would have borne witness to good faith."
34. On 16 June 1986 PG pronounced his judgment in which he found
inter alia:
(translation)
"It (is) maintained that the prosecution authority did not
make an appearance in court every time, and 'failed to
submit a brief in the Criminal Court in support of the
indictment'. The prosecution authority thus allegedly broke
off 'prosecuting its case', and therefore 'the case should
be terminated or acquittal granted for that reason alone'.
In this context it is also stated in the defence:
'This also has the effect that preconditions for a defence
counsel's work are lacking. After evidence has been
collected in criminal court he lacks knowledge of the
arguments the prosecution may employ when the case is
submitted for adjudication. Thus the conditions as regards
the substance of the defence's arguments are uncertain, and
answers to arguments of which the defence may have very
limited knowledge are not justified or merited. The case
should be dismissed from court on these grounds alone'.
The view that the case should be dismissed or the defendant
acquitted as it is not being pursued by the prosecution
authority cannot be sustained since it cannot be seen to be
subject to prosecution and defence according to Sections
131-136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The defence also maintains that in writing the two articles
the defendant was performing an author's duty to society by
drawing attention to physical injuries to people caused by
the police, bringing such matters to light and requesting
official action to prevent them. Such indications command
little attention unless published in the media, and even
that frequently goes unnoticed. Strong words and stylistic
artifices also seem necessary, as authors very well know.
The defendant has been an author by profession for many
years, and public authorities have acknowledged his work,
i.a., by the payment of salaries. He has conducted his work
under the protection of Article 72 of the Constitution,
which provides that censorship and other limitations of
freedom of the press may never be enacted.
In fact the constitutional provision quoted also provides
that a person may be held responsible for printed
statements, a principle which never has been disputed in
Icelandic law. There are in statute law various provisions
that make punishable the expression in print of certain
thoughts, or the making in public of certain statements,
e.g., in print. Aside from Section 108 of the General Penal
Code a reference may be made in this regard to Sections 88,
95, 121, 125, 210 and 229, and Sections 233.a to 237 of the
same Code. The defendant cannot be deemed to enjoy any
privileges or a greater freedom of expression than others
owing to his profession as author.
The defendant's newspaper articles were published in his
name, and he has acknowledged having been their author. The
defendant was domiciled in Iceland when the articles were
published in the Morgunbladid. According to Section 15 of
the Law regarding the Right of Publication, no. 57/1956,
he therefore carries criminal liability and liability for
damages on account of the contents of the articles.
In the indictment the statements on account of which the
charges are made are considered to be directed against
unnamed and undesignated members of the Reykjavík police
force.
Notwithstanding that Section 108 of the General Penal Code
covers, as its text is phrased, offences against a specific
person among public servants, it also covers offences
against a definite group of public servants, cf., the
Supreme Court judgment mentioned in the Supreme Court
Reports vol. LIV p. 57.
The words 'uniformed beasts' and 'of those uniformed beasts'
are, in the context in which they are published, held to be
vituperation and insult to unnamed and undesignated members
of the Reykjavík police force. These statements are
punishable according to Section 108 of the General Penal
Code.
In the indictment these statements are considered defamatory
allegations. Having regard to Section 118 para. 3 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, no. 74/1974, the defendant can
nevertheless be held responsible for their publication, as
his action is in other respects correctly described and his
defence cannot be held to have been prejudiced for this
reason.
The passages 'The boy's room-mates ... Reykjavík
night-squad' and 'Then I found out ... simple lies any more'
and the words 'the victims of the police brutes' are, both
alone and in their contexts in the defendant's newspaper
article in question, deemed to constitute allegations
against unnamed and undesignated members of the Reykjavík
police force of many and serious acts of physical assault
against persons who thus became disabled. This falls under
Section 218, cf. Section 138, of the General Penal Code,
a violation of which may bring a penalty of many years in
prison.
The defendant's allegation has not been justified, and by
the publication of these statements in the article he is
liable to punishment according to Section 108 of the
General Penal Code.
The statements 'with the uniformed beasts' and 'police
brutes' must also be deemed to be insults and vituperation
directed against unnamed and undesignated members of the
Reykjavík police force.
In the indictment these statements are considered a
defamatory allegation, but according to the provisions
referred to above the defendant can nevertheless be held
responsible for them according to Section 108 of the General
Penal Code.
The words 'allowing brutes and sadists to practise their
perverted mentality' are in their context in the said
article held to be vituperation and insults to unnamed and
undesignated members of the Reykjavík police force.
In the indictment they are considered a defamatory
allegation, but according to the provisions referred to
above the defendant can nevertheless be held responsible for
them according to Section 108 of the General Penal Code.
The passage 'Their behaviour* was so typical of our police
force in defence: bullish falsifications, illegal actions,
superstition, hasted stupidity' has not been justified. With
the exception of the words 'superstition, hasted stupidity'
the passage is considered to involve an allegation against
unnamed and undesignated members of the Reykjavík police in
respect of falsifications and other unspecified criminal
offences. This falls under the provisions of Chapters XIV
and XVII of the General Penal Code, a violation of which may
bring heavy prison sentences.
___________
* The applicant's article reads: Captain Bjarnason's behaviour ...
(see para. 21(15) above)
___________
By making these statements the defendant has become liable to
punishment according to Section 108 of the General Penal
Code.
The words 'superstition, hasted stupidity' are, on the other
hand, considered to be within the limits of permissible
criticism, and the defendant is therefore not liable for
them under the indictment."
35. The applicant was sentenced to pay a fine of 10,000 Icelandic
crowns to the State Treasury, alternatively to be detained for eight
days if the fine had not been paid within four weeks from the service
of the judgment. The applicant was, furthermore, ordered to pay all
costs of the case, including fees to his defence counsel.
36. The applicant was present when the District Court judgment was
pronounced and immediately declared that he appealed against the
judgment to the Supreme Court of Iceland. The public prosecutor also
appealed against the judgment.
37. The applicant's case was heard in the Supreme Court on 22
September 1987. His court appointed counsel requested the annulment
of the District Court judgment as well as the entire procedure as from
the issuance of the indictment, and that the case be referred back to
the District Court for renewed adjudication. In the alternative he
requested acquittal of all charges.
38. In its judgment of 20 October 1987, the Supreme Court stated
inter alia:
(translation)
"... the claim of annulment is based on the same points
as were presented to the Criminal Court on 24 September 1985,
and the defendant's lawyer at that time had formulated the
following note:
'The defendant's lawyer refers to the fact that no
representative of the prosecution was present at the trial
or at any former sessions in this case. He also refers to
the statements of the judge that the defendant's indication
of the bill of indictment being a violation of Section 4 of
the Law on Copyright No. 73/1972, had not been presented to
the public prosecutor. Referring to para. 1 of Section 20 of
the Law 74/1974 and No. 1 of para. 1 of Section 36, the
defendant considers the fact of one person performing the
roles of both judge and prosecutor in the same case to be
unlawful. Considering the lack of initiative to modify this
state of affairs, the replacement of the judge of this case
is required'.
The Criminal Court judge rejected this request in a decision
against which the public prosecutor did not authorise a
summary appeal to the Supreme Court ... No evidence has
been produced in the proceedings of this case, which is
categorised as a legally non-prosecuted case in accordance
with Section 130 of the aforementioned law, that can justify
a disqualification of the judge or the annulment of the
judgment appealed against.
The Criminal Court's decision on the defendant's guilt
and its application of the penal law has to be confirmed.
The penalty imposed by the Criminal Court is to be
confirmed. The Criminal Court decision on the costs of the
case shall remain unaltered."
39. In a dissenting opinion one member of the Supreme Court stated
as follows:
(translation)
"In a criminal action on account of defamatory statements a
clear and definite circumscription of those to whom the
statements are considered damaging is necessary. This is
required both for the defence of the accused and for
resolving the difficult question of what limitations have to
be placed in this regard on a discussion of matters of
public concern.
The indictment in this case mentions in its introduction that
the action is brought 'on account of defamatory allegations
against policemen' and it is stated in its section III that
the defamatory allegations in question are directed 'against
unnamed and undesignated members of the Reykjavík police
force'. The indictment must thus be understood as relating to
an offence directed against policemen in Reykjavík generally.
While agreeing that the statements quoted in the indictment
are harsh and have, as such, not been justified, I consider,
by reference to the foundation laid by the indictment
according to the above, that conditions for imposing penalties
by reason of a violation of Section 108 of the General Penal
Code, which is to be construed in the light of the fundamental
principle of Icelandic constitutional law relating to freedom
of expression in speech and writing, are not fulfilled.
According to the above I consider that the defendant should be
acquitted of the charges of the prosecution authority, and
that all costs of the case in the District Court as well as in
the Supreme Court should be paid by the State Treasury, including
the fees of the defendant's appointed counsel before the Supreme
Court."
B. Relevant domestic legislation
40. Article 72 of the Icelandic Constitution no. 33, of 17 June
1944, states the following:
(translation)
"Every person has the right of expressing his thoughts in
print. However, he may be held responsible for them in court.
Censorship or other limitations of the freedom of the press
may never be imposed."
41. Apart from certain general legal provisions on defamation a
special provision on the matter is found in Chapter XII, Section 108
of the Penal Code which reads as follows:
(translation)
"Whoever vituperates or otherwise insults a public servant in
words or actions or makes defamatory allegations against or
about him when discharging his duty, or on account of the
discharge of his duty, shall be fined, confined or imprisoned
for up to three years. An allegation, even if proven, brings fines
if brought forth in an impudent manner."
42. The Icelandic Constitution contains no provisions on the legal
position of an accused person or on the procedure in criminal
litigation against him, which can be deemed relevant to the
applicant's case.
43. The law on criminal procedure relevant for the present case is
the Code of Criminal Procedure, Law no. 74 of 21 August 1974 (CCP).
According to Section 20 of the CCP authority of prosecution is vested
in the public prosecutor. He is assisted by the assistant public
prosecutor, by prosecutors and by his deputies who are all subject to
the public prosecutor's orders. According to Section 21 of the CCP
the public prosecutor determines how the investigation in criminal
cases is to be conducted and directs and supervises it. He brings
criminal action, decides on the appeal of criminal cases and
represents the prosecution in court as the CCP further provides.
44. Provisions on the filing of a criminal case and its prosecution
in the District Court are found in Chapters XIV and XV of the CCP
(Sections 112 to 138). According to Section 115 the public prosecutor
brings criminal action by an indictment in writing, specifying against
whom and in what court of law the case will be filed, what the alleged
offence is and what claims are made by the prosecution. The
indictment is sent to the court in question, with the case documents,
and the person in charge, in Reykjavík the Chief Judge of the Criminal
Court of Reykjavík, assigns the case to a certain judge who writes on
the indictment a statement specifying when the action will be brought.
The indictment is then served on the defendant. According to Sections
121 and 122 of the CCP the judge exhibits the indictment and other
documents when the case is filed and makes them available to the
defendant. If the defendant at this stage admits having committed the
alleged offence the case will be adjudged there and then. If not, the
defendant is to be afforded the opportunity to bring forth evidence
and to present a defence, in writing or orally, with the assistance of
counsel as the case may be.
45. The part played by the public prosecutor in the procedure in
other respects, when the defendant does not confess to the alleged
offence, is determined by Section 130 of the CCP which states that a
case is subject to prosecution and defence, i.e. with the attendance of
the prosecuting authority in court, if the punishment of the offence
may exceed eight years' imprisonment, if issues of law or fact justify
such procedure and punishment of the offence may exceed five years'
imprisonment, if the case involves exceptionally important issues, or
if its conclusion otherwise is of great public significance. If a case
is not subject to prosecution and defence according to these rules the
procedure is governed by Sections 123 to 129 of the CCP. The defendant's
case is then presented before the judge, and the prosecuting authority
does not make an appearance in court, unless the public prosecutor so
decides. If the prosecution does not make an appearance its interests
are not actively protected.
46. According to Chapter X, Section 75 of the CCP the judge shall
on his own accord and independently investigate all facts of the case,
irrespective of whether the police has investigated them and submitted
reports on them previously, and irrespective of whether or not they
relate to the defendant's guilt or innocence, or to mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. When this investigation has been completed
and when evidence collected by the defendant or his counsel has been
submitted, with a defence in writing, the District Court judge
adjudges the case on the basis of the available documents and the
claims made by the prosecuting authority and the defendant.
47. Section 177 of the CCP provides that when judgment in a
criminal case has been rendered the defendant shall be asked, when the
judgment is served, whether he appeals against the judgment to the
Supreme Court of Iceland. Criminal cases which have been appealed must
always be prosecuted and defended orally before the Supreme Court, even
if the provisions described above did not require the public prosecutor
to make an appearance in the District Court. The Supreme Court thus
adjudges issues of fact and law as well as the question of sanctions as
the appeal may require. Before the Supreme Court a motion may also be
made for voidance of the District Court procedure in its entirety or of
the judgment only, and thus the case would be subject to renewed
proceedings in the lower instance, partially or totally.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaints declared admissible
48. The Commission has declared admissible
a) the complaint concerning the absence of the public prosecutor
during the applicant's trial, and
b) the complaint concerning the interference with the applicant's
freedom of expression.
B. Points at issue
49. In the present case the Commission is called upon to consider
- whether or not the applicant received a fair trial by an
impartial tribunal as secured by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention despite the absence of the public prosecutor at certain
court sessions during the applicant's trial, and
- whether or not the applicant's conviction and sentence for
defamation of character constituted a violation of his right to
freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
C. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
50. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, insofar
as relevant to the present case, as follows:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing ... by an ...
impartial tribunal ..."
51. As regards the absence of the public prosecutor during the
trial the Commission recalls (para. 45 above) that the part played by
him in the criminal proceedings is governed by Sections 123-130 of the
CCP.
52. According to Section 130 of the CCP the attendance of the
prosecutor is required if the punishment of the offence may exceed
eight years' imprisonment, if issues of law or fact justify such
procedure and punishment of the offence may exceed five years'
imprisonment, if the case involves exceptionally important issues, or
if its conclusion otherwise is of great public significance. If a case
is not subject to prosecution and defence according to these rules the
procedure is governed by Sections 123 to 129 of the CCP. The
defendant's case is then presented before the judge, and the
prosecuting authority does not make an appearance in court, unless the
public prosecutor so decides. If the prosecution does not make an
appearance its interests are not actively protected.
53. According to Chapter X, Section 75 of the CCP the judge shall
on his own accord and independently investigate all facts of the case,
irrespective of whether the police has investigated them and submitted
reports on them previously, and irrespective of whether or not they
relate to the defendant's guilt or innocence, or to mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. When this investigation has been completed
and when evidence collected by the defendant or his counsel has been
submitted, with a defence in writing, the District Court judge
adjudges the case on the basis of the available documents and the
claims made by the prosecuting authority and the defendant.
54. The Government maintain that the role of the judge is to seek
the truth with equal emphasis on factors relating to guilt and
innocence and in doing so the judge favours neither of the parties.
His role is the same regardless of whether the prosecutor makes an
appearance or not, and the only result of the prosecutor's absence is
that he loses the opportunity to explain his case further than he did
in the indictment. The principle remains, the Government submit, that
the prosecutor must prove the defendant's guilt and if the evidence
produced in court is insufficient to provide such proof an acquittal
will be the result irrespective of whether the prosecutor might have
been able to obtain a different result by appearing in court. The
Government furthermore point out that none of the criteria of a fair
trial, such as for example the right to be heard, to submit evidence
or equality of arms, were disregarded to the detriment of the
applicant.
55. The applicant contends that in practice the Icelandic judge
takes over the task of the prosecutor in cases which do not fall under
Section 130 of the CCP. The wording of Section 75 of the CCP clearly
supports this view which is maintained by a number of District Court
judges who have brought the matter to the attention of the Minister of
Justice with a view to obtaining a change in the present legislation.
In the present case it is undisputed that the prosecutor was absent
during a number of court sessions and the judge necessarily took over
his functions in order to proceed with the case. Such a dual role of
the judge, however, runs counter to the established case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights, such as reflected for example in the
Piersack case (judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A no. 53) and the De
Cubber case (judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86).
56. The Commission finds that a system whereby the prosecutor may
be absent during a trial raises the following two issues: was the
case heard by an impartial tribunal and did the accused get a fair
trial? The Commission recalls, however, that its task is not to review
the relevant domestic law and practice in abstracto, but to determine
whether the manner in which they were applied to or affected the
applicant gave rise to a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt judgment of 24
May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, para. 45).
57. As regards the first point the Commission recalls that the
existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) must be determined according to a subjective test, that is
on the basis of the personal conviction of a particular judge in a
given case, and also according to an objective test, that is
ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see, for example, the
above-mentioned De Cubber judgment, pp. 13-14, para. 24).
58. As to the subjective test the Commission has already found in
its decision on admissibility that no evidence has been adduced which
could raise any doubts on this point. There thus remains the
application of the objective test.
59. Under the objective test, it must be determined whether there
are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to the impartiality
of the judge. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain
importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a
democratic society must inspire in the public and above all, as far as
criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused. Accordingly, any
judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack
of impartiality must withdraw. This implies that in deciding whether
in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular
judge lacks impartiality, the opinion of the accused is important
but not decisive (see the above-mentioned Piersack judgment, p. 16,
para. 31). What is decisive is whether this fear can be held
objectively justified.
60. In the present case the Commission recalls that the case was
dealt with by the District Court of Reykjavik on twelve occasions between
10 September 1985 and 16 June 1986 (10, 17, 24 and 25 September 1985,
9 and 25 October 1985, 15 November 1985, 31 January 1986, 17 February
1986, 28 April 1986 as well as 3 and 16 June 1986). The public
prosecutor was absent on seven occasions (10, 17, 24 and 25 September
1985, 17 February 1986 as well as 3 and 16 June 1986). The fear of
lack of impartiality was based on this absence, a fear which may be
understandable but not necessarily objectively justified. Whether this
is the case depends on the circumstances of the particular case (cf.
the above-mentioned Hauschildt judgment, p. 21, para. 49).
61. From the court transcripts of this particular case it follows
that neither of the parties were present on 10 September 1985 when the
Court merely, at the applicant's request, adjourned the case. On 17
September 1985 counsel was appointed, the documents of the case were
handed over to the applicant and the content of the indictment was
discussed. The Commission notes that this session was merely of a
preparatory character. The applicant was asked to indicate in general
his position in regard to the charge brought against him and the
hearing was then adjourned in order to give the applicant the
opportunity to acquaint himself with the file and to prepare his
defence. The conduct of the proceedings at that session could
therefore give no objective ground for fearing that the Court lacked
impartiality.
62. Neither did the prosecutor's absence affect the impartiality
of the Court during its sessions on 24 and 25 September 1985 as these
sessions only concerned procedural matters unrelated to the merits of
the case.
63. From 9 October 1985 to 28 April 1986 evidence was presented in
Court and witnesses heard. The Commission notes that the prosecutor
was present during every court session save one - 17 February 1986 -
when the Court saw a video taped television programme. The
Commission does not find that this could give rise to any objective
fear of partiality.
64. Furthermore the Commission recalls that the parties agreed on
28 April 1986 that additional investigation in court was not required
and no further substantive court sessions were actually held. On
3 June 1986 the applicant merely submitted his written defence and on
16 June 1986 judgment was pronounced. The prosecutor's absence on the
last two occasions cannot in the Commission's view be considered to
have created any legitimate doubts about the judge's impartiality.
65. Accordingly, having regard to the circumstances of the
present case the Commission finds that the applicant's trial was
heard by an impartial tribunal. Moreover, nothing has emerged during
the Commission's examination of this case which could otherwise give
rise to any misgivings as regards the fairness of the applicant's
trial in this respect. No violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
of the Convention has accordingly been established.
Conclusion
66. The Commission concludes, by a unanimous vote, that there has
been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
D. Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention
67. Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibiities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
68. It is not disputed in the present case that there was an
interference by a public authority with the exercise of the
applicant's freedom of expression. This interference resulted from the
applicant's conviction and sentence for defamation of character by the
District Court of Reykjavík on 16 June 1986, a conviction and sentence
which were upheld by the Supreme Court of Iceland on 20 October 1987.
Such interference contravenes the Convention if it does not satisfy
the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 10 (Art. 10). The
Commission must accordingly examine whether the interference was
"prescribed by law", had an aim that was legitimate under that
paragraph and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the
aforesaid aim (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Lingens judgment of 8 July 1986,
Series A no. 103).
69. As regards the two first points the Commission finds that the
applicant's conviction and sentence were prescribed by law in that
they were based on Section 108 of the Icelandic Penal Code. The
restriction moreover pursued a legitimate aim covered by Article 10
para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention, namely, the protection of the
reputation of others. What remains to be examined is accordingly the
question whether the restriction complained of was necessary in a
democratic society as required by Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2).
70. The adjective "necessary", within the meaning of Article 10
para. 2 (Art. 10-2), implies the existence of a "pressing social
need". The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation
in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with
a European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the
decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court (cf.
above-mentioned Lingens judgment, p. 25, para. 39).
71. Accordingly, while it is not the task of the Commission to
pronounce itself on an interpretation of domestic legislation as
adopted by the domestic courts or otherwise to take the place of the
competent national courts, it is called upon to review under Article
10 (Art. 10) of the Convention the decisions they delivered (cf.
notably Eur. Court H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series
A no. 24 and Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30).
72. The Commission recalls, as the European Court of Human Rights
has underlined, that in exercising their supervisory functions the
Convention organs must pay particular attention to the principles
characterising a "democratic society" and the fundamental role which
freedom of expression plays in such a society. In the above-mentioned
Handyside judgment, the Court stated as follows:
"Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions
for its progress and for the development of every man.
Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (Art. 10-2), it is applicable not
only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'"
(p. 23, para. 49).
73. As Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention, in
formulating the exceptions where interferences with the right to
freedom of expression are justified, refers to necessity in a
democratic society it is essential, in order to permit the citizen to
keep a critical control of the exercise of public power, that
particularly strict limits be imposed on interferences with the
publication of opinions which refer to activities of public
authorities.
74. In order to assess, in the light of these principles, whether
there existed such a pressing social need as to justify the
interference with the applicant's freedom of expression the Commission
must look at the prohibited statements in their proper context and in
the light of the particular circumstances of the case.
75. The applicant contends that freedom of expression is both an
individual right to be respected and a contribution to the right of
the public to receive information and ideas. Free access to opinions
and knowledge - especially offending opinions and hidden knowledge -
is a necessary condition for democracy. If freedom of expression
should prevail Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention should be construed
broadly.
76. Writing the article "Let us consider now" as an open letter to
the Minister of Justice, so the applicant submits, was his
professional duty, having personally experienced unjustified police
brutality and having found, after studying a number of similar cases,
that this was a rapidly increasing problem within the Reykjavík police
force. The strong wording of the article was in the applicant's
opinion justified and no individual was singled out, nor was the
police force in general defamed as this would have been contrary to
the applicant's own opinion.
77. The present case should be viewed, according to the applicant,
as an illustration of the fact that respect for freedom of expression
is a fundamental condition of a democratic society, whereas lacking
respect for that freedom would easily have very undesirable effects.
78. The Government maintain that the topic discussed in the
applicant's articles could not be included in the category of
political discussion or debate but they accept that the articles
concerned a matter of general public concern. The proportionality of
the case implies that the interest of the Icelandic Government in
protecting the reputation of their policemen has to be weighed against
the value of an open discussion. While such a discussion is natural,
it is indispensable that it does not degenerate into unreasonable
attacks.
79. The Government accept that the actions of civil servants
should be open to criticism and their work subjected to scrutiny and
open debate, but as the State prevents them from resorting to means of
reaction, the State should not allow public accusations of criminal
conduct lacking any legitimate cause, and this is indeed the purpose
of Section 108 of the Penal Code.
80. Finally, the Government contend that the general right to
criticise the conduct of civil servants and to take part in the public
discussion was in no way limited and the applicant was not convicted
for having discussed these matters. The conviction was based on
specific allegations of unacceptable conduct and serious crimes
committed by policemen which, if true, would have made them liable to
heavy penalties. The interference accordingly did not aim at
restricting the applicant's right under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the
Convention any more than may be deemed necessary, having regard to the
Contracting State's margin of appreciation.
81. The Commission recalls that the articles in question were
related to allegations concerning police brutality in Reykjavík and
were actually based on a recent incident in which a journalist had
been ill-treated by the police. This incident had resulted in a
criminal conviction of the policemen involved. Other allegations of
police brutality had been made in the previous years, although they
had not resulted in any charges against the policemen involved. In his
articles, the applicant not only drew the public's attention to a
problem of general interest but also pointed out that the present
system of investigation regarding alleged police brutality was
ineffective and should be replaced by a more effective system. The
factual elements upon which the applicant based his strong criticism
of the prevailing situation may in some respects be uncorroborated,
but on the other hand it has not been shown that the events described
in the newspaper articles, including the striking story of the
applicant's experiences at the Communal Hospital, were altogether
untrue and merely invented for the purpose of providing arguments for
a campaign against the police.
82. In such circumstances, the Commission finds that the
applicant's articles concerned a matter of great public concern and
that they had a serious aim, i.e. to promote a new system of
investigating accusations against the police. Having regard to the
general principles set out above, it follows that any interference
with statements of this kind should be subject to particularly strict
limits in order not to discourage the public from keeping critical
control of the exercise of public power.
83. The Commission furthermore recalls that the applicant did not
mention any names of policemen whom he considered to be guilty of
police brutality, nor did he provide other information making it
possible to identify any individual policemen alleged to have
committed such acts. The articles could not, therefore, be regarded
as an attack on any specified policemen. The general interest in
allowing a public debate, even where this involves the use of
offending or shocking words, weighs in such circumstances more heavily
than the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others. In
other words, the Commission has not found that a pressing social need
required a limitation of the applicant's fundamental right secured to
him under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
84. For these reasons the Commission does not find that the
interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression can
be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society". There has
accordingly been a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10).
Conclusion
85. The Commisison concludes, by thirteen votes to one, that there
has been a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
E. Recapitulation
86. The Commission concludes, by a unanimous vote, that there has
been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
(para. 66).
87. The Commission concludes, by thirteen votes to one, that there
has been a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention (para. 85).
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (S. TRECHSEL)
Dissenting opinion of Sir Basil Hall
With regret and with hesitation, I differ from the majority of
the Commission in their conclusion that there has been a violation of
Article 10 in this case.
The Commission's Report states that the general interest in
allowing a public debate, even where this involves the use of
offending or shocking words, weighs more heavily than the legitimate
aim of protecting the reputation of others.
I entirely accept that, in order to stimulate a debate over
matters of public interest, vigorous wording in a newspaper article
may be required, but there are limits to the language that can
properly be used, and there is justification in controlling the making
of unsubstantiated allegations. States have a margin of appreciation
in assessing what is necessary in a democratic society and, though I
might well have reached a different conclusion from that reached by
the Courts of Iceland, I cannot say that their decision went beyond
what was permissible within that margin.
I conclude that there was no violation of Article 10 in this
case.
APPENDIX III
HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
______________________________________________________________________
19 November 1987 Introduction of the application
19 April 1988 Registration of the application
Examination of admissibility
10 March 1989 Commission's decision to invite
the Government to submit
observations on the admissibility
and merits of the application
26 June 1989 Submission of the Government's
observations
21 August 1989 Submission of the applicant's
observations
4 October 1989 Commission's decision to hold an
oral hearing on the admissibility
and merits of the application
14 March 1990 Hearing on admissibility and
merits. The parties were represented
as follows:
The applicant: Mr. Gunnarsson
The Government MM. Geirsson
Claessen
14 March 1990 Commission's decision to declare the
application partly admissible, partly
inadmissible
Examination of the merits
15 May 1990 Submission of the applicant's
observations on the merits
28 June 1990 Submission of further evidence
by the Government
7 July 1990 Consideration of the state of
proceedings
6 December 1990 Commission's deliberations on the
merits and final votes
11 December 1990 Adoption of the Report
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