S.J., B.J. AND G.J. v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 21073/92 • ECHR ID: 001-46123
Document date: December 3, 1997
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SECOND CHAMBER
Application No. 21073/92
S.J., B.J. and G.J.
against
Sweden
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 3 December 1997)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1-15) 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-4) 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5-10) 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 11-15) 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 16-40) 3
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 16-32) 3
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
(paras. 33-40) 6
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 41-64) 8
A. Complaints declared admissible
(para. 41) 8
B. Points at issue
(para. 42) 8
C. The Court of Appeal's failure to give A and B an
oral hearing or an opportunity to complete their appeal
(paras. 43-49) 8
CONCLUSION
(para. 50) 10
D. The alleged failure to inform C of the proceedings
(paras. 51-61) 10
a. As regards Article 6 of the Convention
(paras. 54-57) 10
CONCLUSION
(para. 58) 11
b. As regards Article 13 of the Convention
(paras. 59-60) 11
CONCLUSION
(para. 61) 11
E. Recapitulation
(paras. 62-64) 11
APPENDIX: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION 13
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicants, A, B and C, three brothers, are Swedish citizens born in 1936, 1943 and 1939 respectively. B is a farmer, which also used to be his brothers' occupation. Before the Commission they are represented by Mr Anders Delphin , a lawyer practising in Marstrand .
3. The application is directed against Sweden. The respondent Government were represented by their agent Ms Eva Jagander , Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
4. The application concerns legal proceedings relating to the construction of a road. The applicants invoke Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
B. The proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 25 November 1991 and registered on 15 December 1992.
6. On 30 November 1994 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits, limited to the applicants' complaint under Article 6 of the Convention that A and B, in the second proceedings before the Court of Appeal, were not given an oral hearing or an opportunity to complete their appeal and their complaint under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that C was not informed of the proceedings in the case.
7. The Government's observations were submitted on 17 February 1995. The applicant replied on 6 April 1995.
8. On 16 October 1996 the Commission declared admissible the complaints on which the parties had been invited to submit observations (para. 6). It declared inadmissible the remainder of the application.
9. The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 25 October 1996 and they were invited to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished. The Government informed the Commission on 13 November 1996 that they had no further observations to submit in the case. The applicant submitted further observations on 23 March 1997, after extensions of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.
10. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement. In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.
C. The present Report
11. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:
Mrs G.H. THUNE, President
MM G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. ŠVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIŪNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
12. The text of this Report was adopted on 3 December 1997 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
13. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:
( i ) to establish the facts, and
(ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.
14. The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto.
15. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case
16. The applicants own one third each of two pieces of agricultural property ( Vara Faleberg 2:3 and Vara Faleberg 2:12) in Vedum , Sweden. A and B reside on the property. C emigrated from Sweden in January 1985 and is now living in Dublin, Ireland. On 25 November 1980 C issued a power of attorney for A and B or a lawyer appointed by A or B to represent him in disputes and negotiations with regard to roads and other encroachments on the above property.
17. By contract of 30 November 1985, the property is leased by two lessees to be used for training of hunting dogs. The rent is 5000 Swedish crowns (SEK) per year. It was paid for the first time in 1989. The lease states, as a condition for its validity, that the property will not be encumbered with a right for anyone to travel on it. Accordingly, the applicants have agreed not to construct any roads on the property.
18. After the applicants had started legal proceedings against two neighbours for unauthorised use of a road on the applicants' property, a friendly settlement was reached in court on 30 October 1987 according to which the neighbours agreed not to use the road. The following day C apparently revoked the power of attorney he had issued in 1980.
19. In a petition to the Real Estate Formation Authority ( fastighetsbildningsmyndigheten ) of Mariestad , dated 30 October 1987, one of the parties to the friendly settlement agreement and another neighbour requested that a road be constructed and that administrative proceedings ( anläggningsförrättning ) be instituted for this purpose. Almost half of the length of the proposed road is situated on the applicants' property, mainly taking up the space of the already existing road, but also requiring some logging.
20. On 26 November 1987 a bailiff ( stämningsman ) handed over a summons in the administrative proceedings to A. At the same time, the bailiff also handed over a summons for C to A, in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 21 of the Real Estate Formation Act ( Fastighetsbildningslagen , 1970:988; cf. para. 35). According to the applicants, C was at the time living in England, but A and B did not know his address.
21. On 30 November 1987 the Real Estate Formation Authority, consisting of a land surveyor, held proceedings at the location of the proposed road. The property owners concerned had been summoned and, apparently, most of them, including A and B, were present, either in person or through their representatives. Those present were heard on the different aspects of the undertaking. C was, however, absent. According to the minutes of the proceedings, A and B refused to state C's address.
22. On the same day, 30 November 1987, the Real Estate Formation Authority decided that the proposed road should be constructed, as the benefits of the road outweighed the inconveniences and costs of it and as the construction fulfilled all other requirements of the Construction Act ( Anläggningslagen , 1973:1149). It further decided that 17 properties in the area would benefit from the road, that the road should be jointly owned by these properties, that an association of joint property owners ( samfällighet ) should be founded to construct and maintain the road, and that the costs of construction and maintenance should be distributed among the 17 properties. The applicants' properties' total share of the costs was fixed at 13.7 per cent. Moreover, the Authority decided that the applicants should receive compensation in the amount of 800 SEK for the use of their land. A and B opposed all the decisions taken.
23. A and B appealed to the Real Estate Court ( fastighetsdomstolen ) of Mariestad , requesting the court to quash the decision of the Real Estate Formation Authority, in the first place, because C had not been properly summoned to the administrative proceedings and, in the second place, because the requirements of the Construction Act had not been met. They submitted that the road in question was not of essential importance to the neighbouring properties, as there was an alternative road, not involving the applicants' property, which could be used by these properties. They further maintained that the road to be constructed would affect the leasehold and that this had not been taken into account by the Real Estate Formation Authority. Finally, they claimed that the two neighbours who were parties to the friendly settlement agreement should not, in accordance with the terms of the said agreement, in any event be allowed to use the road to be constructed.
24. On 24 January 1989 the Real Estate Court held a hearing, at which it inspected the locus in quo ( syn ). A and B appeared and were represented by a lawyer but, again, C was absent. Prior to the hearing, the court had investigated C's whereabouts, but had not been able to find out his address. It had, inter alia , contacted A and B who had replied that they did not know C's address and that, in any event, he had requested that his address not be revealed. A had later told a court clerk by telephone that he would provide the court with C's address or a power of attorney for him. A, however, failed to do so. The court, therefore, sent a summons for C to A who, however, refused to sign the receipt as, allegedly, he was not authorised to sign receipts for mail addressed to C. The other property owners and the two lessees had been summoned to appear at the hearing.
25. By decision of 7 February 1989, the Real Estate Court rejected the appeal, stating that C had been summoned to the proceedings of the Real Estate Formation Authority in accordance with the applicable rules, that the road in question was important for forestry purposes, that the costs of putting the alternative road in order for the use of transport of forestry products would exceed the costs of constructing the road in question and that the existence of the leasehold, which the lessees had not yet made use of, did not invalidate the land surveyor's assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the construction. The court further noted that the road in question was constructed for the benefit of the properties involved and not the property owners. For this reason, the friendly settlement agreement was of no importance to the case in question.
26. A, B and the two lessees appealed to the Göta Court of Appeal ( Göta hovrätt ), which on 5 June 1989 quashed the decision of the Real Estate Court and referred the case back to that court for re-examination. The Court of Appeal found that the rules on how to serve a summons in the proceedings of the Real Estate Court were different from the rules applicable to the proceedings of the Real Estate Formation Authority and required, according to Section 15 of the Act on Service of Documents ( Delgivningslagen , 1970:428), in this particular case where the whereabouts of C were unknown, that the summons be served by publication. As this had not been done, the Real Estate Court had made a grave procedural error. The Court of Appeal, however, concurred with the Real Estate Court's finding that C had been served a proper summons in the administrative proceedings.
27. On 26 September 1989 the Real Estate Court held a second combined hearing and inspection, at which A and B and their lawyer were present. C did not appear. He had, however, been summoned by publication; the summons had been available at the court for a period of 20 days and a notice of the summons had been published in five daily papers.
28. On 31 October 1989 the Real Estate Court again rejected the appeal. In addition to its findings of 7 February 1989, the court found that, in accordance with a 1923 agreement to allow the property owners in the neighbourhood to travel on each other's properties, these property owners had, in the 1940's, put the road on the applicants' property in order and had, thereafter, maintained it to stand heavy transports. Thus, the court concluded that the existence of the more recent leasehold was not of decisive importance to the case.
29. A, B and the two lessees again appealed to the Court of Appeal. In submissions filed with the appellate court by A's and B's lawyer on 28 November 1989 and 9 January 1990, A and B claimed that the 1923 agreement did not apply to the road on the applicants' property, as the road did not exist at the time of the agreement, and that the road had not been used by the neighbours until the 1960's. They also referred to the alternative road and to the leasehold, and notified the court of C's address in Dublin. In a further letter, filed with the court by A and B themselves on 7 May 1990, they requested that an oral hearing be held and that they be given an opportunity to complete their appeal at a later date. They did not, however, indicate the nature of the further submissions they wished to make.
30. The Court of Appeal did not give a decision on the requests for an oral hearing and an opportunity to complete the appeal. Moreover, it appears that it did not notify C in any way before its decision, although, at this time, his address was known. By decision of 6 June 1990, the court rejected the appeal. It had at its disposal the case-file of the Real Estate Court, including the minutes of the hearings in the case.
31. A, B and C applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court ( Högsta domstolen ). In addition to what they had stated in their appeals to the lower courts, A and B alleged that, as the Court of Appeal had disregarded their requests for an oral hearing and an opportunity to complete their appeal, they had not been able to complain about certain events that had taken place during the second hearing of the Real Estate Court. C, for his part, asserted that the Real Estate Formation Authority and the different courts had failed to notify him of the proceedings, although his foreign address had been known. He further stated that the economic loss sustained due to the decision to construct the road in question was not insignificant and referred, in this respect, to his brothers' submissions in the case.
32. On 14 June 1991 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
a. Introduction
33. Under Section 1 of the Construction Act, a joint construction for several properties, e.g. a road, may be established if it serves purposes that are of permanent importance to those properties. Sections 5-11 lay down further requirements for such an undertaking, inter alia that the benefits of the construction outweigh the inconveniences and costs of it.
34. The question whether a joint construction should be established is determined by the local Real Estate Formation Authority subsequent to administrative proceedings before that authority (Sections 1 and 4 of the Construction Act). Its decision may be appealed against to the appropriate Real Estate Court. Further appeals may be made to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court (Sections 30-31 of the Construction Act compared with Chapters 15-18 of the Real Estate Formation Act).
b. Service of summons
35. If a property owner resides abroad, the Real Estate Formation Authority may summon him to its proceedings by handing over the summons to the administrator or user of the property, unless service can be effected in Sweden with a known representative of the owner. If possible, the receiver of the summons is obliged to forward it immediately to the owner. In addition, if the owner's foreign address is known, the Real Estate Formation Authority shall notify him that the summons has been served. In any event, service is considered to have been effected at the time when the summons was handed over to the administrator, user or representative (Section 19 of the Construction Act compared with Chapter 4, Section 21 of the Real Estate Formation Act).
36. The Real Estate Court shall summon all the parties concerned to its hearing, unless it is clear that the presence of one or more parties is unnecessary. Service shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Act on Service of Documents (Chapter 16, Section 5 of the Real Estate Formation Act). Normally, the summons is sent by post. If the whereabouts of the person in question are unknown, however, the summons may be served by publication (Section 15 of the Act on Service of Documents). Such service is brought about by keeping the summons available at the court's registry for a certain period of time and by publishing a notice in Post- och Inrikes Tidningar , an official gazette, or a local newspaper (Section 17 of the Act on Service of Documents).
c. Proceedings before the Court of Appeal
37. Upon appeal against the Real Estate Court's decision, the Court of Appeal, if it considers it to be necessary, may serve the appeal petition on the parties concerned and order them to submit their observations (Chapter 16, Section 3 of the Real Estate Formation Act). The appellate court may not change the appealed decision to the detriment of a party concerned, unless that party has been given an opportunity to submit observations (Chapter 16, Section 11 of the Real Estate Formation Act).
38. In cases of the present kind, the proceedings before the appellate court are normally carried out in writing. An oral hearing may be held if it is considered necessary for the examination of the case (Chapter 16, Section 3 of the Real Estate Formation Act and Chapter 52, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure ( Rättegångsbalken )). A decision to inspect the locus in quo requires particularly strong reasons (Chapter 17, Section 3 of the Real Estate Formation Act).
39. If a party's request for an oral hearing is not granted, the appellate court normally issues a formal decision to reject the request. In addition, the party is given the opportunity to submit final observations in writing within a specified time-limit.
d. Joinder of parties
40. Each of several co-parties is normally treated independently in relation to the opposite party or parties. However, when the nature of the matter in dispute is such that only one decision can be given for all the co-parties, any procedural act performed by one of the co-parties applies to all of them (Chapter 14, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure). Such a joinder of parties is at hand, inter alia , in cases of joint ownership to property.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaints declared admissible
41. The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that A and B, in the second proceedings before the Court of Appeal, were not given an oral hearing or an opportunity to complete their appeal and the complaint under Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention that C was not informed of the proceedings in the case.
B. Points at issue
42. Accordingly, the issues to be determined are
- whether there has been a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as A and B were not given an oral hearing or an opportunity to complete their appeal in the Court of Appeal;
- whether there has been a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention on account of the alleged failure to inform C of the proceedings; and
- whether there has been a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention due to that alleged lack of information.
C. The Court of Appeal's failure to give A and B an oral hearing or an opportunity to complete their appeal
43. Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ..."
44. The applicants state that, in making their request to the Court of Appeal, A and B wished to submit information of importance to the case. However, their request was disregarded by the court and, as a consequence, they were unable to submit concluding arguments in the case.
45. The respondent Government claim that, although the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal covered both questions of law and fact, the nature of the issues to be decided was not such that the applicants' physical attendance was essential. On the contrary, the issues were of a technical nature and therefore could be better dealt with in writing than in oral argument during the appeal proceedings. Above all, the dispute does not appear to have involved issues of public importance such as to make a hearing necessary. In regard to A's and B's request for an opportunity to complete their appeal, the Government submit that they were able to present their arguments at two different levels prior to the determination of the case by the Court of Appeal. Further, their arguments were included already in the appeal petition initiating the second set of proceedings before the Court of Appeal. Moreover, when they made their request, they did not specify what kind of further observations they intended to submit or how much time they would need for the submission of these observations. The Government add that a request of this kind would normally be met by a court decision rejecting it or by a court order to submit the observations in question within a specified time-limit.
46. The Commission recalls that the way in which Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention applies to hearings before courts of appeal depends on the special features of the proceedings (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Helmers v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-A, p. 15, para. 31). If several courts may examine the matter, a hearing before one of these may suffice (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Jan- Åke Andersson v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-B, pp. 45-46, paras. 27-29). In certain circumstances, the complete absence of an oral hearing at all levels may be compatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) (cf. Eur. Court HR, Schuler-Zgraggen judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, pp. 19-20, para. 58).
47. As regards the present case, the Commission recalls that the Court of Appeal was called upon to examine it as to both the facts and the law. Prior to that examination, the Real Estate Court had held oral hearings on two occasions, on 24 January and 26 September 1989. Also the Real Estate Formation Authority had held a hearing in the case. At these hearings, which had taken place at the location of the proposed road, A and B had been present and heard. The case file of the Real Estate Court, including the minutes of the hearings in the case, was available to the Court of Appeal. In these circumstances, it might be argued that a further hearing was not necessary and that the Court of Appeal was justified in not holding one.
48. However, under domestic law, the Court of Appeal could have decided to hold an oral hearing and, consequently, it was open to the parties to the proceedings to make a request to that effect. A and B lodged such a request on 7 May 1990 and further asked for an opportunity to complete their appeal. As noted by the Government, the procedure normally followed by an appellate court in regard to such a request is, if it is not granted, to take a formal decision to reject it or to give the requesting party the opportunity to submit final observations in writing within a specified time-limit. However, by decision of 6 June 1990, the Court of Appeal rejected A's and B's appeal on the merits. It did not hold a hearing or order A and B to complete their appeal, nor did it, in any other way, respond to their request.
49. The Commission cannot find that the way in which the Court of Appeal proceeded was justified. Given the practice normally followed by the appellate courts, A and B had reasons to expect an answer to their request. As the Court of Appeal failed to give such an answer and instead rejected the appeal on the merits only a month after the request had been lodged, A and B were effectively deprived of the possibility to submit, orally or in writing, their final submissions in the case. The Commission therefore considers that they were not able to put their case fully before the Court of Appeal and that, thus, they did not have a fair hearing as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Having reached that conclusion, the Commission does not find it necessary to take a separate decision on the question whether there should have been an oral hearing in the Court of Appeal.
CONCLUSION
50. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention as A and B were not able to put their case fully before the Court of Appeal.
D. The alleged failure to inform C of the proceedings
51. The applicants state that C was denied the opportunity to plead against the proposal to construct the road, as he was not informed of the proceedings before the Real Estate Formation Authority and the courts. He claims that his foreign address was to be found in official national registers, to which the Authority and the courts had access, and that the Court of Appeal had been notified of his address in Dublin. Consequently, a summons could not be served by publication, but should have been served by mail or through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
52. The Government contend firstly that C cannot claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, of the alleged violation of Article 6 (Art. 6). The Government argue that, as one of three owners of the property in question, C can be presumed to have had the same interests in the proceedings as the other owners. Furthermore, A and B based their appeals to the different courts partly on their contention that C had not been properly summoned to the various proceedings.
53. In the alternative, the Government submit that C's complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They maintain that C, when leaving Sweden, appears to have left the administration of the property in question to his brothers. All procedural acts performed by A and B concerned the jointly owned property and operated to the advantage of all property owners, including C. As stated by C in his appeal to the Supreme Court, he had the same interests as his brothers. Moreover, C was summoned to the proceedings before the Real Estate Formation Authority and the Real Estate Court in accordance with relevant domestic legislation. In the Government's view, there are also good reasons to believe that C was aware of the proceedings in the case and that he decided of his own volition not to take part in the proceedings.
a. As regards Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention
54. In regard to the Government's contention under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, the Commission notes that C in effect claims that he did not have a fair hearing under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as he was not informed of the proceedings in the case. As the proceedings concerned property which he owned together with his brothers and as there is no evidence of his being aware of the proceedings in question, the Commission finds that he can claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of the Convention.
55. As to the merits of the present complaint, the Commission first notes that the applicants have not shown that C's address was available in national registers. It is further recalled that the Real Estate Court unsuccessfully investigated C's whereabouts. In these circumstances, the Commission is satisfied that C was summoned to the proceedings of the Real Estate Formation Authority and to the second hearing of the Real Estate Court in accordance with the applicable domestic rules, i.e. as a person whose address is unknown.
56. Moreover, the proceedings concerned the construction of a road on property which C owned jointly with A and B. Thus, the nature of the issue to be determined was such that the Real Estate Formation Authority and the courts could take only one decision, which would have the same effects for all three owners of the property. C could be expected to have the same interests as his brothers, who were present at the hearings in the case and presented arguments to all the administrative and judicial bodies. In fact, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, C referred to his brothers' submissions. It thus appears that the arguments C would have wanted to present to the various organs were indeed submitted by A and B.
57. In these circumstances, the Commission cannot find that C was denied a fair hearing in the case.
CONCLUSION
58. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention on account of the alleged failure to inform C of the proceedings in the case.
b. As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
59. Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides the following:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
60. Having regard to its conclusion under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (para. 57), the Commission does not find it necessary to examine the complaint also under Article 13 (Art. 13). The requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) are less strict than, and are here absorbed by, those of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 31, para. 88).
CONCLUSION
61. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention.
E. Recapitulation
62. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention as A and B were not able to put their case fully before the Court of Appeal (para. 50).
63. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention on account of the alleged failure to inform C of the proceedings in the case (para. 58).
64. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention (para. 61).
M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber