PAEZ v. Sweden
Doc ref: 29482/95 • ECHR ID: 001-45782
Document date: December 6, 1996
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Application No. 29482/95
Jorge Antonio Paez
against
Sweden
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 6 December 1996)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1-16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5-11). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 12-16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 17-58). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 17-34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. The evidence before the Commission
(paras. 35-51) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
i. The United Nations Committee against Torture
(para. 36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ii. The Peruvian Government's report to
the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (para. 37) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
iii. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (para. 38). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
iv. The United Nations Human Rights
Committee (para. 39) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
v. Human Rights Watch (paras. 40-43). . . . . . . . . .12
vi. Amnesty International (para. 44) . . . . . . . . . .14
vii. The State Department of the
United States of America (para. 45). . . . . . . . .15
viii. The Peruvian press (paras. 46-47). . . . . . . . . .16
ix. The resurgence of violent Sendero Luminoso
activities (para. 48). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
x. The case of Mr. Castillo Paez before the
Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights (paras. 49-51). . . . . . . . . . . . .17
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
C. Relevant domestic law
(paras. 52-56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
D. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees
(paras. 57-58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 59-84). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
A. Complaint declared admissible
(para. 59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
B. Point at issue
(para. 60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
C. As regards Article 3 of the Convention
(paras. 61-83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
CONCLUSION
(para. 84) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, I. CABRAL BARRETO,
N. BRATZA AND M. VILA AMIGÓ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. J-C. GEUS, JOINED BY MRS. J. LIDDY
and MM. A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK, A. WEITZEL, I. BÉKÉS, J. MUCHA
AND A. PERENIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. F. MARTINEZ, M.A. NOWICKI
AND B. CONFORTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
APPENDIX: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European
Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant is a Peruvian citizen, born in 1971 and currently
resident in Sweden. He was represented before the Commission by Mr. Tomas
Nilsson, a lawyer in Stockholm.
3. The application is directed against Sweden. The respondent
Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. Carl Henrik Ehrenkrona
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
4. The case concerns the applicant's impending expulsion to Peru. He
invokes Article 3 of the Convention.
B. The proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 16 November 1995 and registered
on 7 December 1995.
6. On 7 December 1995 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para.
2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the
respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written
observations on its admissibility and merits. Pursuant to Rule 36 of its
Rules of Procedure, the Commission also decided to indicate to the
Government that it would be desirable in the interests of the parties and
the proper conduct of the proceedings not to enforce the expulsion order
concerning the applicant until the Commission had examined the
application at the latest on 26 January 1996. On 25 January 1996 the
Commission's indication was prolonged until 8 March 1996.
7. The Government's observations were submitted on
28 February 1996, after two extensions of the time-limit fixed for that
purpose. On 7 March 1996 the Commission's indication under Rule 36 was
prolonged until 19 April 1996. On 8 March 1996 the applicant was granted
legal aid.
8. The applicant's observations in reply were submitted on
10 April 1996, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that
purpose. The Government submitted additional observations on
17 April 1996.
9. On 18 April 1996 the Commission declared the application admissible
and prolonged its indication under Rule 36 until further notice.
10. The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to
the parties on 22 April 1996 and they were invited to submit further
observations on the merits. Such observations were submitted by the
applicant on 9 and 22 May 1996 and by the Government on 20 May 1996.
11. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed
itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly
settlement. In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now
finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.
C. The present Report
12. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance
of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the
following members being present:
Mr. S. TRECHSEL, President
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
P. LORENZEN
K. HERNDL
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
M. VILA AMIGÓ
13. The text of this Report was adopted on 6 December 1996 by the
Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the
Convention.
14. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention,
is:
(i) to establish the facts, and
(ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a
breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the
Convention.
15. The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application
is annexed hereto.
16. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case
17. The applicant arrived in Sweden on 12 February 1991. On 4 March 1991
he requested asylum, referring to his activities within the armed
opposition group Partido Comunista del Perú - Sendero Luminoso (Communist
Party of Peru - Shining Path; hereinafter "Sendero Luminoso"). He had
become a member of the movement in July 1990 and had thereafter
participated in distributing political propaganda in support thereof. In
August 1990 he had participated in the building of a road block. He had
also taken part in demonstrations and had given speeches in support of
the movement. On 13 November 1990 his closest superior within the
movement had been arrested and a few days later the applicant had been
subjected to an unsuccessful kidnapping attempt. He had then gone into
hiding. Meanwhile, he had been searched for in his home. He had stayed
with friends until his departure from Peru on 10 February 1991. With the
assistance of friends he had left Peru holding a valid passport.
18. In support of his asylum request the applicant furthermore submitted
that his family had been very active politically. His parents had been
members of leftist movements. His father had been imprisoned for four
years in the 1960's on account of his activities within such a movement.
One of the applicant's cousins, A, had been arrested and killed by
paramilitary troops in July 1989. Another cousin, Mr. Ernesto Castillo
Paez, had been arrested by the police in October 1990 and had since then
disappeared. A further cousin, Ms. Monica Castillo Paez, had also lodged
a request for asylum in Sweden, principally referring to her activities
within a supporting section of Sendero Luminoso.
19. In March 1991 Z, a human rights lawyer engaged in investigating the
disappearance of Mr. Castillo Paez received a letter-bomb which blew off
one of his arms. He had previously been threatened with death. He was
later granted asylum in Sweden.
20. In October 1991 the applicant's mother, L, arrived in Sweden
together with one of her daughters, M. A further daughter, I, arrived in
Sweden in July 1991. In her asylum request L referred to the kidnappings
and disappearances of her nephews A and Mr. Castillo Paez in 1989 and
1990, respectively, which had allegedly been carried out by the Peruvian
paramilitary group Comando Democratico Rodrigo Franco ("CDRF"). Having
tried to investigate the kidnapping of Mr. Castillo Paez, she had been
threatened by members of CDRF. From her husband, who had remained in
Peru, she had learnt that members of CDRF had come to look for her in
August 1991.
21. On 18 June 1992 the National Immigration Board (Statens
invandrarverk) refused L, M and I asylum. The Board noted, in particular,
that on two occasions I had left Peru and returned there without
encountering any problems. The alleged persecution by CDRF could not be
considered proven. Finally, the parents of Mr. Castillo Paez were still
alive and the father had not considered his security jeopardised. L, M
and I appealed to the Aliens Appeals Board (Utlänningsnämnden).
22. On 1 October 1992 Ms. Castillo Paez was refused asylum by the
Swedish Government. In November 1992 she lodged an application with the
Commission, alleging that her return to Peru would subject her to
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. This application was
declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded (No. 20990/92, Dec.
8.4.93, not published).
23. On 1 June 1993 the National Immigration Board rejected the
applicant's asylum request and ordered his expulsion. The Board did not
question his account of his activities within Sendero Luminoso. It
considered, however, that his lawful departure from Peru showed that his
activities within the movement had not become known to the Peruvian
authorities. In addition, the Board considered that, although the
applicant had not himself participated in any serious offences, he had
nevertheless been working for an organisation whose methods were covered
by Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
("the 1951 Convention"). He was therefore not entitled to asylum.
24. On 18 August 1994 the Regional Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") stated, as regards L's appeal before
the Aliens Appeals Board, as follows:
"... [L] seems to have given a clear account of her
experiences in her country of origin and the reasons for her
departure. The fact that her daughter, [I], has left the
country legally on two occasions should not discredit her
claim. According to information available to UNHCR it is
possible to obtain a passport and leave the country legally by
bribing the relevant officials even if the person concerned
fears difficulties for example because of political activities
directed against the authorities. ..."
25. On 16 December 1994 the Aliens Appeals Board decided to refer the
applicant's appeal to the Government. In its opinion to the Government
the Board noted that he belonged to a politically very active and
well-known family. It confirmed the incidents involving his cousins. The
Board could not exclude that the applicant might, on his return to Peru,
be persecuted on account of his and his family's political activities.
It therefore considered that he could claim status as a de facto refugee.
The Board recalled, however, the Swedish Government's decision of
principle of 1992 to the effect that asylum seekers who "in one way or
another" had been involved in, inter alia, activities of Sendero Luminoso
should not be entitled to asylum. The Board nevertheless noted that the
Government's decision had been repeatedly criticised.
26. Before the Government the applicant referred to an opinion submitted
by the Swedish branch of Amnesty International dated 10 May 1995. The
organisation expressed its concern about the fact that the current human
rights situation in Peru was not sufficiently taken into account in the
Swedish authorities' examination of asylum requests. Amnesty
International furthermore stressed that no one should be refused asylum
on account of having participated in peaceful activities. Article 1 F of
the 1951 Convention should be interpreted in line with the Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Amnesty International finally
noted that the applicant's cousin, Ms. Castillo Paez, had obtained
refugee status in the Netherlands after having been recognised as a
refugee by the UNHCR.
27. On 12 October 1995 the Government (the Minister of Labour) rejected
the applicant's appeal, stating as follows:
(translation from Swedish)
"In support of his request for asylum [the applicant] has
stated that he has been active for the benefit of an
organisation which, according to what is known, has committed
repeated severe crimes of the character referred to in Article
1 F (a) of [the 1951 Convention]. The protectional provisions
of [that] Convention do not, according to the same Article,
apply to a person who has been active for the benefit of such
an organisation.
The Government share the Aliens Appeals Board's assessment
according to which [the applicant] is not a refugee within the
meaning of chapter 3, section 2 of the [1989] Aliens Act
[utlänningslag 1989:529]. He must, however, be considered as
having presented weighty grounds within the meaning of chapter
3, section 1 (3) ... [for his unwillingness to return to his
country of origin on account of the political situation
there]. Accordingly, [the applicant] in principle fulfils the
requirements for being regarded as a so-called de facto
refugee.
Making an overall assessment, the Government finds, on the
basis of [his] activities for the benefit of the
above-mentioned organisation ..., that there are special
reasons within the meaning of chapter 3, section 4 of the
Aliens Act for not granting [him] asylum. The remaining
grounds invoked [by him] do not constitute any reason for
letting him stay in the country."
28. The applicant's brother had also requested asylum in Sweden,
referring to activities which he had carried out for the benefit of
Sendero Luminoso. By virtue of a similar decision of the Government dated
12 October 1995 he, too, was ordered to be expelled. This expulsion order
has not yet been enforced.
29. The Government's decisions of 12 October 1995 were reported in
Peruvian newspapers. For instance, on 13 October 1995 the newspaper
"Expreso" wrote about the Sendero Luminoso "terrorists" ordered to be
expelled from Sweden. It noted, however, that the Swedish authorities had
not disclosed their identities.
30. On 30 November 1995 the Swedish branch of Amnesty International
intervened in the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board on behalf
of L, reiterating its previously expressed concerns regarding her case.
It added that the disappearance of her nephew, Mr. Castillo Paez, was
under investigation by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.
This fact in itself naturally meant that the Peruvian authorities'
interest in L and her family had increased rather than decreased.
31. On 21 December 1995 the National Immigration Board stayed the
enforcement of the applicant's expulsion in view of the Commission's
indication under Rule 36 issued on 7 December 1995 (see para. 6).
32. On 16 February 1996 the Aliens Appeals Board granted L, M and I
asylum as de facto refugees. It noted that the principal reasons advanced
by them as to why they were unwilling to return to Peru were L's attempts
to investigate the fate of Mr. Castillo Paez; the fact that they came
from a family which had been subjected to persecution by the Peruvian
regime; and their fear that they would be subjected to aggravated
political persecution on their return. Since it had not been alleged that
L's husband, who still remained in Peru, had been subjected to "problems
created by the authorities or paramilitary groups", the Board regarded
the risk that she and her daughters might be persecuted on their return
as uncertain. They could not therefore be considered refugees within the
meaning of chapter 3, section 2 of the Aliens Act. Making an overall
assessment and giving L, M and I the benefit of the doubt, the Board
nevertheless found that they should be regarded as de facto refugees
within the meaning of chapter 3, section 1 (3), principally because they
belonged to "a well-known family".
33. In its edition of 14 May 1996 the Peruvian newspaper "Politica"
reproduced a cable from the news agency AFP according to which the
applicant's application had been declared admissible by the Commission.
The article was headed: "European Commission of Human Rights accepts
application from Sendero Luminoso member." The editor noted the
following:
(Translation from Spanish)
"The following cable, which we have reproduced as it arrived
at our office, illustrates the 'progressive' approach
prevailing in certain European circles, where all
South American terrorists are seen as 'freedom fighters' and
the countries of our region as small republics run by
dictators. According to the view expressed in this dispatch
and that held by the distinguished members of the Commission,
Sendero Luminoso is a harmless political organisation engaging
in propaganda and its courageous active members are persecuted
by fanatical paramilitary groups. Episodes such as this do not
reflect very flatteringly on the attempts by Peruvian
Embassies in Europe to explain the situation."
A caption under a picture stated: "Sweden must grant asylum to
Peruvian terrorist".
34. On 28 June 1996 the applicant lodged a fresh request for a residence
permit, referring, inter alia, to the Commission's decision of 18 April
1996 to declare his application admissible. On 3 July 1996 the Aliens
Appeals Board decided to stay enforcement of the expulsion order.
B. The evidence before the Commission
35. As regards the Peruvian background to the present case, the
Commission has had particular regard to the following written evidence
available to it.
i. The United Nations Committee against Torture
36. In November 1994 the Committee against Torture assessed Peru's
initial report submitted under Article 19 of the 1984 Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The Committee concluded as follows:
"...
B. Positive aspects
...
65. The Committee takes due note of the intensive campaign to make the armed
forces and the police more aware of the need to respect human rights.
66. The Committee is pleased to note the approval of various items of
legislation, such as that permitting procurators to visit places of detention
in areas where a state of emergency has been declared, that providing for
greater flexibility in the procedures relating to terrorism and those which
establish new bodies for protecting human rights.
C. Subjects of concern
67. One cause for serious concern is the large number of complaints from both
non-governmental organisations and international agencies or commissions
indicating that torture is being used extensively in connection with the
investigation of acts of terrorism and that those responsible are going
unpunished.
68. The Committee points out that the legislation intended to repress acts
of terrorism does not meet the requirements of international agreements
concerning a fair, just and impartial trial with minimum safeguards for the
rights of the accused (for example, 'faceless' judges, serious limitations on
the right of defence, lack of opportunity to take proceedings before a court,
extension of the period of incommunicado detention, etc.).
69. The Committee is also concerned by the subjection of civilians to
military jurisdiction and by the fact that, in practice, the competence of
the military courts is being extended as regards cases of abuse of authority.
D. Recommendations
70. The Committee is aware of the serious difficulties which Peru is
experiencing because of the terrorist attacks, which are to be condemned, and
hopes that it will succeed in overcoming them.
71. Despite the determination stated by the delegation of Peru, in the
Committee's opinion, the legislative and administrative measures adopted in
order to comply with the Convention have not been effective in preventing
acts of torture, as required by Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Convention.
73. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the intentions expressed by the
delegation and the fact that the Government has available to it the means
necessary to eradicate the scourge of torture, the Committee suggests the
adoption of, among others, the following measures:
(a) The procedure relating to terrorist offences should be reviewed for the
purpose of establishing a prosecution system which is effective but which
preserves the independence and impartiality of the courts and the right of
defence, with the elimination of so-called 'faceless trials' and the holding
of detainees incommunicado;
...
(f) Consideration should be given to defining torture as an independent
offence punishable by a penalty appropriate to its seriousness;
...
(General Assembly; Official Records; Fiftieth Session; Supplement No. 44
(A/50/44), pp. 11-13)."
ii. The Peruvian Government's Report to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council
37. In their 1995 report to the Economic and Social Council the Peruvian
Government stated as follows:
159. Since 1980, Peru has been subjected to a criminal offensive by the
terrorist gangs 'Sendero Luminoso' and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement, an offensive which has caused over 25,000 deaths and damage
totalling over US$ 25 billion, an amount greater than the country's external
debt. In addition, thousands of families have been driven from their homes by
the violence which is rife in rural areas.
160. The State has been compelled to resort to criminal legislation and the
suspension of rights as permitted under states of exception in order to deal
with this exceptional criminal activity. In addition, a legal and
institutional framework has been designed in order to deal effectively with
terrorism, which had spread throughout the country and was seriously
threatening the very life of the nation. ...
161. Offences committed for terrorist purposes, which are the subject of
this special legislation, are of two types: (a) ordinary terrorist offences
and related offences, and (b) the offence of treason.
The offence of terrorism
162. An ordinary terrorist offence consists in provoking, creating or
maintaining a state of anxiety, terror or fear among the population or part
of the population. It covers acts committed by any person against life,
security of person, individual freedom, property, the security of buildings,
roads or railways, electricity pylons or power plants. The means must involve
the use of weapons, explosive materials or devices or any other means which
may cause damage or serious disturbance of the peace or affect the
international relations or security of society or the State.
163. On this basis, definitions have been made of a number of aggravated
offences, such as membership of an armed gang, attacks on property for
terrorist purposes and the use of minors in the perpetration of these
offences. Included also in this definition are acts of collaboration with
terrorism, such as the storing of explosives, financial assistance, or the
organisation of indoctrination or training courses or centres for terrorist
groups. Other prohibited acts are association for purposes of terrorism,
public incitement to terrorism, and advocacy of violence and terrorism.
164. These characterisations constitute a precise framework for all acts
perpetrated by terrorists and enable a distinction to be made between a
political opponent who uses peaceful means of dissent and a terrorist
belonging to an armed gang that uses criminal methods in an attempt to
destroy the State and impose a totalitarian plan on society.
The offence of treason
165. A person is guilty of the offence of treason if he perpetrates any of
the following six criminal acts:
(a) First, if he uses car bombs or weapons which cause death or
create serious social danger, provided that the fundamental characteristic of
causing a state of anxiety exists;
(b) Secondly, if he stores or is in possession of explosives
intended for use in terrorist acts of sabotage such as those described above;
(c) Thirdly, if he is a ringleader of a terrorist organisation;
(d) Fourthly, if he is a member of a murder squad set up physically
to eliminate persons;
(e) Fifthly, if he supplies reports, plans or documents intended to
aid and abet terrorist acts of sabotage provided for in subparagraphs (a) and
(b) above;
(f) Sixthly, if as a teacher he influences his students by
advocating terrorism.
166. The acts characterised as offences in the previous paragraph are also
liable to the punishment prescribed for the most serious forms of terrorism.
The characterisation is rigid and is drawn from national experience of the
behaviour of the terrorist gangs, and at the same time includes those acts
which cause the greatest damage and public alarm.
Anti-terrorist trials
167. Anti-terrorist procedural legislation seeks to render the crime control
agencies efficient by providing them with the necessary tools to punish
severely the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences committed for
terrorist purposes. To that end, the powers of the police have been
increased, without reducing the Public Prosecutor's powers of monitoring and
supervision. Provision has been made for very rapid proceedings in order to
respond quickly to charges of such offences, making it possible to determine
promptly and fairly the legal status of the accused. The institution of the
'faceless judges', which is Colombian in origin, and the use of military
courts to try cases of treason for terrorist purposes constitute two
essential parts of this system of prosecution. These steps have been taken
because the terrorist gangs used to identify judges and intimidate them and,
in many instances, made attempts on their lives. In addition, because of the
precarious state of the judicial system, which in fact made reform essential,
the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, these offences were able to escape
proper punishment; consequently, given the increase in terrorist violence, it
became essential to resort to the military courts in order to try terrorist
acts constituting treason.
168. The Constitution establishes a maximum of 15 days' pre-trial detention
by the police. Notwithstanding this, detainees do not lack a proper defence
because the role of the Public Prosecutor's Department was not abolished by
the anti-terrorist legislation. The Procurator not only visits detention
centres and provides defence for detainees, but ensures that the police
investigation does not exceed the limits imposed by law. Every detention is
reported to the Public Prosecutor and the judge, and it is from that point
that the procurators begin their work of monitoring and supervision. The
Constitution prohibits torture and recognises the right of detainees to ask
for an immediate medical examination. Consequently, although the police now
have greater powers, the Peruvian legal system recognises the power of the
Public Prosecutor's Department to guarantee the rights of the citizen and the
right of the latter to demand medical examinations in order to establish
whether or not he has been subjected to improper treatment.
169. In cases of treason, Decree-Law No. 25,744 authorised the extension of
police custody; that decision was incumbent not on the police themselves but
on the military judge. In any event, without prejudice to the institutional
guarantees specified above, the present Constitution does not permit such an
extension (Constitution, art. 2, para. 24 (f)).
170. Decree-Law No. 25,475 restricts the intervention of the defence counsel
to the period immediately preceding the formal statement by the accused; the
enactment of this provision was due to the existence of an organisation made
up of lawyers linked to the terrorist gangs who would coach the detainees,
threaten them and force them to adopt a certain attitude during the trial.
This restriction should be viewed in the light of the work of the Procurator
in protecting civil rights. The present Constitution stipulates that any
person has the right to communicate personally with a defence counsel of his
choosing and to be advised by him as soon as he is summoned or detained by
any authority (art. 139, para. 14). Consequently, this constitutional
provision takes precedence over the concern to provide maximum guarantees of
the right of defence.
171. Furthermore, the offence of enforced disappearance has been added to
Peruvian criminal legislation (Decree-Law No. 25,592 of 2 July 1992), which
punishes any public official or servant who deprives a person of his freedom
by ordering or performing acts which result in that person's duly established
disappearance. The existence of this offence demonstrates the State's
determination, through legislation, to punish severely acts by officials of
the security agencies which violate human rights. The statement that these
acts are investigated by the Provincial Procurator and the issue of specific
guidelines on this subject (...), as well as the keeping of the National
Register of Detainees, with international cooperation, prove that such acts
are not tolerated by the Government and that they in fact constitute a
serious retrograde step in the national peacemaking campaign.
172. The armed forces and the National Police have also issued numerous
guidelines and regulations designed, first, to educate members of the armed
forces and the police in respect for human rights, secondly, to avoid acts
which constitute violations of civil rights, and thirdly, to punish severely
the perpetrators of human rights violations.
Easing of anti-terrorist legislation
173. The legal measures adopted by the Government as part of its efforts to
tackle terrorism have led to the dismantling of subversive groups, with the
capture of important leaders in various parts of the country and the active
participation and organised support of the community. As a result it has
become necessary to relax the measures in question (E/1990/5/Add.29)."
iii. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
38. By letter of 15 December 1995 the Regional Representative of the
UNHCR approached the Director-General of the Swedish Aliens Appeals Board
on behalf of Mr. Napoleon Teobaldo Aponte Inga, a Peruvian asylum seeker
removed from Sweden to Peru in September 1994 and thereafter allegedly
arrested, accused of terrorism and tortured. He had subsequently re-
entered Sweden, again seeking asylum. The Regional Representative wrote
as follows:
"... When Mr. Aponte Inga's claim was previously examined, our office,
despite knowing of the case and considering that it required a particularly
careful weighing of factors, decided on balance not to intervene. We are
reluctant to intervene when issues of credibility are at stake, and Mr.
Aponte's credibility had been questioned because of his failure to seek
asylum despite having been in Sweden for over six months. We were of course
aware that several members of Mr. Aponte's family had already been granted
residence permits in Sweden. Thus, even the very credible information that
Mr. Aponte's two brothers had been imprisoned and tortured, and that his
sister had been the victim of an extrajudicial execution in prison was set
aside. Mr. Aponte himself, we thought, had been outside Peru during the whole
period, and was thus not a likely target of the authorities.
We must now admit that the treatment meted out to Mr. Aponte on return to
Peru seems to belie our earlier assessment. The recent decision of the
Immigration Board in his case does not call into question the information
that he was held in maximum security conditions for three and a half months,
a period which it seems could easily have been a great deal longer had it not
been for the intervention of human right organisations in Peru and in North
America. Neither is Mr. Aponte's claim that he was repeatedly tortured during
his detention, a claim supported by two psychoanalytical practitioners,
questioned by the Immigration Board. The Board found that nothing would
indicate that Mr. Aponte would risk being charged with the same crimes again,
or that the authorities should persecute him for other reasons.
... One could refer to paragraph 43 of the UNHCR Handbook, which mentions the
importance of looking at the experience of relatives, which 'may well show
that [the asylum-seeker's] fear that sooner or later he also will become a
victim of persecution is well-founded'. In this case such experience is of
both objective and subjective relevance - there can be no denying the impact
of the experience of Mr. Aponte's family on his state of mind, or on the
light in which he is viewed by the authorities in Peru.
To conclude, even if one were to concede that there may be room for doubt as
to the future risks faced by Mr. Aponte in Peru, the present case seems
clearly to call for the resolution of that doubt in Mr. Aponte's favour."
iv. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
39. In its preliminary observations of 25 July 1996 the Human Rights
Committee set up under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights assessed the third periodic report of Peru in, inter alia, the
following terms:
"12. The Committee expresses its deepest concern about Decree Law 25,475 and
Decree Law 25,659 which seriously impair the protection of the rights
contained in the Covenant for persons accused of terrorism and contradicts in
many respects the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant. Decree Law 25,475
contains a very broad definition of terrorism under which innocent persons
have been and remain detained. It establishes a system of trial by "faceless
judges", where the defendants do not know who are the judges trying them and
are denied public trials, and which places serious impediments, in law and in
fact, to the possibility for defendants to prepare their defence and
communicate with their lawyers. ...
17. The Committee is deeply concerned by persistent reports of torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of persons detained under suspicion of
involvement in terrorist activities or other criminal activities. It regrets
the failure of the State party to provide the Committee with detailed
information on the measures adopted to prevent torture and cruel, degrading
or inhuman treatment, and to punish those responsible. It draws attention to
the legislation which permits incommunicado detention in certain cases. In
this connection, the Committee reiterates its view, as expressed in its
General Comment 20 on article 7, that incommunicado detention is conducive to
torture and that, consequently, this practice should be avoided.
...
19. The Committee takes note of Decree Law 25,499 of 1992, according to
which repentance of one's association with a terrorist organisation and
information concerning such organisations or which lead to the identification
of other persons involved can lead to a reduction in his or her sentence. The
Committee is concerned that this law may have been used by individuals to
denounce innocent persons in order to avoid prison sentences or to reduce the
duration, a concern that is supported by the fact that there are at least
seven draft proposals - one of them from the Defensor Publico and another
from the Ministry of Justice - and a Decree Law 26,329 attempting to solve
the problem of innocent people being prosecuted or having been convicted
under the anti-terrorist laws (CCPR/C/79/Add.67)."
v. Human Rights Watch
40. In its 1996 report the non-governmental organisation Human Rights
Watch notes, on the one hand, that the number of extrajudicial executions
and disappearances attributed to Peruvian Government forces has continued
to decline. On the other hand, the organisation notes that the practice
of torture is not limited to counterinsurgency but is a routine adjunct
to police investigation in Peru, although its severity seems to depend
on the social class and resources of the victim (pp. 116-117).
41. In a report of August 1996 - Peru: Presumption of Guilt - Human
Rights Violations and the Faceless Courts in Peru" (Vol. 8, No. 5 (B) -
Human Rights Watch/Americas states, inter alia, as follows:
"The incarceration of hundreds of innocent prisoners charged or convicted of
terrorist crimes they did not commit is now an open secret in Peru. While
there may be disagreement about the number unjustly prosecuted by Peru's
'faceless courts', no one in Peru, including the architect of the court
system, President Alberto Fujimori, denies that the problem exists. Those
caught up in the system are presumed guilty and have minimal opportunities to
demonstrate their innocence. In recent years, the Minister of Justice, the
former prosecutor for terrorism, Fujimori himself, and many lawmakers have
proposed the creation of special mechanisms such as a review commission to
remedy defects in the trials, at least in those cases where there are
compelling reasons to believe in the defendant's innocence. Yet nothing has
been done to establish any such mechanism. In the meantime, faceless military
and civilian courts, conducting secret trials behind prison walls, continue
to sentence Peruvians to decades of imprisonment in life-threatening
conditions without offering them the basic judicial process guarantees
required by international human rights law.
Extrajudicial executions and disappearances by Peru's military and police
have been dramatically reduced in the past three years, demonstrating the
effectiveness of international pressure over a government which was
officially engaging in these atrocities. This is a welcome development, even
if the arbitrary deprivation of life by the authorities has simply been
supplanted by the arbitrary denial of liberty. Nonetheless, violent
state-sponsored abuse continues as police regularly engage in torture as an
interrogation tool; a practice which is facilitated by lengthy periods of
police detention allowed under anti-terrorism procedures and by routine
acceptance of coerced confessions as evidence in the faceless courts.
Torture is not only practised in cases involving terrorism. ...
Although the inflicting of physical abuse is outlawed in Peru, torture - the
intentional infliction of severe pain by a government agent or with that
agent's acquiescence - is not specifically penalised, as required by the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and Punishment, which Peru has ratified. The scandal
caused by these recent torture deaths led to several parliamentary proposals
for a law specifically criminalising torture. ...
Meanwhile, the violence and terrorist tactics employed by armed opposition
groups in Peru - predominantly by the now divided Shining Path - continue to
rob Peruvians of their most fundamental human right: the right to life.
According to the National Coordinating Committee for Human Rights
(Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, hereinafter "the Coordinadora"),
a respected umbrella group of non-governmental human rights organisation,
Shining Path was responsible for 222 selective assassinations in 1995,
considerably more than the 173 cases documented in 1994. These violations of
basic international humanitarian standards far outnumber those committed by
the Peruvian military and police. Whatever effect the human rights movement
has had in improving the climate of respect for human rights in Peru in the
last few years, none of it has influenced the behaviour of the Shining Path.
The calculated cruelty which has characterised the Shining Path's ideology
and strategy throughout the conflict is deeply repugnant and in direct
contradiction to international humanitarian law.
...
Several government spokespersons have announced to the international
community that the process of reviewing terrorism and treason cases is
already underway, although there is no evidence that any action has been
taken. The note verbale presented by the Permanent Mission of Peru to the
United Nations office in Geneva on 12 August 1994, during the 46th Session of
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, stated that Peru's Congress had already passed a law submitted by
the executive creating a commission to review cases. This was false: almost
two years later Congress still has not passed any such law.
...
According to a 1994 census conducted by Peru's National Penitentiary
Institute (INPE), 5,003 individuals are currently in prison either charged or
convicted of treason or terrorism (the two categories under which
politically-motivated crimes are catalogued), just under one quarter of the
total prison population. Sixty-six percent of these prisoners are officially
described as belonging to [Sendero Luminoso] and ten percent to the much
smaller Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac
Amaru, MRTA). The remaining twenty-four percent are described as having
'undetermined' affiliation, which evidently means that they belong to neither
of the above groups. Within prison walls, authorities carefully segregate
those prisoners considered to be without affiliation from those of known
militancy. It is reasonable to assume that the category defined in the
statistics as 'undetermined' corresponds roughly with the number of prisoners
who are innocent or who collaborated with the guerrillas against their will.
The Coordinadora is assisting with the legal defence of 607 prisoners they
consider to be innocent. However, they are convinced that there are many
cases of possibly innocent detainees for which they have no information.
Allowing for human error in assessing probable innocence and for undetected
cases, the number of innocent prisoners could scarcely be less then 500, and
it may be considerably higher (pp. 2-4)."
42. Discussing the continuing due process limitations, Human Rights
Watch states:
"Most of the reforms described above are welcome, if long overdue,
improvements. However, they have not affected the basic due process
shortcomings of the faceless court system. Features of this system which
remain unaffected and which contribute to unjust prosecutions and
convictions, include:
the vague definition of terrorism and the disproportionate penalties
assigned. The anti-terrorism law gives imprecise catch-all definitions of
terrorism and violates freedom of expression by criminalising acts such as
'provoking anxiety', 'affecting international relations', or seeming to
excuse the behaviour of terrorists (apología del terrorismo). Both the
terrorism laws and the treason law violate the principle that the punishment
should fit the crime. Under the treason law, for instance, a teacher who
espoused the ideals of the Shining Path and a terrorist who had killed dozens
with a car bomb could receive the same sentence: life imprisonment (pp. 9-
10)."
43. Human Rights Watch furthermore refers to sixteen prisoners who, in
the organisation's view, were unjustly convicted of treason or related
offences (pp. 17-30). The cases were selected in order to illustrate
different due process violations associated with the counter-terrorist
trials. According to Human Rights Watch, the procedures in both the
secret military tribunals which try cases of treason (traición a la
patria), and the civilian "faceless" courts which try terrorism cases
violate elementary international due process obligations. The cases
described by Human Rights Watch include people tortured to extort
confessions while held incommunicado, or falsely incriminated by others
who were themselves tortured or coerced, or who volunteered false
information maliciously or thoughtlessly. All of these defendants were,
according to the organisation, prevented by law from questioning their
accusers. Often they were simply the victims of verdicts reached without
a careful consideration of the evidence presented, or where there had
been no effort made to confirm unsubstantiated allegations (see p. 4).
Out of the sixteen prisoners named in the report five were, according to
Human Rights Watch, unjustly convicted of unwitting "collaboration" (pp.
27-30).
vi. Amnesty International
44. In its 1996 report the non-governmental organisation Amnesty
International notes that the armed opposition groups, including Sendero
Luminoso, remained active in 1995, but on a reduced scale compared with
previous years. However, much of the country remained under a state of
emergency. The armed opposition groups, including Sendero Luminoso,
remained active, but on a reduced scale compared with previous years
(p. 248). Amnesty International continues:
"Peru's anti-terrorism laws continued to fall far short of international fair
trial standards. According to official figures, since 1992 more than 5,000
prisoners had been convicted of 'terrorism' and sentenced to imprisonment.
All were denied the right to have their cases heard in public and to
cross-examine members of the security forces involved in their detention and
interrogation. Hundreds of such prisoners were tried before military
tribunals. Complaints of torture by detainees suspected of 'terrorism'
continued to be filed. ...
Dozens of civilians were deliberately and arbitrarily killed by [Sendero
Luminoso]. Many of those killed had been previously tortured. Among the
victims were local officials, community leaders and captured members of civil
defence patrols. ... (p. 250)."
vii. The State Department of the United States of America
45. In "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995" (April 1996)
the United States Department of State reports, inter alia, that although
the Peruvian Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or humiliating
treatment, torture and brutal treatment of detainees are common.
Eyewitnesses and human rights monitors reported that government security
forces still routinely tortured suspected subversives at military and
police detention centres. The country report continues:
"Torture most often takes place in the period immediately following
detention. The law permits police to hold terrorism suspects incommunicado
for 15 days, and for another 15-day period in cases of treason. Human rights
groups report that the incidence of torture is high during this time, partly
because detainees are not allowed access to family or an attorney except when
giving sworn statements to the public prosecutor.
Besides beatings, common methods of torture included electric shock, water
torture, asphyxiation, and the hanging of detainees by a rope attached to
their hands tied behind the back. Common forms of psychological torture
included sleep deprivation and death threats against both detainees and their
families. Interrogators frequently blindfold their victims during torture to
prevent them from later identifying their abusers. ...
Many victims of Sendero Luminoso terrorism also showed signs of torture. ...
According to statistics [of the National Penitentiary Institute of Peru], as
of June [1995], 76 percent of the country's prison population - almost 16,000
of the almost 21,000 prisoners - consisted of accused persons awaiting trial.
... Those tried on treason charges by military courts generally wait no
longer than 40 days between the time of detention and the beginning of the
trial.
...
According to Supreme Council of Military Justice statistics, between 1992 and
August 1995, faceless military tribunals tried 1,031 cases of treason. In
those cases in which a verdict was reached, these tribunals sentenced 267
individuals to life sentences, 217 persons to 30 years or less, 179 cases
were sent to civilian court terrorism trials, and 24 persons were absolved of
all charges. In a public statement on 11 August, [the] President of the
Supreme Council of Military Justice ... stated that the military justice
system was willing to review any case of a conviction for treason in which
procedural errors could be proved.
The Government did not abolish trials of terrorism cases on 15 October by anonymous
superior court tribunals, as it had originally announced. Human rights groups are
concerned about cases sent by the military justice system to the civilian courts even
when there is no evidence to prove the defendant guilty of treason or terrorism,
since a terrorism trial must begin all over again. For example, ..., a medical doctor
detained in January, was found innocent of treason by a faceless military tribunal
in April. The Supreme Council of Military Justice, however, ruled in September that
he must still be tried for terrorism by a civilian court even though there was no
evidence connecting him to terrorist organisations.
In December the Congress passed the Criminal Procedures Code legislation.
This legislation will institute new accusatorial, investigative and trail
procedures. Informed observers claimed that the Government postponed passage
of the new code ...
There were no reports of political prisoners. Members of Sendero Luminoso and
those detained on charges of terrorism - however arbitrary in some instances
- are not considered political prisoners.
...
Although both the army and Sendero Luminoso committed serious human rights
abuses in Peru's internal conflict, the latter was responsible for many more
heinous acts. Sendero frequently used arbitrary violence against civilians
and non-military targets. ... Many of the victims were unarmed women and
children. ... Sendero also practised forced military conscription of
children; ...
Human rights groups repeatedly denounced Sendero Luminoso as the greatest
violator of human rights in Peru, while simultaneously documenting the many
violations by the security forces. Documentary evidence indicates that
Coordinadora members have been balanced in the denunciations of abuses by
both sides. Nevertheless President Fujimori and other government officials
continued to accuse human rights groups of defending terrorism and
criticising only government abuses. Amnesty International added to the debate
when it referred in its 1994 report on Peru (released in mid-1995) to
Peruvian terrorists as 'political prisoners'. President Fujimori denounced
Amnesty International for this on 10 July.
On 10 July the offices of the Human Rights Commission (COMISEDH), a member of
the Coordinadora, were broken into, and files relating to those believed to
be falsely accused of terrorism and to human rights abuses committed by
security forces were rifled. ... (pp. 505-512)."
viii. The Peruvian press
46. On 4 October 1994 the Peruvian newspaper "Expreso" published an
article about "Peruvian terrorists" on hunger strike in Sweden,
attempting to avoid being expelled back to Peru. The newspaper wrote as
follows:
[Translation from Spanish]
"Sendero Luminoso terrorist Aponte extradited from Sweden
One of the promoters or ambassadors of Sendero Luminoso in Europe was
deported by the Swedish authorities, despite the fact that along with other
terrorists he declared himself on hunger strike to try to prevent his
expulsion from Stockholm.
The man is [Napoleon] Teobaldo Aponte Inga ...[see para. 38] who is charged
with terrorists offences under warrants issued by the 33rd and 46th Lima
Criminal Court.
The terrorist was a member of the so-called 'Sol Peru' Committee, which is
dedicated to distributing the Sendero Luminoso newspaper ...
Supreme Court sources said yesterday that the extradition request for
Teobaldo Aponte was submitted at the beginning of February last year. At the
same time, the requests for [the extradition of eight other Peruvians], who
were all campaigning on behalf of Sendero Luminoso, were renewed. They are
also fund raising to finance their terrorist activities in Peru. ... Officers
of the Supreme Court [met one of them at a Peruvian airport], and they
immediately handed him over to the National Anti-Terrorist Department
(Dincote)."
47. In January 1995 the newspaper wrote the following:
[Translation from Spanish]
"For a long time they have been passing for victims of political persecution
Shining Path terrorists ... living like lords in Stockholm
... International activists of the Sendero Luminoso ... are living like lords
in ... Sweden where the government has been conned for many years by
terrorists who get a monthly pension of 1500 dollars, house and medical care,
a reliable source in the National Police (PNP) disclosed.
The terrorists, the PNP chief added, passed themselves off as the victims of
political persecution, which was quite false.
In that way, they arrived in the European country and were given political
asylum, under the protection of their alleged documents supplied to them by
self-styled human rights protection groups in Lima.
Despite the intense activity of these pseudo agencies in support of
terrorists, the source said, terrorists are no longer accepted in Sweden as
they used to be.
The government of that European country became aware of the terrorists'
activities and is now on the track of several of them, although some of them
are living in the guise of sheep, our informant added.
The citizens of these countries, thanks to the efforts of the Peruvian
embassy, know that it is not a question of victims of political persecution
but of terrorists who have been condemned by the United Nations, the source
claimed.
... The police authorities alerted all countries in order to warn them not to
offer political asylum without first checking the position of the Peruvian
seeking such protection. They could be callous terrorists, the offical warned
finally. ..."
ix. The resurgence of violent Sendero Luminoso activities
48. In its edition of 6 October 1996 the International Herald Tribune
reported on a recent series of deadly bombings and attacks in Peru
raising fears that the Sendero Luminoso insurgency is making a comeback.
The newspaper continued:
"... While Peruvians have learned to live under the constant threat of
terrorism, the latest wave of assaults by the Maoist group, which was once
believed to have been defeated, is particularly troubling because it was well
coordinated and reached sensitive government and military targets. The
guerrillas bombed a central police station charged with protecting the
Peruvian Congress and the house of a general who is the military chief in a
region where the rebels have a stronghold. After assertions that the attacks
were made possible by security lapses, the chief of Peru's anti-terrorist
police resigned.
Experts on terrorism said that the attacks were the most successful the
Shining Path has undertaken since its leaders were captured three years ago.
The arrests were considered a turning point in a civil war that has killed
more than 35,000 people and cost 25 billion dollars in damage since 1980. 'If
you consider what has happened in the last few days - that the government was
forced to remove its director of anti-terrorism because of these strategic
attacks - you have to conclude that Shining Path has started to recover from
its long demise', said ... a Peruvian researcher in terrorism."
x. The case of Mr. Castillo Paez before the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights
49. The disappearance of the applicant's cousin,
Mr. Ernesto Castillo Paez (see para. 18), is currently being examined by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights after referral by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has requested
that the Court find a number of violations of the American Convention on
Human Rights. According to the complaint before the Court, E was arrested
by agents of the Peruvian National Police in October 1990 and since then
his whereabouts have remained unknown.
50. In a judgment of 30 January 1996 the Inter-American Court rejected
the Peruvian Government's preliminary objections and decided to continue
hearing the merits of the case (see the Court's press releases CDH-CP
1/96 and 3/96 as well as Andean Newsletter No. 109 of February 1996, at
p. 7).
51. The case of E has been reported in at least the Peruvian publication
"Ideele", of "Instituto de Defensa Legal" ("The Institute for Legal
Defence") in Peru (No. 80, October 1995).
C. Relevant domestic law
52. Under chapter 3, section 1 of the Swedish Aliens Act of 1989 asylum
may be granted to an alien if, inter alia, he is a refugee (1); or if he,
without being a refugee, is unwilling to return to his country of origin
in view of the political situation there and provided he is able to
present weighty grounds in support of his wish to remain in Sweden (3).
The term "refugee" is defined in chapter 3, section 2.
53. An alien referred to in chapter 3, section 1 is in principle
entitled to asylum. On special grounds asylum may nevertheless be refused
even if the alien fulfils the criteria set out in, inter alia, chapter
3, section 1 (3) (chapter 3, section 4).
54. When considering whether to refuse an alien entry or to issue an
expulsion order, the authorities must examine, pursuant to chapter 8,
sections 1-4 of the Aliens Act, whether the alien can be returned to a
particular country and whether there are other special obstacles
to the enforcement of such a decision. If necessary, the authorities must
also issue instructions regarding the actual enforcement (chapter 4,
section 12).
55. In exceptional cases the Government may determine whether or not an
alien should be allowed to remain in the country, provided that either
the National Immigration Board or the Aliens Appeals Board has referred
the matter for such consideration. Such a referral may take place, inter
alia, if the matter is deemed to be of special importance for the purpose
of obtaining guidance as to the application of the Aliens Act (chapter
7, section 11).
56. If the enforcement meets no obstacles under chapter 8, an alien is
to be expelled or returned to the country of origin or, if possible, to
the country from which he or she came to Sweden. If the decision cannot
be enforced in one of these manners or if special reasons exist, the
alien may be sent to another country (chapter 8, section 5).
D. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
57. Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention reads as follows:
"The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or
a crime against humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country
as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations."
58. According to the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, the interpretation of these exclusion clauses "must be
restrictive" (p. 35, para. 149).
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaint declared admissible
59. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaint
that his expulsion to Peru would expose him to a real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, bearing in mind, in
particular, his activities for the benefit of Sendero Luminoso.
B. Point at issue
60. The issue to be determined is whether the expulsion of the applicant
to Peru would be in violation of Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention.
C. As regards Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention
61. Article 3 (art. 3) reads as follows:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
62. The applicant complains that his expulsion to Peru would violate
Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention on account of his political
background in that country. He considers that his activities within
Sendero Luminoso do not constitute such serious offences as to warrant
his exclusion from protection under the 1951 Convention. He insists that
he has only been involved in Sendero Luminoso activities as a member
expressing its political views.
63. The applicant recalls that in its referral of his case to the
Swedish Government the Aliens Appeals Board stated that it could not
exclude that he might, on his return to Peru, be persecuted on account
of his and his family's political activities and that he could therefore
claim status as a de facto refugee. Although in principle recognising him
as a de facto refugee, the Government refused him asylum on account of
his activities within an organisation known to have carried out serious
crimes within the meaning of Article 1 F(a) of the 1951 Convention. In
the applicant's view, however, no evidence has been presented to the
effect that he himself committed such offences. He also recalls that his
mother and sisters have been granted asylum in Sweden, principally
because they belong to a "well-known" family.
64. The applicant furthermore submits that the fact that he was able to
leave Peru holding a valid passport is not striking as such. Through
bribery it is possible to obtain a Peruvian passport without any
significant difficulties. He, moreover, refers to the treatment in Peru
of Mr. Aponte Inga, who was removed from Sweden to Peru by order of the
Swedish Government after having been charged with "terrorism" in Peru
(see paras. 38 and 46). Though refusing him asylum following his
subsequent re-entry in Sweden, the National Immigration Board did not
question the fact that he had been ill-treated on his return to Peru.
Contrary to Mr. Aponte Inga, the applicant has openly referred to his
activities in support of Sendero Luminoso and thus runs an equal risk of
being subjected to torture or similar treatment, if returned to Peru.
65. Finally, the applicant submits that there has been no noticeable
improvement in the general human rights situation in Peru. Allegedly,
supporters of the Peruvian Government are carrying out "espionage" in
European countries among members of Sendero Luminoso who have requested
asylum. The publicity surrounding the Government's refusal of his asylum
request and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the present
application has led to a dramatic increase of the risk that he might be
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) on his return. His
forthcoming placement in a detention centre pending trial may last a very
long time.
66. The Government submit that there are no substantial grounds for
believing that the applicant would be subjected to a real risk of torture
or other treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) on his return to Peru.
Whilst not doubting that he has taken part in certain Sendero Luminoso
activities, the Government consider that he is of no interest to the
Peruvian police. He has stated himself that he has never been arrested,
prosecuted or sentenced on account of such activities, nor on account of
any other crime or offence committed in Peru. Furthermore, there is no
indication that he would presently be suspected of any crime committed
in Peru. He also holds a valid Peruvian passport by virtue of which he
left his country.
67. The Government recall that in previous cases concerning the
forthcoming expulsion of Peruvians, who had referred to their Sendero
Luminoso connections, the Commission did not deem the situation in Peru
to be such as to prevent those persons from being returned there.
Reference is made to Applications No. 20547/92 (Dec. 15.2.93, D.R. 74,
p. 252) as well as Nos. 20809/92, 20990/92 and 21096/92 (Decs. 15.2.93,
8.4.93 and 8.4.93, respectively; unpublished). Accordingly, the
complaints under Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention were all regarded
as manifestly ill-founded.
68. In the Government's view there is nothing in the present case which
should call for a different assessment, particularly as there is no
indication that the human rights situation in Peru has deteriorated
subsequent to the Commission's decisions in the cases referred to above.
On the contrary, the situation has developed favourably. The Government
refer to reports according to which the political violence has decreased
and the extrajudicial killings and disappearances have almost ceased.
Particular reference is made to the national human rights organisation
La Coordinadora's report for 1995 (not submitted), the U.S. State
Department's report for the same year (para. 45) as well as to
information from the Swedish Embassy in Lima.
69. According to the Government's sources, torture of, among others,
terrorist suspects still occurs during police interrogations, but not as
a rule. A Peruvian citizen, who has been returned to his country after
having been refused asylum is, if wanted by the Peruvian authorities,
transported from the airport of arrival to a detention centre and placed
under the supervision of a public prosecutor. According to the
Government's sources, the risk that such a person might be tortured can
be limited significantly because of his placement in such a centre.
70. The Government furthermore refer to the substantial number of
Peruvian asylum seekers who have arrived in Sweden in the recent years.
A number of these have referred to their membership of or support for
Sendero Luminoso. Some of them have been forcibly returned, while others
have returned of their free will following the refusal of their asylum
requests. The Swedish Embassy in Peru has been in contact with some of
those persons, but there are no substantiated reports that they would
have been ill-treated on their return. The Embassy has also been in
contact with very well-informed persons with broad experience of
expulsion of Peruvian citizens as well as with representatives of local
human rights organisations. The Government therefore concludes that if
the applicant were to be returned forcibly, he would not be placed in a
situation worse than that of Peruvians who have returned voluntarily.
71. The Government finally underline that chapter 8 of the 1989 Aliens
Act reflects almost exactly the principles outlined by the Court when
applying Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention to extradition or expulsion
cases.
72. The Commission recalls that Contracting States have the right, as
a matter of well-established international law and subject to their
treaty obligations including the Convention, to control the entry,
residence and expulsion of aliens. The right to political asylum is not
protected in either the Convention or its Protocols. The decision of a
Contracting State to expel a person may nevertheless give rise to an
issue under Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, and hence engage the
responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a
real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in the receiving country. In such circumstances
Article 3 (art. 3) implies the obligation not to expel the person in
question to that country (see, e.g., Chahal v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-I, p. ..., para. 73;
Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30 October 1991,
Series A no. 215, p. 34, paras. 102-103).
73. The prohibition provided by Article 3 (art. 3) against torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute. Whenever
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to
Article 3 (art. 3) if removed to another State, the responsibility of the
Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is
engaged in the event of expulsion. In these circumstances the activities
of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot
be a material consideration (see the above-mentioned Chahal judgment, p.
23, para. 80).
74. The Convention organs' examination of the existence of a risk of
ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 (art. 3) at the relevant time must
necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of this
provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. In
determining whether substantial grounds have been shown for believing
that a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) exists, the
Commission will assess the issue in the light of all the material placed
before it and, if necessary, material obtained of its own motion (see,
e.g., the above-mentioned Chahal judgment, pp. 26-27, paras. 96-97). The
assessment of the existence of the risk must be made on the basis of
information concerning the conditions prevailing at the time of the
Commission's consideration of the case, the historical position being of
interest in so far as it may shed light on the present situation and its
likely evolution (see the above-mentioned Chahal judgment, p. 24, para.
86).
75. The Commission recalls that the previous applications lodged by
Peruvians claiming to be supporters of Sendero Luminoso have been
declared inadmissible, the Commission having found that the applicants
would not face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3)
if returned to Peru. The Commission has noted, in particular, the absence
of any evidence such as a warrant of arrest or a summons which would show
that the various applicants are wanted by Peruvian authorities or are
otherwise of any other particular interest to them. The Commission has
also attached importance to the considerable experience which the Swedish
authorities appear to have gained in this field as a result of the large
number of asylum claims lodged by Peruvians.
76. The following facts of the specific case are not in dispute between
the parties: The applicant is not a leading personality in Sendero
Luminoso. He has been supporting the activities of the movement but has
not himself committed any atrocities in the name of Sendero Luminoso. Two
of his cousins were also active within the movement. One was arrested and
killed by paramilitary troops in July 1989, while another cousin was
arrested by the police in October 1990 and has since then disappeared.
A local human rights lawyer engaged in investigating this disappearance
was injured by a letter-bomb. The disappearance is presently pending
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. A third cousin of the
applicant, Ms. Monica Castillo Paez, who had been active within a
supporting section of Sendero Luminoso, was allowed to remain in the
Netherlands.
77. The Commission furthermore notes that, in February 1996, the Aliens
Appeals Board granted the applicant's mother and two siblings de facto
refugee status and asylum in Sweden, principally because they were
considered to belong to a "well-known" family in Peru (para. 32). In its
opinion to the respondent Government in respect of the applicant's case
the Aliens Appeals Board considered, moreover, that as he belonged to "a
politically very active family" it could not exclude that he might be
persecuted on his return to Peru (para. 25).
78. The fact remains that the Peruvian treason law would seem to make
no distinction between the crime of committing atrocities in the name of
Sendero Luminoso and, on the other hand, the espousal of the ideals of
the movement (see, e.g., paras. 42-45; cf. also the Peruvian Government's
view as reproduced in para. 37; at p. 10, para. 166 of the quotation).
Various evidence also indicates that torture is still being practised in
Peru and is particularly focused on detainees suspected of terrorism and
subversion (see, e.g., paras. 41 and 44-45).
79. The Commission notes, however, that the applicant has not presented
any warrant of arrest or similar evidence which would show that he is
wanted by the Peruvian authorities or is otherwise of any particular
interest to them at the present time. Nor has it been alleged that his
father has been ill-treated in Peru after the applicant's departure from
Peru in the beginning of 1991.
80. The Commission furthermore notes the efforts reported by the
Peruvian Government to improve the human rights situation in the country
both generally and in respect of persons suspected of being engaged in
subversive activities (see para. 37). The respondent Government have,
moreover, stated that a returned Peruvian is, if wanted by the Peruvian
police, placed in a special detention centre under the supervision of a
public prosecutor where the risk of being tortured can be limited
significantly. In this regard the Commission has already found that there
is no evidence showing that the applicant is in fact wanted by the
Peruvian authorities (para. 79 above).
81. The Commission would not exclude that the various proceedings
instituted by the applicant and his extended family outside Peru,
particularly in international fora, might be perceived negatively by
representatives of Peruvian authorities. Nevertheless, the attention
focused on the applicant and his family outside Peru would not
necessarily increase the risk of his being subjected to ill-treatment on
his return to that country.
82. It is true that some Peruvian media have shown an interest in
Sweden's handling of asylum claims lodged by Peruvians (paras. 29, 33 and
46-47). At least part of these asylum seekers, including the applicant,
have been accused in press articles of being Sendero Luminoso
"terrorists". This fact, however, cannot be of any decisive importance
in the assessment of whether or not his expulsion to Peru would violate
Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention. This is so, in particular, as there
are no specific indications that the applicant has ever been singled out
as a high profile member of the Sendero Luminoso movement.
83. Having assessed all the material before it, the Commission is of
the opinion that sufficient evidence has not been adduced to establish
substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be exposed to
a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) of the
Convention, if returned to Peru.
CONCLUSION
84. The Commission concludes, by 15 votes to 14, that in the present
case the applicant's expulsion to Peru would not violate Article 3 (art.
3) of the Convention.
H.C. KRÜGER S. TRECHSEL
Secretary President
to the Commission of the Commission
(Or. English)
DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, I. CABRAL BARRETO,
N. BRATZA AND M. VILA AMIGÓ
To our regret we cannot agree with the majority of the Commission
in finding that the applicant's expulsion to Peru would not violate
Article 3 of the Convention. The Report leaves us in no doubt that this
is a borderline case. We can accept that looking at the situation of the
applicant in isolation one can indeed reach the conclusion which the
majority has voted for, particularly if, in case of doubt, one gives
precedence to the respondent State's margin of appreciation rather than
to the applicant's security.
However, we cannot look at the case of Mr. Paez in isolation. We are
strongly impressed by the fact that on 16 February 1966 the Aliens
Appeals Board granted asylum to L, M and I, ie. the applicant's mother
and two sisters. They had not advanced any substantially stronger
arguments, if compared with the applicant; the Swedish authorities gave
them the benefit of the doubt and pointed out that they had to be
regarded as de facto refugees, i.a. because they belonged to a
"well-known family" (see para. 32 of the Report).
In rejecting the applicant's appeal on 12 October 1995 the
Government, while finding that the applicant in principle fulfilled the
requirements for being regarded as a de facto refugee, concluded that in
view of his activities within the Sendero Luminoso organisation there
were special reasons for not granting him asylum. To the extent that
these reasons are relied on as justifying the difference of treatment of
the applicant and other members of his family, they do not constitute
valid reasons in terms of the Convention. As the Court pointed out in its
Chahal judgment (Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November
1996, Reports 1996-I, para. 23) the activities of the individual in
question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material
consideration in determining whether the expulsion of the individual
would be compatible with Article 3, the protection afforded by Article
3 being absolute in character and wider than that afforded under the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees. We note in this regard that it is
not in any event suggested that the applicant himself committed any
atrocities in the name of Sendero Luminoso.
In the file before the Commission we have not found any other
convincing argument for distinguishing the situation of the applicant's
family in Sweden from that of the applicant himself. In concluding as we
do that, on balance, substantial grounds have been shown for believing
that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Peru, we place particular
reliance on the inconsistency shown by the Swedish authorities.
(Or. English)
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. J-C. GEUS, JOINED BY MRS. J. LIDDY AND
MM. A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK, A. WEITZEL, I. BÉKÉS, J. MUCHA AND A. PERENIC
I have voted against the finding of the majority that the
applicant's expulsion to Peru would not violate Article 3 of the
Convention. My conclusion differs from that of the majority for the
reasons below.
It is true that the present applicant has not presented any warrant
of arrest or similar evidence showing that he would be wanted by the
Peruvian authorities. However, as there now appears to have been a
resurgence in the violent activities of Sendero Luminoso (para. 48), one
must take into account the effects which this may have on the treatment
of returning Peruvians suspected of participation in activities for the
benefit of that movement. In this connection I note a further report
released by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki in September 1996 - "Swedish
Asylum Policy in Global Human Rights Perspective (Vol. 8, No. 14 (D)) -
which states, inter alia, as follows:
"... Sweden has denied a number of credible asylum applications submitted in
the past few years by Peruvians. In many of these cases, the Swedish
authorities have recognised that the applicant was once a victim of
persecution in Peru. Nonetheless, citing recent reforms in Peru, the
applicants' acquittal by a Peruvian court, or their ability to obtain travel
documents, the Swedish authorities have concluded that they would not face
continued persecution if returned. But, as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki and
other human rights organisations have documented, recent reforms in Peru have
been minor: an acquittal does not protect Peruvians from harassment, arrest,
and retrial; and Peruvian travel documents may be easily obtained by bribing
the relevant officials. Peru's congress has voted to extend the regime of
'faceless courts' until October 1996, meaning that these courts are
continuing to prosecute civilians (p.27; footnotes omitted)."
Human Right Watch goes on to referring to three cases involving
Peruvians, including that of Mr. Aponte Inga (paras. 38 and 46 of the
Commission's Report) and Ms. Monica Castillo Paez (paras. 18 and 26 of
the Commission's Report):
"Aponte, ... left Peru to begin his studies in the Soviet Union in 1984,
where he remained until 1994. During this time, several of his family members
took part in public political activities in Peru. A brother ... took part in
protests against police abuses. His activities resulted in his arrest and
severe torture, followed by the arrest and torture of two younger brothers
... . Aponte's sister ... was accused of belonging to the Communist Party of
Peru - Shining Path and was killed while incarcerated in 1992. His other
siblings ... as well as his parents, fled Peru for Sweden, where they sought
asylum and received permission to stay, some as de facto refugees and others
on family reunification grounds. While in Europe, Aponte was accused by the
Peruvian Government of being a member of a Shining Path support network, a
charge Aponte denies. For this crime, Aponte was tried in absentia by one of
Peru's 'faceless courts', along with sixty-seven other people. Meanwhile, in
1994 Aponte travelled to Sweden to join his family and was subsequently
arrested there for being an illegal resident. At that time he applied for
asylum, arguing that he would face persecution if returned to Peru. His
asylum application was denied, and he was forcibly returned to Peru in
September 1994. Upon arrival at the airport in Lima, he was arrested and
charged with having been sympathetic to terrorist activities. He was
imprisoned for four months, during which he withstood beatings, torture,
shortages of food and medical care, and substandard living conditions. He was
eventually tried by a 'faceless court' and finally acquitted and released on
18 January 1995. Nonetheless, he continued to suffer harassment in Lima. The
police paid frequent visits to his home, and he had the impression of
constantly being followed. Fearing renewed persecution, he left Peru in March
1995, returned to Sweden, and reapplied for asylum. In November 1995, the
Immigration Board once again denied Aponte asylum, reasoning that because he
had ultimately been acquitted, he had nothing more to fear in Peru. In
support of this conclusion, the Immigration Board also noted that Aponte had
been able to obtain travel documents in order to return to Sweden. In July
1996, the Appeals Board reversed the decision of the Immigration Board and
granted Aponte permission to remain in Sweden, albeit with the status of a
'de facto refugee', not a convention refugee.
S.P.
S.P. went to Sweden in October 1991 and immediately applied for asylum. He
based his asylum claim on his fear that, if he returns to Peru, he risks
wrongful arrest on terrorism-related charges and the torture that accompanies
most such arrests in Peru. ... The Swedish authorities have denied three
consecutive applications for asylum filed by S.P. In initially denying him
asylum, the authorities discredited his claims of harassment by the Peruvian
security police, noting that the police had not given him any trouble going
through passport control on his way to Sweden. ... His third application was
denied, in part, because the Appeals Board believes that Peru's 'faceless
courts' no longer prosecute civilians. As previously noted, this decision
reflects a serious error regarding the current state of justice in Peru.
Monica Castillo Paez
Castillo went to Sweden in December 1990. Her brother, Ernesto Castillo Paez
had 'disappeared' in October of that year and is presumed dead. One of her
cousins [A; see para. 18] was killed in 1989. Security forces are suspected
in both cases. Her parents, still living in Peru, have received numerous
threats from people thought to be connected to the security forces. In the
months following her brother's disappearance, the police went to Castillo's
home on several occasions. Fearing the same fate as her brother, Castillo
fled to Sweden and sought asylum. The Swedish authorities denied her
application, finding insufficient grounds for asylum. In August 1993, she was
deported from Sweden. While changing planes in Amsterdam, she applied for
asylum there. The Dutch Government subsequently recognised her as a refugee
under the Refugee Convention (pp. 28-29; footnotes omitted)."
I also note the interest shown notably by Peruvian press in Sweden's
handling of asylum claims lodged by Peruvians. As noted also by the
majority of the Commission (para. 82), at least part of these asylum
seekers have been accused of being Sendero Luminoso "terrorists". I note,
in particular, the newspaper reports of 13 October 1995 and 14 May 1996
(paras. 29 and 33). In these reports the applicant is referred to as a
"terrorist", although there is no indication that he - or indeed any
member of his extended family - has been convicted or even charged with
such a crime. I consider that his treatment on his return to Peru is
likely to be affected negatively by these statements in the public
domain.
The respondent Government have referred to the possibility that the
applicant might be placed in a special detention centre under the
supervision of a public prosecutor where his risk of being tortured could
be limited significantly. I cannot find this argument sufficiently
convincing, as judging from the various evidence available to the
Commission there is still reason to believe that not all officers
particularly within the Peruvian anti-terrorist police respect the
prohibition of torture (cf. the above-mentioned Chahal judgment, paras.
106-107).
Nor can I find any indication that the respondent Government has
received - or even sought - assurances from the Peruvian Government as
to the applicant's fate on his return to Peru.
I also find it probable that the various proceedings which the
applicant himself and members of his extended family have instituted
outside Peru are being perceived negatively by representatives of
Peruvian authorities (see, e.g., paras. 49-50). This is a further element
to be taken into account when assessing whether the applicant would run
a "real risk" of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 on
his return to Peru.
I finally note the facts set out by the majority of the Commission
in paras. 76-78 of the Report. These relate, on the one hand, to the
applicant himself, to the killing and the disappearance of two of his
cousins as well as to the granting of refugee status to members of his
immediate and extended family (see also paras. 18, 20 and 26 in fine).
On the other hand, the facts noted by the majority also relate to the
general situation in Peru. All this information would seem to be of
decisive importance in evaluating the consequences of the applicant's
expulsion to that country.
In these exceptional circumstances I consider that the interest
shown by Peruvian press and presumably by the Peruvian authorities in the
applicant's fate rather than diminishing his risk of facing treatment
contrary to Article 3 has increased it to such an extent as to attain the
threshold set up by the notion of a "real risk" (cf. Eur. Court HR,
Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-
I, p. ..., para. 106).
I am therefore of the opinion that sufficient evidence has been
adduced to establish substantial grounds for believing that the applicant
would be exposed to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention, if returned to Peru. Accordingly, his expulsion to Peru would
violate Article 3 of the Convention.
(Or. English)
DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. F. MARTINEZ, M.A. NOWICKI AND B. CONFORTI
We have voted against the finding of the majority and can subscribe
both to the reasons advanced, on the one hand, by Mr. Geus and others
and, on the other hand, by Mr. Trechsel and others.
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
