COLMAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 16632/90 • ECHR ID: 001-45559
Document date: October 19, 1992
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Application No. 16632/90
Richard COLMAN
against
the UNITED KINGDOM
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
adopted on 19 October 1992
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1 - 12). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 - 2
A. The Application
(paras. 2 - 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
B. The Proceedings
(paras. 5 - 7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
C. The Present Report
(paras. 8 - 12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 13 - 29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 11
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 13-26). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 - 8
B. Relevant Domestic Law and Practice
(paras. 27-29). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 11
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 30 - 51) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 - 16
A. Complaints declared admissible
(para. 30). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Points at issue
(para. 31). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. As regards Article 10 of the Convention
(paras. 32 - 41). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 - 14
D. As regards Article 13 of the Convention
(paras. 42 - 49). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 - 15
E. Recapitulation
(para. 50 - 51) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Opinion dissidente de M. F. MARTINEZ, rejoint par
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, E. BUSUTTIL, A. WEITZEL, C.L. ROZAKIS
et L.L. LOUCAIDES pour sa deuxième partie . . . . . . .17 - 19
Dissenting opinion of Mr. F. ERMACORA . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Dissenting opinion of Mrs. G.H. THUNE . . . . . . . . . . . 21
APPENDIX I : HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . 22
APPENDIX II : DECISION ON ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . .23 - 30
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The Application
2. The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom born in 1949 and
resident in York. He is a doctor in private general practice with a
particular interest in the holistic approach to health care. He was
represented before the Commission by Messrs. Bindman and Partners,
Solicitors, London.
3. The application is directed against the United Kingdom. The
respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mrs. A. Glover,
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
4. The case concerns restrictions placed on the applicant by his
professional body, the General Medical Council, relating to the
advertising of his medical practice. It raises issues under
Articles 10 and 13 of the Convention.
B. The Proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 11 May 1990 and registered on
30 May 1990. After a preliminary examination of the case by the
Rapporteur, the Commission considered the admissibility of the
application on 7 September 1990. It decided to give notice of the
application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to
submit written observations on its admissibility and merits. The
Government's observations were submitted, after an extension of the
time-limit, on 21 December 1990, to which the applicant replied on
12 February 1991.
6. On 5 September 1991 the Commission declared the application
admissible. The text of the decision on admissibility was sent to the
parties on 30 September 1991 and they were invited to submit such
further evidence or additional observations as they wished. No further
observations were submitted by the parties.
7. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed
itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a
friendly settlement. In the light of the parties' reaction, the
Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement
can be effected.
C. The Present Report
8. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention and after
deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being
present:
MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H. G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C. L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M. P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
9. The text of this Report was adopted on 19 October 1992 and is now
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in
accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
10. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the
Convention is:
i) to establish the facts, and
ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose
a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under
the Convention.
11. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the
Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's
decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.
12. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the
Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case
13. The applicant has been a registered medical practitioner since
1975. When working in the National Health Service (N.H.S.) his
experience led him to hold opinions which accord with the "holistic"
approach to health care. This involves not just treating patients, but
trying to help them to explore the cause of their problems and to take
more responsibility for their remedy.
14. In 1985 he established a practice in York named the "Holistic
Counselling and Education Centre". He took various measures to make
available the information that this practice had been established, and
to attract patients, namely:
(a) In August 1985 writing to 140 general practitioners in and
about York.
(b) In August 1985 leaving his business card and a letter of
explanation with the Family Practitioners Committee, the
Citizen's Advice Bureau, and the Central Library in York.
(c) In May 1986 supplementing the information in (b) above
with a practice information sheet.
(d) Attempting to place an entry in the "Yellow Pages"
telephone directory identifying himself as a private practitioner
(British Telecom refused, their policy being not to make a
distinction between private and N.H.S. practitioners).
(e) In September 1985 being interviewed by the press, which
resulted in a rebuke from the chairman of the Local Medical
Committee.
(f) In November 1985 requesting the chairman of the Local
Medical Committee to circulate to local practitioners
information about his practice, to which he received no reply.
(g) Thereafter making other fruitless efforts to publicise
information, in particular by proposing, without success,
to give talks.
15. He then considered the insertion of advertisements in local
newspapers. Recognising that this did not appear to accord with the
Guidance issued by the General Medical Council (G.M.C.), he wrote on
30 March 1987 seeking its advice on the question of practice
advertising and professional ethics. He also requested it to review
the existing rules. He stated that he would like to advertise in the
press, under the heading "General Medical Practice (Private)", his
name, professional qualifications, the name of his Centre, its address,
telephone number, the words "For information, Advice, Private Medical
Care" and directions to telephone for a practice information sheet.
The G.M.C. is the governing body of the medical profession.
16. On 18 May 1987 the applicant was informed by the G.M.C. that it
declined to review its recently amended guidance and that to advertise
in the local press could lead to disciplinary action against him for
the improper promotion of his practice. However he was also informed
that he could make available at public libraries and other information
centres details about his practice, alongside that given by other
doctors in the area.
17. The press limitation on doctors' advertising did not extend, for
example, to private hospitals, over which the G.M.C. has no control.
Private clinics were thus entitled widely to publicise their services.
Virtually all other professions in the United Kingdom, including
dentists, had lifted such advertising restrictions on their members.
18. On 10 August 1987 the applicant applied by way of judicial review
for a declaration that the G.M.C.'s decision and policy on the
dissemination of information by doctors was unlawful on the grounds,
inter alia, that it was disproportionate for the following reasons:
a) it went much further than was required to secure the
legitimate protection of medical practitioners and
patients, and
b) it was unlawful because, inter alia, it was a restraint
on the applicant's freedom of expression contrary to
Article 10 of the Convention.
19. In November 1987 the Secretaries of State for Social Services,
Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland presented to Parliament a White
Paper proposing a loosening of the remaining restraints on doctors'
rights to advertise their services.
20. On 25 November 1988 the Divisional Court rejected the applicant's
application, awarding costs against him. It held that the G.M.C. had
exercised its discretion reasonably. It noted, inter alia, that the
extent to which doctors should be permitted to advertise their services
was a sensitive issue, about which there was professional and social
controversy, and on which the courts should not intervene so as to
substitute their view for that of the G.M.C., the professional body
concerned. To allow advertising might be harmful to patients and their
families who may be vulnerable when they are ill. Advertisements could
be misleading, the best and wealthiest advertisers not necessarily
being the best doctors. The fact that the G.M.C. cannot control the
advertisements of private clinics and hospitals, as it has no
disciplinary jurisdiction over them, cannot of itself make the G.M.C.'s
conduct irrational. Nor was it irrational if the G.M.C., adhering at
that stage to what it regarded as sound and well-tried values for the
medical profession, was somewhat out of step with most other
professions and several overseas medical professions, with the notable
exceptions of Canada, Belgium, France, Greece and the Netherlands at
the material time. It did not consider that the press advertising
restriction was an undue restraint of trade, as such considerations (if
relevant at all) should not be applied with the same rigour to a
profession, where its standards of professional conduct and ethics are
in question, as they would to the normal business world.
21. On the question of the applicability of Article 10 of the
Convention the Divisional Court held as follows:
"Assuming that Article 10 protects an individual's right to
communicate professional and commercial information and that the
G.M.C.'s guidance interferes with that right, the question arises
whether, under the European Convention on Human Rights and
English law, the G.M.C. has to show that that interference was
necessary, that is whether there was a pressing social need for
it. See the majority judgment in the 'Sunday Times' case, ECHR
judgment of October 27, 1978, series A, no. 30, (1979) EHRR 245;
Lingens v. Austria, (1986) 8 EHRR 407, and the Barthold case,
ECHR judgment of March 25, 1985, series A, no. 90.
However, it is by no means clear that the ECHR jurisprudence
would go so far as to require a professional body like the G.M.C.
to demonstrate a pressing social need for its guidance against
advertising in order to justify it as a protection of health or
morals or for the protection of the rights of other doctors and
patients under Article 10 (2). The European Court of Human
Rights said in paragraph 59 of its majority judgment in the
Barthold case that the initial responsibility for securing
compliance with the Convention lies with the individual
Contracting States, and that Article 10 (2) leaves each of them
with a margin of discretion, albeit not an unlimited margin.
The extent to which that discretion is considered by the European
Court of Human Rights to be limited is illustrated in its
decision in that case. It involved a challenge by a veterinary
surgeon of a decision of a German court that he had broken a rule
of professional conduct prohibiting advertising. The nature of
his infringement had not been direct commercial advertising, as
proposed by Dr. Colman, but his involvement in the inclusion of
his name and details of his practice in a press article written
by a journalist. In concluding that the rule infringed
Article 10, the court, by a majority, clearly took the view that
the advertising element in the article was secondary to the
principal purpose of the article, which was to deal with a matter
of public interest, the problem of a night veterinary service in
Hamburg. The court's prime concern was to prevent the
application of a restriction which risked, in the words of the
judgment:
'...discouraging members of the liberal professions from
contributing to public debate on topics affecting the life
of the community if ever there is the slightest likelihood
of their utterances being treated as entailing, to some
degree, an advertising effect ...'
and which would
'hamper the press in the performance of its task of
purveyor of information and public watchdog.'
See paragraph 58 of the majority judgment.
Thus, the court did not decide that commercial or professional
advertising was protected by Article 10. The concurring judgment
of Judge Pettiti (at pages 31-32 of the report) lamenting that
the court had not gone on to consider that issue merely
underlines the difficulty for this court in looking to the
Barthold case for guidance ...
...(The) proper approach here ... is for the applicant to
establish that the G.M.C. has in its guidance to him unreasonably
interfered with his freedom of speech so as to render that
interference unlawful. For the reasons (that have been) given,
the applicant has not established that unlawfulness either in the
form of Wednesbury unreasonableness or of unreasonableness in the
ordinary and natural meaning of that term."
22. In the meantime on 24 May 1987 the G.M.C.'s rules on doctors'
advertising were referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (the
M.M.C.). In March 1989 the M.M.C.'s report, which concluded that the
G.M.C.'s rules were not in the public interest, was presented to
Parliament. The M.M.C. recommended that the G.M.C. revise its guidance
to permit advertising by general practitioners, subject to the two
broad principles that such advertising should not be likely to bring
the profession into disrepute or be such as to abuse the trust of
patients or exploit their lack of knowledge. The contents of
advertisements should be limited to factual information and should not
be published so frequently as to cause a nuisance to potential patients
or put them under pressure. The Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry accepted the M.M.C.'s report and asked the Director General
of Fair Trading to negotiate with the G.M.C. to implement the M.M.C.'s
recommendation further to relax the restrictions on the publication of
factual information about doctors.
23. On 6 December 1989 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeal against the decision of the Divisional Court, again awarding
costs against the applicant. The Court of Appeal held that the G.M.C.
had not been unreasonable or disproportionate in the exercise of its
discretion at the time. It also rejected the applicant's arguments
under Article 10 of the Convention as follows, in the judgment of Lord
Justice Gibson:
"... it is a principle of construction of United Kingdom
statutes, now too well established to call for citation of
authority, that the words of a statute passed after the
treaty has been signed and dealing with the subject matter
of the international obligation of the United Kingdom, are
to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing
such a meaning, as intended to carry out the obligation,
and not to be inconsistent with it ...
It is not clear ... that, in this case, there is, in the
same sense, any identifiable subject matter within section
35 of the (Medical Act 1983) which can properly for this purpose
be regarded as the subject matter of any international
obligation of the United Kingdom under the Convention. In any
event, (to use that principle of construction) ... for the
purpose of construing primary legislation, where there is
ambiguity, is to do no more than to determine the meaning of the
legislation passed by Parliament. That has always been the
proper task of the court. To use that principle to justify the
reviewing by the court of the substantial validity of the action
or decision in question, which is otherwise lawful
as within the powers given, and to carry out that review
on the basis of the court's judgment as to what amounts
to 'conditions, restrictions or penalties as ... are
necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection
of health or morals ...' within Article 10 para. 2 is to
misapply it for a purpose for which it was ... plainly
not intended."
24. The Court of Appeal refused to accept the notion of
"proportionality" as a separate ground for seeking judicial review,
rather than a facet of "irrationality", which, if found, would vitiate
any administrative decision. To accept it as a separate notion would
quickly lead to courts forgetting their supervisory role and
substituting their view of what was proportionate for that of the
administrative decision-making body. It concluded as follows, in the
judgment of Lord Donaldson, MR:
"We live in a period of very rapid change in attitudes and
perception of where the balance of the public interest lies in
the context of advertising by members of professions. Only a few
years ago any form of advertising, even if only informational in
content, would have been unthinkable. Today it is widely
accepted, although still subject to some restrictions in addition
to the standards set by the British Code of Advertising Practice,
namely that advertising must be legal, decent, honest and
truthful. It is certainly a tenable view that the medical
profession has more reason than most other professions to
restrict advertising because of the special relationship of trust
between doctor and patient which lies at the heart of any
effective system of health care and because of the vulnerability
of patients suffering ill health. The problem is where the line
is to be drawn.
The General Medical Council (the G.M.C.) re-examined this
question in November 1986, only a few months before Dr Colman
sought the president's advice, and concluded that advertising by
doctors should be confined to factual information of a non-
promotional character and that it should be disseminated in ways
which would ensure that no one doctor obtained any promotional
advantage over other doctors practising in the same field of
medicine or geographical area. The expectation was that this
would be achieved by all doctors making informational material
available at their surgeries and at local libraries and other
information centres. Dr Colman is in the same position as other
doctors in relation to his surgery, but he has come up against
an obstacle in that local libraries and information centres will
not give out information about his practice unless all other
doctors in private, as contrasted with national health service,
practice are willing for similar information to be provided about
their practices. This is a condition which cannot be met. Hence
his application for special dispensation to allow him to place
a very modest advertisement in the local press, which was refused
in May 1987.
I make no secret of the fact that I have some sympathy for
Dr Colman. There is no suggestion that he is a "quack" and,
whether rightly or wrongly, he genuinely believes that holist
medicine as practised by him provides a service to patients which
is different from and often better than, that provided by the
generality of medical practitioners. In these circumstances it
is understandable that he should feel that the public interest
requires that, the normal channels for dissemination of factual
information about his services having broken down, he should be
allowed to use some other channel. Against this has to be set
the old, but true, adage that hard cases make bad law. If the
G.M.C. authorised departure from the normal rule in Dr Colman's
case, how many other cases would also have to be treated
exceptionally, where would the line be redrawn and, indeed, could
the line be held at all?
Parliament has entrusted the resolution of these competing
considerations to the G.M.C. and not to the courts. Accordingly,
it is quite beside the point to consider whether I would have
reached the same conclusion. It is even possible that the
president of the G.M.C. might not do so today, when he has the
benefit of the recommendations of the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission report 'Services of Medical Practitioners' (Cm 582
(1989)), which must cause the G.M.C. to re-examine the guidance
contained in the Blue Book, although it need not necessarily
cause it to change its mind. However, that is beside the point
for present purposes. What matters is whether the advice given
in May 1987 was irrational. Despite the fact that the guidance
given in the Blue Book failed to prevent some of the anomalies
to which counsel for Dr Colman drew attention, for example the
'glossy' promotional advertising by private hospitals and clinics
over which the G.M.C. has little or no control, I cannot regard
the guidance contained in the Blue Book as irrational. Nor can
I so regard the decision of the president to refuse to make an
exception in the case of Dr Colman."
25. On 4 January 1990 the applicant lodged a petition with the House
of Lords for leave to appeal. It was rejected on 26 February 1990.
26. In the same month as the introduction of the application to the
Commission, in May 1990, the G.M.C. revised its advertising rules to
allow, inter alia, the publication in the press of factual information
about doctors' services.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
27. The G.M.C. is a statutory body, presently governed by the Medical
Act 1983, with powers under section 35 of that Act to assist doctors
in matters of professional conduct and discipline. It maintains a
register of medical practitioners who are entitled to practise in the
United Kingdom. It exercises disciplinary functions over registered
practitioners and may ultimately remove a practitioner from the
register for serious professional misconduct. It is thus responsible
for ensuring that standards of professional conduct are maintained.
28. In November 1986, after 15 months of consultations with many
interested and influential bodies in the medical profession and
outside, the G.M.C. had proposed new guidance, in a document called the
Blue Book, partially relaxing previous rules on advertising. While
accepting that the public should have access to information about
doctors and their services, the guidance indicated that self-promotion
or canvassing by doctors by advertising in the press or otherwise could
amount to serious professional misconduct attracting disciplinary
proceedings. The material passages in Part II of the Blue Book were
as follows:
"58. Patients are entitled to protection from misleading
promotional advertising or similarly improper competitive
activities among doctors ...
"59. Good communication between doctor and patients ... is
fundamental to the provision of good patient care, and the
ethical dissemination of relevant factual information about
doctors and their services is strongly to be encouraged.
This facilitates an informed choice by patients seeking
medical care ...
"60. The provision of information about medical services
provided by a doctor is nevertheless a sensitive matter, in
relation to which the conduct of the doctor may be
questioned either on ethical grounds or on the grounds that
it is incompatible with the principles which govern
relationships between members of a profession. The
paragraphs below outline three particular areas where such
problems may arise.
'The use of promotional material
61. The medical profession in this country has long
accepted the convention that doctors should refrain from
self-promotion, not least because the doctor who is most
successful at achieving publicity may not be the most
appropriate for a patient to consult. Furthermore, people
seeking medical attention, and their families, are often
particularly vulnerable to persuasive influence. In such
circumstances, the use of promotional advertising is not
only a breach of professional etiquette but could be a
source of danger to the public, in extreme cases raising
illusory hopes of a cure.
62. Doctors have a duty to be satisfied, if they are aware
that material about them is to be published, that it will
conform, both in its content and in the manner of its
presentation, with the standards set out in this pamphlet.
A professional offence may arise from the publication in
any form of material commending the professional
attainments or personal qualities of a particular doctor,
or improperly drawing attention to his practice, if that
doctor has either personally arranged for such publication
or has instigated, sanctioned or acquiesced in its
publication by others. The decision whether publication of
this kind of material amounts to serious professional
misconduct will take account of the motive of the doctor
concerned in arranging for or agreeing to publication, and
also of the other circumstances of each case such as:
(a) the nature, content and presentation of the material;
(b) whether the material seeks to suggest that the doctor
has particular abilities as compared with other doctors;
(c) whether the material is published in a manner likely to
attract patients to, or to promote professional advantage
or financial benefit of the doctor ...
Canvassing and other improper arrangements to extend a
doctor's practice
63 ... The distribution of advertising material to members
of the public, or advertising in the press or other media,
with the intention of attracting prospective patients to a
particular doctor or service, may be construed as
canvassing on the part of the doctor ...'"
29. Some of the same ground was covered in Part III of the Blue Book
which gave guidance on standards of professional conduct and on medical
ethics. The following guidance was given under the heading
"Self-promotion: circumstances in which difficulties most commonly
arise":
"92. Paragraphs 58-62 ... draw a distinction between the
proper provision of factual information about doctor's services,
to which no exception can be taken, and activities amounting
to self-promotion, which may raise a question of serious
professional misconduct. The following paragraphs discuss
various circumstances in which difficulties may arise if a
distinction is not carefully observed.
Notices or announcements by or about doctors
93. In order to make an informed choice of general
practitioner, prospective patients need to have ready
access to accurate, comprehensive and well-presented
information about the doctors practising in their area.
Lists of such practitioners including factual information
about the practitioners and their qualifications, the
facilities available and practice arrangements in each
case, should be distributed widely for the benefit of
members of the public, making full use of public libraries,
community health councils and other centres of local
information. Any such material should however be published
by an impartial body which stands to gain no financial
advantage. As far as is practicable, material published in
this way should provide the same items of information about
each doctor and practice and, where the material is
published by a body other than a Family Practitioner
Committee or Primary Care Division or a Health Board, every
general practitioner in the relevant area, whether
practising in the National Health Service or independently,
should be eligible for inclusion in such a list.
Notices or announcements displayed, circulated or otherwise
made public by or on behalf of a doctor in connection with
his professional practice must be confined to factual
information of a non-promotional nature... It is acceptable
for general practitioners to inform patients of their
services and practice arrangements, provided that the
material circulated makes no claim as to the quality of the
service or the doctor's personal qualities or level of
performance. Such material may be available at doctor's
surgeries, local libraries and to the information centres,
for issue individually to a doctor's existing patients or
to persons inquiring about the doctor's practice or the
services available, but should not be distributed to other
persons or be released in bulk to inquirers. Any attempt
by a doctor or his agent to use the circulation of such
material to gain an advantage over local colleagues, or to
canvass their patients may well raise a question of serious
professional misconduct ..."
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaints declared admissible
30. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints
that the G.M.C.'s policy, before May 1990, about advertising in the
medical profession, as it affected him, was in breach of Articles 10
and 13 (Art. 10, 13) of the Convention.
B. Points at issue
31. The following are the points at issue in the present
application:
- whether the advertising restrictions to which the applicant was
subject by the G.M.C. were in violation of his freedom of
expression ensured by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention;
- whether the applicant had effective remedies, pursuant to
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, under English law for his
Article 10 (Art. 10) claim.
C. As regards Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention
32. The relevant part of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention reads
as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers ..."
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, ... for the protection of health or morals, (or)
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others
..."
33. The Commission found in its decision on admissibility of
5 September 1991 that the advertising restrictions placed by the G.M.C.
upon the applicant constituted an interference with his freedom of
expression by a public authority (Appendix II p. 23 below). The
parties do not dispute that the interference was lawful and that, in
principle, it pursued legitimate aims, namely the protection of the
health of patients and the rights of others, namely other doctors. The
key question in the case is whether the interference was necessary in
a democratic society within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2
(Art. 10-2) of the Convention.
Necessary in a democratic society
34. The applicant accepts that the protection of patients from
misleading or manipulative advertising is a pressing social need which
comes within the protection of health referred to in Article 10 para. 2
(Art. 10-2). He also accepts that a certain measure of protection
should be afforded to doctors from unfair competition from their
professional colleagues, such safeguards being necessary for the
protection of the rights of others, also envisaged by Article 10
para. 2 (Art. 10-2). However, in his view, the protection afforded by
the G.M.C.'s advertising rules before May 1990 was wholly
disproportionate, imposing a blanket and indiscriminate ban on all
announcements of the kind sought by the applicant. He contends,
therefore, that the interference with his freedom of expression by the
G.M.C.'s guidance on advertising was not necessary and was in breach
of Article 10
(Art. 10) of the Convention.
35. The Government deny that the case discloses any violation of
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention and, in any event, they point
out that between November 1987 and May 1990 they consistently moved
towards, and succeeded in securing, a relaxation of the G.M.C.'s
advertising restrictions.
36. The Commission refers to the constant case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights "that the Contracting States have a certain
margin of appreciation in assessing the existence and extent of the
necessity of an interference, but this margin is subject to a European
supervision" (Eur. Court H.R., Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus
Beermann judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 165, pp. 19-20,
para. 33). The Markt Intern case concerned unfair competition in trade
matters and the Court commented that such a margin of appreciation is
all the more important in commercial matters and that the Convention
organs must confine their review "to the question whether the measures
taken on a national level are justifiable in principle and
proportionate" (ibid. p. 20, para. 33).
37. The Commission notes that in the Barthold case the Court also
implicitly recognised that some limitations on advertising for the
liberal professions, such as veterinary surgeons, may be justified to
protect the rights of other practitioners, although that was not the
real issue in the case, which concerned Mr. Barthold's professional
contribution in a newspaper interview to a matter of public interest
and which only had the secondary effect of giving publicity to his own
practice (Eur. Court H.R. , Barthold judgment of 25 March 1985,
Series A no. 90, p. 26, para. 58).
38. The Commission has regard to the particular facts of the present
case: the applicant was seeking to attract patients. His concern was
therefore one of advertisement of his professional activity, a clearly
commercial matter. There was not a blanket restriction on doctors'
advertising at the material time. He was affected only by the
prohibition on advertising in newspapers. From 1987 the matter was
under active review by the Government, the M.M.C. and subsequently the
G.M.C.. As the Court of Appeal observed in this case, the question
of advertising in the liberal professions has undergone significant
developments recently: "Only a few years ago any form of advertising,
even if only informative in content, would have been unthinkable.
Today it is widely accepted, although still subject to some
restrictions ...". Moreover, at the material time, other High
Contracting Parties to the Convention maintained similar restrictions
over such advertising (p. 4, para. 20 above. Cf. also No. 14622/89,
Hempfing v. Germany, Dec. 7.3.91, to be published in D.R. 69).
39. In the light of these considerations, and having regard to the
duties and responsibilities attaching to the freedoms guaranteed by
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, the Commission finds that it
cannot be said that the advertising policy of the G.M.C. went beyond
the margin of appreciation left to national authorities. It is obvious
that views may differ as to whether an earlier relaxation on press
advertising for the medical profession would have been appropriate.
However, the Convention organs should not substitute their own
evaluation for that of the competent medical authorities in the present
case where those authorities, on reasonable grounds, had considered the
restriction to be necessary at the material time (mutatis mutandis Eur.
Court. H.R., Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann judgment of
29 November 1989, Series A no. 165, p. 21, para. 37).
40. The Commission is therefore satisfied that the G.M.C.'s
professional guidance preventing the applicant from advertising his
private medical practice in the press was not disproportionate to the
legitimate aims of protecting patients' health, as well as the rights
of others, namely other doctors. In the Commission's opinion, this
advertising restriction upon the applicant may then be considered as
necessary under Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention.
Conclusion
41. The Commission concludes, by 11 votes to 8, that there has been
no violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
D. As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
42. Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
43. The applicant complains that he had no effective domestic remedy,
contrary to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, to test his
substantive Article 10 (Art. 10) claim. He contends that, as the
domestic courts would not have regard to the principles of Article 10
(Art. 10) of the Convention, including the jurisprudential criteria of
a pressing social need and proportionality, they had no jurisdiction
to award him compensation for the allegedly wrongful interference with
his freedom of expression. The Government refute the applicant's
submissions and contend that he has no arguable claim of a breach of
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which would warrant a remedy
under Article 13 (Art. 13).
44. In view of the Commission's above considerations relating to
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, the Commission finds that the
applicant's claim under that Article cannot be regarded as not arguable
on its merits(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of
27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52 and Soering judgment
of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, pp. 46-47, para. 117).
45. The question, therefore, remains whether English law provided the
applicant with a remedy satisfying Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention, in particular whether the application for judicial review
in the present case satisfied Article 13 (Art. 13).
46. The Commission notes that in judicial review proceedings the
domestic courts may rule the exercise of executive discretion unlawful
on the ground that it is tainted with illegality, irrationality or
procedural impropriety. The Commission has examined the analysis made
by the domestic courts of the irrationality principle in English law
during the judicial review proceedings in the applicant's case. Whilst
not accepting "proportionality" as a separate ground for judicial
review, it was considered by the Court of Appeal to be a facet of the
irrationality principle (para. 24 above).
47. The domestic courts' approach in the present case, balancing the
conflicting interests of free competition and individual freedom of
expression with that of the protection of the health of patients and
the rights and freedoms of other members of the medical profession, was
similar to that of the Convention organs in balancing the individual's
freedom of expression with the exigencies of the second paragraph of
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. In scrutinising the
reasonableness of the G.M.C.'s advertising restrictions, the English
courts in the present case effectively considered whether these
restrictions were proportionate to the pressing social needs and the
legitimate aims of protecting patients' health and other doctors'
rights and freedoms. Like the Convention organs it was not for the
English courts to substitute their appreciation of appropriate
advertising norms for that of the medical profession's governing body.
Their task, like the task envisaged by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the
Convention, was to detect and denounce any unreasonable or arbitrary
interference with the applicant's freedom of expression. No such
unreasonableness was found. However, the unfavourable outcome for the
applicant does not detract from the effectiveness of the remedy of
judicial review in such cases.
48. The Commission is therefore of the opinion that there was
available to the applicant an effective remedy under English law
satisfying Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in relation to his
complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10).
Conclusion
49. The Commission concludes, by 18 votes to 1, that there has been
no violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
E. Recapitulation
50. The Commission concludes, by 11 votes to 8, that there has been
no violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention (para. 41
above).
51. The Commission concludes, by 18 votes to 1, that there has been
no violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention (para. 49
above).
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
Opinion dissidente de M. F. MARTINEZ,
rejoint par MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, E. BUSUTTIL, A. WEITZEL,
C.L. ROZAKIS et L.L. LOUCAIDES pour sa deuxième partie
A mon grand regret, je ne partage pas l'avis de la majorité de
mes éminents collègues. En effet, je ne considère pas le requérant
comme victime au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention. Et s'il était
tenu pour victime, je constaterai une violation de l'article 10.
1. Le requérant n'a plus la qualité de victime
La Convention veut que les Etats portent remède à toute possible
violation. Tel est le sens de l'article 13 qui exige des Etats une
voie de recours effectif et interne. Tel est le sens de l'article 25
qui ne permet pas aux victimes de saisir la Commission sans chercher
au préalable toute possibilité d'avoir un recours interne. Par
conséquent, lorsque l'Etat remédie au problème, il est en conformité
avec la Convention, il ne la viole pas.
Il n'est pas nécessaire que le recours interne soit l'oeuvre des
tribunaux et des cours. N'importe quel organe du pouvoir de l'Etat
peut agir s'il apporte une bonne solution. Dans le cas d'espèce, le
Royaume-Uni a donné la meilleure solution et sans trop se faire
attendre.
L'acte rendu en défaveur du requérant s'est produit le
18 mai 1987. C'était l'information fournie par le G.M.C. dont le
rapport de la Commission fait état au paragraphe 16. Mais les
autorités britanniques ont modifié les règles du G.M.C.
En effet, le 24 mai 1987, les règles du G.M.C. ont été soumises
à la Commission des Monopoles (M.M.C.) qui, en mars 1989, a fait un
rapport au Parlement en critiquant les règles du G.M.C. et en
recommandant de les changer. Le secrétaire d'Etat pour le Commerce et
l'Industrie a accepté le rapport du M.M.C. et a demandé au directeur
général de la libre concurrence de négocier avec le G.M.C. (vid.
rapport Comm. par. 22). Tout ceci a abouti, en mai 1990, à ce que le
G.M.C. révise ses règles et de ce fait, les annonces dans la presse ont
été permises (vid. rapport Comm. par. 26).
Le requérant a alors pu faire ses annonces à partir de mai 1990.
Très peu de jours après avoir saisi la Commission européenne des Droits
de l'Homme, il a obtenu satisfaction au Royaume-Uni. Sa requête a donc
été enregistrée le 30 mai 1990 alors qu'elle était sans objet.
Peu importe que le requérant ait entamé une voie judiciaire
parallèle pour attaquer la décision du G.M.C. et qu'il ait échoué. Les
décisions de justice montrent que les juges sont tenus de respecter les
règles du G.M.C. mais une fois que ces règles sont changées après
intervention de l'Etat, il n'y a plus d'ingérence dans la liberté
d'information garantie par l'article 10 de la Convention.
Je voudrais encore faire une remarque. La dernière décision de
justice interne est le refus d'appel du 26 février 1990 (rapport Comm.
par. 25). Si le requérant avait saisi la Commission en août 1990 -
encore dans le délai de six mois permis par l'article 26 de la
Convention - devrait-il être considéré comme victime alors que les
règles du G.M.C. avaient été changées trois mois auparavant ?
Pour en finir sur ce point, je n'accepte pas les arguments de la
Commission (dans la décision de recevabilité) considérant le requérant
comme victime. Les trois ans au cours desquels ont eu lieu les
démarches administratives pour changer les règles du G.M.C., doivent
être supportés par le requérant. Toute voie de recours interne prend
du temps ; et lorsque cette voie abouti, la responsabilité
internationale de l'Etat n'est pas en cause.
Je trouve exagéré de dire que parce que pendant trois ans le
requérant a été privé de la possibilité de faire paraître des annonces
dans la presse, il a perdu les moyens de vivre. Je ne vois pas
pourquoi le désir du requérant de suivre une voie judiciaire parallèle
aux démarches administratives qui ont abouti, devrait déclencher la
responsabilité internationale du Royaume-Uni pour les frais de justice
qu'il a bien voulu engagés.
2. La violation de l'article 10 de la Convention
Tout en reconnaissant le fait que l'interdiction de faire
paraître des annonces dans la presse était prévue par la loi, au sens
de l'article 10 par. 2 de la Convention, je me montre assez nuancé en
ce qui concerne son but.
J'admets que les malades doivent être protégés contre une
publicité mensongère, trompeuse ou manipulée, mais leur donner un
renseignement objectif, sobre et mesuré ne peut leur faire aucun mal.
Ceci, par contre, est conforme à leur liberté de recevoir des
informations, comprise dans l'article 10 de la Convention.
De même, les autres médecins doivent être préservés d'une
publicité déloyale ou qui comporte une concurrence illicite. Mais
l'intérêt d'un médecin pour que le public ne connaisse pas l'existence
d'un autre praticien, n'est pas légitime et, surtout, ce n'est pas un
droit. N'oublions pas que la Convention exige la protection des droits
et non des simples intérêts d'autrui.
Cela dit, l'interdiction de publicité dont le G.M.C. avait frappé
le requérant, n'avait pas de but légitime à l'égard du deuxième alinéa
de l'article 10 de la Convention.
La majorité de la Commission trouve que le G.M.C., en interdisant
la publicité que le requérant envisageait, a agi dans la marge
d'appréciation octroyée par la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des
Droits de l'Homme. Je suis encore ici très réservé.
D'abord, il n'appartient pas à la Commission de porter un
jugement sur la politique globale du G.M.C. en matière de publicité.
Le point qui nous intéresse est celui de savoir si le type d'annonce
que le requérant voulait, mettait vraiment en danger les droits
légitimes des malades et des autres médecins.
L'annonce voulue, telle que décrite au paragraphe 15 du rapport
de la Commission, était limitée à la publication du nom, qualifications
professionnelles, adresse et téléphone du requérant. Y a-t-il quelque
chose de plus banal ? Je n'arrive pas à imaginer comment une telle
annonce aurait pu mettre en péril la santé des malades ou les droits
des autres médecins.
En conclusion, l'interdiction de l'annonce envisagée par le
requérant constitue une ingérence dans la liberté de communiquer des
informations garantie par l'article 10 de la Convention. Et cette
ingérence, bien que prévue par la loi, n'était pas nécessaire pour la
protection de la santé, ni pour la protection des droit des autres
médecins. Par conséquent, il s'agit d'une ingérence non autorisée par
le deuxième alinéa de cet article.
Dissenting opinion of Mr. F. ERMACORA
I agree with the second part of Mr. Martinez' dissenting opinion,
but would add that the criteria he refers to become particularly
important in the case of a doctor, like the applicant, whose methods
and philosophy differ from those of the traditional general
practitioner.
Dissenting opinion of Mrs. G.H. THUNE
I regret that I am not able to share the opinion of the majority
of the Commission in this case.
As regards Article 10 I consider that the interference was not
sufficiently justified to fall under the second part of this provision.
I refer to the arguments given by Mr. Martinez in the last part of his
dissenting opinion. For me it is also of importance that the applicant
represented a somewhat different, namely, holistic approach to health
care than most general practitioners. It would, in my view, be of
particular interest to patients to be made aware of this. For this
reason I do not consider it necessary in a democratic society to
deprive them of such knowledge. The particular advertising conditions
for which the applicant sought permission were indeed modest and
informative.
I also consider that there has been a violation of Article 13.
As underlined by the majority of the Commission, the applicant
had, in principle, a remedy under English law. It is true that the
domestic courts examined the irrationality principle in a careful
manner during the judicial review proceedings. I also recall that the
European Court of Human Rights in previous cases, eg the Soering
judgment, found judicial review sufficient to comply with the
requirements of Article 13 of the Convention. In my submission there
are reasons to reach another conclusion in the present case. As stated
by Lord Donaldson in his appeal court judgment, the applicant applied
for a special dispensation from the generally upheld principle that
doctors were not permitted to place even a very modest advertisement
in the local press. The judge went on to express his sympathy for the
applicant's approach to holistic medicine and his need to find a way
to communicate with the public. Inspite of this the applicant's appeal
was rejected. In my understanding the main reason for this was that
the court found it unwise to make exemptions, even in such a case, from
the general rules laid down by the G.M.C.. I quote from his judgment
(para. 24 above):
"If the G.M.C. authorised departure from the normal rule in
Dr Colman's case, how many other cases would also have to be
treated exceptionally, where would the line be redrawn and,
indeed, could the line be held at all?
Parliament has entrusted the resolution of these competing
considerations to the G.M.C. and not to the courts. Accordingly,
it is quite beside the point to consider whether I would have
reached the same conclusion."
From this I draw the conclusion that there were no prospects of
success for the applicant as the decision by the English courts in his
case was the result of the application of a general norm by which the
courts felt bound. As I consider the application of this norm in the
applicant's case contrary to the Convention, I have reached the
conclusion that there has also been a violation of Article 13, having
regard to the Court's case-law in Silver and Others, Campbell and Fell
and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali.
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
_________________________________________________________________
11.05.90 Introduction of application
30.05.90 Registration of application
Examination of Admissibility
07.09.90 Commission's decision to give
notice of application to the
respondent Government and to
invite parties to submit
written observations on
admissibility and merits
21.12.90 Government's observations
12.02.91 Applicant's observations
05.09.91 Commission's decision to declare
application admissible
Examination of the Merits
30.09.91 Parties invited to submit whatever
further information or observations
they wished
10.01.92 Consideration of state of proceedings
16.05.92 Consideration of state of proceedings
19.10.92 Commission's deliberations on merits,
and on text of its Article 31 Report.
Final votes taken. Adoption of Report