McGINLEY AND EGAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 21825/93;23414/94 • ECHR ID: 001-45778
Document date: November 26, 1996
- 23 Inbound citations:
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- 9 Cited paragraphs:
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- 2 Outbound citations:
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Application Nos. 21825/93 and 23414/94
Kenneth McGinley and E. E.
against
the United Kingdom
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 26 November 1996)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1-12). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5-7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 8-12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 13-75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. Relevant Background
(paras. 14-36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. The particular circumstances of the first applicant's case
(paras. 37-48). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. The particular circumstances of the second applicant's case
(paras. 49-61). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
D. Relevant domestic law and practice
(paras. 62-75). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 76-139). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
A. Complaints declared admissible
(para. 76). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
B. Points at issue
(para. 77). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
C. The evaluation of the evidence
(paras. 78-102) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
D. As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
(paras. 103-119). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
CONCLUSION
(para. 120) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
E. As regards Article 8 of the Convention
(paras. 121-131). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
CONCLUSION
(para. 132) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
F. As regards Article 13 of the Convention
(paras. 133-135). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
CONCLUSION
(para. 136) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
G. Recapitulation
(paras. 137-139). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, F. MARTINEZ
AND N. BRATZA AS REGARDS ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION. . . . . .33
APPENDIX: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . .34
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European
Commission of Human Rights and of the procedure before the Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicants are British citizens, born in 1938 and 1939 and
resident in Paisley and Glasgow, respectively. They were represented
before the Commission by Mr. Ian Anderson, an advocate and attorney at
law practising both in Scotland and the United States of America.
3. The application is directed against the United Kingdom. The
respondent Government were represented by Ms. Susan Dickson, Agent,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
4. The case concerns the applicants' allegations of non-disclosure of
records concerning their participation in the United Kingdom's nuclear
test programme at Christmas Island in 1958 and they invoke Articles 6,
8 and 13 of the Convention.
B. The proceedings
5. The applications were introduced on 20 April 1993 and
31 December 1993 and registered on 12 May 1993 and 7 February 1994,
respectively.
On 5 April 1994 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b)
of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the applications to the
respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written
observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicants'
complaints under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.
6. The Government's observations were submitted by letter dated
7 September 1994 after two extensions of the time-limit fixed for this
purpose. The applicants replied on 19 January 1995 after three extensions
of the time-limit. Further observations of the Government were submitted
on 10 and 11 May 1995. On 15 May 1995 the Commission decided to join the
applications, request further observations from the parties and adjourn
the application in the meantime. The Government submitted the further
observations on 20 July 1995 after one extension of the time-limit and
the applicants submitted their observations on 17 July and 29 August 1995
also after one extension of the time-limit. On 7 July 1995 the Commission
granted the applicants legal aid. On 28 November 1995 the Commission
declared the applicants' complaints under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the
Convention admissible, declared inadmissible the remainder of the
application and requested further observations of the parties. The text
of the admissibility decision was sent to the parties on 30 November
1995. The observations of the Government were received on 15 February,
12 June, 27 August and 24 October 1996. Observations of the applicants
were received on 29 January, 12 February, 1 April, 10 April, 3 May, 17
June, 8 and 12 August and 24 September 1996.
7. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed
itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly
settlement. In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now
finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.
C. The present Report
8. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance
of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the
following members being present:
Mr. S. TRECHSEL, President
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
P. LORENZEN
K. HERNDL
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
M. VILA AMIGÓ
9. The text of this Report was adopted on 26 November 1996 by the
Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the
Convention.
10. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention,
is:
(i) to establish the facts, and
(ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a
breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the
Convention.
11. The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application
is annexed hereto.
12. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
13. The Commission has set out in this part of the report the facts that
are not disputed by the parties and has set out its evaluation of the
evidence on the disputed facts at part III below.
A. Relevant background
1. Atmospheric Nuclear testing programmes
14. Between 1952 and 1967 the United Kingdom Government carried out a
number of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean and
Australia.
15. Over 20,000 servicemen participated in these tests. The tests
included seven detonations at Maralinga, south Australia in 1956 and 1957
and six detonations at Christmas Island on 8 November 1957, 28 April
1958, 22 August 1958, 2 September 1958, 11 September 1958 and
23 September 1958. The weapons detonated in 1958 at Christmas Island were
more powerful than those detonated at Maralinga and many times more
powerful than those detonated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All devices in
the megaton range (Operations Grapple X, Grapple Y and two in the Grapple
Z series) were detonated over the sea off the south-eastern peninsula of
Christmas Island and the two Grapple Z devices in the kiloton range were
detonated over the south-eastern peninsula. Many of the servicemen who
participated in the tests were lined-up in the open air in light clothing
at the moment of the detonations, ordered to look away from the direction
of the initial flash and then ordered to turn around in the direction of
the blast.
16. The United States also ran a test programme in the Pacific which
included the detonation of a hydrogen bomb at Bikini Island in 1954.
2. Documents submitted in support of the applicants' submission as to
one of the reasons for the United Kingdom's nuclear test programme
17. A document headed "Atomic Weapon Trials", marked "Top Secret" and
dated 20 May 1953, of the Defence Research Policy Sub-Committee of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee states:
"... Many of these tests are of the highest importance to
Departments... The army must discover the detailed effects of
various types of explosion on equipment, stores and men with and
without various types of protection...".
18. On 12 March 1984 a debate took place in the House of Commons on the
United Kingdom's nuclear test programme. The content of the above
document was raised and the Minister for Defence Procurement responded
by stating that what happened was that the blast and thermal and
radiation consequences of a nuclear explosion on man were determined by
taking measurements of the flux level of various protected and
unprotected positions using instruments. The consequences of those flux
levels for man would then be calculated. The Minister also confirmed
that, during the tests in Maralinga and in order to allow servicemen to
experience the effects of nuclear explosions at ranges closer than
previously allowed, 200 United Kingdom servicemen were stationed at about
eight kilometres from the epicentres of the detonations.
19. A memorandum headed "Atomic Weapons Trials and Training" and dated
29 November 1955 noted that during the 1957 trials the Royal Air Force
"will gain invaluable experience in handling the weapons and
demonstrating at first hand the effects of nuclear explosions on
personnel and equipment". On 22 December 1955 the Director of the Atomic
Weapons Research Establishment wrote to the Ministry of Defence in
relation to the supply to a similar Australian body of filter pieces
which measured the fallout from the tests in Australia and he
recommended, if Australia asked to examine the filters, that pieces of
the filters be supplied but "that we wait a few days so that some of the
key isotopes have decayed a good deal".
20. A War Office memorandum dated 19 November 1957 and headed "UK
personnel for duty at Maralinga" began by stating that "All personnel
selected for duty at Maralinga may be exposed to radiation in the course
of their military duties". The memorandum continued by referring to
initial medical examinations including detailed blood count analysis to
determine suitability for duty prior to duty in Maralinga together with
blood analysis on return from duty. It concluded that "A steady and
progressive fall in successive blood counts or a fall below the warning
level indicates that the individual must be removed from all contact with
radioactivity until he has been found fit to return to duties involving
exposure to radioactivity".
21. On 15 July 1958, during a meeting of the Atomic Weapons Research
Establishment to discuss the issue of blood monitoring for leukaemia in
4500 servicemen about to depart for Christmas Island, it was agreed that
only civilian personnel would be tested prior to departure since a
serviceman found to be healthy before the test who contracted leukaemia
afterwards "may have a case for arguing that the test was a cause".
22. A Ministry of Defence file, dealing with prospective blast effects
of the Grapple Y detonation (at Christmas Island), gave details of the
positions of certain categories of servicemen, blast effects, thermal
radiation, radiation effects and radiation fallout and stated that
personnel in the main camp should be paraded as during a previous
detonation in late 1957 with the addition of protective clothing bearing
in mind that "thermal radiation may be expected from all angles due to
scatter". It was emphasised that in the event of the expected yield being
obtained or increased there "will almost certainly be, in addition to
considerable material damage, casualties to individuals and this should
be taken into account."
3. Medical Research Council
23. A report headed "Genetic effects of radiation with reference to man"
of the Medical Research Council ("MRC") dated 6 February 1947 stated that
"all quantitative experiments show that even the smallest doses of
radiation produce a genetic effect, there being no threshold dose below
which no genetic effect is induced".
24. In March 1955 the then Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden) requested
the MRC to appoint an independent committee to report to Parliament on
the medical and genetic effects of radiation. In June 1956 the MRC
committee so reported and commented that exposure to ionising radiation,
however small, could increase the frequency risk of gene mutation in the
reproductive cells, noting that from the film badges of employees of the
Atomic Energy Authority it was possible to calculate accurately "the
doses received by such employees in relation to their expectation of
parenthood" and commenting that the changes in the sex ratio in the
children of those exposed to radiation might be due to genetic damage.
Subsequent to a progress report of the MRC committee being shown to the
Prime Minister, a letter was sent from Downing Street dated 16 November
1955 reporting the Prime Minister as having commented on such
consequences as being "a pity but we cannot help it".
25. A telex dated July 1956 discussed the brief of the Director of the
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment on a recent MRC committee (see
below) report pending his arrival on Christmas Island and stated as
follows:
"We do not want to release any statement on genetic effects or on
radioactivity or strontium pending the arrival of .
If you have to, a safer interpretation of the MRC report in the last
sentence of paragraph 4 would be, `has not shown an increase' rather
than `shows an increase'." (emphasis added)
26. The MRC committee submitted an updated report in 1960 emphasising
that the research conducted gave no grounds for believing that there was
a threshold below which no increase in mutation occurs.
4. The Royal Commission into British Nuclear Testing in Australia
27. The Australian Royal Commission was appointed in July 1984 by the
Queen to enquire into the conduct of the Australian tests. That
Commission was furnished with documentation including statements, plans
and reports covering the planning, execution and results of some of the
test activity in Australia, which documents were also transferred at the
same time (mid-1980's) to the United Kingdom Public Records Office under
reference number DEFE16.
28. The Commission's report was published in 1985. It concluded that in
many respects the information furnished by the United Kingdom Government
to the Australian Government in relation to the test programme was
inadequate. Various specific tests and projects were criticised as being
carried out in an inappropriate and negligent manner causing danger to
both civilian populations and military personnel. For example, the Royal
Commission found that the safety precautions against radiation exposure
employed at Maralinga, south Australia, demonstrated, "ignorance,
incompetence and cynicism" by the United Kingdom for the safety of
persons in the vicinity of those tests. It was also concluded that there
had been some serious departures from the contemporary radiation
protection policies and standards during the test programme. It was
accepted that exposure to radiation at certain dose levels is associated
with increased risk of cancer and genetic effects. While increased
frequency of genetic effect had not been demonstrated in any irradiated
human population (and noting that such a study would not be practicable),
it was accepted that such effects do occur. By reason of the major
detonations and the deposition of fallout across Australia, it was
thought probable that cancers, which would not otherwise have occurred,
had been caused in the Australian population.
29. The Commission, accordingly, recommended, inter alia, that the
benefits of certain compensation legislation be extended to include not
only military personnel but also civilians who were at the test sites at
the relevant time. By agreement dated 10 December 1993 the United Kingdom
agreed to pay £20 million to the Government of Australia in settlement
of all claims made by any persons (excluding United Kingdom test
participants) for injuries connected with the test programme.
5. Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal
30. This tribunal was set up in 1987 to consider claims from residents
of the Marshall Islands about the United States trial detonations at
Bikini Island. By 31 December 1993 the tribunal had admitted 676 claims
in respect of cancer related illnesses suffered by the inhabitants of the
Marshal Islands. The closest of the Marshal Islands was 120 miles (192
kilometres) from Bikini (Rongelap), four of the relevant islands were
over 300 miles (580 kilometres) from Bikini and two were 500 miles or
over (800 kilometres) from Bikini. The total gross compensation awarded
by the tribunal as at 31 December 1993 was $25,225,500.00.
6. Reports of the National Radiological Protection Board ("NRPB"), of
personnel from the Atomic Weapons Establishment ("AWE") and of the
British Nuclear Test Veterans Association ("BNTVA").
(a) The 1988 and 1993 NRPB reports
31. Due to increasing concern expressed in the media about early deaths
of test veterans, the Ministry of Defence commissioned the NRPB (in
conjunction with the Imperial Cancer Research Fund) to carry out a study
into mortality and cancer rates amongst the test veterans. The NRPB
compared the mortality and cancer rates of a body of test veterans
(21,358 persons) with a control group (army personnel who passed similar
medical tests on entry into service but who did not participate in the
testing).
32. During the House of Commons debate on 12 March 1984 on the United
Kingdom nuclear test programme, a Member of Parliament read a letter
received that day from the Joint Committee on the Medical Effects of
Nuclear Weapons which confirmed that the National Radiological Protection
Board's expertise was in monitoring radiation exposure not in carrying
out epidemiological health surveys and, furthermore, expressing surprise
that the Government entrusted the investigation into its own liability
to a Government body when other bodies, whose impartiality could not be
reasonably questioned, were available to do the work. The Minister for
Defence Procurement responded by referring to a previous discussion in
the House of Commons about the independence and suitability of the NRPB
and indicating that he had hoped that the relevant Members of Parliament
who had raised the questions would be prepared to accept a body with the
experience of the NRPB as an acceptable assessment source.
33. The NRPB report concluded that participation in the nuclear test
programme did not have a detectable effect on the test veterans' overall
expectation of life nor on their total risk of developing cancer.
However, the test veterans demonstrated a higher rate of leukaemia and
multiple myeloma than the control group. As a result, the Department of
Social security ("the DSS") subsequently awarded war pensions to those
presenting these two conditions.
34. In order to clarify the situation, a follow up report was completed
extending the period of review over seven more years so that almost
double the number of deaths were available for analysis. The NRPB again
concluded that there had been no detectable difference in the veterans'
expectation of life nor as regards their risk of developing cancer or
other fatal diseases. The suggestion from the previous report that
participants may have experienced small hazards of leukaemia and multiple
myeloma, was found not to be supported by the additional data used for
the second report and the excesses observed in the first report were
reported as being a chance finding, although the possibility that test
participation may have caused an additional risk could not be completely
ruled out.
(b) Report by personnel of the AWE
35. Personnel with the AWE produced a report which described the
environmental monitoring programme at Christmas Island during the test
detonations and the results obtained. The report, which is stated to not
necessarily represent the official views of the AWE, is marked
"unclassified" and is dated October 1993. It concluded that there was no
detectable increase in radioactivity on land, in the sea or in the air
pursuant to the Christmas Island testing. It also concluded that there
was therefore no danger to personnel from external radiation nor from
inhalation and ingestion of radioactivity.
(c) The BNTVA report
36. The BNTVA is a voluntary group founded in 1983 by the first
applicant to campaign for recognition and compensation for those who
participated in the United Kingdom's nuclear test programme and who as
a consequence were allegedly exposed to radiation. Its members number
approximately 3000 and include British ex-servicemen, who claim that they
were deliberately exposed to ionising radiation, and their children who
claim to be genetically impaired. Further to a request by an adviser of
the Defence Select Committee, a statistical report entitled "Radiation
Exposure and Subsequent Health History of Veterans and their Children"
was published by the BNTVA in or about February 1992. It was based on a
survey of the members of the BNTVA and it concluded that 1 in 5 of its
members suffered from cancer and that 1 in 4 veterans had children who
suffered from defects attributable to genetic origin. The BNTVA engaged
a researcher in order to obtain available contemporaneous records in
relation to the nuclear test programme in Australia and the Pacific.
B. The particular circumstances of the first applicant's case
37. On 23 October 1956 the applicant's medical examination for entrance
into the army took place and the clinical examination was normal. The
applicant was enlisted fit for full combat service in any part of the
world. In December 1957 the applicant was posted to Christmas Island and
was present on Christmas Island for the test detonations of 28 April
1958, 22 August 1958, 2 September 1958, 11 September 1958 and 23
September 1958. The applicant was lined-up in the open air in light
clothing at the moment of certain detonations, ordered to look away from
the direction of the initial flash and then ordered to turn around in the
direction of the blast.
38. The only entry during the detonation period in the applicant's
service medical records refers to medical treatment on Christmas Island
between 15 September and 23 September 1958 for a throat infection. Those
records continue on 28 October 1958 with treatment for tonsillitis and
between 14 and 21 November 1958 with the provision of a splint for
"facial palsy". The applicant was subsequently hospitalised at the
military hospital in Honolulu for influenza. This latter treatment is
also reflected in his service medical records.
39. On 10 November 1959 the applicant was given a medical discharge from
service. His statement on discharge records that the applicant suffered
a broken ankle on Christmas Island in May 1958 and that he had been
treated for eight weeks for this as an out-patient of a service hospital
on Christmas Island. His service medical records do not reflect this
treatment. In April 1960 the applicant was awarded a 20% war pension in
relation to a duodenal ulcer attributable to army service. In 1962 he had
to undergo an operation to remove part of his stomach. In 1965 he broke
out in boils all over his body and began to suffer constant pain. In 1967
he was diagnosed as being sterile and in 1973 he began to experience
severe kidney problems. Because of his health problems, the applicant was
unable to retain employment for prolonged periods. His disability was re-
assessed at 30 % disability in respect of his ulcer in June 1980. On 8
June 1982 his disability was reduced again to 20% but restored to 30% on
13 December 1982 following the applicant's appeal to the Pensions Appeals
Tribunal ("the PAT").
40. Following a series of articles in the press in 1982 about the
potential effects of the Christmas Island explosions on those exposed to
them, the applicant came to attribute his history of illness to his
service on the island and sought an increase in his pension to reflect
this. On 1 April 1984 the applicant made a claim for an increase in his
pension in relation to his health problems which he alleged resulted from
exposure to radiation on Christmas Island. On 16 May 1984 the DSS made
a departmental inquiry to the Ministry of Defence. The DSS noted that the
applicant was claiming a war pension for radiation related illnesses and
that he was stationed in Christmas Island. The DSS asked for confirmation
that the applicant was directly involved in the tests and that the
applicant was in the vicinity of the tests either before or after the
tests and further asked what the applicant's duties were, whether the
area in which he served was subject to any radiation and, if so, to how
much radiation. The DSS also queried whether the applicant was wearing
a film badge, what the readings from that badge were and what
instructions about safety precautions and the wearing of film badges were
recorded. It was finally noted that in the event of an appeal to the PAT
the information would be made available to the claimant.
41. On 11 June 1984 the Ministry of Defence confirmed that, from the
"information available and reviewed up to now", the applicant was on the
island during the detonations. His duties were outlined and it was stated
that he was no closer than 40 kilometres from the epicentres of the
detonations, that the areas in which he served were not subject to
fallout and that the initial ionising radiations from the detonations in
the area in which he served were not "sensibly different from ZERO".
Accordingly, the applicant was not exposed to such initial radiations at
any level "sensibly differing from ZERO". It was also confirmed that no
film badges were issued to the applicant, that there were general
radiological safety regulations and specific unit orders issued including
instructions on hazards, safety precautions and on the issue and wearing
of film badges where necessary. The response repeated that the radiation
exposure was zero and the radiation effective dose from the ever present
background radiation was no more and probably less than he would have
received had he remained in the United Kingdom. It concluded that
therefore his medical condition would not have been caused by ionising
radiations from the test programme.
42. On 30 November 1984 the applicant's claim, based on the conditions
of reduced fertility, osteoarthritis, skin problems and renal colic
arising out of radiation, was refused by the Secretary of State for
Social Security pursuant to the deliberations of the war pensions branch
of the DSS, as it was found that these conditions were not attributable
to his military service. The applicant's parallel application, to re-
assess his pension based on the duodenal ulcer, was also refused. On 21
January 1985 the applicant appealed to the PAT against both decisions of
the DSS, claiming that his service medical records had been doctored.
43. On 11 February 1985 the DSS again initiated a departmental enquiry
to obtain all available medical records of the applicant between December
1957 and December 1958 or to confirm, using if necessary Admission and
Discharge Books, the applicant's hospital treatment on Christmas Island
during that period relating to "Disablement rash on body and face". Two
days later, on 13 February 1985, the Ministry of Defence responded by
confirming that "No A & D books held under
particulars quoted. N/T medical records."
44. The DSS obtained evidence including hospital case notes, together
with reports from the applicant's own doctor, a DSS psychiatrist, a
rheumatologist, a dermatologist and a urologist. The psychiatrist stated
that he "would not consider that Mr. McGinley is suffering from a
psychiatric condition". The rheumatologist concluded that the condition
complained of related to normal wear and tear and added that he could
"find nothing to connect it with radiation exposure".
45. On 3 March 1986 the dermatologist gave a detailed report of the
applicant's skin problems, which had included the development of 12 to
14 painful and inflamed cutaneous crusts one of which required surgical
excision and two of which were lanced by a medical practitioner. He noted
scattered open comedones and multiple ice pick scars over the applicant's
face and neck. The doctor indicated that he had no professional
competence to determine whether this condition had been induced by
radiation exposure and recommended that an expert opinion be sought from
someone familiar with the effects of ionising radiation on the skin. The
DSS declined to follow this recommendation for two reasons (noted in a
report by the Chief Medical Officer dated 19 January 1987). The evidence
from the military medical records showed no record of skin problems
during the applicant's service and, on the basis of the report from the
Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State did not accept that the
applicant was exposed to ionising radiation and therefore the point was
irrelevant.
46. In his report of 24 June 1987 the urologist found that he could come
to no conclusion regarding the effect of ionising radiation on the
applicant's infertility and renal problems. The DSS had previously stated
to the urologist that "We have been assured by the AWE that
applicant> was too far away from the test sites to have been contaminated
with any kind of ionising radiation". The applicant's own doctor reported
on the applicant's illnesses and conditions and concluded that, though
individually they might not have been significant, taken as a whole they
could be consistent with radiation exposure.
47. Based on this information the DSS prepared a Statement of Case and
sent an edited copy to the applicant (in accordance with Rule 22 of the
Pension Appeals Tribunal Rules (Scotland) 1981) omitting information on
the basis that it was "undesirable in the interests of the applicant to
disclose to him". The applicant's representative received an unedited
version. On 25 February 1988 the PAT disallowed the appeal.
48. On 9 July 1991 the applicant again requested a claim form in
relation to exposure to nuclear radiation resulting in acne vulgaris,
sterility and severe arthritis in his leg, arms and spine. The DSS again
sought a report from the Ministry of Defence regarding the applicant's
service related ionising radiation exposure. The reply confirmed zero
exposure. The applicant did not pursue this claim after he was reminded
by the DSS of the rejection of his previous claim in 1988. In 1992 the
applicant applied for and received an added assessment of 1-5% for
hearing loss.
C. The particular circumstances of the second applicant's case
49. In October 1956 the applicant enlisted in the Royal Navy at age 17.
He was passed as fit with no medical problems and, in particular, his
respiratory system was recorded as normal. He was enrolled fit for full
combat duty in any part of the world. In April 1958 the applicant was
serving on board HMS Ulysses which was positioned off Christmas Island
at the time of the detonation on 28 April 1958. He was lined-up in the
open air in light clothing at the moment of the detonations, ordered to
look away from the direction of the initial flash and then ordered to
turn around in the direction of the blast.
50. The applicant had a number of chest x-rays (mass miniature
radiography on 70 mm film) on 8 March 1958, 30 April 1959, 30 May 1960
and 1 February 1961. He had follow-up full plate x-rays on
2 February 1961 in Portsmouth, England. The applicant's statement, made
on 2 February 1961 in connection with his discharge from the navy, only
referred to a fractured clavicle. On 8 February 1961 the applicant was
discharged from the navy on compassionate grounds by purchase. The
applicant continued to suffer from exhaustion and breathlessness. An x-
ray taken in June 1965 indicated extensive modular infiltration of both
lungs, which condition was diagnosed as sarcoidosis.
51. On 10 July 1970 the applicant applied for a disablement pension
alleging that his condition was attributable to his exposure to the
nuclear test off Christmas Island. On 14 July 1970 the DSS requested "all
available medical records", including "extracts from the admission and
discharge books if necessary" from the Medical Records Section of the
naval archives registry. The reply, which was received on the same day,
read "No trace medical records". On 28 July 1970 the DSS again raised a
departmental enquiry with the Ministry of Defence stating that the
applicant was claiming a pension for a chest condition which he
attributed to his exposure to a detonation at Christmas Island and
requesting the Ministry to confirm the applicant's service at
Christmas Island and whether he was in close proximity to any explosions.
The Ministry of Defence confirmed that the applicant was 70 miles
(112 kilometres) from the detonation and supplied a trace of the
applicant's service record.
52. On 12 August 1970 the DSS asked the Ministry of Defence for the
applicant's x-ray of 2 February 1961. The response, dated
18 September 1970, noted that a thorough search of the large film
records for 1961 had been made and that no trace of a large film for the
applicant could be found. On 5 October 1970 the DSS made another enquiry
of the Ministry of Defence noting that it appeared, from the case notes
regarding the applicant's post-service treatment previously submitted to
the DSS, that the applicant had been admitted to hospital for two weeks
in 1958 and that the applicant claimed that his lung ailment had been
caused by his exposure to radiation during the test programme in 1958.
The DSS, accordingly, requested confirmation as to whether any type of
atomic device exploded whilst the applicant's ship was stationed off
Christmas Island and, if so, requesting confirmation of the distance of
the ship from the epicentre of the blast. Confirmation was also requested
as to whether the ship was stationed sufficiently close for any crew
members to have accidentally sustained radiation burns, whether the
applicant was likely to have cause to be in the open (given the type of
ship on which he served) and thereby subjected to blast and, if so, what
protective clothing was issued. The DSS also requested the medical
records in relation to a particular entry in the service record
previously sent to the DSS relating to, inter alia, the period between
24 May 1958 and 9 June 1958. The x-rays taken on 70 mm film of the
applicant during service were also requested.
53. The response, dated 16 October and 17 November 1970, noted that no
bed tickets were held for the applicant, that there was "no entry in the
Civil Register nor is there any trace in the Medical Officer's Journal"
and that "all available medical documents" had been sent to the DSS on
20 July 1970. It was also noted that the applicant served on the relevant
ship from 30 April 1957 until 2 November 1958, that the records of the
detonation on 28 April 1958 were held by the War Historical Branch and
that an examination of these and the logbook for the applicant's ship
showed that the ship was approximately 70 miles from the explosion in
April 1958. It was further noted that the Naval Plan for the ship
required "precautions to be taken by ships in target areas". All exposed
personnel were to be completely covered, anti-flash hats, gloves and
goggles were to be worn and long trousers were to be tucked into socks.
54. On 12 January 1971 the DSS medical board found against the
applicant. On 4 March 1971, further to representations received on the
applicant's behalf, an enquiry was made by the DSS of the Ministry of
Defence for any "service documents which the Ministry of Defence may have
been holding including hospital records and x-rays report and films. The
DSS indicated that the reason they were asking again was because of the
applicant's recent representations and that the DSS wanted to confirm
that no further in-service documents are available. The response from the
Ministry of Defence was dated 12 March 1971 and was to the effect that
the case had been thoroughly dealt with and that "to date" further
service documents could not be provided.
55. On 5 April 1971 the applicant lodged an entitlement appeal to the
Pensions Tribunal. A medical report, dated 2 August 1971 and completed
by a senior chest physician retained by the DSS, concluded that it was
virtually certain that the correct diagnosis was sarcoidosis and that the
disease had no relationship of proximity to an atomic explosion in April
1958. However, that physician suggested that the applicant might be
suffering from chronic berylliosis caused by exposure to beryllium, an
alloy used in the nuclear tests. His report indicated that the clinical
effects of berylliosis and sarcoidosis were similar and that it was
important to ascertain the precise nature of the applicant's medical
treatment from 24 May 1958 to 9 June 1958 in order to exclude this
possibility. (The Ministry of Defence subsequently confirmed that the
applicant was on loan to another ship during that time and that no
sickness was documented during that period.)
56. Further to another DSS enquiry dated 26 August 1971 to the Ministry
of Defence in relation to beryllium exposure, the Ministry of Defence
expressed the opinion that the applicant's exposure to beryllium
compounds was unlikely in the course of his work as a stoker. It was also
noted that the log of the relevant ship had been "scrutinised in relation
to the periods at Christmas Island in 1958 and there is certainly no
record to substantiate the story of atomic bomb blast. Certainly had he
been ashore there would have been no significant exposure".
57. On 7 December 1971 an edited Statement of Case was sent to the
applicant, which statement excluded information on the basis of its
"potential to distress or harm the applicant". An unedited version was
sent to the applicant's representative. The applicant disputed the
Statement of Case on the basis that it lacked full medical records in
relation to his illness after the April 1958 detonation and his x-ray
films. He also contended that he was 15 to 20 miles (24-32 kilometres)
from the detonation and not 70 miles (112 kilometres) and he disputed
that the log of his ship contained no evidence that the crew was exposed
to an atomic blast.
58. Following a further enquiry by the DSS in relation to medical
reports and x-rays in light of the applicant's mentioning of "missing
records", the Archives section of Medical Records confirmed, in December
1971, that no further medical records had been traced. Two further
enquiries to the Ministry of Defence were made by the DSS for a special
trace for case notes, x-rays or any other details relating to the
applicant's hospitalisation in April 1958 and for confirmation of the
distance of the applicant's ship from the detonation of April 1958. The
responses dated 12 January and 7 March 1972 noted, inter alia, that no
further medical records could be traced, that no x-ray films were held
by the Ministry of Defence before 1960 and that a recalculation of the
position of the applicant's ship showed that he was 60 miles (96
kilometres) from the blast.
59. On 29 August 1972 the PAT rejected the applicant's appeal.
60. On 21 October 1982 the applicant submitted another claim for a war
pension due to radiation related sarcoidosis of the lung. The DSS
responded to the applicant by reminding him of the decision of the PAT
taken in 1972 and informing him that it was legally binding unless set
aside by the Court of Session in Scotland on a point of law.
61. On 11 July 1991 the DSS received another war pension claim (lodged
by the BNTVA on the applicant's behalf) which was similar to that in
respect of which the PAT issued its decision in 1972 and to the further
war pension claim made in 1982. The applicant was again reminded of the
PAT's decision of 1972 and the applicant responded, by letter dated 30
October 1991, stating that he was not happy with that decision. The DSS
replied by referring the applicant to the fact that the PAT had sight of
his service documents in considering his case. On 25 April 1992 the
applicant made a further claim for a war pension due to deafness. The
claim was rejected by the Secretary of State and the applicant did not
appeal the decision to the PAT.
D. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. Civil action for compensation by servicemen against the Crown
62. The right to compensation under common law is enforceable through
the civil courts once the plaintiff proves that, given the state of
knowledge at the relevant time, the illness or injury was reasonably
foreseeable and, on the balance of probability, was in fact caused by the
action or inaction of the person against whom he is claiming.
63. However, armed forces personnel, whose cause of action arose on duty
before 1987, are barred from taking civil proceedings for compensation
against the Crown by section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. It was
specifically provided that the repeal of section 10 by legislation in
1987 was not applicable to those claiming in respect of pre-1987
occurrences. It is disputed between the parties as to whether the Crown's
immunity from suit survived the judgment in the case of Pearce v. The
Secretary of State for Defence and Ministry of Defence [1988] 2 WLR 145.
However, it is not disputed that to date no one (including Mr. Pearce)
has been able to successfully demonstrate in a civil action for
compensation that an illness was, on the balance of probability, caused
by radiation from the Christmas Island nuclear test programme.
2. War Pensions
64. Servicemen can, in relation to pre-1987 occurrences excluded under
section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, apply for a service
disability pension pursuant to the Naval Military and Air Forces Etc.
(Disablement and Death) Service Pensions Order 1983 in relation to, inter
alia, illnesses and injuries attributable to service.
65. Claims for such a pension are made to the Secretary of State for
Social Security and he decides whether a claimant is entitled to benefit
and the way the benefit should be paid depending on the claimant's
assessed disability. An award of a pension is made where the claimant
raises reliable evidence to demonstrate a reasonable doubt in his favour
that the injury or disease is attributable to service after 2 September
1939.
66. On receipt of an application for a pension, the DSS, inter alia,
obtain the claimant's service records (including service medical records)
from the Ministry of Defence and establish certain basic factual matters.
The DSS doctor may, in order to assist him in forming an opinion as to
whether the claimant is suffering from the disability and whether the
disability is attributable to service, obtain further medical evidence
and reports including civilian medical records. Once this assessment is
completed the Secretary of State for Social Security will give the final
decision.
67. A claimant who is refused a war pension by the Secretary of State
for Social Security can appeal to the PAT and the full entitlement appeal
is governed by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal Acts 1943-1949. The PAT
consists of a legally qualified chairperson, a medical member and
normally a member of the armed services. In order to assist the PAT, the
DSS provides the tribunal with a Statement of Case which is a typed
version of the claimant's service records including service medical
records, subsequent medical reports, medical reports obtained at the
request of the DSS doctor, a statement outlining the reasons of the
Secretary of State for Social Security for the decision and possibly a
statement of the DSS doctor of the evidence considered, the conclusions
reached and the reasons for the conclusions. A further appeal from the
PAT lies on a point of law to the Court of Session in Scotland, either
with the leave of the PAT or of the Court of Session itself. Such an
appeal could be made on the basis that the PAT had erred in law by
"acting upon an incorrect basis of fact" (Secretary of State for
Education and Science v. Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014).
3. Public Records
68. Public Records are defined by section 2 of the schedule to the
Public Records Act 1958 as administrative and departmental records
belonging to Her Majesty, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, in
right of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and, in
particular, records of, or held in, any department of Her Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom or records of any office, commission or
other body or establishment whatsoever under Her Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom. The direction of the Public Records Office and the
execution of the Public Records Acts 1957 and 1968 is the responsibility
of the Lord Chancellor. Pursuant to section 3 of the 1958 Act, records
which have been selected for permanent preservation are transferred not
later than thirty years after their creation to the Public Records Office
or other approved location (and thereby to the public domain) and those
not so selected shall be destroyed or disposed of in another way.
69. Section 5 of the Public Records Act 1958, as amended by the Public
Records Act 1967, provides that public records (other than those to which
the members of the public had access before their transfer to the Public
Records Office) shall not be available for public inspection until thirty
years after the creation of the records or such longer or shorter period
as the Lord Chancellor may, with the approval or at the request of the
Minister or other person who appears to the Lord Chancellor to be
primarily concerned, consider.
70. A letter dated 23 May 1994 from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Defence to a Member of Parliament, written in response to
a complaint as regards access to public records in relation to the United
Kingdom's nuclear test programme, referred, in particular, to 14 "closed
files" identified by the applicants' researcher and confirmed after re-
examination of those files that there were in fact 18 such files, that
one file had been released, that four files would remain "closed", that
five files could "not be traced" and that five had been destroyed due to
an accounting process which was "looser" in the 1980s than it is today.
The letter then explained that the Ministry of Defence found it
convenient to fulfil its obligation under the Public Records Acts by
conducting two reviews - one at the 5 year point and one at the 25 year
point. It stated that records that survive the selection process of the
25 year review, but are deemed too sensitive to release at the normal 30
year point (like those identified by the applicants' researcher) remain
closed under the provisions of either section 3(4) or 5(1) of the Public
Records Acts and that the files in question were withheld under section
3(4) on the grounds of national security subject to review at least every
ten years.
71. A letter dated 29 November 1994 from a Member of Parliament to the
applicants' representative noted that documents relating to the health
and safety of the participants who took part in the tests as well as
recorded radiation levels on Christmas Island were withheld from public
scrutiny beyond the thirty year period set out in the Public Records Acts
for "national security and personal sensitivity reasons". It also noted
that an attempt, by way of motion in the House of Commons in January 1993
to urge the Government to reconsider its decision to retain the said
documents and for the appointment of an independent assessor to assess
the national security reasons for the continued retention, was
unsuccessful. It concluded that at that time the said documents were not
in the public domain and were unavailable for national security reasons.
72. Under section 6 of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal (Scotland) Rules
1981 ("the 1981 Rules") a claimant for a war pension can request the
President of the PAT to direct the Secretary of State to produce to the
PAT official documents and information. If the President considers the
documents and information relevant, he can issue the direction. The
Secretary of State can issue the documents and information to the PAT on
the basis, in the public interest, that they are not made public or he
can refuse to disclose such documents at all in the interests of national
security. Once the documents are refused on grounds of national security,
the PAT must decide if the absence of such records would prejudice the
claimant's case - if not, the PAT must continue the examination of the
claimant's case without the records and, if so, the PAT must adjourn
their consideration of the claimant's case until the national security
factor is no longer an issue.
73. In 1995 the President of the PAT, which was considering an
application by a Christmas Island veteran (for a disability pension for
radiation linked larynx and skin cancer), made an application under
section 6 for certain public records which might support the claim. The
response, from the Deputy Departmental Record Officer dated 4 May 1995,
indicated that certain files would be released but that others entitled
"Operation Grapple, personnel safety precautions" were declared
temporarily lost and those entitled "Operation Grapple : consideration
of results" could not be released due to the "very sensitive nature of
the contents of the file that relates to the design details of the
devices used in 1957. To release this file would assist a third party
acquire a nuclear capability and its continued retention is part of
Majesty's Government's> commitment to prevent proliferation".
74. It is possible to apply under the Administration of Justice
(Scotland) Act 1972 for an order requiring production of medical records
in anticipation of civil litigation, to obtain an order for Specification
(production) of Documents, in the context of Scottish court proceedings
to recover damages, in order to require government departments to produce
records and to apply for a Writ of Subpoena Duces Tecum in the context
of an action for damages, which writ requires the production to court of
documents held by a third party.
75. The Access to Health Records Act 1990, which sets down certain
rights of persons to, inter alia, medical records, came into force on 1
November 1991. It relates only to records compiled after 1 November 1991.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaints declared admissible
76. The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaints
about non-disclosure of contemporaneous records in relation to the test
detonations at Christmas Island in 1958.
B. Points at issue
77. The points at issue are whether there has been:
- a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention;
- a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention; and
- a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
C. The evaluation of the evidence
78. The Commission has, prior to dealing with the applicants' complaints
under specific Articles of the Convention, evaluated the evidence on
certain disputed facts relating to the creation and existence of relevant
contemporaneous records and the results of the NRPB and AWE analyses. The
Commission notes that it has taken into consideration in its evaluation
the conduct of the parties in responding to questions raised by the
Commission, and in particular, the clarity and completeness of those
responses (mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 161).
1. Relevant contemporaneous records
(a) The purpose of the test detonations
79. In the first place, the applicants submit that one of the purposes
of the test detonations was to test the effects of radiation on them and
that, accordingly, relevant monitoring records must have been created.
They refer in particular to the line-up procedure used and to various
Government memoranda.
80. In particular, the first applicant claims that on 28 April 1958 he
was lined up with other men on a beach on Christmas Island without
protective clothing for the first megaton explosion. They were ordered
to stand, with their eyes closed and hands over their eyes, with their
backs to the air detonation, approximately eleven miles (18 kilometres)
away, of a megaton nuclear bomb. Immediately after the detonation, the
men were ordered to turn and face the explosion. He then describes in
detail the immediate effects on him together with his subsequent illness
and treatment including immediate searing heat and air blast, diarrhoea,
nausea and sickness together with severe blistering of the skin on his
face, arms and hands which required medical treatment at the military
tent hospital for approximately 10 days consisting of various
applications of medications to the skin and tablets for nausea.
Thereafter, his condition improved with the exception of numbness and
paralysis of his right leg, which the applicant experienced 1-2 weeks
after the detonation and for which the applicant was re-admitted to the
tent hospital for approximately two weeks where he received a plaster
cast for his leg.
81. Again, on 2 and 11 September 1958, the applicant claims that he and
other men were ordered onto the beach to line up for two further
detonations. On 2 September he was wearing only a shirt and shorts.
Subsequently, tablets were administered to him by the tent hospital
personnel over a seven day period for his diarrhoea and nausea and he was
also ordered to take a series of decontamination showers following each
of which he was passed through a radiation monitoring machine. After the
second detonation the applicant submits that he received further
treatment at the tent hospital for nausea and fever and required a daily
administration of tablets over a four to five day period. On 22 August
1958 and 23 September 1958 the applicant was ordered to continue
operating a bulldozer during the explosion in the vicinity of two
detonations. The applicant recalls that the relevant service orderlies
who administered the treatment he described above made notes and that,
while he was in hospital for the numbness in his leg, he remembers
entries being made on his medical chart.
82. The second applicant claims that on 28 April 1958 he and other
members of the crew were ordered on deck to witness a megaton nuclear
detonation in the atmosphere which detonation was at a distance of 12 to
20 miles (19-32 kilometres). He alleges that the men were ordered to turn
their backs to the initial detonation and to face the ensuing blast. The
applicant claims that he suffered from skin burns, nausea, exhaustion and
breathlessness for which he received medical treatment.
83. The applicants also refer to certain official documents arguing that
they clearly indicate that the Government had meant to expose them to
radiation and to discover the effects of radiation on them with and
without various types of protection (see paragraphs 17-22 above).
84. The Government deny, in their observations of 14 June 1995, that the
purpose of the detonations was to test the effects of radiation on
servicemen. The Government deal for the first time with the line-up
procedure in observations dated 25 May 1995 in a related application (No.
23413/94, Dec. 28.11.95). In those observations the Government referred
to a "mustering" procedure by which men were ordered to line up on the
beach, to face away from the detonations and then to immediately face the
detonation site thereafter. The Government explained that this procedure
was for the servicemen's benefit namely, to ensure that they did not look
at the initial flash as that would injure their eyes.
85. In the present application, the Commission posed a question by
letter dated 19 May 1995 as to whether it was disputed that the
applicants were ordered as indicated by them (including references to a
line-up procedure) to participate in the nuclear testing in 1958. The
Government responded by confirming that the applicants were serving in
the armed forces in 1958, that this required them to undertake duties in
support of the nuclear test programme (by, for example, driving a
bulldozer), that it was denied that the devices were tested on the
applicants and that the purpose of the tests was to test the devices
themselves (Government's observations dated 14 June 1995). It was only
in the Government's later observations (dated 1 February 1996) that the
Government accepted that the applicants were lined-up along with other
service personnel in the open air in light clothing at the moment of the
nuclear detonations, ordered to look away from the direction of the
initial flash and then ordered to turn around in the direction of the
blast. However, this procedure was, according to the Government, for the
applicants' benefit, namely to ensure that they did not look at the
initial flash as that would injure their eyes.
86. As regards the various memoranda referred to by the applicants, an
extract from the 1953 memorandum (see para. 17 above) was included in the
Statement of Facts sent to the Government with the initial communication
of the applications. No comment was made by the Government in relation
to the terms of the memorandum until its observations in the above-
mentioned related application dated 25 May 1995. Following a direct
question posed in that respect in the present applications, the
Government stated, in its observations dated 1 February 1996, that the
1953 memorandum does not indicate that the effects of radiation on
servicemen were to be established by exposing those persons to radiation
but to establish, through the use of, for example, dummies and radiation
level recordings, the likely effects on servicemen. As to the other
memoranda the Government deny that they support the applicants'
allegations and submit that those memoranda have been taken out of
context by the applicants.
87. The Commission notes that the applicants raise the motivation behind
the test detonations as a basis for arguing that the purpose of the tests
detonations was to discover the effects of radiation on servicemen, that
it would be logical that contemporaneous records monitoring the physical
effects on the applicants (including necessary medical treatment) must
have been created and that these have not been disclosed. However, the
Commission considers that even if the reason for the test programme was,
inter alia, to test the effects of radiation on servicemen leading to the
consequent creation of such monitoring records, this gives no indication
of how long such records were preserved. Accordingly, the Commission
cannot establish in this way if such records existed on the acceptance
of the right of individual petition by the United Kingdom (14 January
1966) or for any period thereafter.
88. However, the Commission notes the apparent reluctance on the part
of the Government to accept expressly that the applicants were ordered
to line up in the open air at the time of the detonations and considers
the explanations of the Government as to the purpose, as submitted by the
applicants, of the test detonations and as to the meaning of the
memoranda to be unconvincing. It notes, in particular in this latter
respect, that the Government have not given any details of any dummies
used or of how testing on inanimate objects could amount to a test of the
physical effect and impact of radiation on human beings. Accordingly, the
use of the line-up procedure and the texts of the Government memoranda
constitute, in the Commission's opinion, a basis for a reasonable anxiety
and concern in the minds of the applicants as to the nature and impact
of their participation in the nuclear test detonations.
(b) Medical records
89. Secondly, the applicants submit that there are coincidental gaps in
their service medical records disclosed to them which gaps should contain
detailed notes of their medical treatment after the explosions and which
gaps correspond with their exposure to the test detonations. In addition,
the first applicant compares the detailed and frequent entries both
before his transfer to Christmas Island and after the detonation period
with the detailed medical treatment he received during the detonation
period and the lack of entries reflecting such treatment. He has also
submitted a photograph of himself taken in 1958 on Christmas Island
wearing a cast on his leg. He claims that the cast was applied due to
paralysis after a detonation whereas his statement on discharge refers
to his breaking his ankle in May 1958 and to eight weeks medical
treatment in this respect. However, none of the service medical records
for Christmas Island disclosed to him to date contain any record of
treatment for a leg injury or of the application of a plaster cast. He
also refers to the failure to disclose records of his treatment, in the
United Kingdom, in Otterburn hospital for spasms and internal
haemorrhaging. The second applicant refers to the alleged disappearance
of the x-ray films of 2 February 1961 which related to his lung illness.
He claims that the x-rays were required because of his complaints of
exhaustion and breathlessness and that the full plate x-rays were taken
on 2 February 1961 because of a "pick up" found after the x-ray on 1
February 1961. Both applicants state that they did not mention diarrhoea,
nausea, skin blistering or leg paralysis in their service discharge
statements of 2 September 1959 and 2 February 1961, respectively because
the question posed related to injuries then suffered and they were not
suffering from those particular injuries on discharge.
90. The Government refer to various safeguards (including the line-up
procedures) in place on Christmas Island to avoid exposure of personnel.
They dispute that the applicants were ill as they claim since there are
no medical notes reflecting this and they point out that the applicants
did not refer at all, during their invaliding examination on discharge
from the army, to their having been ill as they allege. As regards the
first applicant's photograph, the Government submit that this would be
consistent with the applicant's statement on discharge but the Government
do not comment on the absence of any records in relation to the
application of the plaster cast and the relevant treatment. As to the
second applicant's x-rays, the Government submit that the x-rays of 2
February 1991 were part of a routine screening operation, that the
results were all negative and that the reports on the x-rays of 2
February 1991 have been supplied. The Government also submit that it
would have been impossible to give persons such significant doses of
radiation (to produce the immediate after effects the applicants allege)
without killing them with the blast and heat from the weapons and they
refer to a publication in this respect ("The effects of Nuclear Weapons"
by Glasstone and Dolan, Third Edition published in 1977).
91. However, the Commission notes that, even if it could be concluded
from the applicants' submissions that medical records were created
treating the applicants after each detonation, the evidence submitted by
the parties gives no indication of how long such records were preserved.
Accordingly and as the Commission found at paragraph 87 above, the
Commission considers that it is not established by the above submissions
that such medical records existed on the acceptance of the right of
individual petition by the United Kingdom (14 January 1966) or for any
period thereafter.
(c) Other relevant contemporaneous documents
92. The Commission notes that, in their observations dated 1 February
1996, the Government have acknowledged that the records of the explosive
yields of the Christmas Island tests were placed in the public domain in
1993 and that the AWE report (provided with the Government's
observations dated 14 June 1995) came into the public domain in 1993 when
it was placed in the House of Commons library.
93. As to the original contemporaneous radiation level records on
Christmas Island, the Commission raised a question of the Government as
to whether contemporaneous radiation level records are classified and,
if so, for what reason they are withheld from the applicants as distinct
from public scrutiny. The Government responded that classified documents
do not contain those records, that environmental radiation monitoring at
Christmas Island is not "currently" classified, that "no information was
withheld from the applicants as there was, and is, no reason to do so"
and the Government referred to the AWE report as "a copy summary of such
information".
94. Further to the Commission's question subsequently put to the
Government as to the whereabouts of the documents containing the original
contemporaneous recordings of radiation levels on Christmas Island in
1958 and as to when these documents were made available to the public,
the Government responded (observations of 1 February 1996) that records
relating to the "atmospheric nuclear test programme" have been stored at
the AWE Aldermaston. They stated that "information from such records" has
been summarised in the AWE report which was placed in the House of
Commons in late 1993. The Government went on to point out that the
explosive yield figures now available can be used to calculate radiation
levels at any specified distance from the point of detonation.
95. The applicants point out that the AWE report was not available until
1993, is not even an official report, is erroneous in itself and that,
in any event, it does not contain the original contemporaneous radiation
level records. They also submit that it is scientifically erroneous to
submit that radiation levels can be deduced from the yield records, the
former depending on a number of external factors apart from the yields
from the devices.
96. The Commission considers the observations of the Government (in
particular those of 1 February 1996) in response to a clear question in
relation to the whereabouts and date of release of the radiation level
records to be reluctant and lacking in candour. The question as to when
the records were released into the public domain was effectively
responded to by noting that the AWE report was released in late 1993.
However, the AWE report is a summary report and does not constitute or
contain the original radiation level records. In light of this conclusion
as to the Government's conduct in the context of this application and in
view of the matters outlined above under the heading "Relevant
Background" (see, for example, paragraphs 28, 35 and 70), the Commission
considers that there is a "co-existence of sufficiently strong, clear and
concordant inferences" allowing it to establish that radiation level
records were created, are stored at the AWE Aldermaston and have not been
released as yet into the public domain (see Eur. Court HR, Ireland v. the
United Kingdom judgment, loc. cit.). Those yield and radiation level
records are hereinafter referred to as the "relevant records".
97. The Commission further notes that the Government have not at any
time indicated to the Commission the reasons for the extension of the
period (beyond the initial thirty year period) during which the relevant
records were withheld from the public domain. By the same token the
Government have not disputed the national security aim proffered by the
applicants (the Member of Parliament's letter of 29 November 1994, the
letters of the Deputy Departmental Record Officer dated 4 May 1995 and
of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence dated 23 May
1994). Accordingly and bearing in mind the nature of the documents in
question, the Commission considers that it must proceed on the basis that
the relevant records were withheld from the public domain due to national
security concerns on the part of the Government.
2. The NRPB and AWE reports
98. The applicants maintain that they have been adversely affected by
their exposure to radiation. They challenge in some detail the NRPB and
AWE reports. They note that, while the 1985 NRPB results demonstrated
that levels of leukaemia and multiple myeloma were three times higher in
the veterans' grouping and that leukaemia was a "cancer most closely
associated with ionising radiation", the study concluded that this
difference was due to the extraordinarily low incidence of those diseases
in the control group, which conclusion would seem to undermine the very
rationale of using a control group. In addition, the NRPB did not have
access to the classified documents and all the necessary information in
terms of the veterans and the control group was supplied to the NRPB by
the Ministry of Defence.
99. In relation to the 1993 survey, the applicants question in detail
the basis for the inclusion and exclusion of certain servicemen in and
from the study. They also challenge the sufficiency of the information
on participants with cancer and the conclusion of the report in relation
to the incidence of leukaemia in veterans. The applicants submit that the
report's conclusions contain inferences which contravene the comparison
hypotheses upon which the studies were based. The applicants also argue
that they have not been able to challenge the evidentiary quality of the
conclusions in the NRPB reports in a domestic court precisely because of
the non-disclosure of contemporaneous records. They challenge the AWE
report on the basis that it is merely descriptive and a summary, that the
report expressly states that it does not necessarily represent the
official views of the AWE and that its conclusions defy the basic
statistical references.
100. The Government submit that the statistical surveys and analyses
completed by the NRPB and the AWE clearly demonstrate that the radiation
levels were insignificant and not dangerous and that there is no
increased mortality or cancer rate in the test participants.
101. The Commission does not consider that it is necessary to comment on
the quality or the results of what are technical documents analysing a
complex and specialised area. It can conclude, however, that the
applicants have raised detailed and substantive grounds to challenge
those reports and it accepts the applicants' contention that the primary
data upon which those reports were based (including the relevant records)
are required before they would be in a position to usefully challenge the
results reported.
102. Having established the above, the Commission has considered below
the applicants' complaints under specific Articles of the Convention in
relation only to the relevant records. In view of the contents of the
parties' observations since admissibility, the Commission observes that
it has considered the effectiveness of any avenues open to the applicants
to obtain the relevant records with the merits of the application (Eur.
Court HR, Kremzow v. Austria judgment of 21 September 1993, Series A no.
176-A).
D. As regards Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
103. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant,
reads as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established
by law."
104. The applicants complain under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention that they did not have effective access to the PAT due to non-
disclosure of records.
1. Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
105. The Commission considers that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention
applies to the applicants' complaint since the determination of their
right to a disability pension constitutes a determination of their "civil
rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention (Eur. Court HR, Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland judgment of
24 June 1993, Series A no. 263).
2. Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
106. The applicants argue that without the relevant records they cannot
raise, by way of reliable evidence, a reasonable doubt in their favour
that their illnesses are attributable to service and that they are,
accordingly, denied effective access to the PAT without those records.
The Government essentially argue that the applicants were not denied
access to any documents, that the applicants had therefore effective
access to the PAT and to the civil courts and that the PAT had all of the
applicants' medical records before it. In any event, the Government point
out, inter alia, that the applicants were not test subjects but rather
participated in support activities in relation to the tests, dispute the
applicants' account of their illnesses and note that the NRPB and AWE
reports indicate that there were no adverse effects on the applicants by
reason of that participation.
107. The Commission recalls that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention
guarantees a right of effective access to court which right can be
subject to certain limitations. While the States enjoy a certain margin
of appreciation in this respect, any limitations on access must not
restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to
such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired, the
limitation must have a legitimate aim and the means employed must be
proportionate to that aim (Eur. Court HR, Fayed v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294, pp 49-50, para. 65).
While all rights guaranteed by the Convention are intended to be
practical and real rather than theoretical or illusory, this is
particularly so of the right of access to court in view of the prominent
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial (Eur.
Court HR, Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32,
pp. 12-13, para. 24).
108. The Commission also recalls that it has established above, that the
relevant records were not (in the case of the yield records) and are not
(in the case of the radiation level records) in the public domain for
national security reasons (see paragraphs 92 and 96-97) and that,
accordingly, the applicants did not have access to the yield records
until at least 1993 and have not had access to the radiation level
records to the present date. It further recalls that the first
applicant's initial claim for a pension commenced on 1 April 1984 and the
second applicant's on 10 July 1970. The Commission must therefore
consider whether the limitations on the applicants' access to the
relevant records constitutes, in the particular circumstances of their
cases, a proportionate limitation on their right of access to the PAT
bearing in mind the legitimate aim of national security.
109. On the one hand, the Commission accepts that a certain control of
access to public records raising national security issues could in
principle be compatible with the obligations under Article 6 (Art. 6) of
the Convention taking into account the particular sensitivity of national
security issues and the State's margin of appreciation. However, the
Commission would note, in this respect, that security concerns can vary
(for example, security concerns about design details of devices used
could be different from any security concerns about records relating to
radiation levels) and that such concerns can also change with the passage
of time. Moreover, the Commission considers that the mere assertion of
security concerns, or the recognition by it of possible security
concerns, does not dispense the Commission from making an appropriate
assessment of the weight and relevance of such concerns.
110. On the other hand, the Commission considers, in the first place,
that the applicants have a strong and legitimate interest in obtaining
access to the relevant records for the following reasons. The Commission
notes its findings, in the context of the motivation for the test
programme, as to the reasonableness of the applicants' concerns about the
nature and impact of their participation in the test programme in
Christmas Island (paragraph 88).
111. It would also add, in this respect, the relative strength of the
devices detonated at Christmas Island as opposed to those detonated at
Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Maralinga, the relative proximity of the
applicants to the epicentre of the detonations as opposed to those
persons accepted as negatively affected by and, accordingly, compensated
for the Bikini Island detonations. The Commission would further note, in
this respect, the results reported by the MRC and the MRC committee in
1947, 1957 and 1960 together with the Prime Minister's reported reaction,
upon which reaction the Government have not commented. The criticisms of
the Australian Royal Commission in relation to the manner in which the
test detonations had been conducted by the United Kingdom in Australia
in 1957 (a year before the Christmas Island detonations), that
Commission's recommendations and the agreement by the United Kingdom
Government to pay monies in settlement of claims in connection with the
test programme are also noted. The Commission also recalls the number of
admitted claims before the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal and
the total compensation awarded by that tribunal. Furthermore, the
Commission agrees with the applicants that the relevant records would
constitute an objective starting point as regards the precise nature and
impact of their participation in the test programme and, consequently,
as regards their claim for a disability pension based on alleged
radiation related illnesses.
112. Secondly, the Commission has had regard to the means available to
the applicants to obtain the relevant records and has found that those
means were not feasible for the present applicants for the following
reasons.
113. In this context, the Commission notes that the first step for an
individual seeking access to public records is to ascertain, via the
public records office, what documents are and are not in the public
domain. However, the Commission considers it relevant to highlight a
number of difficulties particular to the applicants' cases surrounding
the public records system. The United Kingdom's nuclear test programme
was, by any standards, an extremely complex and technical matter.
Consequently, even the general nature and ambit of the programme would
be difficult to clarify. In addition, it was also an enormous undertaking
(there were over 20,000 servicemen involved) and, accordingly, the volume
of documents created would reflect the size and complexity of the
operation. Moreover, the records relating to the test programme in the
Pacific have been released into the public domain on a piecemeal basis -
such records would constitute, by definition, public records and they
would therefore have to be withheld from the public domain for a certain
period of time or destroyed. Certain of those records appear to have been
reviewed, initially withheld, further reviewed and then released (the
yield records). Certain records cannot now be traced by the relevant
records office. Certain records, classed as documents to be withheld on
grounds of national security, have been accidentally destroyed and
certain of such records have not been yet released (the radiation level
records). Furthermore, the test programme took place many years ago
(beginning in 1952 and ending in 1967) ensuring, in light of the above-
described process, some difficulty in tracing records which continue to
exist, are in the public domain or remain withheld from the public
domain. Finally, any person in the process of tracking down public
records relies on the replies of public authorities as to the
whereabouts, contents and nature of such records.
114. For these reasons, the Commission considers that it was difficult
in the extreme for the applicants to determine what contemporaneous
records would have been created and withheld, what records had been
destroyed or could not be traced, how such records had been labelled or
categorised and, accordingly, to what type or category of record they
should attempt to obtain access. In such circumstances, the Commission
considers it justifiable to view the public records system as, for all
practical purposes, inaccessible to the present applicants.
115. The Commission notes that the Government point out that civil
proceedings for compensation mean that ancillary discovery processes
could be commenced by the applicants to obtain the records they seek. The
Government submit that the Crown immunity contained in section 10 of the
Crown Proceedings Act 1947 was set aside by the Pearce judgment in 1988
(loc. cit.). The applicants strongly contest this assertion. The
Commission recalls its comments as regards the effectiveness of such a
civil remedy in its admissibility decision in the present applications
(Nos. 21825/93 and 23414/94, Dec. 28.11.95) and in the above-mentioned
related application (No. 23413/94, Dec. 28.11.95). In any event, the
Commission does not consider that it is an answer to a complaint about
a failing in relation to the PAT system that the applicants should seek
access to records and compensation elsewhere. In the same way as the
Court concluded that Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention
presupposed the existence of a procedure in conformity with its
requirements without the necessity of instituting separate legal
proceedings in order to bring it about (Eur. Court HR, Singh v, the
United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1996, to be published), the
Commission considers that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), insofar as it
guarantees effective access to court, presupposes such effective access
without the necessity of instituting separate legal proceedings.
116. The applicants applied for disability pensions on the grounds that
they suffered from radiation related illnesses and, in this context, the
Commission notes section 6 of the 1981 Rules which deals with access to
official documents and information in the context of pensions
proceedings. However, where documents are covered by national security,
the Secretary of State can refuse to produce such documents and the
applicants have provided evidence that requests by the President of the
PAT for records in relation to the Christmas Island detonations are
refused on the grounds of national security. Furthermore, on receipt of
such a refusal from the Secretary of State, the PAT must decide if the
absence of such records would prejudice the claimant's case - if not, the
PAT has no choice but to continue the examination of the claimant's case
without the records and, if so, the PAT must adjourn its consideration
of the case for an indefinite period namely, until the national security
factor is no longer an issue. In the case of the yield records the
adjournment would have been approximately eight years after the first
applicant's first application to the PAT and almost twenty-three years
after the second applicant's first application to the PAT. In the case
of the radiation level records, the Commission has established that the
national security objection to disclosure continues to the present day.
117. Moreover, the Commission considers that in such a specialised field
(a nuclear test programme), the task of the assessment of any causal link
between the detonations and the applicants' illnesses called for an
equally specialised enquiry and decision-making procedure which procedure
would take account of the unusual nature of the matter at issue, the
enormity of the test programme, the consequent limited range of
independent qualified expertise together with any compelling security
considerations. It notes, in this respect, that any expertise in this
field would be highly specialised and would involve close scrutiny of,
inter alia, relevant contemporaneous records as regards the detonation
programme at Christmas Island, the 1988 and 1993 NRPB reports, the AWE
report, the BNTVA report, any relevant studies concerning the detonations
at Nagasaki and Hiroshima together with such reports concerning the
United Kingdom and United States test programmes in the Pacific and
Australia. The Commission notes, in contrast, the relatively bald
assertions of the Ministry of Defence in response to the DSS's enquiries
during the pensions proceedings (see paragraphs 41 and 56) that the first
applicant's exposure to radiation was not sensibly different from zero
and that there was no record to substantiate the second applicant's story
of an atomic bomb blast.
118. However, there is nothing to indicate that the DSS and the PAT, as
constituted, were equipped with the necessary powers, experience or
scientific qualifications to undertake the above-described task or that
these bodies had any possibility of dealing with cases other than on an
individual basis. It notes, in this respect, that the Governments of
Australia and the United States considered it necessary to set up special
bodies of enquiry and decision to deal with claims from persons alleging
injuries caused by nuclear test detonations.
119. The Commission has commented above (paragraph 109) on any national
security concerns relating to the relevant records and on its role in
that respect. However, the Commission recalls its findings that the
applicants had a strong interest in obtaining access to the relevant
records and that they had no feasible means to obtain those records. In
such circumstances, the Commission considers that the applicants' access
to the relevant records and, thereby, to the PAT to obtain disability
pensions was more theoretical than real (within the meaning of the above-
mentioned Airey judgment) and, as such, a disproportionate limitation on
their right of access to the PAT. Accordingly, the Commission finds that
the applicants did not have effective access to court within the meaning
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
120. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
E. As regards Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
121. The applicants complain under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
that the non-disclosure of records constituted an unjustifiable
interference with their private lives. That Article, insofar as relevant,
reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life,
..."
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, ...."
122. The applicants contend, inter alia, that their participation in the
test programme constituted a significant event in their young lives and
that the relevant records are essential for their understanding of the
nature and impact on them of that participation. They refer to the Gaskin
case (Eur. Court HR, Gaskin v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July
1989, Series A no. 160, p. 15, paras. 35-37) and submit they are in an
equivalent position to that applicant who wanted unimpeded access to his
medical file in order to establish his medical condition. They argue that
the release of the records in the Gaskin case was complicated by a
confidentiality problem which does not exist in this case in relation to
the detonation related medical records. The applicants dispute that
current medical examinations could establish the contemporaneous facts
in relation to the nature and impact of their exposure to radiation which
took place approximately 38 years ago. It is necessary, rather, to
establish these facts from contemporaneous records before medical
conclusions can now be drawn as to their current medical conditions.
123. The Government submit that the Gaskin case did not establish that
an individual has an "unfettered right of access" to information held
about him by the State and that the Gaskin case can be distinguished on
its facts as the nature of the information withheld from Mr. Gaskin was
fundamentally different from that which the applicants allege is being
withheld from them. In this latter regard, the Government point out that
the information sought in the Gaskin case was of a highly personal nature
which could not otherwise be found by that applicant. In the present case
the Government argue that the information sought does not purport to
provide insight into the applicants' identities as human beings and,
furthermore, can be pieced together from the applicants' memories or be
acquired from other sources (for example, from their own doctors).
124. The Commission is satisfied that the relevant records constitute the
only source of certain primary data from which the applicants can begin
to construct the actual nature and physical impact of their participation
in the test programme, which participation can be reasonably said to
amount to a highly significant event in their young lives. Accordingly,
in the same way in which the applicant's file in the Gaskin case related
to his private and family life, the Commission considers that the
relevant records relate to the applicants' private lives.
125. The Commission considers that the substance of the applicants'
complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) is that the State has "failed to act"
(see, for example the Airey v. Ireland judgment, loc. cit., p. 17, para.
32) in that it failed to disclose the relevant yield records prior to
1993 and that it has failed to disclose the radiation level records to
date. The Commission recalls that, although the essential object of
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention is to protect the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, there may, in addition,
be positive obligations inherent in the respect for private life which
would address a "failure to act" complaint. In determining whether or not
such an obligation exists, regard will be had to the fair balance that
has to be struck between the general interests of the community and the
interests of the individual and in striking this balance the aims
mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8) may be of a
certain relevance (see, for example, Eur. Court HR, Rees judgment v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 17 october 1986, Series A no. 106, p. 15,
para. 37). Accordingly, the matter at issue is, in the opinion of the
Commission, whether a positive obligation arose under Article 8 (Art. 8)
of the Convention as regards the United Kingdom Government's provision
of access to the relevant records to the applicants.
126. The Commission also recalls that the essential complaint of the
applicant in the Gaskin case was of a failure of the Government to act
and, in establishing whether such a positive obligation on the Government
existed, the Court balanced that applicant's interest in reconstructing
part of his care and treatment over a significant period of his young
life and the wish to maintain the confidentiality of contributors to the
records in question. It concluded that the lack of an independent
authority finally deciding on access to the records where a contributor
fails to answer or withholds consent did not constitute a proportionate
response to the applicant's interests even bearing in mind the importance
of the legitimate aim of the confidentiality of the relevant public
records.
127. The Commission accepts the Government's argument that the Gaskin
case did not establish that an individual has an "unfettered right of
access" to information held about him by the State and indeed notes that
the Court specifically pointed out that they were not establishing such
a right in general but commenting on the particular circumstances
presented. It is, accordingly, the Commission's task to determine the
"fair balance" of the competing interests involved in the particular
circumstances of the present cases and consequently, the existence of a
positive obligation as regards the disclosure of the relevant records to
the applicants.
128. As in relation to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,
the Commission accepts the national security issues involved in relation
to the relevant records and the particular sensitivity of such issues.
It also notes that, in accordance with Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of
the Convention, a certain control of public records raising national
security issues could in principle be considered to be compatible with
the Government's obligations under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention,
taking into account the State's margin of appreciation.
129. On the other hand, the Commission considers, for the reasons
outlined above in relation to the complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art.
6-1), that it was reasonable for the applicants to be concerned about the
nature and impact of their participation in the test programme and that
they had a strong and legitimate interest in obtaining access to the
relevant records. The Government argue that the applicants could have
sought the relevant records by instituting certain proceedings. Despite
the Pearce judgment (loc. cit.) to which the Government refer, the
Commission considers that taking a civil action for damages, with its
ancillary discovery processes, to be an onerous task due to the Crown's
immunity which has been statutorily enshrined since 1947 and recently
statutorily confirmed in 1987 in relation to matters which arose prior
to 1987. The Commission has commented above (paragraph 116) on section
6 of the 1981 Rules which can be invoked in the context of proceedings
before the PAT. The Commission further notes its comments and findings
in such respects in its decisions as to the admissibility of the above-
mentioned related application (No. 23413/94, loc. cit.) and of the
present applications (Nos. 21825/93 and 23414/94, loc. cit.). Moreover,
such proceedings would be rendered an even more unlikely route to the
relevant records by the practical inaccessibility of the public records
system to the present applicants.
130. Moreover, the Commission is also satisfied that a separate issue
arises for its consideration under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
because, quite apart from any award of a pension, the Commission notes
the lack of any provision to date of any individual information or
explanations to the test participants as to the nature and impact on them
of their participation in the tests despite what the Commission accepts
as reasonable concerns in this respect on their part and the increasing
concern about early deaths of test veterans which led to the
commissioning of the first NRPB report. The Commission notes the
publication of the NRPB and AWE reports but this took place in 1988 and
1993, the applicants raised substantive and detailed challenges to those
reports and to the independence of those bodies and those reports cannot
be objectively scrutinised without the primary data upon which they are
based.
131. Accordingly for the particular reasons outlined above, the
Commission considers that the domestic system has not responded in a
proportionate manner to the applicants' strong and legitimate interest
in obtaining access to the relevant records and, accordingly, there has
been failure to fulfil the positive obligation on the United Kingdom
inherent in the applicants' right to respect for their private lives.
CONCLUSION
132. The Commission concludes, by 23 votes to 3, that there has been a
violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
F. As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
133. The applicants also complain under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention that they do not have an effective remedy in relation to the
non-disclosure of relevant records, which Article reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity."
134. The applicants submit that they have, at the very least, arguable
claims of a violation of Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 6,8) of the Convention
and maintain their argument that they have no effective domestic remedy
in that regard. The Government argue, inter alia, that the applicants
have no arguable claim in relation to the complaints raised and thus no
question arises to be considered under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention.
135. The Commission recalls the constant case-law of the Convention
organs that, where questions of civil rights and Article 6 para. 1 (Art.
6-1) arise, it is not necessary to make a separate examination of the
case under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention because its
requirements are less strict than, and are absorbed by, those of Article
6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (see, for example, Eur. Court HR,
R v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p.
126, para. 90). In addition and in light of the Commission's conclusion
under Article 8 (Art. 8) above, it does not find that it is necessary to
consider the applicants' complaints under Article 13 in conjunction with
Article 8 (Art. 13+8) of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
136. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that it is not necessary to
consider the applicants' complaints under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention.
G. Recapitulation
137. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (para. 120).
138. The Commission concludes, by 23 votes to 3, that there has been a
violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (para. 132).
139. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that it is not necessary to
consider the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention (para. 136).
H.C. KRÜGER S. TRECHSEL
Secretary President
to the Commission of the Commission
(Or. English)
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF
MM. S. TRECHSEL, F. MARTINEZ AND N. BRATZA
AS REGARDS ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
While we have voted in favour of a violation of Article 6 in the
present cases for the reasons given in the Commission's report, we are
unable to share the view of the majority of the Commission that there has
been a separate breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
The essential complaint of the applicants concerns the non-
disclosure of relevant records and the consequent impact on their ability
to establish their claims for disability pensions.
The only relevant records which it has been established existed and
continue to exist are not medical records or documents containing data
or information of a personal nature concerning the applicants or their
involvement in the test programme, but records of a more general
character concerning levels of radiation during and following the nuclear
detonations. There is nothing to indicate that the relevant records make
any specific reference to the applicants or to their participation in the
test programme.
As the Commission has found, the failure to disclose the records
amounts to a denial of effective access to court within the meaning of
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. Having regard to this conclusion,
even assuming that the records may be said to relate to the private life
of the applicants, we have not found it necessary to reach a finding on
the question whether the non-disclosure of the same records also amounts
to a breach of the applicants' rights under Article 8 of the Convention.