JACUBOWSKI v. GERMANY
Doc ref: 15088/89 • ECHR ID: 001-45573
Document date: January 7, 1993
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Application No. 15088/89
Manfred JACUBOWSKI
against
GERMANY
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 7 January 1993)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1 - 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. The application
(paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5 - 11). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 12 - 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 17 - 48). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 17 - 47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
(para. 48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 49 - 71). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
A. Complaint declared admissible
(para. 49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
B. Point at issue
(para. 50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
C. Article 10 of the Convention
(paras. 51 - 70) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Conclusion
(para. 71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
APPENDIX I: HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . .15
APPENDIX II: DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY. . . . . . . . . . .16
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant, born in 1933, is a German national and resident
in Bonn. He is a journalist by profession. Before the Commission he
was represented by Mr. Meilicke, a lawyer practising in Bonn.
3. The application is directed against the Federal Republic of
Germany. The Government were represented by their Agents,
Mr. Meyer-Ladewig, Ministerialdirigent, and Mr. Stöcker,
Ministerialrat, of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
4. The application relates to the applicant's complaint under
Article 10 of the Convention about a court order under the Unfair
Competition Act prohibiting him from sending to third parties articles
making adverse comments about his former employer, a news agency, with
whom he was in dispute over his dismissal.
B. The proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 11 April 1989 and registered
on 7 June 1989.
6. On 7 May 1990 the Commission decided to bring the application to
the notice of the respondent Government and invite them to submit
written observations on its admissibility and merits.
7. The Government's observations were submitted on 15 October 1990.
On 12 December 1990 the applicant submitted his observations in reply.
8. On 5 September 1991 the Commission decided to invite the parties
to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.
9. The hearing took place on 3 December 1991. The applicant
attended in person and was assisted by his lawyer Mr. Meilicke,
Representative, and Mr. Heidel, Adviser. The respondent Government
were represented by Mr. Meyer-Ladewig, Agent, and by Mr. von Mühlendahl
and Mrs. Babby, both of the Federal Ministry of Justice, as Advisers.
10. Following the hearing the Commission declared the application
admissible.
11. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed itself
at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly
settlement of the case. Active consultations with the parties took
place between 17 January and 24 March 1992. The Commission now finds
that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.
C. The present Report
12. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and
votes, the following members being present:
MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President
J. A. FROWEIN
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
13. The text of this Report was adopted on 7 January 1993 and is now
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in
accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
14. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the
Convention, is:
i) to establish the facts, and
ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a
breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the
Convention.
15. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the
Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's
decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.
16. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the
Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case
17. The applicant was co-founder, partner and manager of a private
company operating a news agency, which went bankrupt in March 1983.
Subsequently, a successor news agency D., operated by a limited
company, was founded. On 3 May 1983 the applicant was appointed, for
a period of five years, sole managing director and employed as chief
editor of this news agency.
18. On 17 July 1984 the applicant was dismissed without notice. He
instituted court proceedings before the Bonn Regional Court
(Landgericht) challenging his dismissal. Later the news agency D.
repeated the applicant's dismissal on several occasions invoking other
reasons.
19. On 16 August 1984 his employer D., in its news network, published
a press release concerning its reorganisation of personnel, which also
commented upon the applicant's qualifications and his performance as
a journalist and managing director. The press release, so far as
relevant, reads as follows:
" stellt behauptungen richtig
bonn, 16 August 84 - die verwaltung der hat in
branchendiensten wiedergegebene darstellungen ueber vorgaenge bei
der personellen neugliederung der unternehmens- und
redaktionsfuehrung als unzutreffend zurueckgewiesen. im einzelnen
nahm zu diesen versionen wie folgt stellung:
1. nachdem die ... gmbh am 31. maerz den konkurs anmeldete,
startete the ag - weiterhin unter der leitung von manfred
jacubowski - am 20. april 1983 mit einem grundkapital von einer
million dm. jacubowskis unveraendertes geschaeftsgebaren und
unangemessenes verhalten im umgang mit kunden einerseits sowie
das fehlen einer zielstrebigen und verlaesslichen
redaktionsfuehrung andererseits verhinderten, dass die chance des
neubeginns genutzt wurde, und hatten vielmehr verluste von kunden
zur folge. ueber diese entwicklung wurde der damalige
aufsichtsrat in gravierenden punkten bis in dieses fruehjahr
hinein von jacubowski falsch informiert. insbesondere wurden
verbindlichkeiten aus der gmbh-zeit der ag angelastet und damit
erneut in finanzielle schwierigkeiten manoevriert. nur durch
das rechtzeitige eingreifen des damaligen leiters des finanz- und
rechnungswesens, des heutigen vorstands , konnte groesserer
schaden verhindert werden, so dass heute wieder
wirtschaftlich auf gesunden fuessen steht. wegen kaufmaennischen
versagens und besonders wegen uebertragung von verbindlichkeiten
der gmbh auf die ag wurde jacubowski zum 17. juli - dem tag der
hauptversammlung - fristlos gekuendigt. zum neuen alleinvorstand
wurde ernannt.
2. der neugewaehlte aufsichtsrat bot jacubowski einen neuen
vertrag als chefredakteur an. gleichzeitig beschlossen
aufsichtsrat und vorstand die erweiterung der chefredaktion.
jacubowski lehnte die taetigkeit in diesem gremium nach
eingeraeumter bedenkzeit mit der begruendung ab, er bestehe auf
einhaltung seines frueheren vertrages. ..."
" puts allegations right
Bonn, 16 August 84 - The administration of rejected
statements made in several bulletins aimed at specialised sectors
about events in the course of the reorganisation of personnel in
the management of the firm and the editor's office. In particular
commented as follows:
1. After the ... private company declared itself bankrupt on
31 March 1983, the limited company started - still under the
management of Manfred Jacubowski - with a capital stock of one
million DM. The unchanged business policy of Jacubowski and his
inappropriate attitude towards clients on the one hand, and the
lack of an efficient and reliable editorial management on the
other hand, prevented the chance of a new start from being used,
and moreover resulted in the loss of clients. Until this spring
Jacubowski, in important matters, wrongly informed the managing
board. In particular, the limited company was charged with debts,
originating from the period of the private company, and thus
was again manoeuvred into financial difficulties. Only through
the timely intervention of the then Head of Finance and
Accounting, the present Managing Director , more serious
damage could be prevented with the result that has today
again a good financial foundation. Having regard to his failure
as a businessman and in particular the transfer of debts from the
private company to the limited company, Jacubowski was dismissed
without notice as from 17 July - the date of the general meeting.
was appointed new managing director.
2. The newly appointed supervisory board offered Jacubowski a new
contract as chief editor. At the same time the supervisory board
and the managing director decided to enlarge the editorial
management. Jacubowski refused to work in such a group after time
for reflection on the ground that he insisted on his previous
contract. ..."
20. On 29 August and 4 September 1984 the applicant requested the
news agency D. to publish, in its network, his reply (Gegendarstellung)
to the above press release. The news agency refused. On
17 September 1984 the Bonn Regional Court dismissed the applicant's
request for an injunction (einstweilige Verfügung) concerning his claim
of a right to reply.
21. On 25 September 1984 the applicant addressed a circular letter
to a number of leading newspaper and radio journalists known to him,
including clients of the news agency D. The letter was phrased in the
following terms:
"Die beigefügte - wenn auch zwangsläufig nicht vollständige -
Auswahl von Berichten über die Sache Jacubowski ./. kann
sicher einiges aufhellen, das noch im dunkeln liegt, auch wenn
Ihnen die eine oder andere Schilderung schon bekannt sein sollte.
Dies gilt trotz manchmal unzutreffender 'facts', die das
Gesamtbild allerdings kaum verändern. Die noch laufenden
Gerichtsverfahren, die von der gegenwärtigen -Entwicklung
betroffene Mitarbeiter und ich einleiteten, werden aber auch in
Details für endgültige Klarheit sorgen.
Ich würde mich freuen, wenn sich schon bald die Gelegenheit für
ein persönliches Gespräch bieten würde, um nicht nur die
Vergangenheit, sondern auch die künftige Entwicklung am deutschen
'Nachrichtenmarkt' zu erörtern. Um einen Termin dafür werde ich
mich rechtzeitig bemühen."
"The enclosed selection of articles concerning the case of
Jacubowski v. D. which is necessarily not complete will certainly
clarify some matters which are still in the dark, even if you
should already know one or the other reported fact. This is so
despite partly incorrect facts which however hardly affect the
picture as a whole. The pending court proceedings which have
been instituted by staff members affected by the current
development of D. and by myself will finally throw light on all
details.
I would be pleased to have the opportunity for a personal
conversation in which I could discuss not only the past, but also
future developments on the German media market. I shall in due
time ask for an appointment for this purpose."
22. The letter was accompanied by various articles concerning the
financial and staff situation of D. which had been subsequently
published by six newspapers with a wide circulation. While containing
critical remarks on the applicant they also expressed severe criticism
of his former employer. One article of 21/22 September 1984 stated
that D.'s financial situation had become worse than at the time of the
bankruptcy in April 1983, and also mentioned that five clients intended
to terminate their contractual relations with D. Another article
reported that a number of clients of news agency D. had stopped their
subscription to its services because of deficiencies in the quality of
the journalistic product and failure to provide for particular forms
of distribution such as online text or teletext. This was illustrated
by several examples. The article also mentioned that the news agency
risked to lose one of its major clients, which subsidised a news
service in English which had become rather poor.
23. On 11 October 1984 the Cologne Court of Appeal (Oberlandes-
gericht), upon the applicant's appeal (Beschwerde), quashed the Bonn
Regional Court's decision of 17 September 1984, and recognised the
applicant's right to reply to his employer's press release in the terms
chosen by him. The applicant's reply was printed one month later.
24. On 28 October 1984 the news agency D., referring to the
applicant's circular letter, again pronounced his dismissal.
25. In February 1985 D. transferred any claims against the applicant
to the limited company E. holding 25% of the shares of D., and
authorised it to bring such claims in its own name. Thereupon, E.
extended injunction proceedings before the Düsseldorf Regional Court,
which it had brought against the author of the first of the above-
mentioned articles, a journalist, to the applicant. E. submitted that
the applicant had infringed unfair competition law, inter alia, by
addressing the above circular letter with enclosures to clients of the
news agency. In a judgment of 24 October 1984, the journalist
concerned was prohibited from stating that D.'s financial situation had
become worse than at the time of the bankruptcy in 1983.
26. In March 1985 the applicant himself started a news agency.
27. On 29 January 1986 the Düsseldorf Regional Court dismissed the
action of the limited company E. against the applicant. The Regional
Court found in particular that E. was not entitled to bring, in its own
name, injunction proceedings against him.
28. On 11 December 1986 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, upon the
appeal of the company E., which was joined by the news agency D.,
partly amended the Regional Court's decision. The Court of Appeal, by
a prohibitory injunction, ordered the applicant to refrain from adverse
comments on the activities of the news agency D. by transmitting to
third persons a selection of articles on his litigation with D. with
the remark that despite partly incorrect facts, the picture as a whole
would hardly be affected, and that pending court proceedings which had
been introduced by staff members affected by the current development
of D. and by the applicant himself would finally throw light on all
details. It also ordered him to disclose to the limited company E. the
recipients of his circular letter of 25 September 1984. It finally
held that he was liable to compensate E. for all damage caused to D.
by the distribution of the circular letter. The remainder of the appeal
was dismissed.
29. The decision was based on S. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act
(Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb).
30. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant, in his circular
letter enclosing especially two critical articles, had adversely
commented upon D.'s activities, particularly the quality of its
reporting, the unreasonable costs of its services and the lack of
modern techniques. Such statements were likely to depreciate D. in the
eyes of its present or future clients. While these critical remarks
were not contained in the circular letter itself but in the press
articles annexed to it, the applicant had endorsed the factual
statements and value judgments by confirming them in his circular
letter as being essentially correct.
31. Furthermore the Court of Appeal considered that the applicant had
acted for purposes of competition in business transactions. Already
before sending his circular letter, the applicant had planned to found
his own news agency. The distribution of his circular letter with
enclosures to clients of D. as well as D.'s or his potential clients
was capable of promoting the competitiveness of his own envisaged news
agency. Taking the identical clientele into account, a competitive
relationship could be assumed, although the applicant's news agency had
not yet existed at the relevant time.
32. The applicant had also acted with competitive intent. There was
a factual assumption (tatsächliche Vermutung) of competitive intent
where activities were objectively capable of promoting one's own
competitiveness to the detriment of somebody else's. The applicant's
competitive intent was further confirmed by the circumstances of the
case, in particular his plans to set up his own news agency and the
timing of their realisation, and the suggestion, in the last paragraph
of the circular letter, to have conversations about, inter alia, the
future development of the German news market.
33. The question whether the detrimental statements concerning D. had
been correct justifying the negative judgments based thereupon could
be left open as even the distribution of true information constituted
unfair competition if a competitor was depreciated without sufficient
reason.
34. As regards the remainder of the action, the Court of Appeal found
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the applicant had
disclosed professional secrets.
35. On 26 November 1987 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundes-
gerichtshof) refused to admit the applicant's appeal on points of law
(Revision) on the grounds that the case was of no fundamental
importance, and that the appeal offered no prospect of success.
36. On 4 October 1988 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgericht) refused to admit the applicant's constitutional
complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) on the ground that it was
ill-founded.
37. The Constitutional Court found that the civil court decisions
complained of did not disclose any appearance of a violation of the
applicant's rights to the free development of his personality, to
freedom of expression and to the free choice of trade, occupation or
profession, as guaranteed by the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
38. The Constitutional Court considered that the impugned court
decisions had only prohibited the applicant from using a particular
form of expression and particular formulations. The Court of Appeal's
decision did not extend to the expression of particular ideas
irrespective of the means of expression or the form of their
presentation. The applicant had not generally been prevented from
uttering criticism of the news agency D. Having regard to this evident
limitation of the injunction, there was no danger of chilling effects
or other negative consequences of considerable importance on the
general exercise of the applicant's freedom of expression.
39. The constitutional review had to be based on the Court of
Appeal's finding that the applicant's circular letter had been intended
to serve his economic interests and that he had acted for purposes of
competition. Constitutional law could only be violated so far as the
applicant's rights under the Basic Law were relevant for the
interpretation and application of S. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act,
in particular the notion of acting contrary to honest practices.
40. The Constitutional Court found that there was no indication that
the impugned decisions violated the applicant's right to freedom of
expression.
41. The Constitutional Court accepted that the applicant, in
distributing his circular letter with annexes, had expressed an opinion
covered by Article 5 para. 1 of the Basic Law, notwithstanding that it
also came within the scope of unfair competition law.
42. The interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was
based upon S. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act, a law of general
application limiting the freedom of expression. It had to be
interpreted with due regard to the importance of freedom of expression;
thus its limiting effect on that freedom had to be restricted
accordingly. Relevant criteria for the qualification of a detrimental
statement by a competitor were its motive, and its aim and purpose.
If it was not motivated by a person's own economic interests, but by
his concern for political, economic, social or cultural interests of
public importance, the freedom of expression prevailed over private and
in particular economic interests. However, the protection of such
private interests was to be given more weight, if the statement in
question was directly affecting private interests in pursuance of self-
interest, and not contributing to the exchange of opinions on matters
of considerable public interest. In any case, the prejudice to the
person concerned had to remain within the limits of necessity and
appropriateness. In this context the means used to achieve the
intended aim were important. The applicant had distributed a great
number of critical and mostly negative press articles to D.'s actual
or potential clients.
43. The Court of Appeal had applied these principles in line with the
constitutional requirements. It had explained in detail that the
applicant's expression of opinion served purposes of competition, and
that it was not justified in the circumstances of the present case.
44. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant had not
aimed at influencing public opinion, but sent his circular letter only
to a limited number of persons working in this business sector and
known to him. His suggestion of a personal conversation disclosed his
predominant intention to ensure existing and future business contacts
with the addressees of his circular letter, and thus to promote his own
commercial interests and his competitiveness in the news market. There
was therefore no appropriate balance between the aim pursued by the
applicant and the interference with the interests of the news agency
D. and its share-holding company.
45. The press release of the news agency D., which contained
depreciating remarks about the applicant, could not justify the
applicant's behaviour either. An attack in a public debate could in
principle justify a sharp and even depreciating reaction within the
sphere of public debate. However, the applicant's reaction had taken
place outside the sphere of public discussion and had not aimed at
influencing public opinion.
46. Meanwhile, in the proceedings concerning the applicant's
dismissal, the Bonn Regional Court had declared that the applicant's
contract had not been terminated. On 11 October 1988 the Cologne Court
of Appeal, upon D.'s appeal, partly amended the Regional Court's
decision to the effect that the contract of employment had been
terminated upon the applicant's dismissal of 28 October 1984 following
the distribution of the circular letter.
47. Compensation proceedings instituted by company E. against the
applicant on the basis of the Court of Appeal's judgment of
11 December 1986 remained unsuccessful.
B. Relevant domestic law
48. S. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren
Wettbewerb) reads:
"Wer im geschäftlichen Verkehr zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbes
Handlungen vornimmt, die gegen die guten Sitten verstoßen, kann
auf Unterlassung und Schadensersatz in Anspruch genommen werden."
"Any person who in the course of business commits, for purposes
of competition, acts contrary to honest practices may be enjoined
from further engaging in those acts and held liable for damages."
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaint declared admissible
49. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaint
that the prohibitory injunction issued against him on 11 December 1986
in respect of his circular letter of 25 September 1984 violated his
right to freedom of expression.
B. Point at issue
50. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether there has been
a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
C. Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention
51. Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides, so far as
relevant:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, ... for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, ..."
52. The prohibitory injunction of 11 December 1986, issued by the
Düsseldorf Court of Appeal in respect of adverse comments upon the
activities of the news agency D., such as in the applicant's circular
letter of 25 September 1984, constituted an interference with the
applicant's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 para. 1
(Art. 10-1). This interference contravenes Article 10 (Art. 10) if it
is not justified under Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2), as being
prescribed by law, pursuing a legitimate aim and being necessary in a
democratic society for the said aim.
53. The Commission notes that the prohibitory injunction was based
on S. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act. This provision, having regard
to the German case-law on matters of competition and the extensive
commentary, has been accepted as a legal basis under Article 10 para. 2
(Art. 10-2) (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Barthold judgment of 25 March 1985,
Series A no. 90, p. 22, para. 47; Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus
Beermann judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 165, pp. 18-19,
para. 30). The Commission, though no reference has been made to case-
law on the particular issues of the present case, is satisfied that the
case-law on S. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act was such as to enable
persons in the commercial area to regulate their conduct. The
interference complained of was, therefore, prescribed by German law.
54. Moreover, this decision had the aim of protecting the reputation
and rights of others, namely the competitive interests of the news
agency D., which is legitimate under Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2).
55. It remains to be determined whether the interference complained
of was necessary in a democratic society in order to accomplish this
aim.
56. The applicant submits that the restriction imposed upon him was
not necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights
of others. In particular, he had reacted to the preceding attack upon
his professional reputation by the news agency D. in writing to leading
journalists who had been informed of the discussion on the policies of
this news agency. At the time in question, the news agency had refused
his claim to reply, and court proceedings in this respect had been
unsuccessful at first instance. As he did not dispose of the same
publishing means as this news agency, it was for him to choose the
means by which he could best defend his interests. In a democratic
society within the meaning of the Convention he could not solely be
referred to court remedies, i.e. the request for an injunction to
ensure his right to reply, and otherwise be obliged to remain silent
in the situation of his case.
57. The Government, referring to the Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and
Klaus Beermann judgment, maintain that the interference with the
applicant's freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society
within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2).
58. They submit in particular that statements with economic aims were
not at the core of freedom of expression, but rather at its periphery.
The examination of the present case had to start from the Court of
Appeal's finding that the applicant acted, at least partly, for
competitive purposes. In his circular letter, he did not only bring
the annexed press articles again to the attention of the addressees in
prominent positions in press and broadcasting, but also shared their
contents. Thus the considerable danger arose that the addressees would
at least doubt the quality of D.'s services, and would terminate
contracts with D. The applicant could not invoke a right of defence
as he could await the outcome of the court proceedings concerning his
claim to reply to D.'s press release.
59. The Commission recalls that the adjective "necessary" within the
meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) implies the existence of a
"pressing social need". The Contracting States enjoy a margin of
appreciation in determining whether such a need exists, but this goes
hand in hand with a European supervision which is more or less
extensive depending upon the circumstances. The European Court of
Human Rights has held that such a margin of appreciation is essential
in commercial matters and, in particular, in an area as complex and
fluctuating as that of unfair competition. Otherwise, it would have
to undertake a re-examination of the facts and all circumstances of the
case. The review under the Convention must be confined to the question
whether the measures taken on the national level are, in the light of
the case as a whole, justifiable in principle and proportionate (cf.
Eur. Court H.R., Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann judgment,
loc. cit., pp. 19-20, para. 33; Sunday Times (No. 2) judgment of
26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, pp. 28-29, para. 50).
60. In the present case, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, in its
injunction of 11 December 1986, ordered the applicant to refrain from
adverse comments on the activities of the news agency D. by
transmitting to third persons a selection of articles on his litigation
with D. with the remark that partly incorrect facts hardly affected the
picture as a whole, and that pending court proceedings which had been
introduced by staff members affected by the current development of D.
and by the applicant himself would finally throw light on all details.
61. The Commission recalls that since 1983 the applicant had been
sole managing director and chief editor of the news agency D.
Previously, he had been co-founder, partner and manager of a
predecessor news agency, which went bankrupt. Following controversies
with his employer D., the applicant was dismissed without notice on a
number of occasions, the first time on 17 July 1984. Labour court
proceedings brought by the applicant ultimately remained unsuccessful.
62. On 16 August 1984, in the context of these controversies, the
applicant's employer D., in its news network, published a press release
concerning its reorganisation of personnel, which also commented upon
the applicant's qualifications and his performance as a journalist and
managing director. In this press release, D., referring to the
bankruptcy of its predecessor, expressed its opinion that the applicant
had failed as a businessman. In particular his business policy had not
changed, his attitude towards clients was inappropriate, his editorial
management lacked efficiency and reliability, he had thereby prevented
the chance of a new start from being used and lost clients. Moreover,
the applicant, in important matters, had wrongly informed the managing
board.
63. The news agency D. subsequently refused to publish a reply
drafted in respect of the above press release. On 17 September 1984
the applicant's request for an injunction concerning his claim for a
right to reply was dismissed at first instance. The Cologne Court of
Appeal allowed the claim on 11 October 1984, and the applicant's reply
was printed one month later.
64. In the meantime, on 25 September 1984, the applicant had
addressed his circular letter to a number of leading newspaper and
radio journalists. He had enclosed a selection of articles concerning
the financial and staff situation of D. which had been published by six
newspapers with a wide circulation and contained both critical remarks
on the applicant as well as severe criticism of his former employer.
In the accompanying letter, the applicant had mentioned his intention
thereby to clarify some matters. He had closed in stating his interest
in a personal conversation concerning the past and future developments
on the German media market.
65. The Commission considers that the applicant's circular letter has
to be seen in the light of the discussion in German media concerning
the situation of the news agency D. and the applicant's part in the
developments, and in particular the news agency's press release of
16 August 1984. The news agency had thereby brought its controversies
with the applicant to the attention primarily of those connected to its
network. Its publication contained serious attacks upon the
applicant's professional performance and reputation. After the
applicant's claim for a reply had been refused by the news agency D.,
and his application for an injunction to enforce his right to reply in
the news agency's network had been dismissed at first instance, there
was sufficient cause for the applicant to react by other means to the
news agency's publication. His choice of a limited circle of persons
in the news business as addressees of his comments does not, in this
situation, appear inappropriate.
66. The Düsseldorf Court of Appeal founded its decision of
11 December 1986 on unfair competition law. It assumed a competitive
relationship between the applicant and the news agency D., and also the
applicant's competitive intent in respect of his press release. The
Court of Appeal considered that the applicant had adversely commented
upon D.'s activities in that he had endorsed the factual statements and
value judgments contained in the enclosed press articles by confirming
them in his circular letter as being essentially correct. The question
whether the detrimental statements concerning D. had been correct
justifying the negative judgments based thereupon was left open.
67. The Federal Constitutional Court, in its decision of
4 October 1988, confirms this evaluation. According to the Federal
Constitutional Court, freedom of expression only prevailed over private
and in particular economic interests if a detrimental statement in the
field of competition was motivated by a concern for interests of public
importance and contributed to the exchange of opinions on matters of
considerable public interest. The applicant's circular letter was
found to be in pursuance of commercial self-interest, not aimed at
influencing public opinion. The limited number of addressees of the
applicant's circular letter placed it outside the sphere of public
discussion and could not, therefore, justify it as reaction to the news
agency's press release with its depreciating remarks about the
applicant.
68. The Commission considers that, in the circumstances of the
present case, these considerations appear not sufficient to justify the
prohibitory injunction complained of.
69. The German courts emphasised the assumed competitive aspects of
the applicant's circular letter. Yet, at the time in question, the
applicant was still involved in labour court proceedings against the
news agency concerning his dismissal, and only subsequently did he open
his own news agency. Furthermore, the concluding paragraph of his
accompanying letter seeking a personal discussion of the past and
future developments on the news market did not solely serve the purpose
of preparing future business relations. The applicant's legitimate
interest in defending himself against the news agency's public attack
on his personal and professional reputation, the inefficiency of court
remedies to enforce his claim to an immediate reply in the news
agency's network, and the moderate and cautious drafting of his
circular letter which mainly referred to an enclosed selection of
previously published press articles are ignored or underrated. The
German courts' standard that an adverse statement must be motivated by
a concern for interests of public importance and contribute to an
exchange of opinions on matters of considerable public interest does
not fairly balance the right to freedom of expression, in the
applicant's situation as described above, and the employer's private
interests affected by such statements.
70. Consequently, the Commission finds that the prohibitory
injunction issued by the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal and confirmed by
the Federal Court of Justice as well as, from the constitutional point
of view, by the Federal Constitutional Court, was not proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, this interference was not
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation
and rights of others within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2
(Art. 10-2) of the Convention.
D. Conclusion
71. The Commission concludes, unanimously that there has been a
violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. Krüger) (C.A. Nørgaard)
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
_________________________________________________________________
11 April 1989 Introduction of the application
7 June 1989 Registration of the application
Examination of Admissibility
7 May 1990 Commission's decision to invite
the Government to submit observations on
the admissibility and merits of the
application
15 October 1990 Government's observations
12 December 1990 Applicant's observations in reply
5 September 1991 Commission's decision to hold an oral
hearing
3 December 1991 Oral hearing on admissibility and
merits; Commission's decision to declare
the application admissible
Examination of the merits
4 April 1992 ) Commission's consideration of the
5 September 1992 ) state of proceedings
7 January 1993 Commission's deliberations on the
merits, final vote and adoption of
the Report
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
