THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 24269/18 Georgios STYLIANIDIS against Cyprus

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 16 January 2024 as a Chamber composed of:

Pere Pastor Vilanova , President , Jolien Schukking, Yonko Grozev, Darian Pavli, Peeter Roosma , judges , Ioannis Ktistakis , ad hoc judge , Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir , judge , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 May 2018,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the decision taken by the President of the Chamber to appoint Mr Ioannis Ktistakis, the judge elected in respect of Greece, to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rule 29 § 2 of the Rules of Court), Mr Georgios A. Serghides, the judge elected in respect of Cyprus, having withdrawn from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3),

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Georgios Stylianidis, is a Cypriot national, who was born in 1957 and lives in Nicosia. He was represented before the Court by Mr Costas Velaris and Mr Charilaos Velaris, lawyers practising in Nicosia.

2. The Cypriot Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr G. L. Savvides, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . In November 2014 the Supreme Council of Judicature (“the SCJ”) announced its intention to fill a vacancy for the post of district court president. According to the announcement, all district court judges, the applicant included, were to be considered as candidates for the post, and it was not necessary for them to submit an application.

5 . At the same time, two other vacant positions opened for the post of president of the district court. Although these posts were not announced, all judges, including the applicant, who was a senior district court judge at the time, were considered as candidates.

6. On 21 January 2015 the SCJ, composed of eleven judges of the Supreme Court, including the President of the Supreme Court, decided to appoint three judges (M.M., E.E. and A.D.) to the post of district court president. All three judges were senior district court judges at the time. The SCJ was unanimous in its decision with regard to Judge A.D. It was also unanimous with regard to Judge E.E., with the exception of one judge (Judge S.N.) who recused himself. With regard to Judge M.M., the SCJ’s decision was taken by a majority of seven judges, with four judges (Judges S.N., P.P., L.P., and A.L.) dissenting.

7. The applicant was not promoted, even though two judges (Judges S.N. and A.L.) had proposed him for the post.

8 . The minutes of the SCJ meeting stated the following:

“The criteria applied for promotion are, in general, merit, qualifications and seniority. The ‘merit’ criterion includes integrity, honesty, ability and productivity.

In the case of M.M., [the SCJ] particularly took into account his seniority over the other candidates (district court judge since 1991), his age (almost 60 years old) and his integrity.

In the cases of E.E. and A.D., [the SCJ] took into account their merit and qualifications. The SCJ (with the exception of Judge S.N., as regards E.E., on account of family ties) unanimously considered that E.E. and A.D. were the most suitable ( καταλληλότεροι ) for the position of district court president.

The SCJ considers that the hierarchy, in principle, should be adhered to unless there is a serious concern about a candidate ( εκτός και αν υπάρχει κάτι σοβαρό εναντίον κάποιου υποψηφίου ). The hierarchy can, however, be circumvented , inter alia , when it is generally considered that a candidate who may be lower in the hierarchy excels in merit and/or qualifications over other candidates who are more senior, as is the case with E.E. and A.D.”

9. On 30 January 2015 the SCJ’s decision to appoint Judges M.M., E.E. and A.D. to the post of district court president was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus.

10 . On 9 April 2015 the applicant challenged the SCJ’s decision by way of a recourse (judicial review proceedings; no. 469/2015) with the Supreme Court (first-instance administrative jurisdiction). He argued, inter alia , that the SCJ’s decision breached Articles 28, 30, 153 and 157 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 15 and 17 below). He further argued that the decision had been arbitrary, unreasoned, taken without due inquiry and in breach of the principles of natural justice, equality and impartiality. According to the applicant, he had more years of experience and fulfilled the seniority criterion. No reasons had been given for circumventing his seniority and the decision had been made without due inquiry as regards his qualifications, experience and merit compared with the other candidates. He stated that his performance and productivity could be evidenced by yearly reports, which he had submitted to the court. The applicant also complained that he had not been given a copy of the SCJ’s minutes as they had been considered confidential.

11. On an unknown date, the applicant’s recourse was referred to the Administrative Court, which had assumed the Supreme Court’s first-instance administrative jurisdiction, following its creation by Law 131(I) 2015 (Establishment and Operation of the Administrative Court, Law of 2015).

12 . On 13 September 2016 the Administrative Court, in its full composition, delivered its judgment. It appears from the judgment that the case had originally been assigned to and considered by the full bench of the Supreme Court on account of its significance ( [λ]όγω της σοβαρότητας της υπόθεσης, επιλήφθηκε αυτής η Ολομέλεια του Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου ). The Administrative Court examined whether the SCJ was an organ, authority, or person exercising administrative or executive power. Referring to the cases of Antonios Kourris v. the SCJ ((1972) 3 C.L.R 390) and Savvas Karatsis v. 1. the Republic of Cyprus, through the Supreme Council of Judicature, 2. the SCJ ((2001) 3 C.L.R. 220) (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below), the court considered that the SCJ’s decision was closely related to the exercise of judicial power and as such constituted a judicial, not an administrative, decision. It considered, in the absence of an amendment to the legal framework regulating the issue of appointments and promotion of judges, that the court was bound by the precedent of the plenary of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned cases. It therefore held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and the recourse was rejected on that basis. Concerning the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention, the court found that no violation of Article 6 could be found when the matter could not be considered.

13 . On 14 October 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (no. 83/2016), challenging the Administrative Court’s decision. He argued, inter alia , that the Administrative Court had been wrong to conclude that decisions of the SCJ did not constitute administrative decisions, and that there had been a breach of Article 6 of the Convention on account of his lack of access to a court as a result of the Administrative Court’s erroneous decision.

14 . On 5 February 2018 the Supreme Court, sitting as a full bench composed of thirteen judges, eleven of whom had been the same judges comprising the SCJ at the time of the promotion procedure, dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings of the Administrative Court that, inter alia , a decision of the SCJ could not be reviewed by virtue of Article 146 of the Constitution as it did not constitute a decision or act that derived from the exercise of executive or administrative power.

The court further noted that it could not depart from its previous case-law as there had been no significant change in the circumstances underlying the principle of law upon which the judgments of Antonios Kourris v. the SCJ ((1972) 3 C.L.R. 390) and Savvas Karatsis v. 1. the Republic of Cyprus, through the Supreme Council of Judicature, 2. the SCJ ((2001) 3 C.L.R. 220) had been based (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below). The court concluded:

“... [A]rticle 146 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted in a way that is incompatible with its nature, even when the purpose is to provide a judicial remedy in a situation where no other remedy seems to exist.”

As for the applicant’s argument that he had been deprived of access to a court, with no alternative remedy, the Supreme Court noted, with reference to Markovic and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 1398/03, ECHR 2006-XIV), that that right could not be breached where a court lacked jurisdiction. Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the appointment or promotion of a judge was not a right safeguarded by the domestic law but was merely an expectation, and hence the applicant had not had a dispute over a right.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

15 . The right to equality before the law, administration and justice is set out in Article 28 of the Constitution, which provides as follows, in so far as relevant:

“1. All persons are equal before the law, the administration and justice, and are entitled to equal protection thereof and treatment thereby.

2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this Constitution without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political or other convictions, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless there is express provision to the contrary in this Constitution.

...”

16 . At the time of the lodging of the application with the Court, Article 146 of the Constitution provided for the revisional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as follows:

“The [Supreme Court] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision, an act or omission of any organ, authority or person, exercising any executive or administrative authority is contrary to any of the provisions of this Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in such organ or authority or person.”

17 . In accordance with Article 153 § 8 (1) and Article 157 § 1 of the Constitution, the SCJ at the material time was composed of all thirteen judges of the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Article 157 § 2 of the Constitution, the appointment, promotion, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary matters of judicial officers are exclusively within the competence of the SCJ.

18. The relevant domestic provisions concerning the SCJ at the material time are set out in Kamenos v. Cyprus (no. 147/07, §§ 34-36, 31 October 2017).

19 . Importantly, section 10 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law provided at the material time, in so far as relevant (unofficial translation from Greek):

“(1) The Supreme Court shall constitute the [SCJ].

(2) The appointment, promotion, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary matters of judicial officers shall be exclusively within the competence of the [SCJ].

(3) ...

(4) (a) The court may issue procedural rules for determining the procedure which must be followed before the [SCJ] during the exercise of its disciplinary powers over members of the judiciary.

(b) The [SCJ] shall have the power to issue rules governing its own procedure.”

20 . In 2022 the Law was amended, reforming the SCJ and establishing, inter alia , a new Supreme Constitutional Court. For the purposes of the present case, it suffices to note that section 10 of the Law was amended by Law no. 145(I)/2022 and the new paragraphs 5(α) and (ζ) of section 10 currently provide:

“(5) As of 1 July 2023:

(α) the [SCJ] shall begin its operation, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the appointment, promotion, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary matters of judges of the Court of Appeal and judges of the first-instance courts:

Provided that the [SCJ], during the appointment to or the filling of any position of a judge, shall take into account the need for staffing the courts with members who are qualified lawyers:

Provided, further, that every decision of the [SCJ] must be sufficiently and duly reasoned;

...

(ζ) upon the submission of an objection by an affected party, the decision of the [SCJ] shall be reviewed by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which, in such circumstances, shall act as a second-tier judicial council that exercises judicial review over the decisions of the [SCJ] ( ενεργεί ως δευτεροβάθμιο δικαστικό συμβούλιο, ασκώντας ακυρωτικό έλεγχο επί των αποφάσεων του Ανωτάτου Δικαστικού Συμβουλίου ).”

21 . Section 4 of the Courts of Justice Law (no. 14/1960), as amended, provides that the district court is composed of one or more presidents, one or more senior district court judges and other judges, referred to as “district court judges”.

22. Section 6(1) of the Courts of Justice Law provides:

“No one shall be qualified to be appointed as president of the district court or senior district court judge unless he or she is a lawyer who has been practising law for ten years and is of high moral character ...”

23 . Section 7 of the same Law provides that presidents of the district court, senior district court judges and district court judges are permanent members of the judiciary.

24 . Section 8(2) of the same Law, as applicable at the relevant time, provided that presidents of the district court and senior district court judges were to hold their position until they reached the age of 65.

25 . In the case of Antonios Kourris v. the SCJ ((1972) 3 C.L.R. 390), the complainant, a district court judge, brought a recourse before the Supreme Court under Article 146 of the Constitution. He challenged a decision by the SCJ relating to the temporary appointment of five other district court judges as district court presidents and complained that the SCJ had refused or omitted to deal with his written complaint in connection with those appointments. On 8 August 1972 the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse. It held, by a majority, that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution against any act, decision or omission of the SCJ because the latter’s functions were very closely connected with the exercise of judicial power.

26 . In the case of Savvas Karatsis v. 1. the Republic of Cyprus , through the Supreme Council of Judicature, 2. the SCJ ((2001) 3 C.L.R. 220) , the complainant, a family court judge, brought a recourse before the Supreme Court under Article 146 of the Constitution, challenging a decision by the SCJ concerning the conditions of his appointment to a temporary post as district court judge and the revocation of his appointment when he did not accept those conditions. The Supreme Court sat as a full bench (that is, all thirteen judges). The complainant requested that the Supreme Court re ‑ examine and/or revise its judgment in Kourris (see paragraph 25 above) and that his case be heard by a different bench, arguing that the thirteen judges in question had themselves written the impugned decision, which they had taken in their capacity as members of the SCJ. On 15 March 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse for want of jurisdiction without addressing the issue of impartiality. It ruled that the Constitution entrusted the appointment of judicial officers exclusively to the SCJ (Article 157 § 2 of the Constitution). Judicial appointments were closely, even inextricably, interwoven with the exercise of the judicial function; more precisely, they constituted a precondition for the exercise of that function. Entrusting the appointment of judicial officers to the judicial function itself was an aspect of the independence of the judiciary and an expression of the autonomy of that function. Law no. 33/64 had been based on that premise and reflected the constitutional order.

27 . On 2 October 2019 the SCJ issued and published, on the official website of the Supreme Court, the procedure and criteria for the promotion of judges.

28. In brief, the newly established procedure entails seven detailed steps including a pre-selection stage, an interview stage (at which the importance of each criterion in the overall mark to be assigned to each candidate is set out), and a selection stage. Candidates for promotion are entitled to access the minutes kept throughout the procedure.

COMPLAINTS

29. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about his inability to challenge the SCJ’s decision, in breach of his right of access to a court, and about the alleged failure of the Supreme Court to act impartially.

THE LAW

30. The applicant alleged a breach of his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on two grounds. First, he complained that he had had no access to a court to challenge the allegedly arbitrary decision of the SCJ. Secondly, he complained that the Supreme Court had failed to act as an “impartial tribunal”, as the Supreme Court judges dismissing his appeal had been the same judges who had decided, as members of the SCJ, not to promote him.

31. He relied in that connection on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

32. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints had been lodged out of time as he had had recourse to a remedy – namely, the judicial review proceedings – which was ineffective. Specifically, the Government argued that the judicial review proceedings had offered no reasonable prospects of success, because there had been well-established case-law delivered by the full bench of the Supreme Court to the effect that decisions of SCJ were not amenable to judicial review.

33. The Government further submitted that Article 6 of the Convention was inapplicable in its civil aspect. They argued that the domestic law did not recognise a “right” to appointment or promotion to the post of district court president. It only recognised a right for district court judges – including presidents – to hold their position until retirement. This had also been confirmed by the Supreme Court, which had held that the appointment and promotion of a judge was not a right protected under domestic law but was merely an expectation (see paragraph 14 above). According to the Government, the domestic law did not provide for detailed rules concerning the process for promotion, nor were domestic courts competent to review the SCJ’s decision. Neither the Supreme Court nor the SCJ had established procedural rules or publicly set out a procedure or criteria for the promotion and appointment of judges. The SCJ had not conducted any interviews of the candidates, and there had been no protocol to be followed concerning the selection procedure. The assessment of the candidates had been based on their “merit, qualifications and seniority”, with the merit criterion including integrity, ability and efficiency. The SCJ’s decision had been widely discretionary and could not be challenged or reviewed. Accordingly, the Government maintained that the applicant’s mere hope of being promoted could not constitute a right within the Convention meaning.

The Government also argued that even if such a right existed, it was not a “civil” right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The State had expressly excluded access to a court in its national law, and acts, decisions, or omissions of the SCJ could not be challenged by way of a recourse (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). This exclusion of access to a court had been justified on objective grounds in the State’s interest. Specifically, the appointment of judicial officers was entrusted to the judicial function while the SCJ’s decisions were inextricably linked to the exercise of the judicial function. Entrusting the appointment of judicial officers to the judicial function itself (the SCJ comprising all judges of the Supreme Court) constituted an aspect of the independence of the judicial function and an expression of its autonomy. As such, the Government argued that the Court should declare the complaints under Article 6 incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

34. The applicant contested the Government’s submissions concerning compliance with the six-month rule.

35. The applicant further contested the Government’s submission concerning the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention. He argued that his complaint related not to a “right to promotion” but to a right to have the SCJ’s decision judicially reviewed in order to establish whether that decision had been arbitrary or procedurally flawed. In the applicant’s submission, the right to judicial review of administrative acts was provided for in Article 146 of the Constitution and it would be unreasonable to contend that any profession, including that of judges, should be arbitrarily excluded from such constitutional protection. The applicant further argued that there had been neither an express legislative provision excluding judges from the constitutional provisions offering protection from arbitrary decisions, nor had there been national-interest justifications based on objective grounds for such exclusion.

36. The Court does not consider it necessary to address the Government’s preliminary objection concerning the applicant’s alleged failure to respect the time limit of six months, because the applicant’s complaints under this heading are in any event inadmissible for the reasons explained below.

37. The relevant general principles concerning the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention in the context of disputes concerning the appointment, career and dismissal of judges were summarised by the Court in Grzęda v. Poland ([GC], 43572/18, §§ 257-64, 15 March 2022; see also Baka v. Hungar y [GC], no. 20261/12, §§ 100-06, 23 June 2016; Dolińska ‑ Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland , nos. 49868/19 and 57511/19, §§ 220 ‑ 28, 8 November 2021; Gumenyuk and Others v. Ukraine , no. 11423/19, §§ 44 ‑ 59, 22 July 2021; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey , no. 76521/12, §§ 59-63, 9 March 2021; and Bilgen v. Turkey , no. 1571/07, §§ 47-52 and §§ 65-68, 9 March 2021).

38. In the light of the relevant general principles, in order to determine the applicability of Article 6, the Court needs first to examine whether a right existed.

39. In order to determine the existence of a right in the present case, the Court must analyse the actual nature of the applicant’s complaint before the domestic authorities. In that connection, the Court reiterates that it is the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceedings that must be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 is applicable (see Bilgen , cited above, § 54).

40. In the present case, the applicant, a judge at the relevant time, complained that the decision to promote judges other than him to the post of district court president had been arbitrary, unreasoned, taken without due inquiry and in breach of the principles of equality and impartiality (see paragraph 10 above). He argued, inter alia , that no reasons had been given for circumventing his seniority and no explanation had been provided as to how he fell short in terms of qualifications, experience or merit compared with the other candidates. The applicant was therefore not arguing that he had a substantive right to be promoted to the position of district court president, nor does the Court discern such a right. The Court considers, however, that the crux of the applicant’s complaint concerned the right to a lawful and fair procedure in the examination of his candidacy for promotion ( see Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, § 105, 19 September 2017; Frezadou v. Greece , no. 2683/12, § 28, 8 November 2018; and Gloveli v. Georgia , no. 18952/18, § 35, 7 April 2022).

41. It is reiterated that the starting point in deciding the existence of the right in question must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts (see Regner, cited above, § 100). Article 6 might still be applicable, even if national law does not recognise that an individual has a subjective right, if it confers the right to a lawful procedure for the examination of his or her claim, involving matters such as ruling whether a decision was ultra vires, or whether there were procedural irregularities (ibid, § 105). This is the case regarding certain decisions where the authorities have a purely discretionary power to grant or refuse an advantage or privilege with that law conferring on the person concerned the right to apply to the courts, which where they find that the decision was unlawful, may set it aside (ibid.). The Court has accepted that the right to a lawful and fair promotion procedure could be considered as a recognised right in domestic law, at least arguably where the domestic courts had recognised its existence and had examined the relevant complaints of the applicants (see Dzhidzheva-Trendafilova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 12628/09, § 43, 9 October 2012 , Frezadou , cited above , § 28; and Gloveli , cited above , § 35 ). It has held that such a right to a lawful and fair promotion procedure exists under domestic law, and Article 6 is applicable as a result, in cases where national law expressly regulates the procedure and the procedural rights of the individual applicants for the respective positions, and the domestic courts had recognised their existence and had examined the relevant complaints of the applicants (see Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria (no. 43800/12, § 84, 15 September 2015, Frezadou , cited above , § 28), or the national Constitution and its interpretation by the Constitutional Court provided for the right of equal access to public service (see Gloveli , cited above , § 37).

42. Turning first to the relevant domestic law in the present case, the Court notes, as a preliminary remark, the absence of legal provisions regulating the promotion procedure at the material time. According to the Constitution, the appointment and promotion of judges are matters exclusively within the competence of the SCJ (see paragraph 17 above), which, in accordance with the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, had the power to adopt rules governing its own procedure (see paragraph 19 above). As per the Government’s submissions, which the applicant did not contest, the SCJ had not, at the relevant time, adopted rules governing the procedure for the appointment or promotion of judges (compare the procedure adopted by the SCJ for disciplinary matters as outlined in Kamenos v. Cyprus (cited above, § 41). The Court notes, that such rules appear to have been adopted in 2019 (see paragraph 27 above), long after the facts of the present case.

43. In addition, from the minutes of the meeting on 21 January 2015, it appears that the SCJ had only established general criteria for promotion, such as “merit, qualifications and seniority”, with the “merit” criterion including “integrity, honesty, ability and efficiency” (see paragraph 8 above). Nevertheless, no procedure had been established as to how those criteria were to be applied, or what weight was to be attached to each criterion. Nor was the SCJ required to explain the basis of its vote for each candidate or why certain judges had been promoted, while others, like the applicant, had not. No such practice existed either, as the minutes of the meeting on 21 January 2015 contain no reference to the “qualifications” or “merits” of the successful candidates that had been taken into account in the decision to promote them. The SCJ’s decision was therefore entirely discretionary. The absence of an individual right to a fair procedure and the discretion afforded to the SCJ are further evidenced by the fact that even though there was a call for applications, district court judges did not need to apply as they were automatically considered by the SCJ as candidates. Therefore, even the decision on which judges would be considered for the promotion, was made by the SCJ (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). For the sake of clarity, the Court notes that even though the announcement for the vacancy seems to have been open to anyone fulfilling the criteria of section 6(1) of the Courts of Justice Law (see paragraph 21 above), from the documents available to the Court, it appears that there had not been external applicants for the vacancies, and the Supreme Council of Judicature approached the matter from the perspective of the promotion of the candidate judges (see paragraph 8 above). It is clear from the above considerations that no rules regulating the promotion of judges had existed and the SCJ’s power on the matter had been purely discretionary.

44. Turning to the issue of judicial remedies, the Court notes that prior to the 2022 developments (see paragraph 20 above), the domestic law had not provided for the right of judicial review of the decisions of the SCJ concerning appointments or promotions. The domestic courts consistently refused to examine applications for judicial review considering that the judicial appointment and promotion process was part of the judicial, not administrative, function and thus could not be reviewed under Article 146 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). Similarly, the domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s recourse considering that they did not have jurisdiction to review the SCJ’s decisions under Article 146 or under any other Article of the Constitution, such as Article 28 – which was raised by the applicant (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above) – and declined to examine the applicant’s arguments concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the SCJ’s decision on the merits (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above) (compare Oktay Alkan v. Türkiye , no. 24492/21, § 41, 20 June 2023, where candidates in training who had applied for the position of judge or prosecutor had had access to the administrative courts in respect of the recruitment procedures; and Gloveli , cited above, § 38; Tsanova-Gecheva , cited above, § 84; and Dzhidzheva‑Trendafilova , cited above, § 48, 9 October 2012, where the courts in each case had examined on the merits the applicants’ challenges to the outcome of judicial competitions concerning the appointment or promotion of judges). The domestic decisions in the applicant’s case are a strong indication against the existence of a right arguably recognised under domestic law, especially considering the domestic courts’ consistent approach to the matter (see Tencheva-Rafailova v. Bulgaria (dec.) no. 13885/04, 5 January 2010).

46. It follows that the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 8 February 2024.

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Milan Blaško Pere Pastor Vilanova Registrar President