Lexploria

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Application No. 18535/91

K., Z. and S.

against

the Netherlands

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 7 April 1993)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION

(paras. 1-15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

A. The application

(paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

B. The proceedings

(paras. 5-10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

C. The present Report

(paras. 11-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

(paras. 16-22). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

A. Particular circumstances of the case

(paras. 16-20). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

B. Relevant domestic law

(paras. 21-22). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

(paras. 23-59). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

A. Complaints declared admissible

(para. 23). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

B. Points at issue

(para. 24). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

C. As regards Article 8 of the Convention

(paras. 25-44). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Conclusion

(para. 45). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

D. As regards Article 14 of the Convention

(paras. 46-56). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Conclusion

(para. 57). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

E. Recapitulation

(paras. 58-59). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. H.G. SCHERMERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE MM. J.-C. SOYER ET F. MARTINEZ

A LAQUELLE SE RALLIENT MM. A. WEITZEL

ET A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. J.-C. GEUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

APPENDIX I : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

APPENDIX II : DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

I. INTRODUCTION

1 The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A. The application

2 The applicants, who are Dutch nationals, were born in 1954,

1961 and 1987 respectively and reside at Amsterdam. The first

applicant is the mother, the second applicant the biological

father, of the third applicant. Before the Commission they are

represented by Mr. Arnoud Willems, a lawyer practising in

Amsterdam.

3 The application is directed against the Netherlands, whose

Government are represented by their Agent, Mr. Karel de Vey

Mestdagh of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4 The applicants complain that they are unable under Dutch law

to obtain a legal recognition of the second applicant's paternity

in respect of the third applicant and that under Dutch law a

married woman's right to challenge the paternity of her child is

more limited than that of a married man. They submit that, as a

result, the third applicant remains legally the son of a man, who

is not the real father, whereas the third applicant is denied a

legal relationship with the second applicant, the real father, who

feels responsible for his child. The applicants rely on Article 8

of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of

the Convention.

B. The proceedings

5 The application was introduced on 15 May 1991 and registered

on 17 July 1991.

6 On 2 December 1991 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government and invite them to submit

written observations on the admissibility and merits of the

application.

7 The Government's observations were submitted on

26 March 1992. The applicants submitted their observations in

reply on 29 May 1992.

8 On 31 August 1992 the Commission declared the application

admissible and the parties were invited, should they so desire, to

submit further observations regarding the merits of the

application.

9 The respondent Government submitted further observations on

23 November 1992. No further observations were received from the

applicants.

10 After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting

in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also

placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to

securing a friendly settlement of the case. In the light of the

parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis

on which such a settlement can be effected.

C. The present report

11 The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations

and votes, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J. C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C. L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. J.-C. GEUS

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

12 The text of the Report was adopted on 7 April 1993 and is now

transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

in accordance with Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention.

13 The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of

the Convention, is

(1) to establish the facts, and

(2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts

found disclose a breach by the State

concerned of its obligations under the

Convention.

14 A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before

the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the

Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application forms

Appendix II.

15 The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the

Commission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A. Particular circumstances of the case

16 The first applicant, K., and the second applicant, Z., have

since 1983 had a permanent relationship, but without being married

and without living together. The first applicant is the mother,

the second applicant the biological father, of the third applicant,

S., who was born in October 1987. A second child of K. and Z. was

born in 1989.

17 When S. was born, K. was still married to M., although they

had not been living together for a long time. Their divorce was

pronounced on 6 April 1988. M. was registered as being S.'s

father, but he does not even know of S.'s existence and has never

seen him. In fact, he disappeared to an unknown destination a long

time ago. His present whereabouts are unknown.

18 K. and Z. first asked the civil registration authority to

make it possible for K. to declare that M. was not the father of S.

and for Z. to recognise the paternity. However, this was rejected

by a letter from the authority of 21 October 1988.

19 K. and Z. then brought proceedings for the same purpose

before the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam.

By judgment of 13 June 1989 their claim was rejected by the

Regional Court which considered that Dutch law did not make it

possible for them to challenge M.'s paternity and that, although

the plaintiffs had a justified wish to see the biological reality

recognised, the law in force could not be considered to be in

conflict with Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention.

20 Their appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal

(Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam on 5 February 1990. A further appeal on

points of law was rejected by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) on

16 November 1990. The Supreme Court left it open whether the

applicable rules in Book 1, Section 198 of the Dutch Civil Code

(Burgerlijk Wetboek) were in conflict with the Convention,

considering that, if there was such a conflict, it must be the task

of the legislator to adopt the new rules which should replace

Book 1, Section 198 of the Civil Code.

B. Relevant domestic law

21 The relevant provisions of the Civil Code read as follows:

Book 1, Section 197

"Het kind dat staande huwelijk is geboren, heeft de

echtgenoot tot vader. Het kind dat vóór de 307de dag na

de ontbinding van het huwelijk is geboren, heeft de

vroegere echtgenoot tot vader, tenzij de moeder was

hertrouwd."

"The child born in wedlock has the husband as father.

The child born before the 307th day after the

dissolution of the marriage has the former husband as a

father, unless the mother has remarried."

Book 1, Section 198

"1. De moeder kan door een verklaring, afgelegd ten

overstaan van een ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand,

ontkennen dat een kind dat binnen 306 dagen na de

ontbinding van het huwelijk uit haar is geboren, het

kind van haar vroegere echtgenoot is, mits een andere

man het kind erkent bij de akte die van die verklaring

wordt opgemaakt. (...)

2. De verklaring van de moeder en de erkenning moeten

geschieden binnen een jaar na de geboorte van het kind.

3. De verklaring en de erkenning hebben slechts gevolg,

indien de moeder en de man die het kind erkent, binnen

een jaar na de geboorte van het kind met elkander in het

huwelijk treden of (...).

4. (...)

5. (...)."

"1. The mother can, by making a declaration before an

officer of the civil registration authority, contest

that a child whom she has borne within 306 days after

the dissolution of the marriage, is the child of her

former husband, provided that another man recognises the

child in connection with the document in which the

declaration is recorded (...).

2. The mother's declaration and the recognition must be

made within one year from the birth of the child.

3. The declaration and the recognition only have

effect, if the mother and the man who recognises the

child marry each other within a year from the birth of

the child or (...).

4. (...).

5. (...)."

Book 1, Section 199

"De man kan slechts ontkennen de vader van het kind te

zijn door een rechtsvordering tot ontkenning van het

vaderschap in te stellen tegen de moeder en tevens tegen

het kind, dat terzake, tenzij het meerderjarig is,

vertegenwoordigd wordt door een bijzondere curator,

daartoe benoemd door de kantonrechter."

"The man can only contest the paternity to the child by

instituting proceedings regarding challenge of paternity

against the mother and also against the child who,

unless it has come of age, will be represented in the

case by a special curator who will be appointed by the

District Court judge."

22 As a result of changes in society and generally held views on

issues as marriage and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of children,

a Bill (no. 20 626) amending the law of parentage is at present

pending before the Dutch Parliament. This Bill maintains

restrictions of the possibility to contest paternity, but on the

basis of equality between husband and wife.

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A. Complaints declared admissible

23 The Commission has declared admissible the applicants'

complaints that they are unable under Dutch law to obtain a legal

recognition of the second applicant's paternity in respect of the

third applicant and that under Dutch law a married woman's right to

challenge the paternity of her child differs from that of a married

man.

B. Points at issue

24 Accordingly, the issues to be determined are:

- whether there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention taken alone; and

- whether there has been a violation of Article 14 in

conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) of the Convention.

C. As regards Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

25 Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public

safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

26 The applicants submit that, although the second applicant does

not live with the first and third applicants, he has a permanent

relationship with the first applicant since 1983 and contributes to

the best of his abilities to raising the third applicant. The

applicants, therefore, consider that this complaint falls within the

scope of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

27 The Government submit that it has not been argued convincingly

that the relationship of the second applicant to the third applicant

is one of a social father and that, therefore, it cannot be concluded

there is family life between them in the sense of Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention. The Government further argue that the fact that

Dutch law makes no provision for a mother contesting the paternity of

her husband whilst remaining married to him does not constitute any

interference with "family life" within the meaning of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

28 The Government further argue that, even if family life exists

in the present case, the legal consequence desired by the parties,

namely the establishment of relations under family law between the

second and third applicants, could have been achieved by other means.

They point out that, under Book I, Section 227 of the Civil Code, the

first and second applicants could jointly have adopted the third

applicant, a condition being that the adopters had first married each

other. An alternative would be to make an application under Book I,

Section 7 of the Civil Code to have the third applicant's surname

changed to the second applicant's surname, which would have the

effect of socially reinforcing the relationship between the second

and third applicants.

29 Finally the Government submit that, if there is in the present

case an interference with the applicants' rights under Article 8

para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, that interference is justified

under para. 2 of that Article (Art. 8-2) as being necessary in a

democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of

others. The Government point out in this respect that it is a

fundamental principle, precisely with a view to protecting the

child's legal security, that where a child is born in wedlock, the

mother's husband must be regarded as the child's father.

30 The applicants contest that adoption would be a valid

alternative solution, since for other reasons the first and second

applicants do not wish to get married.

31 The Commission recalls that the right to respect for family life

is not confined to "legitimate" families and that, in order to

ascertain whether in a given case it is appropriate to speak of

"family life" within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention, it has considered not only whether the persons concerned

were related but also whether it was in fact possible to point to

such a link as can be considered to establish "family life" referred

to in Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (cf. No. 11418/85,

Dec. 14.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 243).

32 The Commission notes that, although they do not live together,

there is a longstanding relationship between K., the first applicant,

and Z., the second applicant, and it is not disputed that Z. is the

biological father of K.'s son S. and of K.'s second child born in

1989.

33 The Commission is of the opinion that the links between the

applicants involve several aspects of private and family life within

the meaning or Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

34 The Commission, therefore, concludes that Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention is applicable to the present case.

35 The Commission notes that the Netherlands authorities have not

actively "interfered" with the applicants' private or family life.

However, the Commission recalls that although the object of Article 8

(Art. 8) is essentially that of protecting the individual against

arbitrary interference, it does not merely compel a Contracting State

to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily

negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in

an effective respect for private or family life (see eg. Eur. Court

H.R., X and Y v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A

no. 91, p. 11, para. 23).

36 The Commission observes that Z. assumes the responsibility of

being S.'s father and that all applicants wish to see the biological

reality of his paternity legally recognised.

37 However, Dutch law does not make this possible. The question

is whether this constitutes a lack of respect for the applicants'

private and family life.

38 The rules in the Dutch Civil Code are in this respect

characterised by their lack of flexibility. They do not at all make

it possible for the mother of a child or for the child itself to

contest the mother's former husband's paternity where, as in the

present case, the child was born before the marriage had been

formally dissolved.

39 The Commission accepts that the generally recognised rule,

according to which a married man is presumed to be the father of his

wife's children ("pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant"), creates a

reasonable presumption and that there are good reasons why this

presumption should not easily be overturned.

40 Nevertheless, there are cases where it is clear that the

presumption does not correspond to the real situation, and at least

in some such situations the right to respect for private and family

life in Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention may require that the

real paternity is also legally recognised.

41 In the present case, it seems clear that M. cannot be S.'s

father and it appears that he is not even aware of S.'s existence.

Moreover, the divorce between K. and M. was pronounced in April 1988,

i.e. about half a year after S.'s birth. On the other hand, K. and Z.

had a stable relationship already a long time before S. was born.

They agree that Z. is S.'s father, and Z. is prepared to take the

responsibility for S. Furthermore K. and Z. also have another child

together. In view of the fact that in the specific circumstances of

this case M. cannot be considered to have any real interests which

should be taken into account, the situation is somewhat similar to

that of a child born out of wedlock, in respect of whom an agreement

between the mother and a man about the latter's paternity would

normally constitute a sufficient basis for having that paternity

legally recognised.

42 It is true, as the Government have pointed out, that Z. and K.

could jointly adopt S. but only if they first got married.

Apparently, they do not wish to get married. The Commission cannot

find, in such circumstances, that the possibility of an adoption is

sufficient to eliminate the effects on their private and family life

created by the impossibility to contest the legal paternity.

43 Nor can the possibility of changing S.'s family name be

considered a valid alternative to the establishment of Z.'s

paternity.

44 In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

impossibility under Dutch law to contest M.'s paternity and to have

Z. recognised as S.'s father implies a lack of respect for the

applicants' private and family life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention.

Conclusion

45 The Commission concludes by 12 votes to 6 that there has been

a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

D. As regards Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

46 Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, insofar as relevant,

provides as follows:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in

this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on

any ground such as sex (...) or other status."

47 The applicants allege a violation of this provision in that

under Dutch law a married woman's right to challenge the paternity of

her child is more limited than that of a married man.

48 The Government submit that the fundamental principle underlying

the introduction in 1969 of Sections 198 and 199 of the Civil Code

concerning the repudiation of a child's legitimacy, was to maximise

a child's legal security. This implies avoiding situations in which

a child has to be regarded as illegitimate and creating exceptions

only for those situations where the greatest need might arise for

either the mother or the husband, considered separately.

49 With reference to the position of the mother the Government

point out that the legislator endeavoured to ensure that a child born

shortly after the dissolution of a marriage could as far as possible

be granted the status of legitimacy. As regards children born in

wedlock, the father was provided with legal safeguards to prevent

legal ties being created with a child of whom he was not the

biological father.

50 The Commission recalls that whether or not a difference in

treatment constitutes discrimination in the sense of Article 14

(Art. 14) depends on whether there exists an objective and reasonable

justification. The difference in treatment must pursue a legitimate

aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality

between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see eg.

Eur. Court H.R., Inze judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126,

p. 18, para. 41).

51 The Commission further recalls that Contracting States enjoy a

certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what

extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a

different treatment in law and that the scope of the margin of

appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-

matter and its background (Eur.Court H.R., Rasmussen judgment of

28 November 1984, Series A no. 87, p. 15, para. 40).

52 It is not the task of the Commission to examine issues in the

abstract, but to determine whether in the present case the way in

which Dutch law was applied to the applicants disclosed a

discrimination contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

53 The Commission observes that when S. was born in 1987, K. was

still married to M., who had disappeared a long time ago, whereas she

and Z. had a relationship since 1983. The Commission further notes

that the marriage between K. and M. was dissolved in April 1988.

54 The Commission notes that in the Rasmussen case the European

Court of Human Rights pointed out that in the Contracting States'

legislation regarding paternity proceedings there is no common ground

and that in most of these States the position of the mother and that

of her husband are regulated in different ways. On this basis the

Court found that a difference in time-limits applicable to the

institution of paternity proceedings was not discriminatory

(Rasmussen judgment, loc. cit., para. 41).

55 Similar considerations apply in the present case. The Commission

also notes that the difference existing in Dutch law in regard to the

right to contest paternity could hardly be considered to have

affected the first applicant since her former husband, M., was not

even aware of the birth of S. and his legal right to contest his

paternity was therefore only theoretical.

56 For these reasons, the Commission considers that the applicants

are not victims of discrimination contrary to Article 14 in

conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) of the Convention.

Conclusion

57 The Commission concludes unanimously that there has been no

violation of Article 14 in conjuction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) of

the Convention.

E. Recapitulation

58 The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 6, that there has been

a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (para. 45).

59 The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no

violation of Article 14 in conjuction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) of

the Convention (para. 57).

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H. C. Krüger) (C. A. Nørgaard)

DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. H.G. SCHERMERS

Article 8 para. 1. Is the article applicable in case of adultery?

I agree with the majority of the Commission that Article 8 of

the Convention is applicable in the present case. In my opinion one

should accept as a matter of principle that there is always family

life between a biological father and his child. It may be true that

this kind of family life does not always merit protection, e.g. in

the case of artificial insemination or rape, but the exceptions

should be based on para. 2 of Article 8. There should be no

interference by public authorities with the family life of fathers

and children even if the children have been conceived by means of

artificial insemination or as a result of rape, if there are no

interests of other people involved and if both the father and the

child want to enjoy their family life. I may illustrate this with an

example.

Assume a child is born as a result of rape. The mother does not

want any contact with the father of the child. Article 8 para. 2

will then permit that public authorities interfere with the family

life between father and child for the protection of the rights of

others (the mother, perhaps also the child). This does not, however,

exclude any possibility of family life under Article 8 para. 1. Let

us assume that the mother dies, that the child has no other family

and that father and child both want to establish family life. The

authorities cannot then interfere on the ground that family life of

a rapist cannot be recognised. Human rights are for the benefits of

the bad as much as for the good. Equally, the applicability of

Article 8 may not be denied on the ground that adultery is considered

unacceptable. In the present case, therefore, Article 8 is

applicable and it should be considered whether interference is

permitted under Article 8 para. 2.

Article 8 para. 2

According to the established case-law of the Court an

interference with the exercise of an Article 8 right will not be

compatible with paragraph 2 unless it is "in accordance with the

law", has an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under that

paragraph and is "necessary in a democratic society" for the

aforesaid aim or aims (see Dudgeon Case, series A no. 45, p. 19,

para. 43 and mutatis mutandis, the Young, James and Webster judgment

of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 24, para. 59).

It has not been contested that the first of these three

conditions was met. The interference is "in accordance with the law"

since it results from Articles 197-199 of the Dutch Civil Code.

It next falls to be determined whether the interference is aimed

at "the protection of morals", "the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others" or "the protection of disorder". All three aims

are of some relevance.

Although as the sole aim it may not be decisive, the aim of

protection of morals is relevant. Adultery still being considered as

immoral by many people, one may accept that the law refuses to

recognise its consequences.

"The protection of the rights and freedoms of others" is another

aim relevant in the present case. By making it impossible to

challenge the paternity of children born in wedlock all families are

protected against legal acts casting doubts upon the paternity of

children.

In my opinion, the main aim of the Dutch legislation is to

create legal certainty about the parental relations of children.

Such legal certainty is to the benefit of the legal order and

therefore serves for the prevention of disorder.

As it has never been established that the aim or aims for which

measures under Article 8 para. 2 are taken must in themselves be

effective, each of the three aims mentioned above may be sufficient

to fulfil the requirement of a legitimate aim. The three aims

together in any case meet this requirement.

In my opinion the case hinges on the question whether or not the

Dutch legislation can be seen as "necessary in a democratic society"

for one or more of these aims.

A number of principles relevant to the assessment of the

necessity in a democratic society, of a measure taken in furtherance

of an, under the Convention, legitimate aim, have been stated by the

Court in its case-law.

Firstly, "necessary" in this context does not have the

flexibility of such expression as "useful", "reasonable", or

"desirable", but implies the existence of a "pressing social need"

for the interference in question (see the Handyside judgment,

Series A no. 24, p. 22, para. 48).

In the second place, it is for the national authorities to make

the initial assessment of the pressing social need in each case;

accordingly, a margin of appreciation is left to them (ibid).

However, their decision remains subject to review by the Court

(ibid., p. 23, para. 49).

As was illustrated by the European Court in the Sunday Times

judgment, the scope of the margin of appreciation is not identical in

respect of each of the aims justifying restrictions on a right

(Series A no. 30, p. 36, para. 59). The margin of appreciation will

be more extensive where the protection of morals is concerned. It is

an indisputable fact, as the Court stated in the Handyside judgment,

that "the view taken ... of the requirements of morals varies from

time to time and from place to place, especially in our era", and

that "by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital

forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a

better position than the international judge to give an opinion on

the exact content of those requirements" (ibid. p. 22, para. 48).

In determining whether a State remains within the margin of

appreciation granted to it a balance must be found between the

general interest for which the interference was made and the interest

of the individual.

In the present case the interest of the biological father and

his child for recognition of their relationship should be weighed

against the interest of society in legal certainty with respect to

the parentage of children born in wedlock. The presumption that

children born in wedlock are children of the husband of their mother

prevents litigation about paternity in many cases. For many

different reasons people may claim paternity of children of others.

This may lead to insecurity and social tensions. A law providing

that a child is always the child of the husband of the mother is to

prevent such litigation. In my opinion such provision may be

considered necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of

disorder and for the protection of morals. The impossibility to

challenge the paternity of children born in wedlock is an important

part of the security of married life and should not be discarded

lightly. Also the majority of the Commission accepts that the

generally recognised rule, according to which a married man is

presumed to be the father of his wife's children ("pater est quem

nuptiae demonstrant"), creates a reasonable presumption and that

there are good reasons why this presumption should not easily be

overturned (para. 39 of the report).

One could submit that the Netherlands' legislation should be

refined to the effect, that the presumption is maintained, but that

legal paternity could be challenged, if undisputable proof is

available. Perhaps this could be further restricted, e.g. by strict

time limits. However, the security of families may still then be

endangered since modern medical means are now available to indeed

prove that the child of a family is not the child of its legal

father, whilst another man with whom the wife had a relation many

years ago can almost certainly be identified as the father. The

permanent threat that the other man might claim "his" child could

seriously endanger family life. The growing possibilities of proof

might encourage natural fathers of adulterine children to claim their

paternity if the law permitted them to do so.

Taking account of the margin of appreciation which should be

left to the national authorities and of the existing alternative for

the natural father (stepfather's adoption), my conclusion in the

present case is that Article 8 of the Convention is applicable, but

that the interference is justified under para. 2 of that provision.

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE MM. J.-C. SOYER ET F. MARTINEZ

À LAQUELLE SE RALLIENT MM. A. WEITZEL ET A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

1. D'après le Code Civil des Pays-Bas (articles 197 à 199), la

paternité d'un enfant conçu puis né tandis que le mariage était

encore valide ne peut pas être contestée par un homme qui veut

reconnaître cet enfant.

2. Pour la majorité de la Commission, cette solution réaliserait

un manque de respect pour la vie privée de la mère, de l'enfant et du

père prétendu. Par là seul, l'article 8 de la Convention serait

violé. Nous ne partageons pas cet avis. Il va trop loin.

3. La règle "pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant" nous semble connue

de la plupart des Etats parties à la Convention. Cette présomption

fait du mari le père, sauf des exceptions étroitement limitées. Car

il y va tout à la fois de l'intérêt de l'enfant, et de la stabilité

de la famille légitime.

4. Dans le cas particulier soumis à la Commission, le soi-disant

père vit séparé de la mère. Il ne prétend d'ailleurs pas vouloir

l'épouser, ce qui lui aurait permis d'adopter l'enfant

ultérieurement. Il nous paraît difficile, dans ces conditions, d'y

voir un manque de respect pour la vie privée et familiale de

personnes qui se refusent, précisément, à fonder une famille, que ce

soit par la cohabitation ou que ce soit par une union légalement

consacrée.

5. Mais, même en admettant qu'existe un tel manque de respect, il

ne s'ensuivrait pas, par cela seul, une violation de l'article 8 de

la Convention. Encore faudrait-il vérifier si ce manque de respect,

ou cette ingérence, manque de justification.

6. L'avis de la Commission, de façon surprenante à nos yeux,

s'abstient d'une telle vérification. Elle conduit pourtant Ã

constater que l'ingérence (à supposer qu'il en existe une) réunit les

trois conditions qui la justifient pleinement.

7. En premier lieu, la base légale ne fait pas de doute. Elle

réside dans les articles précités (197 à 199) du Code Civil

Néerlandais.

8. En deuxième lieu, le but est de ceux que légitime l'article 8

de la Convention. Il est évident que, protégeant la stabilité de la

famille et des enfants nés dans le mariage, le Code Civil vise Ã

assurer la protection des droits d'autrui et celle de la morale.

9. En troisième lieu, il doit exister une proportion raisonnable

entre l'ingérence et le besoin social convenant à une société

démocratique. Or, cette proportion me paraît évidente dans le cas

présent.

Lorsqu'un homme ne sait pas offrir un nouveau foyer à l'enfant

dont il revendique la paternité, qu'il se refuse à épouser la mère,

ou même, tout simplement, à vivre avec elle, est-il vraiment excessif

de lui refuser la protection qu'il ne fait pas lui-même l'effort de

procurer à son enfant prétendu?

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. J.-C. GEUS

A supposer qu'il y ait ingérence dans la vie familiale des

requérants, cette ingérence serait nécessaire à la défense de l'ordre

et à la protection des droits d'autrui.

D'une part, l'ordre social ne saurait s'accommoder de

l'instabilité et de l'incertitude dans l'établissement de la

filiation légale, et d'autre part, sont en jeu les droits de celui

dont la paternité est reconnue par la loi, et de l'enfant qui ne

pourrait se voir attribuer des pères successsifs au gré des

affections de sa mère.

Par ailleurs, si les organes de la Convention n'ont pas Ã

indiquer aux Etats les moyens qu'ils doivent utiliser pour redresser

la violation qu'ils constatent, encore faut-il qu'ils s'interrogent

sur la possibilité d'opérer un tel redressement, qui doit être

efficace non seulement de manière générale mais également dans le cas

particulier qui a donné lieu à la constatation de violation.

La première possibilité consisterait à ouvrir au père biologique

une action en justice lui permettant d'obtenir le renversement de la

présomption de paternité et la reconnaissance légale de sa paternité

biologique.

S'il est possible d'établir scientifiquement qu'un homme ne peut

être le père d'un enfant déterminé, il est impossible d'établir que

tel homme est indiscutablement le père de tel enfant. L'application

du principe "actor incumbit probation" a pour effet de priver de

toute efficacité l'action en justice envisagée, et un système

juridique permettant le renversement de la présomption légale et la

reconnaissance de paternité sans qu'aucune preuve soit apportée

engendrerait de nombreux conflits positifs de paternité ; il ne peut

donc être raisonnablement envisagé.

Reste la voie de l'adoption qui, actuellement, n'est ouverte aux

Pays-Bas qu'aux couples mariés, ce qui, à mon avis, ne se justifie

pas. Toutefois, l'adoption ne peut être accordée que dans l'intérêt

de l'enfant, ce qui implique que l'enfant pourra s'épanouir au

contact d'un père et d'une mère attentifs à son bien-être quotidien,

à son développement intellectuel et affectif.

En l'espèce, le père biologique se refuse au mariage - ce qui

est son droit - mais également à la vie commune, et n'a de ce fait

que des contacts épisodiques avec son enfant.

Dans de telles circonstances, l'adoption ne pourrait être

accordée dans l'intérêt de l'enfant.

Je n'aperçois donc aucune solution acceptable au problème tel

qu'il est posé par les requérants.

Les contacts limités qu'a le requérant avec son fils rendent

hypothétique l'existence d'une vie familiale entre eux, et donc

l'existence d'une ingérence. C'est pour cette raison que je n'ai pu

me rallier à la majorité.

APPENDIX I

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

Date Item

___________________________________________________________________

15 May 1991 Introduction of application

17 July 1991 Registration of application

Examination of admissibility

2 December 1991 Commission's decision to

invite the Government to

submit their observations

on the admissibility and

merits of the application

26 March 1992 Government's observations

29 May 1992 Applicant's observations in

reply

31 August 1992 Commission's decision to

declare the complaints

relating to Articles 8

and 14 admissible and the

remainder of the

application inadmissible.

Commission's decision to

invite the parties, should

they so desire, to submit

further observations on the

merits of the application

Examination of the merits

23 November 1992 Further observations by the

respondent Government on

the merits of the application

30 March 1993 Commission's deliberations

on the merits and final vote

7 April 1993 Adoption of the Report

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K., Z. AND S. v. the NETHERLANDS

K., Z. AND S. v. the NETHERLANDS

LEXI